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Almost seven years after the tragedy at the Pike River mine, the Supreme Court of New Zealand declared that an 
unlawful bargain had been made to stifle the prosecution of the mine’s CEO. This thesis analyses the issues that 
remain unresolved by the Osborne Supreme Court decision, and uses comparative jurisprudence to highlight the 
deficiencies of New Zealand law’s position in relation to the judicial review of prosecutorial discretions. The 
conclusion to the analysis is the finding that some of the public law values that underlie judicial review, namely: 
the rule of law, the safeguarding of individual rights (including those of victims), accountability, consistency and 
certainty in the administration of the law are not sufficiently protected by the current New Zealand law. The 
contextual constraint of requiring ‘exceptional circumstances’ as a pre-condition to intervention, represents a 
judicial initiative to apply the intensity of review of prosecution discretions to the lower end on the reviewability 
spectrum, the lowest being non-justiciability. That prevailing approach is unstructured, meaning that the exercise 
of prosecution discretions may be anomalous or demonstrably wrong and yet insusceptible to judicial review. On 
the face of it, the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test requires an extremely high evidentiary threshold. A more 
principled approach is to modulate the appropriate intensity of review by using explicit calibrations or variable 
intensities on sliding scales depending on the nature of the issues engaged. This would enable courts on a more 
nuanced basis than the blunt instrument of the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test, to cautiously balance appropriate 
vigilance with appropriate restraint. The case law has in practice ring-fenced justiciability exclusively to the 
‘illegality’ branch of review. The other orthodox grounds of review have been hypothesised by the courts as being 
available but have been very restrictively conditioned by potent dicta, so as to make them only likely to succeed 
in the very rarest of circumstances. That prevailing judicial ethos is critically examined for its compatibility with 
principle. The dissonance between New Zealand decisional law and the well-established approach in other 
jurisdictions, to markedly different effect, is identified. One crucial consequence is that victims are left without 
sufficient rights in the prosecution decision-making phase and have only limited access to justice. This thesis 
provides recommendations intended to offer some principled guidance post-Osborne: a renaissance of approach 
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New Zealand courts have seldom grappled with the issue of judicial reviewability of 
prosecution decisions not to prosecute.1 Prosecution discretionary power was found either to 
be sourced in the prerogative or its use did not constitute an ‘exceptional circumstance’ where 
review would be appropriate.2 These circumstances operated as institutional restraints. To date, 
there has been just one successful application for judicial review of a prosecution decision not 
to prosecute in New Zealand, the 2017 Supreme Court decision of Osborne v WorkSafe New 
Zealand.3 However, that decision left several major issues unconsidered or unresolved.4 Most 
significantly, the court only went as far as it was required on the issue of justiciability and did 
not offer its conclusions on a detailed overall analysis of the state of the current jurisprudence, 
nor did it stipulate a definitive test for judicial intervention.5 The current test for reviewability 
was set out by the High Court in Polynesian Spa, where justiciability is dependent upon proof 
of ‘exceptional circumstances.’6 The reviewability of prosecutorial discretions in New Zealand, 
has therefore been specially quarantined by that approach. It might be thought in itself, to be a 
remarkable statistic that there has only ever been in this country one successful judicial review 
of a decision not to prosecute (and then only after the High Court and Court of Appeal had in 
turn dismissed the proceedings), when the comparative success rate in other jurisdictions is 
                                                
1 Chapter 3 of this thesis identifies the key cases that have led to the current position regarding the justiciability 
of prosecution decisions in New Zealand. 
2 Prerogative power is power possessed by an official by virtue of their office, and was prior to the authoritative 
decision in Burt v Governor-General [1992] 3 NZLR 672 (CA) held to be unreviewable; GDS Taylor Judicial 
Review: A New Zealand Perspective (3rd ed, Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2014) at [2.25]. The current test for 
justiciability is the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test articulated by Randerson J in Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne 
[2005] NZAR 408 (HC) at [61]- [69]. 
3 See Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand [2017] NZSC 175, [2018] 1 NZLR 447, [2017] 15 NZELR 365. 
4 Chapter 5 analyses this Supreme Court case and identifies some of the issues left unconsidered or unresolved by 
that decision. 
5 See Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (SC), above n 3, at [1]; the court only went as far as it was required on 
the issue of justiciability. The court found that “It is contrary to the public interest and unlawful for an arrangement 
to be made that a prosecution will not be brought or maintained on the condition that a sum of money is paid.” 
See Chapter 5 for an analysis of this case. 
6 It was held in Polynesian Spa that a challenge to a prosecution decision not to prosecute will succeed only in 
exceptional cases where the prosecuting authority has acted in bad faith or for a collateral purpose; Polynesian 
Spa Ltd v Osborne, above n 2, at [61]- [69] per Randerson J.  
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examined. In short, to date, only illegality has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court as a 
basis for judicial review of a prosecution discretion not to prosecute. 
 
1.2 Purpose of the Research        
             
The New Zealand courts are at risk of not doing proper justice by an approach to judicial review 
of such prosecutorial discretions that is both austere and obscure. This thesis, therefore seeks 
to answer why such a restrictive approach to judicial review of decisions not to prosecute has 
been adhered to by New Zealand courts, and how the Osborne case has impacted upon that 
position.7 The reason why only decisions not to prosecute have been selected for consideration 
is simply that when such a decision is made, the road for justice by victims effectively ends; 
whereas by a decision to prosecute, the road continues throughout the trial and beyond.8 Case 
law on decisions to prosecute has however been incidentally analysed to elucidate a number of 
specific features relevant to justiciability. 
 
While there are both profound and compelling reasons for the existence of wide prosecutorial 
discretions,9 the purpose of this thesis is not to consider why broad prosecutorial discretion is 
intrinsically good, but to consider the dangers of inadequate checks and balances on the 
exercise of such broad prosecutorial power. The objectives of this thesis include the 
identification of areas in the law which presently fail to uphold some of the public law values 
that underlie judicial review: the rule of law, the safeguarding of individual rights (including 
                                                
7 Chapters 6-9 consider some of the issues left unconsidered and unresolved by Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand 
(SC), above n 3. 
8 See Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand [2017] NZCA 11, [2017] 2 NZLR 513 at [35] – [37]. See also T Endicott 
Administrative Law (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, 2015) at 267; Endicott highlighted that a trial in itself is a 
safeguard against unlawful decisions to prosecute: “For a defendant against whom an unreasonable investigation 
is conducted or an unreasonable prosecution is pursued, the criminal justice process itself provides a hearing.” 
See also R (on the application of F) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2013] EWHC 945 (Admin) at [3]; Lord 
Judge CJ similarly emphasised that an individual facing trial has various mechanisms of accountability available 
to ensure that adequate prosecutions take place; See also R (B) v DPP [2009] EWHC 106 (Admin), [2009] 1 WLR 
2072 at [52]; R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Manning [2001] QB 330 (DC) at [23] and Marshall v 
Director of Public Prosecutions [2007] UKPC 4, [2007] 4 LRC 557 at [18]. In Belhaj and another v Director of 
Public Prosecutions [2018] UKSC 33, 4 July 2018 at [32] Lord Mance stated that: “In the case of decisions to 
prosecute, a more appropriate forum for any challenge is usually the criminal process itself, in which the court 
has power to halt proceedings if they constitute an abuse.” 
9 See R v Beare [1988] 2 SCR 387 at 410; Stephanos Bibas “The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion” (2010) 19 
Temple Political and Civil Rights Law Review 369.  
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those of victims of crime), accountability, consistency and certainty in the administration of 
justice.10  
 
1.3 Methodology and Issues Considered 
 
In order to examine the potential inadequacies of New Zealand’s current decisional law on 
judicial review of prosecutorial discretion, this thesis provides a consideration of the legal 
powers, concepts and history of New Zealand’s approach to the judicial review of prosecutorial 
discretion.11 Against this backdrop, a consideration of the same species of review is considered 
in selected jurisdictions in order to provide comparative points of reference.12 This thesis then 
analyses the Osborne Supreme Court decision and isolates some of the issues that were left 
unresolved by that decision.13 Those issues provide the framework to illustrate the systemic 
failures and inadequacies of the current law of judicial review of prosecutorial discretion.  
 
One of the unresolved issues flowing from the Osborne case relates to the current contextual 
decisional law test of requiring ‘exceptional circumstances’ for intervention.14 Various 
procedural and jurisprudential issues relating to this test and the principles that underlie it 
prevent justice from being properly served and the rule of law from being fully supported. The 
issue is whether what the Court of Appeal stated in Wright v Bhosale, namely that “…the courts 
are traditionally reluctant, for constitutional and policy reasons, to interfere in prosecutorial 
decision-making” remains justified or is a principled approach.15 Those policies may be sound 
in themselves, but whether they require such judicial abstinence is another matter altogether. 
The courts are not ‘interfering’ in prosecutorial decision-making, if they conclude such a 
decision was made under an error of law, was unreasonable or procedurally unfair. There the 
courts are vindicating a greater rule that denies the unaccountability of unlawful executive 
action. 
 
Although the contextual difficulties and challenges of judicial review are well documented in 
jurisprudence, the impact of this context on the rights and interests of victims is much less 
                                                
10 See Matthew Smith New Zealand Judicial Review Handbook (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters New Zealand Ltd, 
Wellington, 2016) at [2.0]. 
11 See Chapters 2 and 3. 
12 See Chapter 4. 
13 See Chapter 5. 
14 See Chapter 6. 
15 Wright v Bhosale [2016] NZCA 593, [2017] NZAR 203 at [26]. 
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acknowledged. This is evidenced by the Osborne Supreme Court’s decision not to consider 
victim-related issues which were raised in the Court of Appeal.16 More problematically, the 
current process of prosecutorial decision-making fails to adequately support the most basic of 
victims’ needs and interests.17  
 
As Justice Glazebrook explained, any reform of the criminal justice system must be to reduce 
the possibility of miscarriages of justice.18 Her Honour also made the point that miscarriages 
do not arise only through what happens in court.19 Victims are particularly vulnerable at the 
prosecution decision-making phase, of being exposed to unjust decision-making. While there 
is undeniable importance in convicting and punishing the guilty, this goal is arguably 
subordinate to ensuring that standards of fairness are observed in prosecutions. The right to fair 
trial is a non-derogable constitutional right. It is acute that to date in New Zealand, victims do 
not have a secured right to have prosecutorial decisions whether to prosecute, realistically 
subject to judicial oversight. Nor has there been any acknowledgment of victims’ insufficient 
rights in the prosecution decision-making phase. Currently, the balance of the scales regarding 
process is unfairly tipped in favour of the prosecutor, wrongly relegating victims to a position 
of virtual irrelevancy.  
 
This thesis also considers the appropriate boundaries of discretionary power for situations that 
were not resolved by the Supreme Court in Osborne.20 The inherent limitations of private 
prosecution, as an alternative route to justice, is also considered.21 
 
Recommendations regarding the reform of both the prosecution decision-making process and 
the reconceptualisation of judicial review in this particular context is addressed.22 The objective 
is to ensure that all New Zealanders fundamentally experience fair and proper administration 
of justice in this area of the law.  
 
                                                
16 The Court of Appeal in Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand, above n 8, at [84] – [89]; considered whether the 
applicants had a legitimate expectation that they would be consulted prior to the prosecutor making its decision. 
17 See Chapter 7. 
18 Susan Glazebrook, Justice of the Supreme Court of New Zealand “Keynote address to the Criminal Law 
Conference” (Criminal Law Conference 2012: Reforming the Criminal Justice System of Hong Kong, Hong 
Kong, 17 November 2012) at 2. 
19 Ibid. 
20 See Chapter 8. 
21 See Chapter 9. 
22 See Chapter 10. 
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1.4 Structure  
 
This thesis comprises ten Chapters.  
 
Chapter 2 considers the Acts, Guidelines and prosecution powers that are engaged when 
prosecution decisions are made. Chapter 3 provides insight into the key cases that have defined 
the judicial development of judicial review of prosecution decisions in New Zealand. 
The material dissonance between the current New Zealand position and that of other common 
law jurisdictions is noted in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 is an analysis of the Osborne Supreme Court 
decision, and identifies problematic areas of the law which remain unresolved by that decision 
to be considered in Chapters 6-9. Chapter 6 critically considers the organising principles by 
which the ‘exceptional circumstances’ position has been reached, and how judicial reluctance 
to review prosecutions decisions not to prosecute violates the rule of law. Chapter 7 considers 
the locus standi of victims in the prosecution process and the issues that impact victims when 
a decision not to prosecute is entered. Chapter 8 titled ‘Relief, Reconsideration, Resumption 
and Reneging,’ considers these concepts in the context of prosecution decisions. The issues 
related to the alternative remedy of private prosecution are examined in Chapter 9. The last 
Chapter makes a final conclusion and provides recommendations for the issues considered 
throughout the thesis. 
 
1.5 Statement of Positionality 
 
In 2016, I was asked by Nigel Hampton QC to be junior counsel for the Appellants in Osborne 
v WorkSafe New Zealand in the Court of Appeal.23 My involvement in the case exposed me to 
the salient issue of justiciability of prosecutorial discretions, and the apparent inadequacies of 
the law at the time. 
                                                




2 Prosecution Decision-Making, Power, Guidelines and Comity  
 
This Chapter discusses the core powers, legislative instruments and principles that are 
engaged when a prosecution decision to prosecute is made or not, and considers a number of 
legal concepts relevant to the objectives of this thesis. 
 
2.1 The Role of Crown Prosecutors  
 
Prosecutors have a specialist role and have a duty to act in the wider public interest.1 Deane J 
in Whitehorn v R made the following seminal statement on the role of prosecutors: 2  
 
Prosecuting counsel in a criminal trial represents the State. The accused, the court and the 
community are entitled to expect that, in performing his function of representing the cases 
against an accused, he will act with the fairness and detachment and always with the objectives 
of establishing the whole truth in accordance with the procedures and standards which the law 
requires to be observed and of helping to ensure the accused’s trial is a fair one. 
 
The prosecutor therefore “strives to resist pressures from victims and from the police, to show 
respect for due process, to be fair and act as a ‘minister of justice.’”3 A prosecutor’s experience 
and specialist knowledge is perhaps most crucial in determining the prosecution decision.4 This 
                                                
1 This is commonly misunderstood by many victims of crime who view prosecutors as their own legal 
representative and acting legal advisor. As a result, many victims tend to place high expectations on how the 
prosecutor should perform his or her functions. These expectations are usually unrealistic or unrelated to the 
prosecutor’s role, often causing such victims to feel marginalised in the process. 
2 Whitehorn v R (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 663-664. The Victims of Crime-Guidance for Prosecutors 2014 at [9] 
states: “The prosecutor acts in the public interest when conducting a criminal prosecution and does not act for 
victims or the families of victims in the same way as other lawyers act for their clients. Prosecutors must 
nonetheless be mindful of the consequences for the victim, and take appropriate cognisance of views expressed 
by the victim or the victim’s family, in relation to any significant decision relating to the proceedings.” At [10]: 
“Prosecutors should ensure that the victim has a clear understanding of the proper role of the prosecutor.” See 
also R v Boucher (1954) 110 CCC 263, [1955] SCR 16 (SCC) at 270 per Rand J: “It cannot be over- emphasised 
that the purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to obtain a conviction; it is to lay before a jury what the Crown 
considers to be credible evidence related to what is alleged to be a crime. Counsel have a duty to see all available 
legal proof of the facts is presented: it should be done firmly and pressed to its legitimate strength, but it must also 
be done fairly. The role of the prosecutor excludes any notion of winning or losing; his function is a matter of 
public duty than which civil life there can be none charged with greater personal responsibility. It is to be 
efficiently performed with an ingrained sense of dignity, the seriousness and the justness of judicial proceedings.”  
3 David Jeremy QC “The Prosecutor’s Rock and Hard Place” (2008) 12 Crim L Rev 925 at 926.  
4 R (on the application of B) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] EWHC 106 (Admin), [2009] 1 WLR 2072 
at [44], Lord Justice Toulson described this decision-making duty in the following terms: “The head of an 
independent, professional prosecuting service…entrusted by Parliament with the responsibility of deciding 
whether or not a person should be prosecuted at public expense.”  
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‘gatekeeping’5 task is essentially quasi-judicial in nature and discretion should be exercised 
independently of any improper external influence.6 Hong Kong’s former Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP) Ian Grenville Cross, commented that:7 
 
The decision whether or not to prosecute is the most important step in the prosecution process. 
In every case great care must be taken in the interests of the victim, the suspected offender, and 
the community at large to ensure that the right decision is made. A wrong decision to prosecute, 
or, conversely, a wrong decision not to prosecute both tend to undermine the confidence of the 
community in the criminal justice system. 
 
2.2  The Test for Prosecution in New Zealand 
 
In New Zealand, the test for prosecution is outlined in the Solicitor-General’s Prosecution 
Guidelines 2013 (Guidelines). It engages a two-limbed test at paragraph 5 of the Guidelines;8 
an Evidential Test and a Public Interest Test.9 The Guidelines also provide a non-exhaustive 
and illustrative list of public interest considerations to be taken into account when making a 
decision to prosecute or not.10   
 
2.3 The Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines 2013  
 
                                                
5 House of Commons Justice Committee The Crown Prosecution Service: Gatekeeper of the Criminal Justice 
System (Ninth Report, HC 186, 2009) at 3. 
6 The Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines 2013, paragraph 4.1 states: “The universally central tenet of a 
prosecution system under the rule of law in a democratic society is the independence of the prosecutor from 
persons or agencies that are not properly part of the prosecution decision-making process.” Further at paragraph 
4.2: “In practice in New Zealand, the independence of the prosecutor refers to freedom from undue or improper 
pressure from any source, political or otherwise. All government agencies should ensure the necessary processes 
are in place to protect the independence of the initial prosecution decision.”  
7 Ian Grenville Cross [Director of Public Prosecutions of Hong Kong 1997-2009] “To prosecute or not to 
prosecute? Duty and accountability” (Seminar on Constitutional Law Developments 1998, Hong Kong Bar 
Association and the Centre for Comparative and Public Law of the University of Hong Kong, 9 May 1998). 
8 The Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines 2013, paragraph 5.1 states: “Prosecutions ought to be initiated 
or continued only where the prosecutor is satisfied that the Test for Prosecution is met. The Test for Prosecution 
is met if: 5.1.1: The evidence which can be adduced in Court is sufficient to provide a reasonable prospect of 
conviction- the Evidential Test; and 5.1.2: Prosecution is required in the public interest- the Public Interest Test. 
5.2: Each aspect of the test must be separately considered and satisfied before a decision to prosecute can be taken. 
The Evidential Test must be satisfied before the Public Interest Test is considered. The prosecutor must analyse 
and evaluate all of the evidence and information in a thorough and critical manner.” 
9 The prosecutor will evaluate matters such as the admissibility of evidence that may implicate the accused, the 
credibility and competence of witnesses and the influence they may have in court, factors relating to the prospect 
of conviction and any defences the accused may have. 
10 The Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines 2013 at paragraph 5.8 provides a list of public interest 
considerations for prosecution and at paragraph 5.9 provides a list of public interest considerations against 
prosecution. As a general rule, the more serious the offence is, the more likely that the public interest will require 
that a prosecution be pursued. 
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Under New Zealand’s constitutional structure, the Attorney General’s role includes a 
responsibility through Parliament to the citizens of New Zealand for prosecutions carried out 
by or on behalf of the Crown. “However, this process is in practice, superintended by the 
Solicitor-General, who pursuant to s9A of the Constitution Act 1986, shares all the relevant 
powers vested in the office of the Attorney General.”11 The Solicitor-General’s responsibility 
for public prosecutions has been codified in s185 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011, giving 
these arrangements renewed force.12 
 
The Guidelines apply to all Crown Solicitors, government agencies or instructed counsel13 and 
assist prosecuting agencies in determining whether criminal proceedings should be 
commenced,14 what charges should be filed15 and if commenced, whether criminal proceedings 
should be continued or discontinued.16 In executing all prosecution duties, the touchstone must 
be fairness to all of the parties that are engaged in the procedure and administration of the 
criminal legal processes involved.17  
 
The primary check on prosecutorial discretion is whether decisions are made in compliance 
with the Guidelines.18 Unlike other common law jurisdictions, New Zealand has no centralised 
decision-making agency that deals solely with prosecutions.19 The absence of a stand-alone 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and therefore a regulated decision-making process, 
highlights the importance of comprehensive Guidelines and adherence to core prosecution 
values.20  
                                                
11 The Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines 2013, at 1 “Attorney-General’s Introduction.” 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid at paragraph 2.1 Most Crown prosecutions, are conducted by Crown Solicitors, who are private 
practitioners appointed to prosecute by the Governor-General by virtue of a warrant. Other prosecutions are 
conducted by the New Zealand Police and various enforcement agencies specialising in the enforcement of a 
particular regulatory area. 
14 Ibid, at paragraph 1.2.1. 
15 Ibid, at paragraph 1.2.2. 
16 Ibid, at paragraph 1.2.3. 
17 Ibid, at paragraph 19.1. 
18 As a public document, the Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines 2013, allow transparency to be achieved 
and encourages prosecutors to be consistent in their duties.  
19 The United Kingdom has had a centralised decision-making agency called the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) 
since 1986, headed by the Director of Public Prosecutions. See generally <www.cps.gov.uk>. 
20 The New Zealand Law Commission reached a preliminary view that a stand-alone Crown Prosecution Service 
was not a viable option due to reasons of efficiency and economy. Instead, the Commission proposed a number 
of improvements to the existing system However, the Commission identified that a factor strongly in favour of a 
Crown Prosecution Service was the former lack of clear separation between investigation and prosecution 
functions within the police and prosecuting agencies generally; see New Zealand Law Commission Criminal 
Prosecution (NZLC R66, Wellington, 2000) at 13. See also The Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines 2013 
at paragraph 1.1 for the core prosecution values. 
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2.3.1 The Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines 2013: Mandatory or Not? 
 
The Guidelines were not designed to be “an instruction manual for prosecutors” and “do not 
purport to lay down any rule of law.”21 Although compliance with the Guidelines is expected 
by the Solicitor-General, there are no specified consequences for non-compliance. This raises 
questions about the Guideline’s legal status.  
 
The case R v Barlow (No 2) considered the legal status of the 1992 version of the Guidelines.22 
The Court of Appeal upheld the reasoning of the High Court23 finding that “the Guidelines do 
not and could not purport to control the exercise of the court’s discretionary powers. Their only 
relevance for present purposes is to indicate the general practice which is adopted by the 
Solicitor-General.” 24 
 
In contrast, the 2013 Guidelines were issued pursuant to s185 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
2011. Sections 185 and 187 codified, for the first time, the Solicitor-General’s oversight 
responsibility for Crown and public prosecutions. It was argued in the Court of Appeal in 
Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand that this provided a clear statutory basis for the 2013 
Guidelines, that was absent in the creation of the 1992 Guidelines.25 However, the Court of 
Appeal confirmed that the Guidelines were not to be construed as a Code since they are 
aspirational in character and have a high discretionary content.26   
 
The lack of specified consequences for non-compliance with the Guidelines that largely 
removes the prospect of prosecutorial accountability, indicates the quasi-legal nature of the 
Guidelines. To this extent, the Guidelines may be identified as soft law: “Rules of conduct 
which, in principle, have no binding force but which nevertheless may have practical effects.”27 
The Guidelines are not rules of law that prosecutors are always bound to apply, but rules of 
                                                
21 The Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines 2013, paragraph 2.3. 
22 R v Barlow [1996] 2 NZLR 116 (HC) 121. 
23 Ibid, at 121; Justices Gallen and Neazor held that the 1992 Guidelines were only an indication of the approach 
a prosecutor will follow, not binding and not enforceable by mandamus. 
24 R v Barlow (No 2) [1998] 2 NZLR 477 (CA) at 479. 
25 In the Court of Appeal; Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand [2017] NZCA 11, [2017] 2 NZLR 513. 
26 Ibid, at [74] per Kós P. 
27 Francis Synder Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community: Institutions, Processes, Tools 
and Techniques (EUI Working Papers (Law), No 93/5, 1993). 
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practice. They form part of a broader normative framework for courts to consider when judging 
cases submitted to their jurisdiction. Although the Guidelines are not legally binding by 
definition, they still embody some hard law characteristics where for example, obligations are 
imposed.28  
 
2.4 Prerogative Powers 
 
A prosecutor’s decision to prosecute or not was traditionally believed to be an exercise of 
prerogative power.29 Whilst even that orthodox approach rejected the idea of limitless power, 
and of limits which were immune from judicial administration, prosecution decisions were 
once held to be immune from judicial review simply because the power to make them was 
sourced in the prerogative.30 The lack of an existing power of review was itself a determining 
feature of prerogative power.31 The distinction between public powers was based on their 
source, despite prerogative power being in most cases, conceptually and analytically identical 
to discretionary statutory power.32 
 
The initial development came with the English Court of Appeal decision in Laker Airways Ltd 
v Department of Trade.33 Lord Denning MR rejected the notion that public powers were to be 
distinguished by their source and held that prerogative power “is a discretionary power to be 
exercised for the public good, [and] it follows that its exercise can be examined by the Courts 
just as any other power which is vested in the executive.”34 This empowered courts to interfere 
where prerogative power was exercised “improperly” or “mistakenly.” The decision was 
endorsed in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (GCHQ).35 
                                                
28 Obligations may be identified where the auxiliary verb “must” is used in the Guidelines. For example, at 
paragraph 5.2: the test for prosecution “must be separately considered and satisfied before a decision to prosecute 
can be taken.” 
29 GDS Taylor Judicial Review: A New Zealand Perspective (3rd ed, Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2014) at [2.38]. 
30 Saywell v Attorney-General [1982] 2 NZLR 97 (HC). 
31 Philip A Joseph “False Dichotomies in Administrative Law: From There to Here” (2016) New Zealand Law 
Review 127 at 134 – 136. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Laker Airways Ltd v Department of Trade [1977] QB 643 (CA). This position was foreshadowed in R v Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Lain [1967] 2 QB 864 (DC) (Judicial review of the Compensation Board 
although created by prerogative powers.) See also Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New 
Zealand (4th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2014) at [18.6] (Judicial review of the prerogative). 
34 Laker Airways Ltd v Department of Trade, above n 33, at 705 per Lord Denning MR.  
35 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1983] UKHL 9, [1985] AC 374 [GCHQ]. See 
also Burt v Governor-General [1992] 3 NZLR 672 (CA). Burt was followed by R v Secretary of State for the 
Housing Department, ex parte Bentley [1994] QB 349 (CA) (judicial review of the prerogative of mercy). See 
also Joseph, n 33, at [18.6] (Judicial review of the prerogative). 
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Prerogative power was as amenable to judicial review as discretionary statutory power, and 
both powers are subject to considerations of justiciability on the same grounds.36 Prosecution 
powers have now been converted to a total statutory footing in New Zealand, reinforcing the 
justiciability of prosecution decisions, albeit though only in ‘exceptional circumstances.’37  
 
 
2.5 Comity between Judiciary and Executive Re Prosecutorial Decisions 
 
The New Zealand government,38 acting through Parliament, may exert Parliament’s legislative 
supremacy over the courts by changing the law in response to any judicial decision.39 
Conversely, it is the function of the judicial arm to control the executive under the courts 
inherent jurisdiction to scrutinize executive action.40 This is the self-referential responsibility 
of the judiciary. The principle of judicial independence was created to safeguard against abuses 
of power and empowers courts to judicially review prosecutors.41 Applications for judicial 
review42 of public decision-making may be made under the Judicial Review Procedure Act 
201643 or by Part 30 of the High Court Rules 2016. Judicial review of the executive is an 
application of “checks and balances.”44 Courts have the power and duty to constrain a 
prosecutor from exceeding his or her powers and to compel the lawful performance of their 
public duties.  
 
                                                
36 R v Secretary of State for the Foreign Office, ex parte Everett [1989] 1 QB 81; followed GCHQ, above n 35, 
Taylor LJ held that the grant or refusal of a passport is a matter of administrative decision affecting the right of 
individuals and their freedom of travel. It raises issues which are just as justiciable as the issues arising in 
immigration cases.  
37 Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne [2005] NZAR 408 (HC) at [69] per Randerson J.  
38 New Zealand’s government is known as “the Westminster model” after the British system at Westminster 
London and is based on the concept of the separation of powers. See Joseph, above n 33, at [8.0] (Separation of 
Powers). 
39 It was suggested in Dame Sian Elias “Administrative Law for “Living People” [2009] 68 CLJ 47 at 54 that the 
notion of parliamentary sovereignty is arguably a common law doctrine. However, there is suggestion that the 
deference shown by the courts to parliament is a political choice; See Jeffery Goldsworthy The Sovereignty of 
Parliament, History and Philosophy (Clarendon, 1999). 
40 See Joseph, above n 33, at [22.1] (Judicial Review) and [8.4.2] (Executive and judiciary). 
41 See the Honourable Justice J M Priestly, “Chipping Away at the Judicial Arm?” (Harkness Henry Lecture, 
University of Waikato Law School, October 2009); “The independence of the judicial arm of government is 
secured not only by statute but also by convention and protective measures.”  
42 The application for judicial review must raise an important issue, discrete from that of whether or not to 
prosecute in fact; see Weist v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 81 ALR 129 (FCA). 
43 The Judicature Review Procedure Act 2016 came into force on 1 March 2017 and re-enacts Part 1 of the 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972. Section 3(2) of the 2016 Act notes that the new Act is “not intended to alter the 
interpretation or effect” of the 1972 Act. 
44 Joseph, above n 33, at [8.4.2]. 
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Judicial review has been regarded as an “institution of constitutional importance embracing the 
rule of law, the bureaucracy and government, and the independence of the judiciary.”45 It also 
manifests a relationship between the judicial and executive branches that is distinctly different 
from that of the courts and Parliament.46 A criminal justice system that is built on the rule of 
law, requires independent and impartial prosecutors who can perform unwaveringly, the task 
of investigating and deciding whether or not to prosecute alleged crimes. Professor Joseph 
states, “all legal systems must provide machinery for resolving claims and conflict between 
individuals and the State, according to law.”47  
 
Prosecutors and judges alike, have the indispensable function of protecting the rule of law 
ensuring the rights of individuals. Independence and impartiality are required to properly 
perform this role.48 It is understood that without the fulfilment of these key roles of maintaining 
justice in society, there is an undeniable risk that “a culture of impunity will take root, thereby 
widening the gap between the population in general and the authorities.”49 Therefore, if the 
public are unable to secure justice for themselves via the criminal justice system, they may be 
compelled to take the law into their own hands. This in turn would result in an uprising of 
crime, and further deterioration in the administration of justice. In this regard, comity between 
the judiciary and the executive is important in safeguarding confidence in the criminal justice 
system. The rights of the public are assured to the extent that the judiciary and the executive 
are protected from interference and unnecessary pressure.  
 
Professor Philip Joseph contends that the inter-relationship of the judicial arm and the 
government arm can be considered to be a “collaborative enterprise.”50 Professor Joseph cites 
favourably the dictum of Lord Bridge of Harwich in X Ltd v Morgan-Grampian (Publishers) 
Ltd:51  
                                                
45 Joseph, above n 33, at [22.1]. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Philip A Joseph “Parliament, the Courts, and the Collaborative Enterprise” (2004) 15 KCLJ 321.  
48 Joseph, above n 33, at [8.1]. 
49 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Cooperation with the International Bar Association 
Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers 
(United Nations, Professional Training Series No.9, 2003) at 116. 
50 Joseph, above n 47, at 323. The Honourable Justice J M Priestly, above n 41, at 14, footnote 38, noted that this 
“symbiotic analysis is largely similar to the concept advanced by Sir Stephen Sedley of bipolar sovereignty” See 
also C J S Knight “Bi-polar Sovereignty Restated” [2009] CLJ 361; Joseph, above n 33, at [21.2.2] (Collaborative 
enterprise). 
51 X Ltd v Morgan-Grampian (Publishers Ltd) [1991] 1 AC 1 at 48. See Arorangi Timberland Ltd. v Minister of 
the Cook Islands National Superannuation Fund [2017] 1 WLR 99 (PC) at [31] per Lords Neuberger and Mance 
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The maintenance of the rule of law is in every way as important in a free society as a democratic 
franchise. In our society the rule of law rests upon twin foundations, the sovereignty of the 
Queen and Parliament in making the law and the sovereignty of the Queen’s courts in 
interpreting and applying the law. 
 
The appropriate limits to judicial review has been a perennial topic of debate, as courts seek to 
define their role as opposed to that of Parliament and the executive.52 While Cooke P has stated: 
“Some common law rights presumably lie so deep that even Parliament could not override 
them,”53 Jeremy Waldron has suggested that: “Judicial review is politically illegitimate, so far 
as democratic values are concerned: by privileging majority voting among a small number of 
unelected judges and unaccountable judges, it disenfranchises ordinary citizens and brushes 
aside cherished principles of representation and political equality.”54 Perhaps the answer 
between these two positions is seen in the courts’ cautious development of the boundaries of 
judicial review, whilst recognising that Parliament ultimately reserves the right to change the 
law. In Canada, this process has been described as a “constitutional dialogue between the courts 
and the legislature.”55  
 
The next Chapter considers chronologically, the key cases that have led to New Zealand’s 
current legal position.
                                                
in a joint judgment; “The Board would accept that, save perhaps in extreme circumstances, a statute should be 
presumed to be constitutional…”; (the author was junior counsel in the case). 
52 Joseph, above n 33, at [22.5] (Constitutional and institutional limits to judicial review). 
53 Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board [1984] 1 NZLR 394 at 398. 
54 Jeremy Waldron “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review” (2006) 115 Yale LJ 1346 at 1353. 
55 Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (or perhaps the Charter 
of Rights isn’t such a bad thing after all)” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall LJ 75. See also Joseph, above n 33, at [21.2.5] 
(Political-judicial dialogue); The Hon Justice Matthew Palmer “Constitutional Dialogue and the Rule of Law” 





3 The Current Law Re the Justiciability of Prosecutorial Decisions in New Zealand 
 
New Zealand courts have to date acknowledged only very limited power to judicially review 
prosecutorial discretions. The Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand Supreme Court decision did 
not stipulate a precise test for the availability of judicial review in this context.1 The current 
legal test is that judicial intervention is only appropriate in ‘exceptional circumstances.’ That 
test was articulated in Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne2 which the Supreme Court did not 
consider, but took no issue with.3 This Chapter examines the transitions that have led from the 
initial austere position of the complete self-denial of jurisdiction to challenge any prosecutorial 
decision, to the present slightly ameliorated position that decisions not to prosecute are now 
amenable to judicial review, but under only almost unprovable threshold conditions.  
 
3.1 Key Cases in New Zealand’s Legal History on the Justiciability of Prosecutorial 
Discretion 
 
In the 1978 case Kumar v Immigration Department, Richardson J accepted that it would be 
appropriate for a court to intervene where the power to prosecute under immigration legislation 
was “exercised for collateral purposes, unrelated to the objectives of the statute or the 
prerogative in question.”4 A decision to prosecute based on a discriminatory reason was 
specifically stated to imperil the rule of law.5  
 
In Saywell v Attorney General, the decision of a Crown Solicitor to present an indictment and 
the content of any indictment, were held to be matters immune from review by the High Court.6 
                                                
1 See Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand [2017] NZSC 175, [2018] 1 NZLR 447, [2017] 15 NZELR 365. 
2 Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne [2005] NZAR 408 (HC) at [61]- [69] per Randerson J. 
3 See Rewa v Attorney-General of New Zealand [2018] NZHC 1005 at [46]; where Venning J held that the 
Osborne Supreme Court did not take issue with the Court of Appeal’s propositions in Osborne v WorkSafe New 
Zealand [2017] NZCA 11, [2017] 2 NZLR 513 regarding restraint in the review of prosecutorial discretion, 
adopted from Polynesian Spa, above n 2, at [62]. 
4 Kumar v Immigration Department [1978] 2 NZLR 553, 558 (CA). 
5 Followed in Solicitor-General v Siemer HC Wellington CIV 2010-404-8559, 9 May 2011 at [47] and [59] per 
Mallon J.  
6 Saywell v Attorney-General [1982] 2 NZLR 97 (HC) at 105. See also Newby v Moodie (1987) 78 ALR 603 
(FCA). In Barton v R (1980) 147 CLR 75, (1980) 32 ALR 449 it was held that the Solicitor-General acting as the 
alter ego of the Attorney-General making an original, or ex officio, decision to prosecute was also unreviewable. 
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The court’s reasoning rehearsed the then orthodox view, that the exercise of prerogative power, 
being an extraordinary discretionary power that exceeds any other power possessed by an 
official by virtue of an office, was immune from judicial review. This was a judgment made 
during the apotheosis of unreviewable prerogative power. The Council of Civil Service Unions 
v Minister for the Civil Service (GCHQ) decision in the House of Lords, which held prerogative 
power to be as amenable to judicial review as discretionary statutory power, was still a few 
years away.7 In Amery v Solicitor-General, the Court of Appeal was faced with the issue of 
whether a decision of the Solicitor-General to stay private prosecution proceedings (by a nolle 
prosequi) was reviewable.8 The court observed: “Certainly this could be seen as the exercise 
of a statutory power and there is a good deal that can be said in favour of the conclusion that it 
is reviewable.”9 However, apart from that tentative observation the Court of Appeal held that 
further consideration of the question was in the circumstances unnecessary, leaving the matter 
open. GCHQ, although not cited in argument, was to the same effect.  
 
In the late eighties, the High Court in the two Hallett cases examined a non-prosecution 
decision.10 The first, involved the decision of a Department of Labour Inspector not to 
prosecute Mainzeal Corporation Ltd for alleged breaches of the Construction Act 1959 and 
Regulations. Again, the High Court found it was constitutionally inappropriate for the judiciary 
to review the relevant prosecution decision not to prosecute because it was a protected exercise 
of prerogative power. Nevertheless, Gallen J ventured, in an obiter statement, that the exercise 
of a statutory power would generally be open to review if it was “analogous to or identical with 
the power exercised by virtue of a prerogative.”11 The Court now took refuge in reasoning that 
where the decision and effect of the exercise of a prerogative power fell within the 
circumference of a statutory power then judicial review was potentially available. This 
reasoning depended on the apparent concentricity of the two sources of power. If a non-
prerogative equivalent could be found, then the challenge to a prerogative power was avoided 
by the convenient displacement of the prerogative. The relevant Act imposed an obligation on 
the Inspector to make a prosecution decision. The court decided the power was statutory, not 
                                                
7 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1983] UKHL 9, [1985] AC 374 [GCHQ]. For 
an overview of GCHQ, see Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (4th ed, 
Brookers, Wellington, 2014) at [18.6] (Judicial Review of the prerogative). 
8 Amery v Solicitor-General [1987] 2 NZLR 292 (CA).  
9 Ibid, at 293 per Cooke P. 
10 Hallett v Attorney-General [1989] 2 NZLR 87 (HC) (Gallen J); Hallett v Attorney-General (No 2) [1989] 2 
NZLR 96 (HC) (Henry J). 
11 Hallett v Attorney-General, above n 10, at 87 per Gallen J. 
	 16 
prerogative and was therefore reviewable. Gallen J held any ground of review could only 
determine not whether a prosecution should have been initiated, but the conceptually different 
and narrower issue of whether the question had been correctly addressed.  
 
Hallett v Attorney General (No 2) was an application for judicial review of the Inspector’s 
decision not to prosecute Mainzeal Corporation Ltd. Henry J held that as a matter of principle 
the court should not question whether or not a prosecution should have been initiated.12 Since 
the Inspector had considered and decided against the question of prosecution, a discretion had 
been exercised. It was therefore not open for the court to review the decision or examine the 
various factors considered in the decision-making. This approach effectively eliminated any 
practical scope for an aggrieved person to successfully challenge a decision made for 
unreasonable or improper reasons. This decision represents the nadir of justiciability of 
prosecutorial decisions. 
 
Polynesian Spa is the most oft-cited decision for the justiciability test on judicial review of 
prosecution decisions in New Zealand.13 Although judicial review was ultimately refused in a 
health and safety context, it was held that “all of the impugned steps taken by the Inspector 
involve the exercise of a statutory power or statutory power of decision and there is jurisdiction 
to review.”14 However, Randerson J ruled that, for policy and constitutionality reasons, a 
challenge to a prosecution decision not to prosecute will succeed only in exceptional cases 
where the prosecuting authority has acted in bad faith or for a collateral purpose.15 This 
                                                
12 Hallett v Attorney-General (No 2), above n 10, at 96.  
13 Polynesian Spa Ltd, above n 2. Note, the Supreme Court in Osborne v WorkSafe NZ, above n 1, did not refer to 
Polynesian Spa in its judgment, but took no issue with the Court of Appeal’s propositions in Osborne v WorkSafe 
New Zealand, above n 3, regarding the court’s ability to interfere with prosecution decisions that it had adopted 
from Polynesian Spa. In Snodgrass v Kapiti Coast District Council [2014] NZHC 3153, [2014] NZAR 834 Mallon 
J noted Polynesian Spa, above n 2, at [91], as providing authority for the proposition that the court's jurisdiction 
to prevent an abuse of process, and appeal rights, provide a readily available alternative remedy, such that other 
than in rare cases, judicial review of decisions to prosecute will be unavailable. But this line of reasoning cannot 
apply to a challenge to a failure to prosecute. In Potaka-Kiu v Police [2016] NZHC 3063, HC Napier, 14 December 
2016, Williams J at [28]; “Prosecutorial discretion should not be interfered with by the courts except in very rare 
circumstances. There may be scope for intervention if bad faith is established …” citing Polynesian Spa Ltd, 
above n 2, at [61] – [62] and noting Tui Saili v R [2012] NZCA 149 at [23] that "deciding which charges to lay is 
a decision for prosecutors and not for the Court.” 
14 Polynesian Spa Ltd, above n 2, at [60] per Randerson J. 
15 Ibid, at [68] per Randerson J. The court in Mellon v Attorney-General [2005] NZAR 432 at [25] found that a 
decision to prosecute could be subject to review and stayed in extreme cases where the circumstances precluded 
a fair trial or was made for reasons inconsistent with the purposes of criminal process such as grounds of bad faith, 
improper purpose, or a change of course that prejudiced the accused. 
	 17 
decision gave the apparent quietus to Hallett (No2).16 But to permit a challenge on such limited 
grounds meant that unreasonableness (or its varietals) was denied as a legitimate basis to 
challenge a statutory decision refusing to prosecute a putative defendant. Unfairness was also 
excluded as grounds for review. 
 
In Young v Police, Randerson J referred to “the extreme reluctance of the Courts to interfere 
with the [prosecutorial] discretion” and followed his judgment in Polynesian Spa.17 The Judge 
accepted that judicial review was available if there had been “a failure to exercise a discretion 
whether to prosecute.”18 
 
In Dewar v Waikato District Council, Heath J was considering an appeal from a conviction 
under the Dog Control Act 1996. The appellant's argument was that the prosecution ought to 
have been stayed before the defended hearing had occurred.  Heath J said:19   
 
[36] The starting point for analysis is the purpose of the abuse of process ground for staying a 
prosecution.  In my view, it is designed as a means to protect the integrity of the criminal justice 
system and the Court's processes against prosecutorial abuse.  The jurisdiction must, however, 
be exercised in a manner that is consistent with the general deference that the Court gives to 
prosecutorial discretion: see, for example, Polynesian Spa Ltd. v Osborne [2005] NZAR 408 at 




[37] By way of example, it is not uncommon for a person to be charged with indecent assault 
but to face a charge of sexual violation following committal at a preliminary hearing on the 
basis that the relevant Crown Solicitor has decided that the evidence is sufficient to prove the 
elements of the more serious offence.  That example highlights why it is necessary to repose 
prosecutorial decisions in officers who have responsibility for making them.  What may or may 
not have been said by subordinates leading up to the prosecutorial decision will rarely have any 
impact on the ability to charge. 
 
In Burgess v Field, a Member of Parliament was prosecuted for corruption, an offence which 
required the prior consent of the Attorney General, which had been given.20A challenge to the 
Attorney General's consent failed. William Young P and Ellen France J in a joint judgment 
noted that there was only High Court authority for the proposition that a decision to prosecute 
may be challenged by judicial review, referring to Hallett v Attorney General (No. 2) and to 
                                                
16 But in Burgess v Field [2007] NZCA 547, [2008] 1 NZLR 733, the Court appeared at [42] to resurrect Hallett 
(No. 2), above n 10. 
17 Young v Police HC Christchurch, CIV 2004-409-2406, 29 September 2006 at [17] - [18]. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Dewar v Waikato District Council HC Hamilton, CRI 2006-419-101, 19 October 2006. 
20 Burgess v Field, above n 16. 
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Polynesian Spa.21 The joint judgment noted that “a number of constitutional and policy reasons 
for the courts' reluctance to interfere in relation to the prosecutorial discretion” exist.22 The 
Court of Appeal further emphasised “the traditional reluctance across the common law 
jurisdictions to interfere with decisions to initiate and continue prosecutions.”23 It noted that 
Edwards discussed “compelling reasons for that reluctance.”24 In the end, the Court assumed 
“without deciding” that the Attorney General's statutory decision to consent to a prosecution 
was reviewable, but rejected the claim that any “absurdity” had been established.25 
 
In Greymouth Petroleum Ltd. v Solicitor-General, Warwick Gendall J decided two unusual 
challenges.26 Gendall J stated that whilst Saywell27 “has been traditionally regarded as authority 
for the proposition that decisions of a Crown Solicitor to present an indictment, and the content 
of any indictment, are immune from judicial review,” that “it has become more generally 
accepted that the decisions are justiciable.”28 The Judge noted that Pritchard J had been strongly 
influenced in Saywell by the concept that prosecutorial power was based upon historical 
prerogative, so that prosecutorial discretion was “a power of a special kind and not desirable 
for the Court to exercise a supervisory role in determining what “criminal prosecutions” should 
be heard.” Gendall J saw Polynesian Spa as adopting a more permissive approach and 
expressly followed that decision. He identified that in Hallett (No. 2), Henry J had accepted 
that in principle, a court could intervene where there was a failure to exercise a discretion to 
prosecute at all.29 But Gendall J rejected in principle that any discretion was amenable to review 
on the basis of weighing up the various factors relevant to such a decision. He found support 
in the Privy Council decision in Sharma v Brown-Antoine that although judicial review of a 
prosecutorial decision was available it is a highly exceptional remedy to be sparingly exercised 
                                                
21 Burgess v Field, above n 16, at [42]; Chambers J did not discuss this point. See Hallett v Attorney General (No. 
2), above n 10; Polynesian Spa, above n 2. 
22 Burgess v Field, above n 16, at [43] referring to Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne, above n 2, at [62]. 
23 Burgess v Field, above n 16, at [43] referring to Fox v Attorney- General [2002] 3 NZLR 62 (CA) at [31]. 
24 See Burgess v Field, above 16, at [43] referring to John Llewelyn, Jones Edwards, “The Attorney-General, 
Politics and the Public Interest” (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1984) at 29-32. 
25 Burgess v Field, above n 16, at [44]. 
26 Greymouth Petroleum Ltd. v Solicitor-General [2010] NZHC 1381, [2010] 2 NZLR 567; a challenge to the 
filing of an indictment by the Solicitor-General under s345(2) of the Crimes Act 1961 and a challenge to the 
refusal by the Solicitor-General to grant dispensation under Reg 8 Crown Solicitors Regs 1994 to the Crown 
Solicitor at New Plymouth for him to accept instructions to appear at trial as defence counsel for Greymouth 
Petroleum Ltd, its employees and contractors, for breaches of the Resource Management Act 1991. 
27 Saywell v Attorney-General, above n 6. 
28 Greymouth Petroleum Ltd. v Solicitor-General, above n 26, at [37]. 
29 Ibid, at [63] per Gendall J referring to Hallett v Attorney General (No 2), above n 10, at 102. 
	 19 
and concluded that on the evidence no improper purpose was involved in the presentation of 
the indictment in the name of the Solicitor-General.30 
 
In Young v Christchurch City Council, French J stated: “It is well established that as a general 
rule a decision to prosecute is not reviewable, subject only to some very limited exceptions, 
none of which apply here: Thompson v Attorney-General [2000] NZAR 583; Polynesian Spa 
Ltd. v Osborne [2005] NZAR 408; Wilson v Auckland City Council (No. 2) [2007] NZAR 
711.”31 
 
In R v Winn, Ellis J, in a case where the defence claimed the wrong charges had been laid and 
that others were more appropriate (and involving lesser criminality), noted that judicial review 
can only lie where bad faith or improper motive has been alleged following Greymouth 
Petroleum.32 The Judge set out paragraph 1.4 of the Prosecution Guidelines dated 1 January 
2010:33 
 
[7] In the rare case of poor decision-making, the Court seized of a particular prosecution may 
exercise its inherent remedial powers to prevent an abuse of its processes.  The courts in New 
Zealand had declined to hear challenges to prosecution decision either in summary or indictable 
cases brought by way of judicial review.  Principled decisions in accordance with these 
guidelines will help to ensure that the courts in New Zealand will see little reason to 
countenance a challenge to a prosecution decision. 
 
The bad faith criterion was accepted as being the only basis for intervention in Wilkins v 
Housing New Zealand Corporation and the institutional limitations on fact-finding ability in 
judicial review has been offered as a reason for the Court's limited willingness to entertain 
challenges to prosecutorial decisions.34 Entertaining challenges to decisions to prosecute 
outside the trial and appeal process was reasoned to be likely to seriously disrupt the criminal 
justice system.35 
 
                                                
30 Sharma v Brown-Antoine [2006] UKPC 57, [2007] 1 WLR 781 (PC Trinidad and Tobago) at [14]. 
31 Young v Christchurch City Council HC Christchurch CIV 2008-409-003095, 9 April 2009 at [25]. 
32 R v Winn HC Auckland, CRI-2009-090-12003, 13 September 2010 at [7]. 
33 Ibid, citing The Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines 2010 at paragraph 1.4. 
34 Wilkins v Housing New Zealand Corporation HC Auckland [2014] NZHC 507, 19 March 2014 at [21] per 
Andrews J (prosecution for using a document to gain pecuniary advantage). See also Jefferies v Wellington 
Regional Council [2014] NZHC 916, 9 May 2014 at [17] per Collins J; in Li v Hamilton District Court [2015] 
NZHC 1605, [2015] NZAR 1280 at footnote 37; Duffy J noted “the procedural limitations of judicial review in 
terms of the restrictions on fact finding ability” as an additional reason for the limited right to challenge 
prosecutorial decisions. 
35 Taikato v Tauranga District Court [2012] NZHC 560, [2012] NZAR 471 at [46] per Wylie J 
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The judgment of Brown J in Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand36 closely examined the 
jurisprudential issues, which unlike any other New Zealand case, was not about whether a 
decision to prosecute should have been made but rather whether the decision by the prosecution 
to offer no evidence (as part of a wider plea-bargain outcome) was amenable to judicial review. 
WorkSafe pleaded that its decision was not amenable, “…because it was a decision made after 
taking into account specific factors in the exercise of its prosecutorial discretion.  Such factors 
included the weighing of policy and public interest factors with which it is inappropriate for 
the Courts to interfere.” 37 Brown J recognised and adopted the approach that under English 
law (and supported by English and Privy Council authority), the threshold for judicial review 
will be lower in the context of decisions not to prosecute.38 
 
WorkSafe invoked four constitutional and policy reasons to defend the judicial review: 
 
(a) The discretion to prosecute is part of the function of the executive, not the courts; 
(b) it is inappropriate for the court to interfere in prosecutorial decisions given its own 
function of responsibility for the conduct of criminal trials; 
(c) prosecutorial decisions involve a high content of judgment and discretion; 
(d) there is political accountability for prosecutorial decisions. 
 
The High Court did not peremptorily reject the argument that judicial review is available if the 
prosecutor has failed to have regard to a relevant consideration or has had regard to an 
irrelevant consideration.39 Instead the court adopted the approach that such a claim is “unlikely 
to be vindicated” because of the width of considerations that the decision-maker could properly 
take into account and because of the “high level of restraint” that “will be observed by the 
Court in recognition of the policy and constitutional decision of such a decision.”40 
 
Subsequently, in Waiapu v R Lang J stated:41  
 
[21] In New Zealand, the position has always been that the courts have been reluctant to 
intervene or become involved with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The reasons for this 
were succinctly summarised by Randerson J in Polynesian Spa Ltd. v Osborne [2005] NZAR 
408 (HC) at [61].  In essence, the discretion to prosecute on behalf of the state is a function of 
                                                
36 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand [2015] NZHC 2991, [2016] 2 NZLR 485, (2015) 13 NZELR 485.  
37 Ibid, at [31]. 
38 See R v Director of Public Prosecutions ex parte Manning [2001] QB 330 at [23], Mohit v Director of Public 
Prosecutions of Mauritius [2006] UKPC 20, [2006] 1 WLR 3343 at [18]; Marshall v Director of Public 
Prosecutions [2007] UKPC 4, [2007] 4 LRC 557 (Jamaica) at [14]. 
39 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (HC), above n 36, at [38], adopting Matalulu v Director of Public 
Prosecutions (Fiji) [2004] NZAR 193 (SC Fiji) at 216. 
40 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (HC), above n 36, at [40]. 
41 Waiapu v R [2016] NZHC 2491, [2016] NZAR 1561. 
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Executive government rather than the courts. The role of the courts has traditionally been to 
ensure the proper and fair conduct of trials.  This is an important principle, because the 
prosecutor will almost always have a far greater understanding than the Court of issues that 
may render the laying of a particular charge appropriate or inappropriate. 
 
In Wright v Bhosale, Whata J, giving the judgment of the Court, repeated the constitutional and 
policy reasons for the Courts' reluctance to interfere in prosecutorial decision-making, but 
added: “Despite these constraints, there are two remedies available to a person who considers 
he or she has been wrongly charged. The first and most effective remedy is to defend the charge 
and, if necessary, to apply to have it dismissed. The second is the availability of judicial review, 
though we accept there may be substantial hurdles to relief in this context.”42   
 
In 2017, the Osborne Court of Appeal held that “the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is 
justiciable,” but that “intervention”43 is likely only to be in ‘exceptional circumstances.’44 The 
court held that there were good reasons for the exercise of judicial restraint in the review of 
prosecutorial discretion and was particularly influenced by the Polynesian Spa judgment and 
other overseas authorities.45 The court also found that a stronger case for restraint existed where 
the prosecutorial decision was to prosecute, due to the risk of collateral interference with the 
criminal justice system being greater.46 The appeal failed as the Court found there was nothing 
improper with the conditional reparation undertaking as there was no agreement that it was to 
be paid in substitution for a prosecution. 
 
New Zealand’s most recent and highest authority on judicial review of prosecutorial discretion 
is the 2017 decision of Osborne in the Supreme Court.47 The court found that an unlawful 
bargain to stifle a prosecution had been made by WorkSafe, and granted the applicants a 
declaration to this effect.48 The court’s decision affirmed the justiciability of prosecution 
decisions, but it did not attempt to create a precise test on the availability of judicial review of 
prosecution decisions. The Court did not take issue with the propositions of the Court of Appeal 
                                                
42 Wright v Bhosale [2016] NZCA 593, [2017] NZAR 203 at [26]; expressly noting Polynesian Spa Ltd, above n 
2, at [68]. 
43 In Randerson J’s terms from Polynesian Spa, above n 2, at [63], [69] and [100]. 
44 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (CA), above n 3, at [35]. 
45 Ibid, at [34]. See generally Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne, above n 2, at [62]; R (Corner House Research) v 
Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2008] UKHL 60, [2009] 1 AC 756 at [31]; Fox v Attorney-General, above 
n 23, at [28] – [31]; and Matalulu v Director of Public Prosecutions (Fiji), above n 39, at 215. 
46 Ibid, at [34], [35] and [36]. 
47 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (SC), above n 1. 
48 Ibid, at [101]. 
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on this point, and to this extent, the current test is that which was articulated by Randerson J in 
Polynesian Spa.49 
 
The overall outcome then is that since 1978 in Kumar, when Richardson J first ventilated the 
possibility of judicial review of a prosecutorial decision,50 until the 2017 Supreme Court 
decision in Osborne, only a single challenge to a prosecutorial discretion to refuse to initiate a 
prosecution has been successful. The immediate post-Kumar decisions were dominated by 
reasoning that prosecution decisions were protected as being unreviewable prerogative 
decisions. That line of judicial reasoning slipped away, but was replaced by reasoning that the 
general orthodox grounds for judicial review were simply unavailable and that only either bad 
faith or a proven collateral purpose could ever be the basis for a successful challenge. Rather 
than explicitly reaffirming that all grounds for judicial review were available and insisting on 
the production of cogent evidence, (together with the fact that because of the polycentric nature 
of the decision-making, this necessarily required a very substantial deference to the decision-
maker for constitutional and policy reasons,) the New Zealand courts opted instead for the view 
that only the two nominated grounds for review were available.51 Challenges based on 
unreasonableness, or error of law, or the failure to take into account relevant considerations (or 
its converse taking into account irrelevant considerations) are simply not open. In Osborne 
Brown J acknowledged for the first time in a New Zealand court, that the full array of judicial 
review grounds are potentially available, but concurrently emphasised that the intrinsic nature 
of the decision-making will mean that the prospect of a successful outcome under this widened 
vista still remains very low indeed.52 The Supreme Court decision in Osborne confined 
reviewability to the ‘illegality’ branch of review and made no further comment regarding 
expansion of the grounds. The other branches remain impervious to judicial review.  
 
From the above cases, it is demonstrated that the courts have taken a hesitant but incremental 
approach towards reviewability of prosecution powers. It is accepted now that where a statute 
regulates an area where a prerogative power operates, the statute prevails and ousts the 
prerogative, subject to the statute expressly or impliedly, preserving the prerogative power 
                                                
49 See Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (CA), above n 3, at [34]; Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne, above n 2, at 
[62]. See also the Venning J’s comment in Rewa v Attorney-General of New Zealand, above n 3, at [45] and [46]. 
50 Kumar v Immigration Department, above n 4, at 558 noting that a discriminatory exercise of a prosecutorial 
discretion would erode “an essential pillar of the rule of law.” 
51 These grounds both fall under the ‘illegality’ branch of review. 
52 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (HC), above n 36, at [38]- [40]. 
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intact.53 The Polynesian Spa decision opened non-prosecutions to review in any ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ but limited that opening to exclude unfair or unreasonable decisions.54 
 
3.2 Judicial Review of Police Operational Decisions: A Parallel 
 
A useful parallel is to consider the current New Zealand law regarding the justiciability of 
police operational decisions. The Courts have reasoned that challenges to the failures of the 
Police to investigate: allegations of criminality or their failures to prioritise types of 
investigations or in the prioritisations of Police resource allocations, is a complete ‘no-fly zone’ 
for judicial review.55 Attempts to have the New Zealand Police held accountable for such 
decision-making uniformly have failed. The success of Mr. Blackburn before Lord Denning 
MR in R v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, ex parte Blackburn56 has not been 
replicated in New Zealand. In Evers v Attorney-General, Chambers J held that operational 
decisions of the police were unreviewable, except in ‘exceptional circumstances.’ 57 That is 
exactly the same narrow approach articulated in Polynesian Spa as applying in the context of 
prosecutorial decisions. The test exhibits perfect symmetry. 
 
In Sathyan v Police Commissioner of Wellington58 Clark J held in judicial review proceedings 
that the non-investigation of a complaint or series of complaints from the public was not 
justiciable. The Court of Appeal dismissed Ms Sathyan’s application for leave to appeal out of 
time from that decision. Winkelmann J for the Court stating:59 “It is well established that the 
                                                
53 Joseph, above n 7, at [27.5.3]; GDS Taylor Judicial Review: A New Zealand Perspective (3rd ed, Lexis Nexis, 
Wellington, 2014) at [2.38].  
54 In R (on the application of Corner House Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office, above n 45, at [30]; 
the House of Lords found that the decision whether or not to prosecute was only review in ‘highly exceptional 
circumstances.’  
55 The New Zealand position is contrasted by that taken in the United Kingdom on this point. See Belhaj and 
another v Director of Public Prosecutions and another [2018] UKSC 33, 4 July 2018 at [16]; where the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom stated: “The High Court’s review jurisdiction extends to principles to the exercise 
of any official’s functions in relation to the criminal process. These include police decisions to investigate or 
charge (R v Comr of Police of the Metropolis, ex parte Blackburn [1968] 2 QB 118) or to administer cautions (R 
(Aru) v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2004] 1 WLR 1697).” 
56 R v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, ex parte Blackburn [1968] 2 QB 118, [1968] 1 All ER 763 (CA); 
(a directive by the Commissioner of Police to his officers to take no proceedings against clubs for breach of 
gaming laws quashed as unlawful.) 
57 Evers v Attorney-General [2000] NZAR 372 (HC) at [11]; (an unsuccessful private action to compel the 
Commissioner of Police to stop youths persistently causing nuisance outside a motel and resulting in business 
loss.) 
58 Sathyan v Police Commissioner of Wellington [2016] NZAR 175 (HC); (Ms Sathyan believed she was a victim 
of cyber-bullying from various governmental agencies). 
59 Sathyan v Police Commissioner of Wellington [2017] NZAR 186 (CA) at [11]. 
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courts will not compel the police to commence an investigation into a particular incident or 
incidents.” In LP v Attorney General,60 Nation J reached a similar conclusion, but accepted that 
intervention was possible at least in police policy matters, where a perverse decision had been 
made. 
 
By contrast to the New Zealand position, in DB v Chief Constable of Police Service of Northern 
Ireland the United Kingdom Supreme Court invalidated as unlawful a police operational 
decision made as part of a police strategy to manage associated public disorder arising from an 
illegal parade, which involved the flying of flags provocative to certain sectors of the Belfast 
population.61 The argument that the operational decision of the Police were immune from 
challenge by judicial review received short shrift. Lord Kerr approved the approach of the 
English Court of Appeal in an earlier case: 62  
 
As Lord Dyson MR said in H v Commissioner of the Metropolis v ZH [2013] 1 WLR 3021 at 
para 90: …operational discretion is important to the police…It has been recognised by the 
European court: see [(2012)] Austin v United Kingdom 55 EHRR 359, para 56. And I have kept 
it well in mind in writing this judgment. But operational discretion is not sacrosanct. It cannot 
be invoked by the police in order to give them immunity from liability for everything they do. 
 
Under the present state of the law in New Zealand, the courts have repeatedly disavowed 
jurisdiction to judicially review the operational decisions of the Police. This wide-horizon 
exception makes, as Lord Dyson MR noted in England, all operational decisions “sacrosanct.” 
The present position in relation to police operational decisions resonates with the similar 
reluctance of the Courts here to assume a more robust approach to the accountability of 
prosecutors (including the police). Just as with the core issue of judicial reviewability of 
prosecutorial decision and discretions the Court have recognised that an entire and major aspect 
of policing is firmly within a modern Alsatia.  
 
 
3.3 Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Decisions in Disciplinary Contexts: A Parallel 
 
                                                
60 LP v Attorney General [2016] NZAR 511 (HC); (LP a paranoid schizophrenic thought he had been the victim 
of a sexual assault because upon awakening he suffered from soreness in the spine and anal region). 
61 DB v Chief Constable of Police Service of Northern Ireland [2017] UKSC 7, 1 February 2017. 
62 Ibid, at [6] and [71] per Lord Kerr (with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Reed, Lord Hughes and Lord Dyson 
agreed). At [76] Lord Kerr stated: “A definite area of discretionary judgment must be allowed the police. And a 
judgment on what is proportionate should not be informed by hindsight. Difficulties in making policing decisions 
should not be underestimated, especially since these frequently require to be made in fraught circumstances. 
Beyond these generalities, I do not consider it useful to go.” 
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A further parallel, like the judicial review of police operational decisions, is the judicial review 
of decisions to institute or terminate disciplinary decisions. This subject too provides an 
informed comparative basis for analysis. 
 
In Z v Complaints Assessment Committee a dentist had been acquitted in a trial of indecently 
assaulting patients. Disciplinary proceedings were instituted against Z who sought judicial 
review of the decision to initiate the disciplinary proceedings, on a range of contentions 
including double jeopardy63 and delay.64 In denying judicial review Fogarty J emphasised the 
reluctance of a Court “to interfere with the exercise of discretion by any prosecutor whether to 
prosecute or not.”65 
 
Panckhurst J in M v Wellington Standards Committee (No. 2) had, in judicial review 
proceedings, to decide whether the decision of the Committee warranted the laying of 
misconduct charges before the New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyances Disciplinary 
Tribunal.66 By this time, the Supreme Court decision in Z v Dental Complaints Assessment 
Committee was available, substantially affirming the judgment of Fogarty J and that of the 
Court of Appeal. 67 McGrath J in the Supreme Court stated:68 
 
[139] Where the lawfulness of the exercise of a statutory power turns on expert judgment, and 
there is no question of breach of natural justice, bad faith, material error in the application of 
the law, or exercise of the power in a way which cannot rationally be regarded as coming within 
the statutory purpose, the courts are unlikely to intervene. 
 
Applying this approach Panckhurst J reasoned although “a conventional exercise of a 
prosecutorial discretion is subject to this Court's supervisory jurisdiction…the same rationales 
that have founded the traditional reluctance [in criminal prosecutorial decision-makers] to 
intervene remain at play [in the analogous disciplinary context].” 69 Once the decision has left 
the prosecution and been entrusted to another body the rights to challenge the prosecution's 
decision had been superseded by the rights now available before the trial forum.70 
 
                                                
63 Relying on Re a Medical Practitioner [1959] NZLR 784 (CA). 
64 Z v Complaints Assessment Committee HC Christchurch, CIV 2005-409-000458, 12 October 2005 (Fogarty J). 
65 Ibid, at [47], citing Polynesian Spa Ltd, above n 2. 
66 M v Wellington Standards Committee (No. 2) HC Wellington, [2013] NZHC 1037, 9 May 2013. 
67 Z v Dental Complaints Assessment Committee [2008] NZSC 55, [2009] 1 NZLR 1. 
68 Ibid. 
69M v Wellington Standards Committee (No. 2), above n 62, at [10] – [11]. 
70 See to the same effect; Orlov v New Zealand Law Society [2013] NZCA 230, [2013] 1 NZLR 562 at [50]. 
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The New Zealand Legal Complaints Review Officer (LRCO), in a series of decisions has 
decided that the successful intervention point by an aggrieved practitioner to challenge a 
disciplinary decision to prosecute will include situations in which the decision to prosecute 
was:71 
 
           (a) Significantly influenced by irrelevant considerations, 
(b) exercised for collateral purposes unrelated to the objectives of the statute in question 
(and therefore an abuse of process), 
(c) exercised in a discriminating manner, or 
(d) exercised capriciously in bad faith, or with malice. 
 
Recently, the New Zealand LRCO confirmed that this approach (which as to (a) and (b) is 
much wider than that of Polynesian Spa) remained appropriate.72 However, this approach of 
an inferior tribunal has limited value, especially as the High Court has not adopted its liberality. 
 
The Court of Appeal has emphasised that disciplinary proceedings are a facet of consumer 
protection legislation and to achieve the statutory aims, complaints against professionals must 
be dealt with expeditiously. Therefore, to ensure that statutory objective, the High Court is 
directed not to entertain an application for judicial review before the disciplinary process is 
complete, unless the complaint is one that cannot be cured by the disciplinary Tribunal. The 
prospect of successful judicial review of a decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings is now 
remote.73 But this emphasis on the disruptive effect of judicial review on a disciplinary process 
is irrelevant in a decision not to prosecute at all in a disciplinary context. 
 
Over the last few decades, New Zealand courts have significantly expanded the criteria of who 
may be subject to review. This now includes prosecutors. But to date only the Osborne 
Supreme Court has successfully reviewed a prosecution decision.74 The outcomes in other 
                                                
71 Poole v Yorkshire [2009] LRCO 133/09, 11 November 2009 at [21]; CN v Auckland Standards Committee 1 
[2010] 106/2010, 23 September 2010; TE v Wellington Standards Committee 2 [2013] LCRO 100/2010, 92/2011, 
153/2012, 1 February 2013. 
72 DL v [Area] Standards Committee LRCO 164/2016, 26 October 2016 at [15]. See also FF v Wellington 
Standards Committee 2 LCRO 23/2011, 27 September 2011 at [50] - [51]. 
73 Deliu v New Zealand Law Society [2015] NZCA 12, [2016] NZAR 1062 per Wild J at [22] and especially 
footnote 20. 
74 For other cases on judicial review of prosecutorial discretion, see Matthew Smith New Zealand Judicial Review 
Handbook (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters New Zealand Ltd, Wellington, 2016) at [3.4.5]; see Hayes v Logan [2005] 
NZAR 150 (HC) at [52]; Lin v Police HC Auckland CRI- 2010-404-312, 4 October 2010 at [9]; Orlov v New 
Zealand law Society (No. 8) [2012] NZHC 2154, [2013] 1 NZLR 390 at [62]; Jefferies v Wellington Regional 
Council [2014] NZHC 916 at [18]. 
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4 Judicial Review of Prosecution Decisions in Select Foreign Jurisdictions: A 
Comparative Analysis 
 
This Chapter compares and contrasts comparators that share New Zealand’s Anglo-
Commonwealth characteristics and common law background. There is also a comparative 
section focusing on South Africa with its Roman-Dutch legal heritage overlaid by English 
Common Law and modern constitutional law jurisprudence. Decisions from its Constitutional 
Court have been often cited and applied in the New Zealand higher courts. This Chapter also 
includes a consideration of Armani Da Silva v United Kingdom decided in the European Court 
of Human Rights in order to examine the human rights response to the issue and to provide 
insight regarding the availability of judicial review of prosecutorial decisions (or some 
functional equivalent) in civil law countries.1 
 
Australia holds the most reactionary position as prosecution decisions are held to be non-
justiciable. Hong Kong, Canada, South Africa and the United Kingdom have each approached 
the justiciability issue quite differently, and all have evolved beyond New Zealand’s current 
position. The United Kingdom has the most extensive body of jurisprudence, and the courts in 
Canada have established an exclusive standard of review unshared by any other jurisdiction. 
Development in Hong Kong and the hybrid jurisdiction of South Africa appears to have been 
catalysed by the differing demands of each jurisdiction’s own unique disposition.  
 
While New Zealand’s position is more developed than the absolutism of Australia, the judiciary 
has by adopting the contextual position of only allowing intervention in ‘exceptional 
circumstances,’ pre-set a very demanding entry-point in this area of review.  
 
4.1 Australia  
 
In Australia, prosecutorial decisions are made by the Office of the DPP which applies the 
Australian Prosecution Policy. “The first criterion of this policy is that of evidential 
                                                
1 Armani Da Silva v United Kingdom [2016] ECHR 314, (2016) 63 EHRR 12. 
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sufficiency…A prosecution should not be instituted or continued unless there is admissible, 
substantial and reliable evidence that a criminal offence known to the law has been committed 
by the alleged offender. The existence of a bare prima facie case is not sufficient to justify 
prosecution. Once it is established that there is a bare prima facie case, it is then necessary to 
give consideration to the prospects of conviction. A prosecution should not proceed if there is 
no reasonable prospect of a conviction being secured.”2 
 
4.1.1 Non-justiciability of Prosecutorial Decisions 
 
The prosecution discretion in Australia is a statutory power.3 However, the courts there have 
reasoned that since prosecutorial discretion was originally sourced in the prerogative, the shift 
from prerogative to statute did not remove immunity even where the statute completely 
supplants the prerogative.4 This quarantining from judicial review has been rationalised by 
Australian courts, on the basis that the independence and impartiality of the judicial process 
would be jeopardised if they were to be seen in any way as affiliated with who is to be 
prosecuted and for what.5 In Maxwell v R, Dawson and McHugh JJ made the point that:6  
 
[15] The decision whether to charge a lesser offence, or to accept a plea of guilty to a lesser 
offence than that charged, is for the prosecution and does not require the approval of the Court. 
Indeed, the Court would seldom have the knowledge of the strength and weaknesses of the case 
on each side which is necessary for the proper exercise of such a function. The role of the 
prosecution in this respect, as in many others, is such that it cannot be shared with the trial 
judge without placing in jeopardy the essential independence of that office in the adversary 
system.” The justices later stated in relation to a decision in R v Brown:7 “The Court rightly 
observed that the most important sanctions governing the proper performance of a prosecuting 
authority’s functions are likely to be political rather than legal. 
 
The Australian legal system operates under the written Australian Constitution, which sets out 
a federal system of government that sharply divides power between the federal government 
and the States and territories, each of which maintain separate jurisdictions with their own 
system of courts and parliaments.8 Therefore, decisions that involve the prosecution process 
                                                
2 Armani Da Silva v United Kingdom, above n 1, at [182]. 
3 Mark Aronson, Bruce Dyer and Matthew Groves Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed, Lawbook Co, 
Sydney, 2004) at 95, footnote 49. 
4 Ibid, at 95. 
5 Likiardopoulos v R (2012) CLR 265 at [37], 86 ALJR 1168 (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ), 
see also at [2] - [3] (French CJ). 
6 Brain William Maxwell v R [1996] HCA 46, 184 CLR 501, 60 SASR 7, 135 ALR 1, 67 A Crim R 11. 
7 R v Brown (1989) 17 NSWLR 472. 
8 J Carvan Understanding the Australian legal system (5th ed, Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2005) at 59. 
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may be capable of judicial review by virtue of different statutory schemes for judicial review 
than are available in some jurisdictions or under the common law.9 The jurisdictions that appear 
to support judicial review in this context via statute will be discussed in turn.  
 
In the Commonwealth jurisdiction, section 3 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) 
Act 1977 (Cth) ("ADJR Act") states that all decisions of an ‘administrative character’ made 
under the Act are capable of judicial review. In Newby v Moddie, the Full Federal Court held 
that prosecution decisions to prosecute that have been made under the Director of Public 
Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth) fall within the interpretation of section 3 ADJR Act and may 
therefore be capable of judicial review.10 Davies J in Smiles v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation was prompted by the earlier High Court decision, Australian Broadcasting Tribunal 
v Bond,11 to suggest that decisions to prosecute might be classified as a "procedural 
determination" rather than a "decision".12 The Full Federal Court dismissed the appeal from 
Davies J and declined to make any comment on this issue.13  
 
In the jurisdiction of Victoria, ss 2 and 3 of the Administrative Law Act 1978 (Vic) ("AL Act") 
states that: “any person whose rights are affected by a decision of a [person] who is required 
to observe natural justice has a right to apply to the Supreme Court of Victoria for judicial 
review of the decision.” Although the provision could empower review of prosecutorial 
process, there has been no such case that has been the subject of authority. In discussing this 
point, Flynn commented that “Many decisions of prosecutors undoubtedly affect the rights of 
a person. However, it is uncertain whether a prosecutor is required to observe natural justice… 
The existence of the right to review under the AL Act is in addition to any right to review that 
may exist at common law: s 11 AL Act. However, the Public Prosecutions Act 1994 (Vic) ousts 
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review defined "special decisions" and decisions 
related to laying of contempt charges by the Attorney-General: s 47 ff.”14 
                                                
9 Martin Flynn “Human rights, prosecutorial discretion and judicial review- the emergence of missing links?” 
(paper presented to the Australian Institute of Criminology, Prosecuting Justice conference, Melbourne, 18-19 
April 1996) at 5. 
10 Newby v Moddie (1988) 83 ALR 523 at 526-527. 
11 Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 335-9. 
12 Smiles v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 107 ALR 439 at 442. 
13 s39B(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) enabled the Federal Court to exercise power to review the decision: 
Smiles v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, above n 12, at 456. The provision states that “the original jurisdiction 
of the Federal Court of Australia includes jurisdiction with respect to any matter in which a writ of mandamus or 
prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer or officers of the Commonwealth.” 
14 Flynn, above n 9, at 5. 
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Lastly, in the Queensland jurisdiction, section 4 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) ("JR 
Act") allows for all decisions of an administrative character that have been made under a 
Queensland enactment to be capable of being judicially reviewed. In analysing this statutory 
provision, Flynn commented that:15 
 
The similarity of the wording of this provision with the wording of the ADJR Act suggests that, 
subject to the observations of Davies J. in Smiles v FCT (1992) 107 ALR 439 at 442… a 
decision to prosecute made under the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1984 (Qld) is 
reviewable. It should be noted that while the decision to initiate a prosecution is a decision of 
an "administrative character" (Newby v Moddie (1988) 83 ALR 523 at 526-527), it has been 
held that the decision of a prosecutor on whether to exercise a right of reply during the course 
of a criminal trial is not a decision of an administrative character: Bellino v Clair (1992) 63 A 
Crim R 346 at 347. The statute also empowers the court to decline to review a decision on the 
basis that the review would disrupt proceedings of a court: s 14 JR Act. 
 
While the above statutory provisions appear to suggest that some prosecution process decisions 
may be potentially reviewable in a few Australian jurisdictions where statutory prosecution 
power is exercised, the courts at common law and legal commentators have frequently 
suggested that a Crown prosecutor’s decision to prosecute is insusceptible to review.16 
 
In Maxwell, the court held that “the integrity of the judicial process particularly, its 
independence and impartiality and the public perception thereof would be compromised if the 
courts were to decide or were to be in any way concerned with decisions as to who is to be 
prosecuted and for what.”17  
 
The passage in Maxwell was cited with approval18 in Likiardopoulos v R. The Court confirmed 
that:19 “Sanctions available to enforce well established standards of prosecutorial fairness are 
to be found mainly in the powers of a trial judge and are not directly enforceable at the suit of 
the accused or anyone else by prerogative writ, judicial order to an action for damages.”  
 
                                                
15 Flynn, above n 9, at 6. 
16 For cases see Smiles v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, above n 12, at 445 Davis J; Jarrett v Seymour (1993) 
119 ALR 46 at 34-36. For Legal commentators see Fiona Wheeler “Judicial Review of Prerogative Power in 
Australia: Issues and Prospects” (1992) 14 Sydney LR 432-473. 
17 Brain William Maxwell v R, above n 6 at [26].  
18 In the joint judgment of Justices Gummow, Hayne Crennan Kiefel and Bell in Likiardopoulos v R, above n 5. 
19 Ibid, at [4] (French CJ reserved his position on whether there may be limited scope for review under 
Constitution, s75 (v)). 
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4.1.2 The Exceptional Nature of the Jurisdiction 
 
In Jarret v Seymour the Full Federal Court stated that, exceptionally, a decision of a prosecutor 
to institute proceedings may be subject of judicial review:20 “Moreover, this case is concerned 
with a particular area of criminal process, that is, the discretion to institute criminal 
proceedings, where collateral intervention, as was sought here, should be allowed only in very 
special situations. There a cogent, and obvious, policy considerations underlying the reluctance 
of the civil courts to interfere collaterally with the initiation of a criminal prosecution (see, for 
example, Barton v R21).”   
 
Gaudron J in Elliot v Seymour dismissed an appeal from the Full Federal Court, and stressed 
the exceptional nature of the jurisdiction. “It is by no means clear that civil proceedings will 
lie to prevent the laying of criminal charges. But, if they do, it will only be because it would be 
an affront to justice if the proceedings were to be instituted or, and this may be an aspect of the 
same thing, because the safeguards available in criminal proceedings are clearly inadequate to 
protect against the injustice involved.”22 
 
In Smiles, Davies J considered a line of authorities that contemplated the grounds for judicial 
review of the decision to prosecute. In his judgment, he concluded that “the Court will not 
interfere by way of judicial review in the ordinary process of a prosecution. It may be 
appropriate for the Court to make an order of review affecting a prosecution where, for 
example, the decision or conduct sought to be reviewed was beyond jurisdiction or an abuse of 
process, or the conduct sought to be reviewed was contrary to that provided by statute, or there 
is a discrete point of law the early determination of which may conclude or assist the resolution 
of the prosecution proceedings.”23 
 
The High Court of Australia in Island Maritime Ltd v Filipowski, similarly held that there may 
be room in the modern age to reconsider the court’s reluctance to intervene in prosecutorial 
decision-making, but also warned that intervention should only be exercised in ‘exceptional 
circumstances.’24  
                                                
20 Jarret v Seymour, above n 16, at 56. 
21 Barton v R [1980] HCA 48, 147 CLR 75, 32 ALR 449. 
22 Elliot v Seymour (1993) 119 ALR 1 at 7.  
23 Smiles v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, above n 12, at 442. 
24 Island Maritime Ltd v Filipowski (2006) 226 CLR 328 (HCA) at [81] – [82].  
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In Elias v R, the court articulated the scope of external review as limited. “In the unlikely event 
that the discretion to prosecute a particular charge (or at all) was exercised for some improper 
purpose, the court has the power to relieve against the resulting abuse of its process. The time 
for debate as to any claimed abuse arising out of the selection of the charge is before the entry 
of a plea.” 25 
 
The current common law position in Australia is that decisions to prosecute or not are not 
justiciable, except where an abuse of process has been found, but even then, there are strict 
time requirements to bring such claims.26 The Australian courts have allowed review however, 
where a specific statutory consent was required to commence proceedings out of time. The 
Federal Court in Buffier v Bowen, held that the Attorney-General has statutory power to consent 
to the institution of criminal proceedings out of time.27 However, his decision to consent was 
unlawful as he had inadequate material before him.  
 
Flynn contends that “the abrogation by statute in each jurisdiction of common law prerogatives 
in relation to the criminal process removes “prerogative” as a reason to deny judicial review.”28 
On this view, prosecutorial decision-making would no longer retain “prerogative’ status and 
must be open to review. The Australian courts are yet to adopt this reasoning or to reach this 
conclusion. The courts have made obiter comments suggesting when intervention ‘may be 
appropriate’ under grounds of review relating to illegality, but this is also yet to be affirmed.29  
 
In a recent Royal Commission Roundtable Discussion on DPP Complaints and Oversight 
Mechanisms, former DPP of New South Wales, Nicholas Cowdery QC stated that “The High 
Court of Australia has plainly ruled out judicial review of prosecution decisions other than in 
cases of abuse of process of the court or where unfairness would arise that could not be 
overcome in the trial process; so to introduce it would require legislation (presumably in all 
jurisdictions to be so affected). Courts retain the right to stay proceedings for good cause in 
                                                
25 Elias v R (2013) 248 CLR 483, 87 ALJR 895 at [35], (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ)  
26 i.e. procedures required by law to be observed in connection with the making of the decision were not observed 
(e.g. consent of a particular office holder to the prosecution: Bacon v Rose [1972] 2 NSWLR 793); (the decision 
involved an error of law: Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1). 
27 Buffier v Bowen (1987) 72 ALR 256; [1988] 32 A Crim R 222 (FCA) per Neaves J. 
28 Flynn, above n 9, at 6. 
29 Smiles v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, above n 12, at 442. 
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individual cases, temporarily or permanently.”30 Cowdery expressed in his view that “no need 
for judicial review in Australia has been demonstrated.”31 Cowdery continued to explained 
that: “A real issue of the separation of powers arises here. A DPP is regarded as a part of the 
executive branch of government, albeit with some quasi-judicial functions and characteristics. 
If the judiciary is to be supplanted in that position (and putting to one side the practical 
difficulties that would arise), that is a clear breach of the separation that we regard as essential 
to the proper functioning of government.”32  
 
4.2 Hong Kong 
 
The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of 
China (BL) which came into effect on 1 July 1997, serves as the constitutional document of 
Hong Kong. Article 63 of the BL provides that: “The Department of Justice of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region shall control criminal prosecutions, free from any 
interference.”33 The Department headed by the Secretary of Justice, has full independence in 
deciding whether a prosecution should be initiated, pursued or terminated.34 
 
                                                
30 Nicholas Cowdery AM QC, former DPP of NSW Royal Commission Roundtable Discussion on DPP 
Complaints and Oversight Mechanisms (29 April 2016) at 3.  
31 Ibid, at 3. 
32 Ibid, at 4.  
33 In Re C (A Bankrupt) [2006] 4 HKC 582 at [18] per Stock JA, “The prosecutorial independence is a linchpin of 
the rule of law. He is in the discharge of that duty to be ‘actuated by no respect of persons whatsoever’ (Sir Robert 
Finlay, 1903, Parl. Debates Vol. 118, cols. 349-390) and ‘the decision whether any citizen should be prosecuted 
or whether any prosecution should be discontinued should be a matter for the prosecuting authorities to decide on 
the merits of the case without political or other pressure…any practice savouring of political pressure, either by 
the executive of Parliament, being brought to bear upon the Law officers when engaged in reaching a decision in 
any particular case, is unconstitutional and is to be avoided at all costs.’” Ian Grenville Cross “Focus on Discretion 
to Prosecute: The DPP and Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion” (1998) 28 Hong Kong LJ 400; in reference to 
Art 63 “I consider it reassuring that this principle, long recognised in colonial times, now for the first time enjoys 
an entrenched status by virtue of its placement in the mini-constitution. See also Sino-Joint Declaration Part III, 
Annex I, (“A prosecuting authority of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall control criminal 
prosecutions free from any interference.”) 
34 Bokhary GBM, NPJ, Michael Ramsden and Stuart Hargreaves Hong Kong Basic Law Handbook (Sweet & 
Maxwell, Hong Kong, 2015) at 266; “Article 63 is directed not only at protecting the Director of Public 
Prosecution from objectionable political interference in his decision to institute, take over and discontinue criminal 
proceedings. The protection also extends to preclude judicial interference, subject only to issues of abuse of the 
court’s process, and judicial review in exceptional circumstances: Ma Pui Tung v Department of Justice CACV 
64/2008, [2008] HKEC 1590 at [10] per Rogers VP; “It is no doubt, in extremely rare cases and only where the 
evidence points unquestionably to a decision of the prosecuting authority not to prosecute. There are instances 
where an application for judicial review in respect of a refusal to prosecute has been allowed… It is, perhaps, all 
the more important that a court should exercise extreme caution if consideration is given to questioning a decision 
not to prosecute.”) However, this comment was made without a full review of all relevant authorities and on 
appeal the CA was of the view that there was no ground to question the decision not to prosecute.  
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Prosecutors in Hong Kong make their decisions in accordance with the Prosecution Code 2013. 
The Code in practice, is used as a set of guidelines similar to the ones set out in New Zealand 
and are based on the guidelines previously formulated for the Attorney-General in the United 
Kingdom. The Department of Justice holds that “the golden thread that runs through the fabric 
of the Prosecution Code is the importance of upholding the just rule of law by just application 
of just laws.”35  
 
There are two means of redress available to a person who feels aggrieved by inertia or partiality, 
caused by a prosecutor.36 Firstly, any private individual has the right to institute a private 
prosecution, as recognised by the common law.37 Secondly, a prosecutor may be held 
accountable for a prosecution decision via judicial review. Former Hong Kong DPP Grenville 
Cross SC stated that the decision whether to prosecute or not is dependent upon a broad view 
of the interests of justice,38 and that a wrong decision not to prosecute will “undermine the 
confidence of the community in the criminal justice system.”39 
 
4.2.1 Judicial Reviewability of Prosecution Decisions Pre-Handover 
 
In the case Keung Siu-wah v Attorney-General decided in 1990, the Court of Appeal refused 
to interfere with the Attorney-General’s decision to prosecute.40 The court found that “any 
prerogative remedies, or injunctions and declarations, were not applicable in regards to a 
decision whether to initiate a prosecution; the content of an indictment; the preferment of a 
voluntary bill, the compounding of an offence; or the timing and conduct of prosecutions.”41 
In his leading judgment, Fuad VP made the following statement:42“In my judgment it is a 
                                                
35 Department of Justice Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Prosecution Code 2013 at 3. 
36 As in New Zealand, the prosecution decision in Hong Kong is based on the available evidence and the public 
interest. 
37 Magistrates Ordinance Cap 227, s14. The case Ma Pui Tung v Department of Justice, above n 34, involved a 
decision not to prosecute where the aggrieved person brought a private prosecution.  
38 Grenville Cross, Director of Public Prosecutions of Hong Kong “To prosecute or not to prosecute” South China 
Morning Post (Hong Kong, 19 December 2000). 
39 Grenville Cross, Director of Public Prosecutions of Hong Kong “To prosecute or not to prosecute? Duty and 
accountability” (Seminar on Constitutional Law Developments 1998, Hong Kong Bar Association and the Centre 
for Comparative and Public Law of the University of Hong Kong, 9 May 1998) at 2. 
40 Keung Siu-wah v Attorney-General [1990] 2 HKLR 238 (CA), expressly disapproved in Mohit v Director of 
Public Prosecutions of Mauritius [2006] UKPC 20, [2006] 1 WLR 3343 
at [16] - [17].  
41 Ian Dobinson “The decision not to prosecute” (speaking at the International Conference of the International 
Society for the Reform of Criminal Law papers, 26 August 2001) referring to Keung Siu-wah v Attorney-General, 
above n 40. 
42 Keung Siu-wah v Attorney-General, above n 40, at [54]. 
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constitutional imperative that the Courts do not attempt to interfere with the Attorney General’s 
discretion to prosecute, but once the charge or indictment comes before a Court for hearing, it 
can consider whether the prosecution should be allowed to continue if grounds amounting to 
an abuse of process are raised.” Penlington JA agreed with Fuad VP and noted that:43 “There 
is no doubt that any court may refuse to hear proceedings which it regards as an abuse of 
process…but the authorities are overwhelmingly that the decision of the Attorney General 
whether or not to prosecute in any particular case is not subject to judicial review.” The Court 
of Appeal in Keung Siu-wah took an extremely strict stance where Penlington JA considered 
the authorities to be “overwhelming that the decision of the Attorney General whether or not 
to prosecute in any particular case is not subject to judicial review.”44  
 
In 1991, the Court of Appeal in R v Harris, stated that: “[Any] involvement by the courts in 
the prosecution process is liable to compromise and to be perceived to compromise their 
impartiality.”45 In that case the Attorney-General had resiled from his earlier decision not to 
prosecute a former expatriate Senior Crown Counsel for inciting sexual offences. The Court 
considered “the twin problems of an absence of objectively ascertainable standards and the 
relative unfamiliarity of the courts with the weighing of all the considerations which may bear 
on the exercise of prosecutorial responsibility.”46 The issue of the non-justiciability was raised 
by Silke VP who held that the Attorney-General was permitted to change his mind and by 
reversing his earlier decision not to prosecute, the Attorney-General was not found to have 
manipulated or misused the rules or procedure.47 Fuad VP noted that he would be indisposed 
to intervene unless “the court processes are being employed for ulterior purposes or in such a 
way (for example, through multiple or successive proceedings) as to cause improper vexation 
and oppression”48  
 
These pre-handover decisions have since been disproved and it has been the view of post-
handover judgments that decisions not to prosecute under the new constitutional order are 
susceptible to judicial review in exceptional cases.49 
                                                
43 Keung Siu-wah v Attorney-General, above n 40, at [58]. 
44 Ibid. 
45 R v Harris [1991] 1 HKLR 389 (CA) at 406. 
46 Ibid, at 403 citing Connelly v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 1254 (HL). 
47 Ibid, at 397-398 and 401. 
48 R v Harris, above n 45, at 402. 
49 RV v Director of Immigration [2008] 4 HKLRD 529 at 545; Hartmann J, “The prosecutorial independence of 
the Secretary is the linchpin of the rule of law. That is the way it has been prior to the Basic Law and the way it 





In 2005, Hartmann J, the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List, 
in Kwan Pearl Sun Chu v Department of Justice,50 repeated the long-held view that the courts 
would be slow to interfere with the DPP’s decision not to prosecute. In reviewing the 
allegations advanced by the applicant, he almost made the suggestion that such decisions were 
not capable of judicial review at all, by stating:51 
 
[13] In any event, it seems to me that the law, as it presently stands, prevents the applicant from 
obtaining leave. The relevant Hong Kong law is contained in a judgment of our Court of Appeal 
in Keung Siu-wah v Attorney General [1990] 2 HKLR 238. I quote from the headnote: ‘It was 
a constitutional imperative that the court would not interfere with the Attorney General’s 
discretion to prosecute. However, the court retained an inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse 
of process. 
 
Hartmann J, albeit conscious of being prima facie bound by Keung Siu-wah then however, 
qualified the above statement by referring to developments in judicial review in the United 
Kingdom, which highlighted that decisions not to prosecute were in fact amenable to judicial 
review where dishonesty, bad faith or other exceptional circumstance where it could be 
found.52  
 
In Re C (A Bankrupt), Stock JA in the Court of Appeal noted that Article 63 of the BL enshrines 
the independence of the Secretary for Justice but added nevertheless that “dishonesty, bad faith 
or some other exceptional circumstances” might provide a basis for challenge in the courts of 
the exercise in a particular case of a prosecutorial prerogative (following R v Director of Public 
Prosecutions ex parte Kebilene & Others [2000] 2 AC 326).53 
 
In RV v Director of Immigration, Hartmann J found that the Secretary for Justice had not acted 
unconstitutionally by failing to follow published prosecution policy and held that the courts 
have no power to inquire into the rationality of the policy.54 The supervisory jurisdiction of 
                                                
that the Secretary has acted outside of his very broad powers, powers that…he exercises free of direction by his 
ministerial colleagues and free also of the control and supervision of the courts.” 
50 Kwan Pearl Sun Cha v Department of Justice [2005] 3 HKC 441. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid, at [17]. 
53 Re C (A Bankrupt), above n 33. 
54 RV v Director of Immigration, above n 49, at 544 per Hartmann J, “Clearly, the secretary would act outside of 
his powers if it could be demonstrated that he has done so not on an independent assessment of the merits but in 
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judicial review extended to conduct an examination whether the Secretary of Justice had acted 
beyond his power by making decisions that were “not an independent assessment of the merits 
but in obedience to a political instruction,”55 “institut[ing] a prosecution in return for payment 
of a bribe,”56 or “refus[ing] to prosecute a specific class of offences detailed in a statute lawfully 
brought into law.”57 The RV case also considered the reviewability of the Department of 
Justice’s decision to prosecute. The court followed the Privy Council judgments in Mohit v 
Director of Public Prosecutions of Mauritius 58and Sharma v Brown-Antoine59 and concluded 
that the policy considerations in a decision not to prosecute were different from those engaged 
in a decision to prosecute.60 
 
Zervos J’s61 decision in the Court of First Instance in D v Director of Public Prosecutions is 
Hong Kong’s most significant development regarding judicial review of prosecution 
decisions.62 The case involved an application for leave to judicially review the decision of the 
DPP not to prosecute an alleged case of indecent assault. The alleged incidents of indecent 
assault involved a domestic helper’s (‘D’s) male employer Mr Shek exposing his genitals and 
covertly masturbating himself behind her, which she had captured on her mobile phone. The 
DPP refused to prosecute Mr Shek on the ground that the totality of the evidence was equivocal 
as to whether he was reckless in acting as he did. Counsel for ‘D’ contended that the DPP had 
failed to evaluate the evidence properly and misunderstood or misapplied the legal test for 
recklessness. 
 
In making his decision, Zervos J was persuaded by the decision in RV.63 Hartmann J concluded, 
the source and nature of the power is therefore different from the source and nature of the 
prerogative power that had been exercised when Keung Siu-wah was decided.64 It is essential 
                                                
obedience to a political instruction. Article 63 specifically forbids such interference with the exercise of his 
powers.”  
55 RV v Director of Immigration, above n 49, at [71]. 
56 Ibid, at [72]. 
57 Ibid, at [73]. 
58Mohit v Director of Public Prosecutions of Mauritius, above n 40, which had expressly disapproved Keung Siu-
wah v Attorney General, above n 40. 
59 Sharma v Brown-Antoine [2006] UKPC 57, [2007] 1 WLR 781 (PC) (Trinidad and Tobago) 
60 See also Iqbal Shahid & Others v Secretary for Justice [2010] 5 HKC 51, where the court determined that a 
prosecution decision that ran contrary to a prosecution policy in a particular area could also be judicially reviewed, 
but the application failed on the facts. 
61 Himself, the former Director of Public Prosecutions in Hong Kong from 2011-2013. 
62 D v Director of Public Prosecutions [2015] 4 HKLRD 62. 
63 RV v Director of Immigration, above n 49. 
64 Keung Siu-wah v Attorney-General, above n 40. 
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that power only be exercised within constitutional limits, or remain within them. This 
assessment is for the courts, and the determination is judicial review. “To come to this 
conclusion is not a defiance of binding precedent, it is recognition of a new constitutional order 
and the duties of our courts in respect of that new order.”65 In Re C, Stock JA made the 
observation that “dishonesty, bad faith or some other exceptional circumstances might found a 
basis for challenge in the courts of the exercise in a particular case of a prosecutorial 
prerogative.”66  
 
Zervos J in D v DPP held that it was reasonably arguable that the Director in deciding not to 
prosecute had erred in his understanding of the application of law, and that such a 
misapplication fell within the ‘exceptional circumstances’ as observed by Stock JA in Re C or 
the DPP had exceeded the constitutional limits as held by Hartmann J in RV.67 
 
The DPP then took the advice of Mr David Perry QC68 from the English Bar who gave very 
clear advice that the original decision of the DPP not to prosecute was unsustainable in law and 
that in the forth-coming substantive judicial review the applicant would inevitably succeed.69 
In the result, the DPP agreed to prosecute. The defendant Mr Shek was found guilty and was 
sentenced to jail for four months. The indecent assault had clearly been caught on a mobile 
phone video. His appeal against conviction was dismissed.70 
 
The current law in Hong Kong is that any decision made under the public interest aspect, 
automatically makes the decision potentially amenable to review. Any decision not to 
prosecute is susceptible to judicial review, however in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung it was 
held that any ground to obtain leave for judicial review must be reasonably arguable.71The 
institution of an action will only have a chance of success if a court is satisfied that:72  
 
(a) the decision was the result of an unlawful prosecution policy;73 
(b) the decision ignored established policy; or 
                                                
65 RV v Director of Immigration, above n 49, at [68]. 
66 Stock JA in Re C (A Bankrupt), above n 33, also cited in RV v Director of Immigration, above n 49 at [64].  
67 D v Director of Public Prosecutions, above n 62 at [26]. The Director had provided reasons for not prosecuting. 
68 Ex relatione Ms Emma Tsang, junior counsel for D. 
69 In Hong Kong, every application for judicial review requires leave to apply for judicial review: The Rules of 
the High Court Cap. 4A, O 53. 
70 HKSAR v Shek Kwok Ngai [2017] 2 HKLRD 629. 
71 Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676.  
72 A Bruce SC Criminal Procedure: Trial on Indictment (Butterworths Asia, 1998) at [553]. 
73 Prosecution policy relates to the guidelines set out in Hong Kong’s Prosecution Code. 
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(c)  the decision was perverse74 
(d) the decision was based on a material error of law75 
(e) the decision was made in bad faith76 
(f) the decision was made in obedience to political instruction77 
 
Some of these criteria obviously may overlap. Prosecutors can be held to account for improper 
decisions to prosecute. It is noted in Bruce on Criminal Procedure that a failure to institute 
criminal proceedings may now be open to challenge as a result of R v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners, Ex parte Allen78 where the court held that the decision to prosecute was 
amenable to judicial review if an unjustified departure from normal prosecution practice could 
be established or “even if, without reference to wider policies or practice, it is insofar as it 
amounts to a breach of contract or representation.”79 
 
4.2.3 Limitations of Judicial Review in Hong Kong 
 
Since D v DPP, the Hong Kong courts have moved away from the “exaggerated sense of 
deference to ‘constitutionally guaranteed’ independent prosecutorial discretion.”80 However, 
the courts still “labour under a self-imposed unwillingness to review, expressed through 
reliance upon the strict test of unreasonableness.”81  
 
Another limitation standing against effective judicial review was described by McConville as 
“the recourse by courts to grounds for review of an essentially subjective character.”82 He 
commented that “there is, of course, a tension of another kind at work which must be 
recognised: courts are fully aware that the wider the interpretation given to unreasonableness 
the greater the risk the courts will slip into reviewing the merits of the decision as opposed to 
the decision-making process itself.”83 The courts in Hong Kong have nevertheless embraced a 
                                                
74 See Re Leung Lai Fun [2018] 1 HKLRD 523 (CA) at [14]; the Court noted that the party seeking judicial review 
of a decision not to prosecute did “not have all the information in the control of the DPP, including the statements 
and explanations of the persons concerned.” 
75 D v Director of Public Prosecutions, above n 62. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte Allen [1997] STC 1141. 
79 Bruce, above n 72; CPS “Appeals: Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Decisions” <www.CPS.gov.uk>. 
80  Michael James McConville "Politicians and Prosecutorial Accountability in Hong Kong" 36 Common Law 
World Review 355 at 375. See D v Director of Public Prosecutions, above n 62. 
81 McConville, above n 80, at 375. See Re Leung Lai Fun, above n 73. See also Ng Shek Wai v Independent 
Commission Against Corruption [2018] HKCFI 720 at [34] (a decision not to further investigate a possible 
offence). 
82 McConville, above n 80, at 367. 
83 Ibid, at 367. 
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strict view of the unreasonableness standard. The difficulties for an applicant to prove that the 
prosecution decision was made dishonestly or in bad faith is an onerous task and one that is 
unlikely to occur in practice. However, where a prosecutor provides reasons for his or her 
decision not to prosecute they may disclose as in D v DPP a clear error of law. Fok JA (now 
Fok PJ) identified the relevant duty to give reasons in Lister Assets Ltd v Chief Executive in 
Council.84 
 
4.2.4 Comparison with New Zealand  
 
While the HKSAR courts labour under a strict but a self-imposed approach to review of 
prosecution decisions, the HKSAR courts have made significant constitutional developments 
to the concept of ‘reviewability.’  
 
D v DPP is an important case to contrast with the High Court decision of Osborne v WorkSafe 
New Zealand to illustrate the differences in judicial attitudes towards reviewability in each 
jurisdiction. Counsel for both Anna Osborne in Osborne and the domestic maid “D” in D v 
DPP relied on Matalulu v Director of Public Prosecutions (Fiji) as authority for the position 
that prosecution decisions are amenable to judicial review.85 Zervos J found in D v DPP that 
Matalulu disapproved Keung Siu-wah,86 by deciding that judicial review of prosecutorial 
discretion can be exercised sparingly. One of the strong comments that came from the Matalulu 
decision was that established principles of judicial review are applicable when prosecution 
power is reviewed. Zervos J’s judgment alluded to this by holding that the prosecution decision 
was amenable to judicial review as a matter of principle. Contrastingly, Brown J’s decision in 
Osborne took a very conservative view of the Matalulu decision and focused on an extremely 
closed element of the decision which has since been overridden. Brown J was persuaded by 
Matalulu’s stance on irrelevant considerations as not open to review, yet strayed from the main 
                                                
84 Lister Assets Ltd v Chief Executive in Council CACV 172/2012, 25 April 2013 at [20] “Moreover, there is no 
general duty at Common law to give reasons for an administrative decision. Instead, the duty may arise as a matter 
of fairness in the particular circumstances of the decision. The general position is stated in R v Home Secretary ex 
p Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 at p 564E and R (Hansan) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2009] 3 All ER 
539 at 19.” At [21] “There are two situations in which, by way of exception to the general rule, reasons may be 
required for an administrative decision. The first is where the decision appears aberrant, so that the reasons for 
reaching that decision should be made known to the recipient so that he may know whether the aberration is a 
legal one (and so challengeable) or apparent. The second is where the decision engages an interest such as personal 
liberty that is so highly regarded by the law that fairness requires that reason to be given as a right. See R v Higher 
Education Funding Council, ex parte Institute of Dental Surgery [1994] 1 WLR 242 at 263.”   
85 Matalulu v Director of Public Prosecutions (Fiji) [2004] NZAR 193 (SC Fiji). 
86 Keung Siu-wah v Attorney-General, above n 40. 
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and widely approved point that when review is properly engaged, it would accord with 
principles for judicial review to be granted. Zervos J’s decision in D v DPP took a modern 
approach, in line with recent authority that has overlooked the austere parts of Matalulu.87  
 
One reason why the application for judicial review succeeded in D v DPP was that the court 
was persuaded by the English approach to judicial review of declined prosecutions. The case 
Mohit was decided by the Privy Council and was considered in D v DPP and not considered in 
the High Court in Osborne.88 The central issue in Mohit was whether the decision of the DPP 
to discontinue a private prosecution was subject to judicial review. The Privy Council, with 
Lord Bingham delivering the judgment held that the threshold for a successful challenge of a 
prosecutor’s decision is high, however “it is one thing to conclude that the courts must be 
sparing in their grant of relief to those seeking to challenge the DPP’s decisions not to prosecute 
or to discontinue a prosecution, and quite another to hold that such decisions are immune from 
any review at all.” The court in Mohit actually endorsed the view that prosecution decisions 
are poly-centric in nature as stated in Matalulu, but made it firmly clear that it does not prevent 
decisions from being reviewable at all.89 Brown J’s judgment in Osborne did not refer to the 
Mohit decision. If Mohit had been given consideration, it would have provided valuable insight 
into the more recent English approach and may have reduced the persuasiveness of the rigid 




In Canada, the Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook contains the test for 
prosecution.90 Prosecutors first consider “the evidential test, which requires that there be more 
than a bare prima facie case; however, it does not require a probability of conviction (that is, 
                                                
87 It must be noted that Matalulu v Director of Public Prosecutions, above n 85, was decided by Von Doussa and 
French JJ of the Federal Court of Australia (the latter later Chief Justice of Australia) and Keith J of the Court of 
Appeal, later of the Supreme Court of New Zealand and the International Court of Justice. The presiding judges 
in Matalulu came from countries where judicial review of discontinued prosecutions had never succeeded. This 
leaves little speculation as to why the Matalulu decision itself was so restrictive. Matalulu must be read as 
constrained by this factor, and it should now be compared against more recent cases that have widened the scope 
for review. See now R v Director of Public Prosecutions ex parte Jones (Timothy) [2000] IRLR 373, [2000] Crim 
LR 858; and Webster v Crown Prosecution Service [2014] EWHC 2516. These cases have widened the scope for 
judicial review since Matalulu. 
88 See Mohit v Director of Public Prosecutions of Mauritius, above n 40. 
89 Also approved in R v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, ex parte Blackburn [1968] 2 QB 118, [1968] 
1 All ER 763 (CA) and in R v Director of Public Prosecutions ex parte Chaudhary [1995] 1 Cr App R 136. 
90 Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook at part 2.3 referring to the Guideline of the Director Issued 
under Section 3(3)(c) of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act, S.C. 2006, c.9, s. 121. 
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that a conviction is more likely than not).”91 Prosecutors then consider whether a prosecution 
would best serve the public interest. 
  
4.3.1 Judicial Reviewability of Prosecutions Decisions 
 
The Canadian courts have repeatedly affirmed that prosecutorial discretion is necessary for the 
proper functioning of the criminal justice system in light of R v Cook.92 In Miazga v Kvello 
Estate prosecutorial discretion was considered fundamentally important “not in protecting the 
interests of individual Crown attorneys, but in advancing the public interest by enabling 
prosecutors to make discretionary decisions in fulfilment of their professional obligations 
without fear of judicial or political interference, thus fulfilling their quasi-judicial role as 
‘ministers of justice.’” 93 In Sriskandarajah v United States of America, the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that: “Not only does prosecutorial discretion accord with the principles of 
fundamental justice — it constitutes an indispensable device for the effective enforcement of 
the criminal law.”94 
 
In R v Anderson, the court held that all Crown decision-making is reviewable, but made the 
distinction that “decisions of Crown prosecutors are either exercises of prosecutorial discretion 
or tactics and conduct before the court.”95 Subsequent to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Krieger v Law Society of Alberta,96 the law had been clouded as a result of confusion over the 
meaning of “prosecutorial discretion,” so the Anderson court took the opportunity to clarify 
this point. The court found that “prosecutorial discretion” is an expansive term covering all 
“decisions regarding the nature and extent of the prosecution and the Attorney General’s 
participation in it.” 97  
 
The courts in Canada afford a high level of deference to prosecutors making their prosecution 
decisions. In Anderson, the court observed that:98 “The many decisions that Crown prosecutors 
                                                
91 Armani Da Silva v The United Kingdom, above n 1 at [184]. 
92 R v Cook [1997] 1 SCR 1113, at [19]. See also R v Beare [1988] 2 SCR 387 at 410; R v T (V) [1992] 1 SCR 
749 at 758-762. 
93 Miazga v Kvello Estate 2009 SCC 51, [2009] 3 SCR 339 at [47]. 
94 Sriskandarajah v United States of America 2012 SCC 70, [2012] 3 SCR 609 at [27]. 
95 R v Anderson 2014 SCC 41 [2014] 2 SCR 167 at [36]. 
96 Krieger v law Society of Alberta 2002 SCC 65, [2002] 3 SCR 372. 
97 R v Anderson, above n 95, at [44], citing Krieger v law Society of Alberta, above n 96 at [47]. 
98 Ibid, at [46]. 
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are called upon to make in the exercise of their prosecutorial discretion must not be subjected 
to routine second-guessing by the courts. The courts have long recognized that decisions 
involving prosecutorial discretion are unlike other decisions made by the executive: see 
M Code , “Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Decisions: A Short History of Costs and Benefits, 
in Response to Justice Rosenberg” (2009) 34 Queen’s LJ 863, at 867.” On the same footing, 
the court in Power commented that judicial reluctance to interfere in prosecutorial decisions is 
a “matter of principle based on the doctrine of separation of powers as well as a matter of policy 
founded on the efficiency of the system of criminal justice” which also recognizes that 
prosecutorial discretion is “especially ill-suited to judicial review.” 99 
 
The Anderson court affirmed that “manifestly, prosecutorial discretion is entitled to 
considerable deference. It is not, however, immune from all judicial oversight.”100 The court 
in R v Jewitt reversed a long line of authority, and effectively established judicial review of 
prosecutorial misconduct at common law.101 The Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed on 
several occasions that prosecutorial discretion is also reviewable for abuse of process.102 
 
4.3.2 The Highest Legal Test for Review 
 
Canada currently maintains the highest threshold for review of non-prosecutions in all of the 
selected jurisdictions. The legal test is one of ‘flagrant impropriety.’103 The courts only take 
into account the prosecutor’s decision-making process and exclude any consideration of factors 
that the prosecutor may have paid regard to in reaching his final decision. In Kostuch v Alberta 
(Attorney General) the court used Miller ACJ’s definition104 of ‘flagrant impropriety’ that it 
“can only be established by proof of misconduct bordering on corruption, violation of the law, 
bias against or for a particular individual or offence.”105 The court in Nixon v R held that the 
abuse of process doctrine comes into play where there is evidence that the Crown’s decision 
                                                
99 R v Power [1994] 1 SCR 601 at 623. 
100 R v Anderson, above n 95, at [48]. 
101 R v Jewitt [1985] 2 SCR 128 (SCC).  
102 Krieger v Law society of Alberta, above n 96, at [32]; Nixon v R [1984] 2 SCR 197 at [31]; Miazga v Kvello 
Estate, above n 93, at [46]. 
103 Gentles v Ontario (Attorney-General) (1996), 39 CRR (2d) 319, 1996 CarswellOnt 4247 (QL) at [55]; Perks 
v Ontario (Attorney General) 1998 CarswellOnt 416, [1998] OJ no. 421; Krieger v Law society of Alberta, above 
n 96, at [49], Kostuch v Attorney General (1995), 174 AR 109 (CA) at [33]. 
104 Kostuch v Alberta (1991), 121 AR 219, 66 CCC (3rd) 201 (QB) at 206 per Miller ACJ.  
105 Kostuch v Alberta (Attorney-General), above n 103, at [34]. 
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“undermines the integrity of the judicial process” or “results in trial unfairness.”106 The Court 
also referred to “improper motive[s]” and “bad faith”107 in its discussion. Courts in more recent 
cases generally use the precise term of ‘flagrant impropriety’ and have added to the definition 
of it, ‘improper motive,’108 ‘bad faith’ or ‘so wrong as to violate the conscience of the 
community.’109 
 
There have been recent attempts to expand the meaning of ‘flagrant impropriety’ but the courts 
have to date, been unaccepting of further expansion. In both the cases of Kostuch v Attorney 
General and Gentles v Ontario (Attorney-General), the argument that violations of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms should be grounds to review the charging decisions 
of prosecutors was raised.110 In both cases the argument was rejected, finding that violations of 
s7 of the Charter does not amount to ‘flagrant impropriety,’ preventing the courts from 
intervention. The argument was also tested in McHale v Ontario (Attorney-General) regarding 
a violation of section 15 of the Charter involving prosecutorial bias towards police.111 The 
argument did not stand in that case either. The courts have also dismissed arguments to expand 
the definition of ‘flagrant impropriety’ to include a simple “error of law”112 and where 
allegations of Aboriginal rights being violated, were unfounded.113 However, it appears that 
true violations of Aboriginal rights may be accepted as ‘flagrant impropriety’ in light of the 
statement made by Moldaver J in R v Anderson, at least where Aboriginals have been subject 
to prosecutorial discrimination: “Crown decisions motivated by prejudice against Aboriginal 
persons would certainly meet this standard.”114 
 
The Canadian legal system has its roots in the common law legal tradition, except for the 
Province of Québec which has its own unique legal system.115 The courts in Québec have 
adopted a wider definition of ‘flagrant impropriety,’ that extends to decisions of the Crown 
                                                
106 Nixon v R, above n 102, at [64] 
107 Ibid, at [68]. 
108 Perks v Ontario (Attorney General), above n 103 at [8]. 
109 Gentles v Ontario (Attorney-General), above n 103, at [54].  
110 Kostuch v Attorney General, above n 103; Gentles v Ontario (Attorney-General), above n 103. 
111 McHale v Ontario (Attorney-General) 2011 CarswellOnt 5984, 239 CRR (2d) 73. 
112 Zhang v Canada (Attorney- General) (2007) 61 Admin LR (4th) 99 at [14].  
113 Labrador Metis Nation v Canada (Attorney General) 267 FTR 219, [2005] 4 CNLR 212, 35 Admin LR (4th) 
239. 
114 R v Anderson, above n 95, at [50]. 
115 Québec is the only province in Canada which regulates civil matters by French-heritage civil law. Other areas 
of the law such as; public law, criminal law and other federal law operate in accordance to Canadian common 
law. 
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prosecutor that are “patently unreasonable.”116 Although the standard in Québec is lower than 
the ‘flagrant impropriety’ standard used in the rest of Canada, the permissible grounds of 
review paired with the burdensome standards of evidential proof, have made the ‘patently 
unreasonable’ standard similarly burdensome for claimants to satisfy. 
 
The burden of proof required for the ‘flagrant impropriety’ standard lies on the accused to 
establish on the balance of probabilities the proper evidentiary foundation to proceed with an 
abuse of process claim.117 However it was recognised by the court in Nixon that since the 
Crown will almost always be the only party who knows why a particular decision was made, 
the Crown may be required to give their reasons for making the decision in order to justify the 
decision taken when the claimant has satisfied the evidentiary foundation.118 Moldaver J in 
Anderson noted that:119 “Requiring the claimant to establish a proper evidentiary foundation 
before embarking on an inquiry into the reasons behind the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion120 respects the presumption that prosecutorial discretion is exercised in good 
faith…It also accords with this Court’s statement in Sriskandarajah, that ‘prosecutorial 
authorities are not bound to provide reasons for their decisions, absent evidence of bad faith or 
improper motives.’”121 
 
In R v Power, it was held that the court should be presented with “overwhelming evidence that 
the proceedings under scrutiny are unfair.”122 In R v Roach the court concluded that it is not 
always necessary for cases under review to require an evidential foundation of affidavits or 
viva voce testimony.123 
 
                                                
116Bérubé c Québec (Procureur general) 1996 CarswellQue 1183, [1997] RJQ 86. See also, Law Society of New 
Brunswick v Ryan [2003] 1 SCR 247 at [52] per Justice Iacobucci; “A decision that is patently unreasonable is so 
flawed that no amount of curial deference can justify letting it stand.” 
117 R v Anderson, above n 95, at 52 per Moldaver J; R v Cook, above n 91, at [62]; R v O’Connor, [1995] 4 SCR 
411 at [69] per L’Heureux-Dubé J; R v Jolivet [2000] 1 SCR 751 at [19]. 
118 Nixon v R, above n 102, at [60]. 
119 R v Anderson, above n 95, at [55]. 
120 Application under s83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re) 2004 SCC 42, [2004] 2 SCR 248 at [95]. 
121 Sriskandarajah v United States of America, above n 94, at [27]. 
122 R v Power, above n 99, at [17] per L’Heureux-Dubé J. 
123 R v Roach 2013 ABQB 472 at [36]. 
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Despite the ‘flagrant impropriety’ being the automatic standard used to review prosecutorial 
discretion in Canada, claimants may also bring review for “malicious prosecution.”124 To 
establish malicious prosecution the plaintiff must prove the following:125  
1. Initiated by the defendant; 
2. Terminated in favour of the plaintiff; 
3. Undertaking without reasonable and probable cause; and 
4. Motivated by malice or a primary purpose other than carrying the law into effect. 
Canadian claimants have experienced greater success for challenges that have been bought on 
the grounds of “malicious prosecution” or “abuse of process” for the simple reason that the 
courts have more power to intervene and a greater evidential matrix during a trial. In fact, 
claimants are nowadays attempting to rely on the abuse of process doctrine instead of claiming 
alleged ‘flagrant impropriety’ in order to seek a certiorari order against Crown prosecutors that 
have stopped private prosecutions, on the sheer basis that the courts are more likely to 
intervene.126 However, none of these attempts to date have been successful. In the case 
Ahmadoun v Ontario the court had grave doubts whether the applicant had standing to seek to 
quash the Crown’s decision entering a stay in criminal proceedings against a defendant.127  
 
4.3.3 Comparison with New Zealand  
 
In Canada, the Crown prosecutor’s discretionary power to prosecute or not derives from 
prerogative power.128 Although the courts have accepted that such decisions are justiciable, the 
fact that the power is still sourced in the prerogative might indicate why the courts in 
recognition of common law tradition, have afforded a high level of deference to prosecutors 
that is unmatched across other jurisdictions and have set the exacting standard of ‘flagrant 
impropriety.’ The New Zealand position is different in that the courts willingness to intervene 
is not conditioned by the source of the discretionary power. Rather, it is only whether the 
exercise of that power is lawful that remains critical.  
 
                                                
124 Krieger v Law Society of Alberta, above n 96, at [46], [47] and [49]; the Supreme Court of Canada held that 
courts may interfere in circumstances of ‘flagrant impropriety’ or ‘malicious prosecution.’ 
125 Miazga v Kvello Estate, above n 93 at [3]; Nelles v Ontario [1989] 2 SCR 170 at 193; Proulx v The Attorney 
General of Quebec [2001] 3 SCR 9 at [123]. 
126 Ahmadoun v Ontario (Attorney General) 281 CCC (3d) 270, [2012] OJ No 639 (QL). 
127 Ibid, at [6]. 
128  The scope and exercise of the prerogative power of the Crown prosecutor to decide whether to prosecute is 
sourced from common law practice that has not been codified in Canada. 
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The most explicit difference between the two jurisdictions are the tests used by their respective 
courts and the standards of proof required to meet evidentiary thresholds. Comparatively, the 
Canadian ‘flagrant impropriety’ standard is far more stringent than New Zealand’s ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ approach.129 In the Canadian case R v Durette Finlayson JA observed that it 
was the burden of the applicant to give sufficient and clear evidence to support his allegation 
against the Crown Prosecutor and that this must be done before the court will scrutinise the 
prosecutor’s exercise of discretionary power.130 If the burden is not met, it is assumed by the 
courts that there are no issues relating to the exercise of power by the Crown prosecutor. It was 
noted in R v Laforme that mere conjecture or speculation is insufficient to meet the ‘flagrant 
impropriety’ threshold.131   
 
Crown prosecutors in both jurisdictions are not obliged to provide reasons for their charging 
decisions. When reasons are not given in a decision not to prosecute, it becomes extremely 
difficult for victims to obtain evidence concerning the decision-making process that would go 
towards satisfying the evidential threshold. 
 
4.4 United Kingdom  
 
4.4.1 Different Approaches to Judicial Review of Decisions to and not to Prosecute 
 
Of all the jurisdictions selected for consideration, the law in the United Kingdom will have the 
most weight in terms of judicial direction for New Zealand. The New Zealand legal system is 
heavily based on English law, and by virtue of the common heritage, remains similar in many 
respects. Both jurisdictions do not have a single document written constitution, therefore the 
confines of judicial review cannot be delineated by any words in a constitution.132 Furthermore, 
both jurisdictions do not define the appropriate scope of judicial review by any statute. The 
                                                
129 Although the ‘exceptional circumstances’ approach only allows for review if it can be established that “the 
prosecuting authority acted in bad faith or brought the prosecution for collateral purposes”; Polynesian Spa Ltd v 
Osborne [2005] NZAR 408 (HC) at [64] this is still a less limited form of review than that requiring ‘flagrant 
impropriety’. But see Dean R Knight “A Murky Methodology: Standards of Review in Administrative Law” 
(2006) 6 NZJPIL 117 at 145-146; who made the reference that judicial review of prosecutorial discretion in New 
Zealand would fall under the ‘flagrant impropriety’ standard of review when applying his own framework for the 
basis of judicial intervention. 
130 R v Durette (1992) 72 CCC (3d) 421 at 437 – 439. 
131 R v Laforme (2003),57 WCB (2d) 40, [2003] OJ no 845 (Ont SCJ) at [8]. 
132 For discussion of New Zealand’s constitutional structure and the foundations of judicial review see Joseph, 
Philip A Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (4th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2014) at [8.0] and 
[22.0]. 
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legislation133 that relates to the review in this context is procedural only, and therefore it is the 
full responsibility of the courts in both jurisdictions to set the limits or boundaries to the 
grounds of review as a function of the supervisory jurisdiction under the Rule of Law.134 
 
Judicial review of prosecution decisions to prosecute or not is a situation that is treated with 
special restraint in the United Kingdom, but it is accepted that such decisions are amenable to 
review.135 The United Kingdom’s Supreme Court in Belhaj and another v Director of Public 
Prosecutions gave a short summary of the position:136 “The High Court’s review jurisdiction 
extends in principle to the exercise of any official’s functions in relation to the criminal process 
These include…decisions of prosecutors whether or not to prosecute (R (Corner House 
Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office (JUSTICE Intervening) [2009] 1 AC 756, 
para 30), or of the Director of Public Prosecutions to consent to a prosecution (R v Director of 
Public Prosecutions, Ex p Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326); and decisions of the Attorney General 
whether to take over a prosecution or enter a nolle prosequi (Mohit v Director of Public 
Prosecutions of Mauritius [2006] 1 WLR 3343).” 
 
In R (on the application of Gujra) v Crown Prosecution Service it was held that “The general 
approach of the courts is to disturb a decision of an independent prosecutor only in highly 
exceptional cases.”137 The Court in Sharma made a similar observation stating “judicial review 
of a prosecutorial decision, although available in principle, is a highly exceptional remedy.”138 
                                                
133 Formerly the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 and now the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016 [NZ]. 
134 As noted in GDS Taylor Judicial Review: A New Zealand Perspective (3rd ed, Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2014) 
at [5.02], the legislative history surrounding the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 indicates that the legislation 
was intended merely to renovate the procedure for judicial review. See now the Judicial Review Procedure Act 
2016. 
135 In certain circumstances the courts in the United Kingdom have also been willing to judicially review 
prosecutorial decisions relating to youths. See R v Chief Constable of Kent, ex parte L; R v Director of Public 
Prosecutions, ex parte B (1991) 93 Cr App R 416; the Divisional Court held that prosecutorial discretion to 
prosecute a youth or not is not amenable to judicial review. The court decided however that judicial review is only 
able to only succeed where evidence could be shown that the decision was made regardless of, or clearly contrary 
to, a settled policy of the DPP evolved in the public interest (for example, the policy of cautioning juveniles). In 
R (on the application of F) v Crown Prosecution Service and Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2003] EWHC 
3266 (Admin); the court decided a judicial review application involving a decision to pursue a prosecution against 
a youth. The claimant argued that his case should be dealt with by way of a final warning. That application failed 
as the Divisional Court held that all relevant matters had been considered and that the prosecutor had given proper 
regard to the Code for Crown Prosecutors, and that the prosecutor’s decision was rational. The court made the 
observation that it was inappropriate for it to retake decisions that Parliament had entrusted to the CPS except in 
exceptional circumstances.  
136 Belhaj and another v Director of Public Prosecutions [2018] EWHC 3056, 4 July 2018 at [16]. 
137 R (on the application of Gujra) v Crown Prosecution Service [2012] UKSC 52, [2013] 1 AC 484 (UKSC) 
at [41]. 
138 Sharma v Brown-Antoine, above 59, at [14(5)]. 
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Likewise, in R (Bermingham) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office the court found that 
judicial review of the prosecutor’s decision whether to launch a prosecution is to be exercised 
sparingly.139 The court in Mohit also commented that the prosecutorial decisions of English 
Directors of Public Prosecutions are in principle amenable to judicial review.140  
 
The administrative courts of England and Wales take different approaches to review depending 
on whether the decision was to prosecute or whether it was not to prosecute. The Supreme 
Court in Belhaj explained that:141 “Judicial review proceedings challenging decisions whether 
or not to prosecute are not common. In the case of decisions not to prosecute, a more 
appropriate forum for any challenge is usually the criminal process itself, in which the court 
has power to halt proceedings if they constitute an abuse. Nevertheless, challenges by potential 
defendants by way of judicial review to decisions to prosecute are probably more familiar than 
challenges by victims, interest groups or others by way of judicial review to decisions not to 
prosecute.” 
 
4.4.2 Judicial Review of the Decision to Prosecute 
 
In R v (Pepushi) v Crown Prosecution Service the court observed “save in wholly exceptional 
circumstances, applications in respect of pending prosecutions that seek to challenge the 
decision to prosecute should not be made in this court. The proper course to follow…is to take 
the point in accordance with procedures of the Criminal courts.”142 In R v Panel on Takeovers 
and Mergers, Steyn LJ in the Court of Appeal noted obiter that “in the absence of evidence of 
fraud, corruption or mala fides, judicial review will not be allowed to probe a decision to charge 
individuals in criminal proceedings.”143 The court in Kebilene made a similar observation and 
held that where there is a remedy within the criminal process and there is no finding of 
dishonesty, bad faith or other exceptional circumstance, the DPP’s decision is not amenable to 
judicial review.144  
                                                
139 R (Bermingham) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2006] EWHC 200 (Admin), [2007] QB 727 
at [63]. 
140 Mohit v Director of Public Prosecutions of Mauritius, above n 40, at [18]. 
141 Belhaj and another v Director of Public Prosecutions, above n 136 at [32]. 
142 R v (Pepushi) v Crown Prosecution Service [2004] EWHC 789 (Admin) at [49]. 
143 R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Fayed [1992] BCC 524 at 536C-D per Steyn LJ. 
144 R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene and Others [1999] UKHL 43, [2000] 2 AC 326, [1999] 
3 WLR 972 at 337. See to the same effect, in the context of a decision to prosecute, the terse rejection of a 
challenge to a prosecution by Simon France J in Rowell v District Court of Wellington [2017] NZHC 2706; 
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In R v Panel of Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc the Court of Appeal held that the 
amenability of judicial review often requires an examination of the nature of the power under 
challenge including its source:145  
 
In all the reports it is possible to find enumerations of factors giving rise to the jurisdiction [of 
judicial review], but it is a fatal error to regard the presence of all those factors as essential or 
as being exclusive of other factors. Possibly the only essential elements are what can be 
described as a public element, which can take many different forms, and the exclusion from the 
jurisdiction of bodies whose sole source of power is a consensual submission to its jurisdiction. 
 
In Allen, the High Court Queen’s Bench Division found that decisions to prosecute are 
judicially reviewable if evidence can establish that there was an unjustified departure from 
settled prosecution practice.146 Review may also be available if there is no reference to any 
wider policy or practice, where the actions are so unfair that it amounts to a breach of contract 
or representation. The courts in Allen emphasised that judicial review of decisions to prosecute 
will though very rarely succeed.  
 
The Divisional Court in R v Liverpool City JJ and the CPS, ex parte Price held that the 
circumstances for a review of a decision to prosecute would have to be exceptional where there 
is perversity, or if the decision is contrary to the Code for Crown Prosecutors.147 However, in 
practice, the courts are reluctant to intervene in the expanded grounds of acting perversely or 
contrary to the Code for Crown Prosecutors.  
 
In Kebilene, the House of Lords stated “absent dishonesty or mala fides or an exceptional 
circumstance, the decision of the Director to consent to the prosecution of the [claimants] is 
not amenable to judicial review.”148 The court then quashed the Divisional Court’s declaration 
that the continuing decision of the DPP to proceed with the prosecution was unlawful.  
 
There are numerous policy reasons that underlie the court’s reluctance to review a prosecutor’s 
decision to prosecute without first demonstrating fraud, corruption, or mala fides in the 
                                                
[2017] NZAR 1717 pointing out the full powers of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 to deal with such issues at 
trial by conventional procedures. 
145 R v Panel of Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc [1987] QB 815, [1986] 2 All ER 257 per Lord 
Donaldson MR. 
146 R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte Allen, above n 78. 
147 R v Liverpool City JJ and the Crown Prosecution Service, ex parte Price (1998) 162 JP 766. 
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decision-making process. The case Sharma highlights the critical reason that the accused has 
alternative options other than judicial review, such as subsequent criminal trials or the ability 
to file a motion to stay a prosecution where there has been an abuse of process.149  
 
In Sharma, judicial review was sought as to a decision to begin disciplinary proceedings against 
the Chief Justice of Trinidad and Tobago who was charged with attempting to pervert the 
course of justice. The Privy Council held that although decisions to prosecute are susceptible 
to review, interference with the prosecutor’s decision would be rare and the court must be 
satisfied that such a claim would have a realistic prospect of success and could not be addressed 
through the normal criminal process. The request was rejected by the court as it saw that the 
matter could be resolved though the criminal process and held that it was the correct forum to 
deal with the issue at hand.150  
 
The court in R (Barons Pub Company) v Staines Magistrates Court considered whether public 
law principles that limit the scope of judicial review should be imported into criminal 
litigation.151 The defendant company was charged with contraventions of the Food Hygiene 
(England) Regulations 2006 and the local council decided to prosecute. The defendant 
company applied to stay the proceedings as an abuse of process as it contended that the decision 
to prosecute was perverse because it was in breach of the council’s enforcement policy. The 
company proposed that the magistrates to review the prosecutorial decision via “mini judicial 
review.” The Administrative Court dismissed the claim and found that a challenge relating to 
such a decision should not be made outside of the criminal proceedings. It may only be 
challenged as an abuse of process application which, by definition, could only be determined 
by the criminal trial court.  
 
The authorities regarding judicial review of the decision to prosecute demonstrate that review 
in this context is almost insurmountable. There appears to be only one modern example where 
such a judicial review in the United Kingdom has succeeded. In the case E and others v DPP 
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judicial review was sought of a decision by the respondent to prosecute a 14-year-old child for 
her alleged sexual abuse of her two younger sisters aged five and six.152 The case succeeded in 
review on the point that the prosecution policy had not “as a matter of irrefutable substance” 
been correctly applied.153 The prosecutor’s explanations for the decision were quite radically 
deficient and were such that it was “impossible to know” how the prosecutor had reconciled or 
dealt with the powerful countervailing considerations involving the welfare of all the children. 
 
4.4.3 Judicial Review of Decisions Not to Prosecute 
 
Prosecutorial decisions not to prosecute in the United Kingdom are amenable to review, 
however the courts have emphasized that intervention should be sparingly exercised.154 Judicial 
review of decisions not to prosecute share the same grounds of “fraud, corruption, and mala 
fides” for review as decisions to prosecute, however the courts are comparatively more 
receptive of variegated forms of intensity of review and structured forms of deference.155 As a 
result, applications for review of non-prosecutions has achieved some success in the United 
Kingdom.156 In Manning, Lord Bingham CJ gave a comprehensive reason explaining that if 
the standard of review were ‘too exacting’ victims will have no effective remedies to deal with 
flawed decisions as decisions not to prosecute do not proceed to trial, nor do they go through 
other proceedings where the legitimacy of such decisions may be checked.157 His Lordship’s 
reasoning and principle was adopted in subsequent cases.158  
 
                                                
152 E and others v Director of Public Prosecutions [2011] EWHC 1465 (Admin), [2012] 1 Cr App R 6, [2012] 
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154 R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Chaudhary, above n 89. 
155 See Dean R Knight “Modulating the Depth of Scrutiny in Judicial Review” [2016] New Zealand Law Review 
at 78. See R v Director of Public Prosecutions v ex parte Manning [2001] QB 330, where the court examined the 
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In R v DPP Ex parte Chaudhary Kennedy LJ noted: “It has been common ground before us in 
the light of the authorities that this Court does have power to review a decision of the Director 
of Public Prosecutions not to prosecute, but the authorities also show that the power is one to 
be sparingly exercised.”159 His Lordship continued stating: “From all those decisions it seems 
to me that in the context of the present case this court can be persuaded to act if and only if it 
is demonstrated to us that the Director of Public Prosecutions…arrived at the decisions not to 
prosecute…”160 Whereupon he proceeded to set out the basic principles that ought to be 
considered in determining whether a decision not to prosecute should be overturned, and 
established three possible grounds of review. It was held that judicial review is permissible 
only if it can be demonstrated that the DPP acting through the CPS arrived at the decision not 
to prosecute:161  
 
1) Because of some unlawful policy… 
2) Because the Director of Public Prosecutions failed to act in accordance with his or her own 
settled policy as set out in the Code; or  
3) Because the decision was perverse. It was a decision at which no reasonable prosecutor could 
have arrived. 
 
Of all the grounds founded by Kennedy LJ, perversity has the highest threshold. His Lordship 
held that perversity included illegality as well as unreasonableness, and is similar to how Lord 
Greene MR interpreted ‘unreasonableness’ in the (in)famous Wednesbury decision, to refer to 
both illegality and to irrationality.162 Only the first ground of unlawful policy matches the New 
Zealand decision in Polynesian Spa. The other two grounds; failure to act in accordance with 
the Code and perversity of the decision were not considered. The Polynesian Spa decision 
made the scope for judicial review of prosecution decisions not to prosecute very limited. Only 
where there is bad faith, a collateral purpose or an unlawful policy, can the decision be 
reviewed.163 However, other grounds of review such as abuse of a discretionary power and 
material error of law or fact, may produce the same outcome where the Guidelines are not 
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followed. The New Zealand courts have never articulated outright if perversity is a ground for 
review.  
 
The United Kingdom has a great body of jurisprudence regarding judicial review of the 
decision not to prosecute. Some cases which have experienced success under the grounds 
founded in Chaudhary are considered below.164 
 
4.4.4 Error in Law 
The facts of Chaudhary related to the issue of whether the prosecutor approached his decision 
in accordance with the Code.165 The court observed that the CPS had confused or conflated 
consensual buggery and non-consensual buggery, which are two separate and distinct offences 
in the evidentiary sufficiency test. The court held that since the prosecutor had looked to 
convict on a less serious offence and failed to consider the question of whether the evidential 
sufficiency criteria had been met in relation to the more serious offence, the prosecutor had 
therefore made an error of law, making his decision to discontinue ultimately irrational.  
In R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Jones (Timothy), the Divisional Court found 
that the DPP’s decision not to prosecute a company or its managing director for the 
manslaughter of the claimant’s brother in a workplace accident had been irrationally 
concluded.166 The court held that the DPP had correctly identified the objective test for gross 
negligence manslaughter, but then had permitted a lack of subjective recklessness to intrude so 
as to be able to decide not to prosecute. The DPP also failed to address other factors which, in 
the absence of subjective recklessness would usually go against the prospects of a successful 
conviction. The court decided that the DPP’s conclusion that the danger had not been 
sufficiently obvious was irrational.  
4.4.5 Evidential Insufficiency 
In R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Manning, the court examined the 
reasonableness of the prosecutor applying the evidential sufficiency test.167 It was found by the 
court that the prosecutor had not properly taken into account certain critical evidential matters 
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and had applied a test that was higher than required by the Code in determining the prospect 
of success. It was not required by the Code that if a prosecution was brought, that it would 
more likely than not result in a conviction. Also, the CPS was not required to establish the 
equivalent standard of proof as that required of a jury or magistrates court after trial, in 
assessing whether to initiate a conviction or not.  
R (on the application of B) v Director of Public Prosecutions was a case involving a serious 
assault where “B” the victim, had his ear bitten off.168 The victim identified “HR” as the ear 
biter. B had a history of psychotic illness which lead him to hold paranoid beliefs about some 
people, and he also experienced hallucinations. There was no evidence of this in relation to HR 
however. A medical report describing B’s mental condition concluded that it might affect B’s 
perception and recollection of events. On this basis, the prosecutor decided without further 
investigation that this precluded him from putting B before the jury as a reliable witness in the 
absence of any other evidence to confirm that HR was the ear biter. The prosecutor offered no 
evidence. The court held that the prosecutor misapplied the Code by deciding not to prosecute 
on the basis of B’s metal health. The decision was held to be both irrational and also constituted 
a violation of the victim’s right under Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
 
4.4.6 Procedural Unfairness 
 
In certain circumstances, the English courts have allowed judicial review of decisions not to 
prosecute under the ground of procedural unfairness. The court in Manning made the point that 
the prosecutor had not given reasons behind his decision not to prosecute in the unlawful killing 
of a man in custody, which violated Article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR).169 In following the reasoning of the Manning court, the High Court of England and 
Wales decided in R (Peter Dennis) v DPP, that judicial review is available “where an inquest 
jury has found unlawful killing, the reasons why a prosecution did not follow have not been 
clearly expressed.”170 The court also took consideration of the case Jones (Timothy) and found 
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that if it can be shown that the evidence used by the prosecutor in making his decision is 
irrational, then that may also be grounds for review.171 
 
Although the grounds for review in the United Kingdom have developed to be significantly 
more expansive than the available grounds in New Zealand, the chance of ultimate success for 
judicial review in England and Wales still remains slim. The following cases illustrate the 
various ways the courts have refused to intervene in a decision not to prosecute.   
 
The case Patrick John Lewin v Crown Prosecution Service, involved a CPS decision not to 
prosecute for manslaughter by gross negligence. An application for judicial review was made 
but dismissed by the Divisional Court.172 There was evidence contained in a letter written by 
the CPS which outlined the reasons for the decision. The court held that the prosecutor’s 
reasoning and conclusions regarding causation could not be faulted. It was found that there was 
no possibility of proving beyond reasonable doubt that a reasonable person in the position of 
the potential accused would have foreseen the risk of death. The prosecutor had adhered to the 
prosecution Code and the decision not to prosecute could not be found to be premature nor 
tainted by an earlier decision not to prosecute.  
 
In R (Da Silva) v Director of Public Prosecutions the Divisional Court dismissed a judicial 
review application of the prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute any police officers for the 
murder or gross negligence manslaughter of the claimant’s cousin in a fatal shooting.173 The 
court found that the decision in Manning remained good law following the introduction of the 
European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law, and thus continued to provide the 
relevant test concerning the lawfulness of decisions of prosecutors not to bring prosecutions.174 
The court noted that the decision had been made by a highly-experienced Crown prosecutor 
which was then reviewed by the DPP and a leading counsel both of whom had special expertise 
of serious criminal trials. The Court also observed that the decision-making process was careful 
and thorough and that the Crown Prosecutor had given proper regard to the Code and applied 
the evidential test properly relating to each of the individuals. 
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In Marshall v Director of Public Prosecutions, the appellant sought judicial review of a 
decision not to prosecute that involved police officers shooting the appellant’s son.175 The 
decision was made on the basis that there was on insufficient evidence to bring a charge. It was 
argued by the appellant that the DPP’s reasoning was insufficient making the court’s task to 
consider that decision futile. The Privy Council disagreed and held that the DPP was under no 
obligation to provide further reasoning since it appeared that the prosecutor had not 
misapprehended or failed to include any important piece of evidence in his consideration. The 
decision was also not found to be inexplicable nor aberrant. The main issue in the case was 
whether the DPP could have made his decision sensibly on the evidence, which the Privy 
Council found that he could, and thus the appeal was unsuccessful.   
4.4.7 Recent Developments 
 
On the 4th of July 2018, the United Kingdom Supreme Court handed down its decision in 
Belhaj. The appellants sought judicial review of the failure to prosecute Sir Mark Allen (a 
former MI6 officer). The application was brought on three grounds: misdirection of law, 
procedural unfairness and inconsistency with the evidence. The Supreme Court held that only 
the last of these grounds was relevant to the issue before them and allowed the appeal on the 
basis that “decision not to prosecute was irrational because…the material in the public 
domain alone [was] enough to make good the elements of the relevant offences.”176 
 
In June 2013, the CPS in England and Wales launched the Victims’ Right to Review Scheme 
(VRRS) which gave effect to the principles laid down in the case of R v Christopher Killick 
and Article 11 of the European Union (EU) Directive establishing minimum standards on the 
rights, support and protection of victims of crime.177 The scheme was designed to make review 
of CPS decisions not to prosecute easier for victims of crime.178 The court in Killick held that 
victims have a right to seek review in circumstances where a decision not to prosecute has been 
made and that victims should not have to seek recourse to judicial review.179 The court 
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recognised that prosecutors can make errors and therefore an administrative review process 
must be made available to ensure accountability and redress. The court also stated that the right 
to review should be made the subject of a clearer procedure and guidance with time limits. 
 
The VRRS mechanism is co-extensive with the right of a victim to seek judicial review of 
decisions not to prosecute. When a request for review has been made, the CPS arranges for an 
immediate review of the case by a prosecutor who has had no previous dealings with the case 
to determine whether the matter can be resolved quickly. If the issue cannot be solved at this 
stage, the matter proceeds to an independent review carried out by the Appeals and Review 
Unit or a Chief Crown Prosecutor to determine whether the decision was right or wrong.180 The 
standard of review of the VRRS is correctness.181 It allows reviews “even in the case or mere 
error-extending the role of victims as agents of accountability.”182 This standard is lower and 
more easily proved than the standard of reasonableness generally applied in judicial reviews 
taken in the United Kingdom.183  
 
Dr Marie Manikis argues however, that the VRRS includes numerous limitations to 
accountability. “First, some have argued that it presents severe objectivity issues since these 
reviews are typically made internally by the CPS. Second, review is limited under this 
mechanism to decisions not to prosecute.”184 Dr Manikis highlighted that victims also have an 
interest in ensuring that decisions to prosecute and decisions to enter into plea discussions are 
“justified and not tainted with defects, and that a trial might not always be possible or present 
a sufficient safeguard against these flaws.”185 
 
Even though the administrative review must be exhausted before victims can proceed to 
judicial review and the VRRS may bear other limitations, the United Kingdom is the first of 
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all common law jurisdictions to give victims a more accessible process to have prosecution 
decisions not to prosecute reviewed, including a lower standard to contest those decisions. To 
this extent, the United Kingdom is leading the way in giving victims better procedural rights 
and a participation framework based on accountability, “the CPS decision-making in the first 
instance is an important milestone for victims in their integration into a system of justice that 
otherwise ill affords victims’ rights that can be enforced against the state.”186  
 
4.4.8 Comparison with New Zealand 
New Zealand’s stance on judicial review of decisions not to prosecute is similar to the United 
Kingdom’s position on review of decision to prosecute. The scope for review of decisions not 
to prosecute is considerably more expansive in the United Kingdom since more grounds for 
review are available.  
The jurisprudence of the United Kingdom indicates two significant judicial trends. Firstly, the 
courts have taken a much more “nuanced and variegated”187 stance to justiciability of 
prosecution decisions. Secondly, where the rights of individuals are concerned, the courts are 
more willing to require prosecutors to be accountable for the process of their decision-making 
by asking them to provide “reference to the policy basis on which decisions have been taken, 
and justification in the form of either archival reasons or explanation to the court on judicial 
review.”188 The introduction of the VRRS scheme is also indicative of an effort to improve 
confidence in the justice system. There is a greater level of accountability where prosecutorial 
discretionary power is concerned in the United Kingdom, and the extensive body of 
jurisprudence will continue to be a useful comparative source for the courts in New Zealand.189 
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4.5 South Africa 
 
4.5.1 Prosecution Decision Trends in South Africa 
 
South Africa has a 'hybrid' or 'mixed' legal system, which was formed by combining several 
distinct legal traditions; the civil law system inherited from the Dutch, the common law from 
the United Kingdom and the customary law of indigenous Africans. The different legal 
traditions have a complex inter-relationship, however the English influence is most prominent 
in the procedural aspects of the legal system. As a general rule, the law in South Africa for 
criminal and civil procedure follows the common law tradition, thus making the jurisdiction a 
worthwhile comparator for judicial review.  
 
In South Africa, all prosecutors work for the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) which was 
established as a result of South Africa’s transition to democracy.190 Under South African law, 
the Constitution empowers the NPA to institute criminal proceedings on behalf of the state.191 
The test for the institution of a prosecution is set out in commentary on the Criminal Procedure 
Act:192 
A prosecutor has a duty to prosecute if there is a prima facie case and if there is no compelling 
reason for a refusal to prosecute. In this context ‘prima facie case’ would mean the following: 
The allegations, as supported by statements and real and documentary evidence available to the 
prosecution, are of such a nature that if proved in a court of law by the prosecution on the basis 
of admissible evidence, the court should convict. Sometimes it is asked: Are there reasonable 
prospects of success? The prosecution, it has been held, does not have to ascertain whether 
there is a defence, but whether there is a reasonable and probable cause for prosecution – see 
generally Beckenstrater v Rottcher and Theunissen 1955 (1) SA 129 (AD) at 137 and S v 
Lubaxa 2001 (2) SACR 703 (SCA). 
 
The South African Constitutional Court has recognised post 1994, that “the constitutional 
obligation upon the state to prosecute those offences which threaten or infringe the rights of 
citizens is of central importance in our constitutional framework.”193 The NPA is an institution 
that is indispensable to the rule of law, and therefore must act consistently to constitutional 
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prescripts and within its powers.194 However, performance data of the NPA suggests that the 
NPA’s policy that grants prosecutors a broad discretion in the decision not to prosecute, “has 
been broadly interpreted, making a decision to prosecute the exception rather than the rule.”195 
Essentially, this has marred the NPA’s repute with controversy, leading the public to question 
the decisions of NDPPs where there is no clear legal basis. It has additionally caused an 
unfavourable ripple effect in the criminal justice system. For example, in S v Macrae the 
Supreme Court of Appeal held that the prosecutor had failed to exercise his discretion sensibly 
and the decision not to prosecute “had led a matter without merit to be pursued to that court 
[causing unnecessary] expenditure of time and effort and placed [extra] costs [on] the public 
purse.”196 
 
As a result of this prosecuting trend, withdrawals have become the most common result in 
cases that are enrolled in court.197 In the Zuma review case the then acting NDPP Mpshe 
discussed the extent of withdrawals in his answering affidavit, in an attempt to justify his claim 
that NDPPs have an unfettered discretion and that decisions not to prosecute are not susceptible 
to judicial review. Mpshe stated: “Of the 1,5 million criminal matters, 300 000 to 400 000 cases 
are withdrawn per year.198 In an audit conducted during September 2007 it was established that 
about 25% of the criminal matters were withdrawn at the request of the complainant. About 
21% were withdrawn because, in the assessment of the prosecutor, there was no prima facie 
case. In about 5% of the matters the withdrawal was because the magistrate refused a 
postponement and 4% because a witness statement was outstanding.”199 Mpshe failed to outline 
the circumstances of the remaining 45% of cases. It is suggested by Jean Redpath that “In the 
absence of further information, it must be that in such cases the prosecutor must have exercised 
his/her discretion and decided not to prosecute.”200 
 
4.5.2 Judicial Reviewability of Prosecution Decisions 
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198 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma (573/08) [2009] ZASCA 1, 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA). 
199 Answering affidavit of Mokothedi Mpshe in the Zuma review application (20 October 2009).  
200 Redpath, above n 190, at 39. 
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The issue of whether prosecution decisions are reviewable in relation to the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 2000 has been a question that has burdened the courts in South 
Africa for some time. The Act itself specifically excludes decisions to prosecute from review, 
however it does not state the same for decisions not to prosecute outright.201 In 2011 the 
Democratic Alliance (DA) made an application to review, correct and set aside Mpshe’s 
decision not to prosecute Jacob Zuma the President of South Africa on corruption charges in 
the North Gauteng High Court.202 In his answering affidavit, Mpshe on behalf of the NPA 
contested that prosecution decisions to prosecute are able to be distinguished from decisions 
not to prosecute, maintaining that the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act does not apply 
to the decision not to prosecute.203  
 
Mpshe argued that prosecution decisions are only reviewable on very narrow grounds such as 
bad faith, (and does not include broader constitutional and administrative law grounds such as 
rationality). The former NDPP also claimed without reference to any authority that ‘this is the 
approach that our courts have always adopted in relation to prosecutorial decisions, and it is 
the approach adopted in other jurisdictions.’204 Mpshe’s statement rings true somewhat for the 
years preceding 1994 in South Africa, discretionary powers of prosecutors were then 
considered to be non-justiciable.205 In South Africa’s current constitutional arrangements, the 
legal position regarding amenability in this context has changed. Hoexter states that “the idea 
of uncontrolled or unguided discretion is hopelessly at odds with modern constitutionalism.”206 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Roncarelli v Duplessis similarly stated that "there is no such 
thing as absolute untrammeled discretion.”207 These changes started to progress in the1980s 
where the normal standards of review were applied to both prosecutors and Attorney 
Generals.208  
 
In 2009, the Supreme Court of Appeal noted obiter that decisions to prosecute under the PAJA 
are not subject to review, but also made the following footnote:209 “The review of a decision 
                                                
201 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, Section 1(ff). 
202 Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others (19577/09) [2011] 
ZAGPPHC 57, 22 February 2011.  
203 Answering affidavit of Mokothedi Mpshe in the Zuma review application (20 October 2009) at [18]. 
204 Ibid, at [59]. 
205 See L Baxter Administrative law (Juta, Kenwyn, 1994) at 333 footnote 184. 
206 C Hoexter Administrative Law (2nd ed, Juta, Cape Town, 2012) at 47. 
207 Roncarelli v Duplessis 1959 SCR 121. 
208 Redpath, above n 190, at 42. 
209 National director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma, above n 198, at [35]. 
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not to prosecute is not excluded by PAJA and although the Constitutional Court in Kaunda v 
President of the RSA (2) 2005 (4) SA 235 (CC) para 84 left the question open, the court below 
held that it could be reviewed (para 58). As to a decision not to prosecute in the UK: Corner 
House Research v The Serious Fraud Office [2008] UKHL 60 (30 July 2008).”210 It is self-
evident that the court appended this footnote to suggest that decisions to prosecute are 
distinguishable from decisions not to prosecute and perhaps that it may even entertain review 
of decisions not to prosecute. 
 
The reviewability issue under the PAJA arose again in the 2014 case Freedom Under Law v 
National Director of Public Prosecutions.211 Murphy J in his reasoning disassociated decisions 
to prosecute from decisions not to prosecute and held that under a “purely textual interpretation 
of the definition of administrative action thus confirms that prosecutorial decisions in general 
do indeed constitute administrative action and are subject to review under PAJA.”212 The Judge 
also commented on an argument calling for deference of prosecutorial discretion that was 
advanced in the case Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others 213as being “misplaced.”214  
 
However, in 2014 the Supreme Court of Appeal heard the case National Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Freedom Under Law and settled the question of reviewability under the PAJA. 
The court held that decisions to prosecute and not to prosecute are of the same genus and that 
“although on a purely textual interpretation the exclusion in s 1(ff) of PAJA is limited to the 
former, it must be understood to incorporate the latter as well.”215   
 
In the judgment of Harms DP in National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma, a series of 
cases from the United Kingdom were cited for their explanation of the policy considerations 
that provide the basis of non-justiciability of prosecution decision to prosecute.216 The court 
stated that the same considerations apply to the exclusion of decisions to prosecute under the 
                                                
210 National director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma, above n 198, at [35], footnote 33.  
211 Freedom Under Law v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2014 1 SACR 111 (GNP). 
212 Ibid, at [132]. 
213 Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC). 
214 Freedom Under Law v National Director of Public Prosecutions, above n 211, at [138]. 
215 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Freedom Under Law 2014 4 SA 298 (SCA) at [27]. 
216 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma, above n 198, at [35], footnote 31; referring to Re Smalley 
[1985] AC 622, [1985] 2 WLR 538 (HL) at 642-643; Re Ashton [1994] 1 AC 9 at [17]; Sharma v Brown-Antonie, 
above n 58, at [14]; Marshall v Director of Public Prosecutions (Jamaica), above n 175, at [17]. 
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PAJA. 217 The principle created by the English courts meant that judicial intervention should 
only be reserved for ‘exceptional circumstances.’  
 
Brand JA held later in the Supreme Court of Appeal that the parameters of judicial review do 
not extend to include review under the basis of the PAJA, but is “limited to grounds of legality 
and rationality.”218 The Judge continued that “the legality principle has by now become well-
established in our law as an alternative pathway to judicial review where PAJA finds no 
application.”219 Brand JA noted that the legality principle acts “as a safety net to give the court 
some degree of control over action that does not qualify as administrative under PAJA, but 
nonetheless involves the exercise of public power. Currently it provides a more limited basis 
of review than PAJA. Why I say currently is because it is accepted that ‘[l]egality is an evolving 
concept in our jurisprudence, whose full creative potential will be developed in a context-
driven and incremental manner’ (see Minister of Health NO v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd & 
others 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC) para 614; Cora Hoexter op cit at 124 and the cases there cited). 
But for present purposes it can be accepted with confidence that it includes review on grounds 
of irrationality and on the basis that the decision-maker did not act in accordance with the 
empowering statute (see DA & others v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions & 
others 2012 (3) SA 486 (SCA) paras 28-30).”220 
  
Essentially, the courts in South Africa have constructed a parallel legal process that involves 
the development of judge-made law in order to review prosecution decisions of the NPA. When 
it is overtly clear to the courts that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion must be justifiably 
restrained, the courts may expand the law by creating new factors that can be attributed to the 
rationality enquiry. The Constitutional Court construed the rationality principle in the 
following way:221 
 
It is a requirement of the rule of law that the exercise of public power by the Executive and 
other functionaries should not be arbitrary. Decisions must be rationally related to the power 
for which the power was given, otherwise they are in effect arbitrary and inconsistent with this 
requirement. It follows that in order to pass constitutional scrutiny the exercise of public power 
by the Executive and other functionaries must, at least, comply with this requirement. If it does 
                                                
217 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma, above n 198, at [35]. 
218 National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Freedom Under Law (67/20140 [2014] ZASCA 58; 
2014 (4) SA 298 (SCA) at [27].  
219 Ibid, at [28]. 
220 National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Freedom Under Law, above n 218, at [29]. 
221 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re ex parte President of the RSA 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) at 
[85] - [86]. 
	 66 
not, it falls short of the standards demanded by our Constitution for such action. The question 
whether a decision is rationally related to the purpose for which the power was given calls for 
an objective enquiry. Otherwise a decision that, viewed objectively, is in fact irrational, might 
pass muster simply because the person who took it mistakenly and in good faith believed it to 
be rational. Such a conclusion would place form above substance and undermine an important 
constitutional principle. 
 
The judicial stance and precedent regarding the judicial review of prosecution decisions in 
South Africa is that a court will not interfere with a bona fide decision,222 nor will it compel a 
decision on whether to prosecute within a specified time period.223 Courts can however, review 
the exercise of discretion of the DPP on the basis of ordinary administrative law grounds of 
review.224 In Freedom Under Law v National Director of Public Prosecutions the court made 
reference to the fact that judicial review of prosecutorial discretion in South Africa is based on 
breaches of the principle of legality, and courts may intervene when the discretion is 
improperly exercised (illegal and irrational), where there is evidence of mala fides or of 
decisions based on ulterior purposes.225 
 
In 2016, the Gauteng Division of the High Court in Pretoria heard the review involving the 
prosecution decision by former acting NDPP Mokotedi Mpshe to drop on the 6 April 2009, 
783 corruption charges against the South African President Jacob Zuma.226 The High Court 
rejected Jacob Zuma’s attempt to appeal. The Court held that the case was ‘inexplicable’ and 
the prosecution decision was “irrational and should be reviewed” and that “Mr Zuma should 
face the charges as outlined in the indictment.” 227 Ledwabe J held that Mpshe’s decision to 
disclose his decision to prosecutors only after it was discussed in a news conference was 
irrational behaviour and thinking. Ledwaba J stated “considering the situation in which he 
found himself, Mr Mpshe ignored the importance of his oath of office which commanded him 
to act independently and without fear and favour.”228 Accordingly the court also found that 
                                                
222 See Gillingham v Attorney-General [1909] TS 572. 
223 See Wronsky v Prokureur-General [1971] (3) SA 292 (SWA). 
224 See Mitchell v Attorney-General, Natal [1992] (2) SACR 68 (N); Highstead Entertainment (Pty Ltd t/a ‘The 
Club’ v Minister of Law and Order 1994 1 SA 387 (C); Wilson v Director of Public Prosecutions [2002] 1 All 
SA 73 (NC); S v Dubayi 1976 3 SA 110 (Tk). 
225 Freedom Under Law v National Director of Public Prosecutions, above n 211, at [124]. 
226 Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions & Others 2016 (2) SACR 1(GP). 
Mpshe’s speech was heavily criticised as it appeared that he had plagiarised the Judgment of Seagroatt J in the 
criminal case of HKSAR v Lee Ming Tee, Hong Kong High Court, December 13 2002 and for his reliance on 
dubious international legal authority. 
227 Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions & Others, above n 223, at [92] - [94]. 
228 Ibid. 
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Mpshe had failed to treat the respondents equally before the law. President Zuma applied for 
leave to appeal but the Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.229  
 
4.5.3 Comparison with New Zealand 
 
The NPA in South Africa has played the role of protagonist in the increased dilution of the 
duty to prosecute.230 The NPA’s apparent erosion of independence, has blighted its reputation, 
however it maintains that its decisions are immune from review. The NPA recently published 
a code of conduct which stated that the discretion not to prosecute should be exercised free 
even of ‘judicial interference.’231 This might appear to be a petulant example of the NPA 
fighting against the judiciary. Furthermore, there has been no clear example of Crown 
Prosecutors acting in a manner that is suggestive of bureaucratic influence. The closest example 
of a prosecution decision to not to prosecute wielded on ‘politically’ sensitive and weak 
grounds is the prosecutorial decision taken in Osborne.232  
 
South African law accepts irrationality to be a valid ground in reviewing a prosecution 
decision. Irrationality however, was not a confirmed ground for review in Polynesian Spa. The 
position in South Africa, although bears its own limitations (i.e. reviewability is only really 
available as a result of the legality principle and not the PAJA), has allowed a very wide and 
far-reaching ground of review to be available. Considering the unstable political climate and 
the doubtful independence and diminished credibility of the NPA, this ground of review is 
likely to be the basis for most review cases in South Africa, and is likely to provide adequate 
protection for the proper functioning of South Africa’s newly-founded democracy. In this 
sense, judicial review in South Africa has developed to respond most effectively to the dangers 
present in its own unique circumstances.  
 
4.6 The European Court of Human Rights 
 
                                                
229 Zuma v Democratic Alliance (1170/2016) [2017] ZASCA 146 13 October 2017 per Navasa ADP (Cachalia, 
Bosielo, Leach and Tshiqi JJA concurring). 
230 Redpath, above n 190, at 54. 
231 Ibid, at 55. 
232 Where the prosecutor made an arrangement that a prosecution will not be brought or maintained on the 
condition that the sum of $3.41 million was to be paid to the victim’s dependents. 
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The European Court of Human Rights recently decided the case Armani Da Silva v The United 
Kingdom.233 The applicant, Da Silva, is the cousin of Jean Charles de Menezes, a Brazilian 
national who was shot dead by two special firearms officers after he was mistakenly identified 
as a suicide bomber. Ms Da Silva complained that after the investigation had ensued, the State 
failed its duty to ensure the accountability of its agents for her cousin’s death since none of the 
police officers implicated in the killing had been prosecuted for a serious criminal offence. 
 
The Court’s Grand Chamber held that the United Kingdom did not fail to uphold its procedural 
obligations under the right to life (Art. 2 ECHR) since it conducted an effective investigation 
into the shooting of Mr de Menezes which was capable of identifying and if appropriate, 
capable of punishing those responsible.234 The decision not to prosecute any individual police 
officer was not due to the “failings in the investigation or the State’s tolerance of or collusion 
in unlawful acts; rather, it was due to the fact that, following a thorough investigation, a 
prosecutor had considered all the facts of the case and concluded that there was insufficient 
evidence against any individual officer” to allow for a decision to prosecute.235 
 
The court regarded the Manning case to be authority for judicial review of prosecutorial 
decisions.236 and stated that “a decision not to prosecute is susceptible to judicial review in 
England and Wales but the power of review is to be sparingly exercised; the courts can only 
interfere if a prosecutorial decision is wrong in law.”237  
  
The Court also commented on the availability of judicial review of prosecutorial decisions in 
European Contracting States by referring to information made available to it:238   
                                                
233 Armani Da Silva v The United Kingdom, above n 1.  
234 Ibid,at [282]. 
235 Ibid, at [284]. 
236 Ibid, at [165]. See R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Manning, above n 155, at [23]. 
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…the decision not to prosecute is susceptible to some form of judicial review or appeal to a 
court of law in at least twenty-five Contracting States and in these countries the standard of 
review varies considerably. In seven of these countries the decision must first be contested 
before a hierarchical superior in the prosecution service. In twelve countries, the decision of 
the prosecutor may only be contested before such a hierarchal superior. Consequently, it cannot 
be said that there is any uniform approach among Member States with regard either to the 
availability of review or, if available, the scope of that review.  
 
4.7 Concluding Comments 
 
Judicial review of prosecutorial decisions in New Zealand is less developed in comparison with 
the majority of other common law jurisdictions. The position in Australia remains the most 
extreme in maintaining non-justiciability. The overall New Zealand position does not allow 
this facet of the criminal justice process to be held sufficiently accountable as prosecutorial 
discretions are effectively unchecked, since judicial review is rarely accessible. Bingham LCJ’s 
comment in Manning is therefore deserving of extra emphasis: “If the standard of review is set 
too high, and if the test were to be too exacting, an effective remedy would be denied.”239 The 
Canadian ‘flagrant impropriety’ standard is an exemplar of a high threshold test, which 
Bingham LCJ warned against. The Privy Council in Mohit240 has endorsed both the width and 
the supreme importance of the supervisory jurisdiction over prosecutorial discretions not to 
prosecute. The courts in the United Kingdom have allowed review where the DPP had: failed 
to act in accordance with his or her own settled policy as set out in the Code, arrived at a 
decision on the basis of an unlawful policy or reached a decision that reflected an error of law 
or was perverse. The courts in South Africa have allowed irrational decisions to be reviewable. 
The experience in Hong Kong indicates that judicial review is a fundamental supervisory duty 
and that such law must be generative and transformational if it is to enhance the rights of 
victims of crime as significant stakeholders in the criminal justice system. New Zealand 
decisional law has, by contrast, moved only very cautiously and incrementally. There does not 
yet exist a comprehensive and definitive statement by our highest courts of their acceptance of 
the developed positions already reached by the Privy Council and the courts in other common 
law and comparative jurisdictions. 
 
                                                
239 R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Manning, above n 155, at [23].  
240 Mohit v The Director of Public Prosecutions of Mauritius, above n 40. 
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An analysis of the Osborne Supreme Court decision241 and the problems and issues that remain 
unresolved by that decision are made in the next Chapter.
                                                




5 Analysis of the Osborne Supreme Court Decision 
 
In 2010, an underground explosion at the Pike River mine killed twenty-nine men and injured 
another two. The company Pike River Coal Limited (PRLC) was found guilty of various 
breaches of the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 (HSEA), and was sentenced to pay 
a fine of $760,000 and $3.41 million in reparations to the victims’ dependents. The company 
subsequently fell into receivership and given its economic state, was unlikely to make the 
payments. The mine’s CEO Peter Whittal, was also charged with offences under the Act and 
pleaded not guilty to all charges. Whittal, who had directors’ and officers’ liability insurance, 
used the money to fund the defence of the charges and reparation payments. Through his 
counsel, Whittal undertook to make a voluntary payment of $3.41 million in reparation on the 
condition that the prosecution would offer no evidence against him. WorkSafe considered this 
offer and made the decision not to prosecute. It explained that while there was sufficient 
evidence to justify a prosecution, the likelihood of success was low. No evidence was offered 
and the charges were dismissed.1 
 
The applicants; a widow and a mother of two men who had perished in the mine, sought judicial 
review of WorkSafe’s decision to offer no evidence, on the basis that an unlawful bargain had 
been made to stifle the prosecution in exchange for payment. Brown J in the High Court 
dismissed the application finding that no grounds of review had been established. He held that 
the offer of reparation was voluntary and that WorkSafe was entitled to consider this as a factor 
in deciding whether to prosecute.2 The applicants appealed to the Court of Appeal. The bench 
comprising of Kós P, Randerson and French JJ considered several issues including:3 
 
1. Is the prosecutor’s decision on 4 December 2013 to offer no evidence in support of the charges 
against Mr Whittal on the basis that it was not in the public interest to do so (“Prosecution 
Decision”) amenable to judicial review? 
2. Did the prosecutor enter into an agreement with Mr Whittal that in return for the payment of 
$3.41 million to the victims it would offer no evidence in support of the charges against Mr 
Whittal? 
3. In deciding not to proceed with the prosecution against Mr Whittal, did the prosecutor:  
                                                
1 See for a more explicit summary of the facts see Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand [2017] NZSC 175, [2018] 1 
NZLR 447, [2017] 15 NZELR 365 at [2]- [13]. 
2 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand [2015] NZHC 2991, [2016] 2 NZLR 485 at [37] – [42]. 
3 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand [2017] NZCA 11, [2017] 2 NZLR 513 at [26]. 
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3.1 fail to comply with the Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines; or 
3.2 fail to have regard to s5(g) of the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992? 
 
4. Did the applicants have a legitimate expectation that they would be consulted prior to the 
prosecutor making its decision? 
 
The Court of Appeal held that while it was prepared to review executive action of that nature,4 
it could not be shown that there had been a meeting of minds and therefore a striking of an 
unlawful arrangement to stifle the prosecution.5 The applicants appealed to the Supreme Court. 
 
New Zealand’s landmark case on judicial review of prosecutorial discretion is the unanimous 
Supreme Court decision Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand.6 The presiding judges were Elias 
CJ, William Young, Glazebrook, O’Regan and Ellen France JJ. The Court considered whether 
the Court of Appeal was correct to dismiss the appellants’ appeal to that Court, namely, 
“whether WorkSafe New Zealand acted to give effect to an unlawful agreement of this nature 
when it offered no evidence on charges against Peter Whittal” for breaches of the HSEA.7 
 
Adopting the test in Jones v Merionethshire Permanent Benefit Building Society, the Supreme 
Court held that an unlawful bargain arises when there is an understanding or promise, express 
or implied, that a public offence8 would not be prosecuted on the condition of the receipt of 
money or other valuable consideration.9 It was not material that the prosecutor had been 
independent or been fair or honest, or that a judge gave express approval to the withdrawal of 
the charges.10  
 
The Supreme Court adopted Bhowanipur Banking Corp Ltd v Dasi noting that agreements to 
stifle prosecutions were seldom set out on paper. The conduct of the parties must be inferred 
from a survey of the whole circumstances.11 The way in which the parties described their affairs 
                                                
4 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (CA), above n 3, at [34] – [36]. 
5 Ibid, at [55], [56] and [59]. 
6 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (SC), above n 1. 
7 Ibid, at [25]. 
8 Opposed to a civil wrong. 
9 Jones v Merionethshire Permanent Benefit Building Society [1892] 1 Ch 173 (CA). 
10 See Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (SC), above n 1, at [70], [71], [74], [75], [76], [77], [78] and [104]. 
11 Bhowanipur Banking Corp Ltd v Dasi (1941) 74 Calcutta LJ 408, [1942] BOMLR 1 (PC); the author of this 
thesis was junior counsel in Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (CA), above n 3, and had located and brought this 
extremely obscure but definitive judgment of the Privy Council to the court’s attention. The judgment, given at 
the time of World War Two, was never reported except in two discontinued Indian series of law reports. 
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was not determinative. Neither was the fact that one party’s reasons or motives behind entering 
into the arrangement might have included considerations other than the conditional payment.12 
 
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, finding that on the evidence, the arrangement was an 
unlawful bargain to stifle a prosecution. The decision that the charges were not to be proceeded 
with as they no longer fulfilled the public interest test was an acceptance of an offer of payment 
in exchange for not proceeding with any of the charges against Mr Whittall. The withdrawal 
of the charges had been conditional on a payment to be used for reparations being made. Even 
though WorkSafe had made various considerations of legitimate significance, these did not 
alter the substantive object and effect of the arrangement made with Mr Whittall.13 
 
The observation made by all of the judges, except for Ellen France J, was that it was 
unnecessary to express a view on whether, in the absence of an unlawful bargain, the decision 
not to offer any evidence would have been lawful in any event, and that “[w]e should not be 
taken to agree with the High Court or Court of Appeal that the justifications put forward for 
the decision were adequate to pass the supervisory jurisdiction of the court.”14 
 
The Osborne Supreme Court decision has significance by its very uniqueness, literally New 
Zealand’s only ever successful judicial review of a prosecutorial decision. It affirms that 
prosecution decisions not to prosecute are justiciable. Specifically, the Court held that an 
arrangement to stifle a prosecution on condition that a sum of money is paid is unlawful. 
“Chequebook justice” will not be tolerated in New Zealand.15 The Court’s decision clarifies 
the approach that the prosecutor should have adopted. The decision has also contextually 
improved the health and safety landscape in New Zealand. 
 
However, the contours of judicial review of prosecutorial discretions still remains quite 
unclear. The court eschewed from articulating more fully what are, and what are not, good 
reasons for judicial review of prosecutorial decisions. In Rewa, Venning J, the Chief High 
Court Judge, noted that the Supreme Court in Osborne did not take issue with the Osborne 
Court of Appeal’s propositions regarding the limited extent of the Court’s powers of review of 
                                                
12 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (SC), above n 1, at [81], [82], [83] and [104]. 
13 Ibid, at [92], [93], [94], [95], [101], [103] and [104]. 
14 Ibid, at [97] – [98].  
15 The voluntary payment of reparation was often termed “chequebook justice” by counsel for the appellants 
throughout the appeals in their written and oral submissions, coauthored by the writer of this thesis. 
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prosecutorial discretion, which were in turn adopted from Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne.16 On 
that analysis, the grounds for judicial review of prosecution decisions still remain confined 
under the Polynesian Spa approach, to only the illegality branch of orthodox justiciability. The 
standard of review similarly remains as the quasi-standard (or pseudo-standard) of ‘exceptional 
circumstances.’ In comparison with other jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom and Hong 
Kong, the development of judicial review in the context of prosecution decisions is still at an 
incipient stage in New Zealand. While the door to judicial review has finally been unlocked, 
the gap created is narrow. The Supreme Court left several significant issues unresolved, 
contenting itself with reaching the disturbing conclusion that a Crown Prosecutor had acted 
under an illegal arrangement. 
 
Firstly, although the Supreme Court appears to have agreed with the Court of Appeal’s 
assessment of both New Zealand and overseas authorities, and the various principles for review 
of prosecution decisions, the Court did not give its own view on the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ position posited by Randerson J in Polynesian Spa.17 To this extent, no legal 
test that considers the availability of judicial review of prosecutorial decision-making has yet 
been articulated by our highest court. As the next Chapter illustrates, there are constitutional 
and practical rationales for the basis of the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test. However, when 
the test is confined to matters of illegality, and the applicable intensity of review is not 
transparent, the risk to the balance between vigilance and restraint is self-evident. Wider rule 
of law implications are engaged.18 While the court made it clear that the agreement to stifle the 
prosecution was one that violated the rule of law,19 the Supreme Court reasoning is concise and 
precise. It plainly decided not to determine any more than it had to do. The proven illegality 
                                                
16 Rewa v Attorney-General of New Zealand [2018] NZHC 1005 at [45] and [46]; See Osborne v WorkSafe New 
Zealand, above n 3, at [34]; See generally Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne [2005] NZAR 408 (HC) at [62]; R (on 
the application of Corner House Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2008] UKHL 60, [2009] 1 AC 
756 at [31]; Fox v Attorney- General [2002] 3 NZLR 62 (CA) at [28]–[31]; Matalulu v Director of Public 
Prosecutions (Fiji) [2004] NZAR 193 (Fiji SC) at 215. 
17 Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne, above n 16, at [61]- [69] per Randerson J. 
18 See Michael Fordham QC Judicial Review Handbook (5th ed, Hart, Portland, 2008) at [12.1]; “Judicial review 
is the Courts’ way of enforcing the rule of law: ensuring that public authorities’ functions are undertaken according 
to law and that they are accountable to law. In other words, ensuring that public bodies are not “above the law.” 
19 It emphasised that “prosecutions taken on behalf of the public are in vindication of law and to protect rule-of-
law values such as in equality of treatment”; Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (SC), above n 1, at [73]; “[t]he 
rule of law is undermined if accountability and punishment for public wrongs turns on the means of the 
defendant.” See also at [73] “If obtaining reparation in return for a promise to abandon criminal proceedings is “a 
serious abuse of the right of private prosecution”,
 
it is at least as much an abuse of the obligations of public 
prosecution. Such prosecution is undertaken by public officials. It is undertaken on behalf of the community in 
vindication of law and to protect rule of law values such as in equality of treatment.” 
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clearly contaminated the prosecutorial decision-making process and the resultant decision not 
to prosecute. 
 
Secondly, the Osborne Court of Appeal considered the issue of whether the victims’ families 
had a legitimate expectation that they would be consulted prior to the prosecutor making its 
decision. The Court of Appeal concluded that the Victims’ Rights Act 2012 (VRA), the 
Guidelines and the Victims of Crime- Guidance for Prosecutor Guidelines of 2012 do not 
singly or cumulatively create a legitimate expectation of consultation.20 The Supreme Court 
did not touch on this matter. While it may be accepted that those Acts and Guidelines do not 
create a legitimate expectation of consultation, the pressing and outstanding issue left 
unresolved is whether victims or their dependents should be denied any involvement in the 
prosecution decision-making phase at all. This and related issues that victims experience in the 
prosecution process, and in judicial review of prosecution decisions, is considered in Chapter 
7. 
 
Thirdly, in relation to relief, the Supreme Court could only grant a declaration that the decision 
of WorkSafe New Zealand to offer no evidence in the prosecution of Peter Whittall was 
unlawful.21 The reasons for this were considered by the Court of Appeal.22 Chapter 8 considers 
other appropriate remedies that were not available in Osborne but may be available to other 
successful claimants, by an examination of comparative law. The concepts of reconsideration, 
resumption and reneging are also considered to illustrate the appropriate boundaries of the 
Court’s power, should these circumstances occur in future cases. 
 
Finally, although the dependents in Osborne were granted a declaration, in many ways their 
victory may be pyrrhic considering the numerous lives of loved ones lost. Judicial review was 
the only route for justice, since the appellants were statutorily barred from instituting a private 
prosecution.23 To this end, Chapter 9 analyses the various limitations on private prosecutions 
and the viability of this alternative. 
                                                
20 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (CA), above n 3, at [85] - [89]. 
21 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (SC), above n 1, at [101] per Elias CJ, William Young, Glazebrook and 
O’Regan JJ and at [102] per Ellen France J. 
22 See Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (CA), above n 3, at [24] “even if there was illegality in the decision, no 
relief other than declaration should be granted because any error was immaterial and did not affect the outcome 
of its decision – and because third parties (the insurer and the families who had received payment of the reparation 
sum) had altered their positions in reliance on the decision.” 
23 Section 54A(2) of the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 precludes private prosecution if WorkSafe 




6 The Systemic Failures of the Current Law Re Justiciability and the Rule of Law 
 
This Chapter sets out the key procedural and jurisprudential issues arising from the current 
regime of judicial review of prosecutorial decisions not to prosecute. After the Supreme Court’s 
narrow but enlightened decision in Osborne v Worksafe New Zealand,1 a number of systemic 
failures remain that continue to militate against justiciability and the objectives of the rule of 
law. The prevailing judicial approach of only intervening in ‘exceptional circumstances’ is 
critically examined for its compatibility with principle.2 
 
6.1 Difficulties of Accessing Judicial Review 
 
It is of significant constitutional importance that access to justice is ensured. However, access3 
to judicial review of prosecutorial discretions is not absolute. The following sections consider 
the ways in which access to the courts in this context may be denied.  
 
6.1.1 Intensity of Review 
 
Courts use standards of review to guide the latitude or degree of deference that they are 
prepared to cede to the initial decision-making body,4 i.e. the “calibration of the depth of 
scrutiny as a preliminary step in the supervisory process.”5 Two issues concerning the standard 
of review of prosecution decisions post-Osborne are raised:  
 
                                                
1 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand [2017] NZSC 175, [2018] 1 NZLR 447, [2017] 15 NZELR 365. 
2 The ‘exceptional circumstances’ position as articulated in Polynesian Spa [2005] NZAR 408 (HC) at [61]- [69] 
per Randerson J. See Chapter 6 at section 6.1.3 for a consideration of the organising principles underlying the 
‘exceptional circumstances’ position and the restrictions to access to justice. 
3 See GDS Taylor Judicial Review: A New Zealand Perspective (3rd ed, lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2015) at [3.07]. 
See also Edite Ligere “Locus Standi and the Public Interest: a Hotchpotch of Legal Principles” (2005) Journal of 
Planning & Environment Law 292-297.  
4 Michael Taggart “Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury” [2008] New Zealand Law Review 423. The courts 
do not review the merits of the decision, but consider only the process to which the prosecution decision was 
made. This position was affirmed in Matalulu v Director of Public Prosecutions (Fiji) [2003] 2 HKC 457 at 735 
(Fiji SC); “the polycentric character of official decision-making in such matters including policy and public 
interest considerations which are not susceptible of judicial review because it is within neither the constitutional 
function nor the practical competence of the courts to assess their merits.” 
5 Dean R Knight “Modulating the Depth of Scrutiny in Judicial Review: Scope, Grounds, Intensity, Context” 
(2016) New Zealand Law Review 63 at 77.  
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1. The inconsistency and uncertainty of the current approach to intensity of review. 
2. The high standard of review that the ‘exceptional circumstances’ approach dictates 
and its implications of access for judicial review.6 
 
Currently, the Supreme Court of New Zealand has declined to embrace terminology that 
describes different variabilities of intensity.7 Instead, the courts adopt an appropriate intensity 
of review of discretionary prosecution decisions by contextually analysing the impugned 
decision.8 But the courts’ dependency on the ‘exceptional circumstances’ approach, rather than 
acceptance of an explicit doctrinal form of the variable intensity of review, leaves judicial 
review of prosecution decisions susceptible to inconsistency and vulnerable to unpredictability 
of outcome. The current test for reviewability masks any principled analysis by employing the 
opaque reasoning that the supervisory jurisdiction is only engaged in cases demonstrating 
‘exceptional circumstances.’9 This is policy-driven rather than principled analysis and it does 
not elucidate at all. 
 
As Professor Michael Taggart warned, “unless we commit to [a] sort of mapping project [i.e. 
a schematic for the intensity of review] the law will continue to be rather chaotic, unprincipled 
and result-orientated.”10 Dr Dean Knight explained that “the strong commitment of New 
Zealand courts to contextualism means techniques which involve different degrees of scrutiny 
are inevitable. But, except for some limited exceptions, the courts are generally quite coy about 
explicitly embracing the notion of variability or providing any firm scaffolding for its 
deployment.”11  
                                                
6 The ‘exceptional circumstances’ position as articulated in Polynesian Spa, above n 2, at [61]- [69] per Randerson 
J. 
7 See Dean R Knight “Mapping the Rainbow of Review: Recognising Variable Intensity” [2010] New Zealand 
Law Review 393 at 399- 408. See for example, Ye v Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC76, [2010] 1 NZLR 
104 (NZSC, transcript, 21-23 April 2009, SC 53/2008) at 179-182; The Chief Justice said that the word 
‘deference’ is “dreadful” and that there was “so much dancing around on the heads of pins” in relation to different 
degrees of reasonableness. 
8 See the comment of Chief Justice Sian Elias in Ye v Minister of Immigration, above n 7; “It’s got to be contextual. 
What is reasonable takes its colour from the context.” 
9Polynesian Spa, above n 2, at [61]- [69] per Randerson J; Fox v Attorney- General [2002] 3 NZLR 62 (CA) at 
69-72 per McGrath J for the court; Gill v Attorney-General [2010] NZCA 468, [2011] 1 NZLR 433 at [19] per 
Stevens J for the Court; but Gill and Fox were decisions challenging the refusal of a trial Court to grant a 
discretionary stay of a criminal prosecution. The assimilation of the abuse of process doctrine and trial decision-
making with pre-trial prosecutorial decision-making, is reasoning consistently found in New Zealand decisions.  
But that approach can have no logical impact or peremptory value in relation to decisions not to prosecute at all. 
See also Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (4th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 
2014) at [22.6.1]. 
10 Taggart, above n 4, at 453. 
11 Knight, above n 7, at 399. 
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In an exchange with counsel on the question of intensity of review, Elias CJ in Ye v Minister 
of Immigration stated:12 “I don’t know that degrees of reasonableness help…It’s got to be 
contextual. What is reasonable takes its colour from the context.” Contrastingly, the High 
Court has endorsed the concept of explicit standards of review and some Court of Appeal 
judges have flirted with the concept.13 Local scholars have largely embraced the concept of 
variability of review.14 However, Professor Joseph criticised it as “a terminological overload 
[which] can only result in distracting formalism,”15 but noted that the sliding threshold of 
review- or “selective raising and lowering of the review threshold” is now part of the judicial 
review process in New Zealand.16  
 
Dr Knight contends that the method of capturing the “key schemata employed throughout 
New Zealand and the Anglo-Commonwealth to organize the modulation of the depth of 
scrutiny,” is to turn to De Smith’s Judicial Review textbook.17 With regard to the intensity of 
review, the text notes that intensity may be understood by a continuum of methods:18 “In the 
last decade the New Zealand courts, following UK developments, overtly have adopted a 
variable approach to the intensity of review: that is, the graver the impact of the decision 
upon the individual affected by it, the more substantial the justification that will be required 
to assure the court of its legality. The emphasis on justification is all-important, and it is not 
coincidental that the common law is increasingly requiring reasons and putting greater 
                                                
12 Ye v Minister of Immigration, above n 7 at (NZSC, transcript, 21- 23 April 2009, SC 53/2008) at 179 – 182. 
Note, in Knight, above n 5, at 64; Knight noted that the variation of the depth of scrutiny may be deeply embedded 
in jurisprudence and judicial methodologies. Perhaps this is one reason why the Supreme Court objects to the 
language of variability of intensity. This does not however help provide transparency in finding the balance 
between vigilance and restraint.  
13 Ibid, at 79 – 80. See Wolf v Minister of Immigration [2004] NZAR 414 (HC) at [43] where Wild J endorsed the 
intermediate standard of simple reasonableness (or simple unreasonableness), with the adoption of the appropriate 
form depending on context. See also Pharmaceutical management Agency Ltd v Roussel Uclaf Australia Pty Ltd 
[1998] NZAR 58 (CA) at 66 which endorsed the “hard look” intensity of review; Pring v Wanaganui District 
Council [1999] NZRMA 519 (CA); Huang Xiao Qiong v Minister of Immigration [2007] NZAR 136 (HC); Wright 
v Attorney-General [2006] NZAR 66 (HC); S v Chief Executive of the Department of Labour [2006] NZAR 234 
(HC); Dunne v CanWest TVWorks Ltd [2005] NZAR 577 (HC).  
14 See Taylor above n 3, at [3.11]. 
15 See Joseph, above n 9, at [22.8.4]. 
16 Philip A Joseph “The Demise of Ultra Vires- Judicial Review in the New Zealand Courts” [2001] PL 354 at 
936. 
17 See Harry Woolf, Jeffery L Jowell, Catherine M Donnelly, De Smith’s Judicial Review (8th ed, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, 2018). 
18Ibid, at 11-086; this ranges from “full intensity review” to “non-justiciable”, with “variable intensity 
unreasonableness review” in the middle. Note that Dean R Knight “A Murky Methodology: Standards of Review 
in Administrative Law (2008) 6 NZJPIL 117 was referenced in De Smith’s Judicial Review at 11-140 in relation 
to New Zealand’s intensity of review profile. 
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emphasis on transparency. It is now generally recognised that judicial review of discretionary 
decision-making involves a sliding scale, with non-justiciability at one end and close scrutiny 
at the other.” 
 
The variation of the intensity of scrutiny in the context of the broader Anglo-Commonwealth 
“is ubiquitous but the manner in which the balance between vigilance and restraint is struck 
varies across time and across jurisdictions.”19 For example, standards of review in Canada are 
organized by a clear framework of explicit standards,20 whereas in the  English- style judicial 
review, the method taken by courts regarding intensity of review “tends to be seen in 
particular grounds or doctrines for substantive review, rather than providing a grand 
schematic. In particular, it arises from…variegated forms of unreasonableness and structured 
forms of deference; all these doctrines exhibit the transparent mediation of the balance 
between vigilance and restraint, based on various constitutional, institutional and functional 
factors.”21  
 
The variable intensity approach espoused by Dr Knight and cited in De Smith’s Judicial 
Review, reflects the curial technique taken by the English courts.22 When properly understood, 
variable intensity turns on the nature, the importance and the context of the impugned decision. 
This is actually in harmony with the concept of contextualism, “but the courts remain reticent 
to translate this contextualism into an explicit adoption of variable intensity or deference. This 
is a contradictory, not principled, position. As Professor Taggart recorded, you cannot have 
                                                
19 Knight, above n 5, at 64. 
20 See Dunsmuir v New Brunswick 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190. See generally Harry Woolf, Jeffery L Jowell, 
Catherine M Donnelly, above n 17, at 11-112 – 11. 130. Paul Daly “The Struggle for Deference in Canada” in 
Hanna Wilberg and Mark Elliot (eds) The Scope and Intensity of Substantive Review (Hart, Oxford, 2015) at 297; 
Paul Daly “Dunsmuir’s Flaws Exposed: Recent Decisions on Standard of Review” (2012) 58 McGill LJ 483; 
David J Mullan “Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, Standard of Review and Procedural Fairness for Public Servants: 
Let’s Try Again!” (2008) 21 CJALP 117; Gerald P Heckman “Substantive Review in Appellate Courts Since 
Dunsmuir” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall LJ 751; Andrew Green “Can There Be Too Much Context in Administrative 
Law? Setting the Standards in Canadian Administrative Law” (2014) 47 UBC L Rev 443. 
21 Knight, above n 5, at 78-79. See R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Bugdaycay [1987] 
AC 514 at 531 (HL); R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith [1996] QB 517 (CA); R v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, ex part Brind [1991] 1 AC 696; R v Lord Saville of Newdigate, ex parte A [2001] EW Civ 
2048, [2001] WLR 2855; R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex parte Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 
1115 at 1130; R (Mahmood v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] EWCA Civ 315, [2001] 1 WLR 
840 at 849; A (Asif Javed) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] EWCA Civ 789, [2002] QB 129 
at [49]; Sheffield City Council v Smart [2002] EWCA Civ 4 at [42]; Kennedy v Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 
20, [2014] 2 WLR 808. See generally Tom Hickman Public Law After the Human Rights Act (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2010) at 18 and 105; Harry Woolf, Jeffery L Jowell, Catherine M Donnelly, above n 17, at 11-087 – 11-
1-03. 
22 The Chief Justice in Sian Elias “Administrative law for ‘Living People’” (2009) 68 CLJ 47 at 66 recognised 
that the simplistic approach taken in New Zealand could be ridiculed for being an “anti-intellectual strand.” 
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one without the other.”23 He also argued that “we must get beyond simply talking about context 
and actually contextualize in a way that can generate generalizable conclusions. In short, we 
need a map of the rainbow of review that is reliable and helpful, and we need willing 
cartographers.”24 
 
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court in Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand did not articulate any 
standard of review required for prosecution decisions.25 Randerson J’s ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ threshold however, operates as a quasi-standard of review. Only where 
‘exceptional circumstances’ can be found, will an applicant succeed in judicial review.26 The 
approach is contextual, but on the face of it, sets an extremely high threshold and corresponding 
intensity of review. It imposes a heavy burden to adduce ‘exceptional’ evidence on applicants 
seeking to challenge prosecutorial decisions. In short, it disincentivises recourse to judicial 
review by the imposition of an artificial and almost unsustainable standard for challenges to 
one critically important sub-species of decision-making. 
 
Dr Knight considered the ‘murky methodology’ of standards of review of administrative law 
in New Zealand, and questioned what “appropriate standard of review that courts should adopt 
when reviewing the decisions of public bodies and officials.”27 He proposed a framework 
which refined the basis of intervention on the following continuum or sliding-scale of 
categories:28 
 
(a) Non-justiciability;  
(b) Flagrant impropriety; 
(c) Manifest unreasonableness;29 
(d) Simple reasonableness; and 
(e) Incorrectness. 
 
                                                
23 Knight, n 7, at 429. 
24 Taggart, n 4, at 454. 
25 Nor did the Court of Appeal in Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand [2017] NZCA 11, [2017] 2 NZLR 513. The 
court there used the ‘exceptional circumstances’ approach adopted from Polynesian Spa, above n 2. Note the 
Supreme Court in Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (SC), above n 1, took no issue with the Court of Appeal 
using this test; see Rewa v Attorney-General [2018] NZHC 1005 at [45] – [46] per Venning J, Chief High Court 
Judge. 
26 Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne, above n 2, at [61] - [69]. 
27 Knight, above n 5, at 118. 
28 Ibid, at 143. 
29 Ibid at 146; Knight noted that this standard is equivalent to the traditional Wednesbury reasonableness standard; 
See Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1KB 223 (CA). 
Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1999) [2001] 2 AC 91 
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Dr Knight noted that the standard of ‘flagrant impropriety’ is closely aligned with non-
justiciability and that judicial intervention is only allowed under ‘exceptional circumstances.’ 
That standard was used by the Privy Council in Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporation 
of New Zealand, where intervention was restricted to fraud, corruption or bad faith.30 Dr Knight 
then made the comparison that this limited form of review is noted in other areas “to soften the 
effect of otherwise non-justiciable matters,” and gave the example of reviewing prosecutorial 
discretion.31 He proposed that the ‘flagrant impropriety’ standard “provides a workable 
methodology in that intervention is reserved for the most exceptional cases, that is bad faith, 
corruption and fraud.”32 Dr Knight’s article essentially suggests that the standard of review 
currently adopted by the courts under the ‘exceptional circumstances’ approach might be one 
of ‘flagrant impropriety,’ the same standard used  in Canadian jurisprudence for this type of 
review.33  
 
English courts that have considered judicial review of prosecutorial decision-making, have 
adopted a similar ‘exceptional circumstances’ approach, but importantly, the intensity of 
judicial review has been in those cases, decided using variegated intensities. For example, if 
the intensity of review were to be captured by an explicit standard under the unreasonableness 
ground, it has in most cases resembled the much lower ‘reasonableness’ standard, (or simple 
reasonableness based on Dr Knight’s Framework).34  
 
Professor Keith’s comment on the adoption of an appropriate standard of review, must be 
noted:35 “…there is no single precise answer to the extent of appellate review of the exercise 
of discretion. Moreover, there can clearly be approaches falling between the two possibilities 
                                                
30 Knight, above n 5, at 145. The case Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd [1994] 
2 NZLR 385 (PC) considered whether commercial decisions of a state-owned enterprise were reviewable. Lord 
Templeman at 391 stated “It does not seem likely that a decision by a state-owned enterprise to enter into or 
determine a commercial contract to supply goods or services will ever be the subject of judicial review in the 
absence of fraud, corruption or bad faith.” See also Janet McLean “New Public Management New Zealand Style” 
in Paul Craig and Adam Tomkins (eds) The Executive and the Public Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2006) at 124. 
31 Knight, above n 5, at 145. 
32 Ibid, at 146. 
33 See chapter 4 at section 4.3.2 for a discussion on the standard of ‘flagrant impropriety’ used in Canada. 
34 See Chapter 4 at section 4.4.3; see R v Director of Public Prosecutions v ex parte Manning [2001] QB 330 
where Lord Bingham CJ examined the reasonableness of the prosecutor’s decisions by applying the evidential 
sufficiency test. See also Knight, above n 18, at 150 for a discussion on the ‘simple reasonableness’ standard. See 
generally Taylor, above n 3, at [11.01]. It should also be noted that the ‘exceptional circumstances’ approach in 
the United Kingdom covers matters that fall under all three branches of review, namely; illegality, unfairness and 
irrationality/ unreasonableness. 
35 KJ Keith “Appeals from Administrative Tribunals – the Existing Judicial Experience” (1969) 5 VUWLR 123 
at 151. 
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stated at the outset- “wrong principles” and complete substitution….More precise articulation 
of the line will normally have to come from the courts…” 
 
The New Zealand Supreme Court has never articulated a “unified and principled” approach of 
variegated intensities of review for prosecutorial discretion.36 But it may be deduced from the 
works of scholars and the organising principles that underlie the ‘exceptional circumstances’ 
approach that the standard applied in New Zealand is high.37 This means that aggrieved victims 
may be precluded under that demanding standard from having their cases successfully 
judicially reviewed. 
 
6.1.2 The Limited Grounds of Review for Prosecution Decisions in New Zealand 
 
The grounds for challenge under judicial review generally in New Zealand are not prescribed 
by statute but are analytically divided into:38 
 
1) illegality (acting outside the scope of the power; getting the law wrong) 
2) unfairness or impropriety (both procedural and substantive or actual), and 
3) irrationality or unreasonableness.39 
 
These are not hermetically sealed categories-they overlap and converge. Their Lordships in 
CCSU cautioned that these grounds are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive and there is 
room for new grounds to evolve on a case to case basis.40 Lord Greene MR in Associated 
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation noted that grounds of review are not 
discrete categories but often merge and overlap.41 In terms of public law, impropriety and 
illegality shade into each other and there is no clear demarcation line. A strict categorisation 
                                                
36 See Benjamin Snow “Reviewing Crown Discretion: The Need for a Unified, Principled Approach that Mandates 
Transparency” (2013) 98(6) Criminal Report 143. 
37 See Chapter 6 at section 6.1.4 for the principles that underlie the ‘exceptional circumstances’ position. 
38 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1983] UKHL 9, [1985] AC 374 at 410-411 
[GCHQ] per Lord Diplock. 
39 Taylor, above n 3, at [11.01]; “The inconsistency in the use of “unreasonableness”, “Wednesbury 
unreasonableness” and “irrationality” as being restricted to the meaning of what no reasonable authority could do 
and being used in a wider sense as including the other grounds relating to the deliberative process…has still not 
been settled. In fact, the concept of varying intensity of unreasonableness review stated by Baragwanath J in 
Progressive Enterprises Ltd v North Shore City Council [2006] NZRMA 72 has been gaining acceptance.” 
40 See also Wheeler v Leicester City Council [1985] AC 1054 (HL) at 1078 per Lord Roskill. Lord Roskill arrived 
at a similar classification as Lord Diplock. 
41 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation, above n 29. There is often tendency for 
plaintiffs to claim under every possible ground. Helen Aikman QC stated that in her experience, it is usually better 
to focus on one or two major grounds, even if there is some overlap; see Helen Aikman QC “Grounds of challenge” 
in Judicial Review Intensive (September, 2007). 
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approach only leads to the blanket exclusion of certain grounds of review, evidenced in 
Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne and Matalulu v Director of Public Prosecutions (Fiji).42  
 
The ordained tripartite expression of the grounds of review has been repeatedly endorsed in 
New Zealand administrative law.43 Lord Cooke advanced the following statement on the 
grounds of review: “The substantive principles of judicial review are simply that the decision-
maker must act in accordance with law, fairly and reasonably.”44 However, the orthodoxy has 
never prevailed in judicial review of prosecution decisions. By only deciding as far as it was 
required, the Supreme Court in Osborne approved justiciability on a slender basis- without 
endorsing the approach of the Court of Appeal on other aspects of its reasoning. Any position 
that finally eliminated the branches of unfairness and unreasonableness from review, would be 
unprincipled. The courts would have failed to find an appropriate balance between vigilance 
and restraint.45 
 
As a matter of judicial policy, Randerson J in Polynesian Spa, narrowly circumscribed 
justiciability to extend only to the illegality branch of review. Only where there is bad faith,46 
a collateral purpose or where there is an abdication of discretion via the adoption of a fixed 
policy47 could a decision be reviewed.48 For a decision not to prosecute, “judicial review is 
only likely to be obtained in such a case where there has been a failure to exercise discretion, 
such as by the adoption of a general policy in certain classes of cases, prosecutions will not be 
                                                
42 Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne, above n 2; Matalulu v Director of Public Prosecutions (Fiji), above n 4. 
43 See Peters v Davison [1999] 2 NZLR 164 (CA) at 208; BNZ Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
[2007] NZCA 356, [2008] 1 NZLR 598 at [15]; Osbourne v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development 
[2010] 1 NZLR 559 (HC) at [54]. See also Knight, above n 5, at 71 – 72.  
44 Robin Cooke “The Struggle for Simplicity in Administrative Law” in Michael Taggart (ed) Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action in the 1980s- Problems and Prospects (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1986) 1 at 5. 
45 See Knight, above n 5, at 74. 
46 Joseph, above n 9, at [23.2.1]; “The courts will admonish public administration where there is malice, or 
fraudulent or dishonest intent”; See for example, Huffman v Black (No 2) [1990] DCR 152; Roncarelli v Duplessis 
[1959] SCR 121; Beaton v Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand HC Auckland CIV-2005-404-2642, 
17 November 2005 at [84]. “A person exercising public powers must use them for the public good and not for 
ulterior, fraudulent or capricious purposes”; Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank 
of England (No 3) [2001] UKHL 16. See also Webster v Auckland Harbour Board [1983] NZLR 646 (CA) at 
650; Webster v Chetnik Developments Ltd [1988] 1 AC 858 (HL) at 873, footnote 20; “These decisions judicially 
approved a passage from Sir William Wade and CF Forsyth Administrative Law (9th ed, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2004) at 355, where the concept of the public good was used to distinguish public from private action.” 
47 Joseph, above n 9, at [23.3.2]; “A decision maker entrusted with a discretion must not allow a fixed rule of 
policy to displace personal judgment. “The general rule” said Lord Reid, “is that anyone who has to exercise a 
statutory discretion must not ‘shut his ears to an application’.”; British Oxygen Co Ltd v Minister of Technology 
[1971] AC 610 (HL) at 624, referring to R v Port of London Authority, ex parte Kynoch Ltd [1919] 1 KB 176 
(CA) at 183, and applied in Westhaven Shellfish Ltd v Chief Executive of Ministry of Fisheries [2002] 2 NZLR 
158 (CA) at 171.  
48 Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne, above n 2, at [64]. 
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brought. There may be other grounds but it is likely only to be in exceptional cases that a court 
would intervene where a decision has been taken not to prosecute in a specific case not affected 
by factors such as the adoption of a general policy.”49  
 
In Osborne (HC),50 Brown J noted there is conflicting High Court authority on whether 
prosecutorial decisions may be reviewed on the basis of relevant or irrelevant considerations.51 
He applied dicta in Matalulu:52 “Contentions that the power has been exercised for improper 
purposes not amounting to bad faith, by reference to irrelevant considerations or without regard 
to relevant considerations or otherwise unreasonably, are unlikely to be vindicated because of 
the width of the considerations to which the DPP may properly have regard in instituting or 
discontinuing proceedings.” Brown J noted that restraint is particularly necessary where the 
prosecution discretion is broad and does not expressly or impliedly identify relevant or 
extraneous matters, drawing from Duffy J’s analysis in Cooke v Valuers Registration Board.53 
But, Brown J did not consider R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Chaudhary, where 
Kennedy LJ found the decision not to prosecute “unreasonable in that it failed to have regard 
to a material consideration.”54  
 
Subscribing to the strict view in Matalulu, Brown J held that a challenge based on not taking 
into account relevant considerations cannot succeed, unless the statutory power in question 
either expressly or impliedly identifies what is extraneous. This parallels Polynesian Spa in 
limiting the grounds of review for prosecutorial discretion. A deep-seated sense of judicial 
restraint is evident by this exclusionary approach.  
 
                                                
49 Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne, above n 2, at [69]. 
50 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand [2015] NZHC 2991, [2016] 2 NZLR 485 at [38] - [42]. 
51 Matalulu v Director of Public Prosecution (Fiji), above n 4, at 216. 
52 Ibid, at 753-756. That passage was approved by the Privy Council in Mohit v The Director of Public 
Prosecutions of Mauritius [2006] UKPC 20, [2006] 1 WLR 3343 at [17]. Both Mohit and Matalulu, above n 4, 
were approved generally by the House of Lords in R (on the application of Corner House Research) v Director 
of the Serious Fraud Office [2008] UKHL 60, [2009] 1 AC 756. 
53 Cooke v Valuers Registration Board [2014] NZHC 323; When dealing with a broad discretionary statutory 
power, it is necessary to distinguish considerations that the decision-maker has treated as relevant to the exercise 
of the power from those that are made mandatory by statute. The distinction is made clear in CREEDNZ Inc 
Governor-General [1981] 1 NZLR 172 (CA) at 183 per Cooke J: What has to be emphasised is that it is only 
when the statute expressly or impliedly identifies considerations required to be taken into account by the authority 
as a matter of legal obligation that the Court holds a decision invalid on… [that ground]. It is not enough that a 
consideration is one that may properly be taken into account, nor even that it is one which many people, including 
the Court itself, would have taken into account if they had to make the decision. See per Mander J in Vogel v 
Commission of Crown Lands [2018] NZHC 953 at [82] – [84]. 
54 R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Chaudhary [1995] 1 Cr App R 136 at 144. 
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The Court of Appeal in Osborne stated that “a decision not to prosecute because of an unlawful 
general policy which is in effect, an abdication of discretion is both reviewable and likely to 
result in relief being ordered (usually in the form of an order to reconsider).”55 The Court of 
Appeal cautioned that:56  
 
…the reality remains, however, that it will be difficult to make out grounds of review such as 
having regard to irrelevant considerations or failing to have regard to relevant considerations 
because of the width of the considerations to which the prosecutor may properly have regard, 
as well as the limited scope of considerations that are truly mandatory rather than merely 
permissive. That is one reason why it is said courts will only intervene in exceptional cases.  
 
The Court of Appeal also found that: “A material error of law in the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion will be reviewable.”57 In considering Chaudhary it also held that failure to accord to 
the applicable code for the conduct of prosecutions was a legitimate ground for review and that 
such failure “may logically be cast as either an error of law or a failure to consider a relevant 
consideration.”58 The Osborne Court of Appeal considered certain contexts where review 
would be available, it did not articulate the precise grounds that may be available for judicial 
review of prosecution decisions.  
 
The Osborne Supreme Court decision did not go as far as the Court of Appeal in its analysis 
of the appropriate circumstances for intervention, but held that “it is contrary to the public 
interest and unlawful for an arrangement to be made that a prosecutor will not be brought or 
maintained on the condition that a sum of money is paid.”59 To this extent, the Supreme Court’s 
decision was confined to the ‘illegality’ branch of review, and made no further comments 
regarding any expansion from this branch. 
 
Instead of applying the array of general judicial review standards, principles and tests that 
applies in every other judicial review,60 but insisting on proof commensurate to the seriousness 
of the allegation, the courts have significantly minimised the area for challenge, thereby putting 
a whole class of important executive activity beyond the reach of review. This same outcome 
                                                
55Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (CA), above n 25, at [39]. 
56 Ibid, at [45]. 
57 Ibid, at [48]. 
58 Ibid, at [49]. 
59 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (SC), above n 1, at [1]. 
60 Except for commercial decisions of quasi-public bodies; see Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporation of 
New Zealand Ltd, above n 30, at 391 (only reviewable for “fraud, corruption or bad faith”). See also Lab Tests 
Auckland Ltd v Auckland District Health Board [2008] NZCA 385, [2009] 1 NZLR 776 (CA); Air New Zealand 
Ltd v Wellington International Airport Ltd [2009] NZCA 259, [2009] 3 NZLR 713; Knight, above n 5 at 77.  
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would occur, but on a sound principled basis, if the general orthodoxy prevailed, as the realities 
of being able to prove, by cogent evidence, bad faith or collateral purpose are so slim in any 
event. To quarantine two whole branches from review because they have possible potential of 
involving questions that conflict with the separation of powers or require strenuous balancing 
exercises, “is to ignore the fact that the court is already required to enter a similar exercise in 
relation to legislation whenever proportionality is in issue.”61 
 
In a recent decision by the New Zealand LCRO, a challenge was made by a lawyer “DL” to 
review the prosecutorial discretion to charge him with disciplinary offences.62 It was found that 
the relevant principles that might apply to decisions being reversed by Review Officers were 
discussed in FF v Wellington Standards Committee 2 and include situations where a decision 
to prosecute was:63  
 
(a) Significantly influenced by irrelevant considerations 
(b) Exercised for collateral purposes unrelated to the objectives of the statute in question (and 
therefore an abuse of process). 
(c) Exercised in a discriminatory manner. 
(d) Exercised capriciously, in bad faith or with malice. 
 
The Officer noted that the principles while not necessarily exhaustive, provide guidance on the 
approach a LCRO can be expected to adopt when proceeding with a review of a decision to 
prosecute. It can be seen that the LRCO has adopted a more comprehensive position than that 
yet achieved by our courts.  
 
6.1.3 The Organising Principles underlying the ‘Exceptional Circumstances’ Position: 
Restrictions to Access to Justice 
 
As previously noted, the Supreme Court in Osborne did not provide a comprehensive 
analysis. It decided the case on a narrow basis and left many important issues unanswered.64 
The ‘exceptional circumstances’ approach is limited by the organising principles that underlie 
it.65 The Polynesian Spa restrictions demonstrate judicial caution towards interfering with 
                                                
61 Anna Poole “Recent legislative competence challenges” (2011) 19 SLT 127-134. 
62 DL v [Area] Standards Committee LRCO 164/2016, 26 October 2016.  
63 FF v Wellington Standards Committee 2 LCRO 23/2011, 27 September 2011 at [49] – [51].  
64 The Supreme Court in Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand, above n 1, only went as far as it was required on the 
justiciability issue. See Chapter 5. 
65 The ‘exceptional circumstances’ position as articulated in Polynesian Spa, above n 2, at [61] – [69] per 
Randerson J. 
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prosecutorial independence. The question that arises however, is whether the rationales 
employed by the courts to justify the current restraint are defensible? This section considers 
these principles concludes that the Courts have overly limited their own scope of review, 
significantly reducing the opportunity of aggrieved victims to have prosecution decisions 
reviewed.  
 
6.1.3.1 The Concept of Judicial Reluctance to Interfere 
 
The common law courts give respect to the “constitutional and institutional differences 
between the branches of government and defer over decisions involving: the national interest, 
polycentric issues, macro-economic policy, the allocation of public resources, the mediation of 
sectional interests and moral preferences.”66 In Sharma v Brown-Antoine,67 Lord Bingham 
explained that the courts have provided numerous reasons for their extreme reluctance to 
disturb prosecution decisions via judicial review. Firstly, the powers in question are entrusted 
to the specific officers and no other person, and no other authority is allowed to exercise such 
powers or make any judgment on which such exercise must depend. Secondly, courts have 
long-recognised the polycentric nature of such decisions, which necessarily includes policy 
and public interest considerations that are not susceptible to judicial review. Thirdly, the 
powers are conferred in very broad and non-prescriptive terms.68 
 
In Wayte v United States,69 Powell J commented on why courts are reluctant to circumscribe 
prosecutorial discretion; “This broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision 
to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as the strength of the case, 
the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the 
case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to 
the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.”70 The same factors similarly apply 
to a decision not to prosecute. 
                                                
66 Joseph, above n 9, at [22.5.1]. See for example, R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene and 
Others [1999] UKHL 43, [2000] 2 AC 326, [1999] 3 WLR 972 at 381; R v Lichniak [2002] UKHL 47, [2003] 1 
AC 903 at [14]. Compare A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA CIV 1502, [2004] QB 
335; A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 68 (judicial deference to 
ministerial assessments of the national interest involving terrorist threats but not so as to exclude judicial scrutiny 
where Convention rights are in issue under the Human Rights Act 1998 UK). See generally, Harry Woolf, Jeffery 
L Jowell, Catherine M Donnelly, above n 15, at 1-034 – 1-044. 
67Sharma v Brown-Antoine [2006] UKPC 57, [2007] 1 WLR 781 (PC), at 788. 
68 Ibid, at 788 E-H. 
69 Wayte v United States 470 US 598 (1985). 
70 Ibid, at 607-608 per Powell J. 
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In R v Director of Public Prosecutions ex parte Manning, Lord Bingham CJ, explained why 
differential approaches are taken for decisions to and not to prosecute:71   
 
[23] In most cases the decision will not turn on an analysis of the relevant legal principles but 
on the exercise of an informed judgment of how a case against a particular defendant, if brought, 
would be likely to fare in the context of a criminal trial before (in a serious case such as this) a 
jury. This exercise of judgment involves an assessment of the strength, by the end of the trial, 
of the evidence against the defendant and of the likely defences. It will often be impossible to 
stigmatise a judgment on such matters as wrong even if one disagrees with it. So the courts will 
not easily find that a decision not to prosecute is bad in law, on which basis alone the court is 
entitled to interfere. At the same time, the standard of review should not be set too high, since 
judicial review is the only means by which the citizen can seek redress against a decision not 
to prosecute and if the tests were too exacting an effective remedy would be denied. 
 
In R (on the application of F) v Director of Public Prosecutions Lord Judge CJ made the point 
that in contrast to an inappropriate decision to prosecute, where the individual facing trial has 
various alternative remedies in the Crown court or Magistrates’ court, by its definition, a 
decision not to prosecute that constitutes a miscarriage of justice only has judicial review as a 
remedy.72 His Lordship emphasised that:73 
 
[5]…the court examining the decision not to prosecute is not vested with a broad jurisdiction 
to exercise its own judgment, and second guess the Director’s decision, and direct 
reconsideration of the decision simply because the court itself would have reached a different 
conclusion. The remedy is carefully circumscribed. In the decided cases different epithets have 
been applied to highlight how sparingly this jurisdiction should be exercised. The remedy is 
‘highly exceptional,’ rare in the extreme,’ and ‘very rare indeed. 
 
Prosecutorial decision-making has been described as being cloaked with a presumption of 
validity, making a prosecutor’s charging decision “essentially unreviewable.”74 This discretion 
is further cloaked in a “presumption of regularity [that] supports…prosecutorial decisions and 
‘in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that [prosecutors] have 
properly discharged their official duties.”75 Some commentators have described the 
prosecutorial discretion as being “treated as gospel, resulting in a doctrine that prevails and 
                                                
71 R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Manning, above n 34. 
72 R (on the application of F) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2013] EWHC 945 (Admin), [2014] 2 WLR 190 
at [3]. 
73 Ibid. 
74 James Vorenberg “Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power” (1981) 94 Harv L Rev 1521 at 1522. Professor 
Vorenberg notes that while prosecutorial discretion remains broad, other actors’ discretionary powers in the 
criminal justice system have been limited He cites the limitations on the powers of magistrates to set bail, judges 
to set sentences, and correctional offices to control inmates. 
75 United States v Armstrong 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996) (quoting United States v Chemical Found Inc 272 U.S.1, 14-
15 (1926)). 
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prospers through inertia rather than through sound policy.”76 The judicial deference generally 
afforded to prosecutors is most evident with respect to the decision-making function.77  
 
6.1.3.2 The Principle of Deference  
 
 
Judicial review of prosecutorial decisions is anchored to the judicial deference principle, 
limiting the role of the courts with respect to judicial review.78 Within this paradigm, the 
judiciary has absolute power to interpret the law, while prosecutors perform their function 
within a sphere of discretionary administrative power bounded at the margins of law 
circumscribed by Parliament. The deference principle presupposes judicial power to review, 
but constrains the appropriateness to review based on the premise that administrative decision 
makers are entitled leeway and concession to make their discretionary decisions, and that the 
courts will respect this. Justiciability as a concept imports the deference principle as a means 
of recognising the constitutional and institutional limits of judicial review.79 Accordingly, 
deference is considered to be the “invisible hand” guiding the exercise of the judicial discretion 
to review or not.80  
 
The adoption of judicial deference is still a highly controversial proposition and has mixed 
support amongst judges.81 For example, Laws LJ endorsed the doctrine of deference in 
International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department, and even 
went as far as creating criteria to aid judges in implementing the principle on a case-by case 
                                                
76 Robert Heller “Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal Law: The need for meaningful Judicial 
Review of Prosecutorial Discretion” (1997) 145 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1309 at 1327. Heller 
observed at 1327 footnote 79 referring to Kenneth Culp Davis Discretionary justice: A Preliminary Inquiry 
(Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1969) at 191 that: “Professor Davis is especially critical of the 
inability of courts, and even many commentators to question the soundness of bestowing upon…prosecutors 
almost unlimited discretion: ‘[T]he habit of assuming that of courts the prosecutor’s discretion must be 
uncontrolled is so deeply embedded that the usual implied response to questions as to whether the prosecuting 
power can be confined or structured or checked is that the questioner must be totally without understanding. 
Inability of those who are responsible for administering the system to answer the most elementary questions as to 
the reasons behind the system is itself a reason to re-examine.’”  
77 Bennett L Gershman “A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor’s Exercise of the Charging Discretion” (1993) 20 
Fordham Urban Law Journal 513-530. 
78 The principle of deference is closely linked to the concept of variable intensity of review as discussed in Chapter 
6 section 6.1.2. See Taylor, above n 3, at [3.13]; “The reasons for deference relate to subjective justiciability and 
focus on institutional capacity and special expertise. Deference is therefore variable.” 
79 Joseph, above n 9, at [22.5.1]. 
80 Ibid. 
81 See Taylor, above n 3, at [13.3]; See Steyn “Deference a tangled story” [2005] PL 346; Lord Steyn stated he is 
“reluctant to enter into an argument about labels”, but that his “inclination is not to abandon altogether the phrase 
deference, which is sanctioned by wide usage in the United Kingdom and abroad, and has virtue of concision.” 
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basis.82 Other judges deplore the principle, for example Lord Hoffmann baulked at the notion 
of deference in R (Prolife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation and considered that 
the submissive overtones of the word “deference”, denoting “servility or perhaps gracious 
concession” is not appropriate to describe what is happening.”83 However, as Professor Joseph 
cogently reasoned, the “enterprise of judicial review would collapse without the concept of 
justiciability, and this concept implies ex hypothesi a principle of judicial restraint.”84 
 
The House of Lords in R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene, upheld the 
DPP’s decision to prosecute three individuals under section 16A of the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1989.85 Lord Steyn, in his majority opinion explained that the 
DPP’s decision should be upheld on the basis that “absent dishonesty or mala fides or an 
exceptional circumstance, the decision of the DPP to consent to the prosecution of the 
Respondents is not amenable to judicial review.”86 Lord Hope concurred, indicating that the 
Court should adopt the judicial deference principle:87 
 
…in this area difficult choices may have to be made by the executive or the legislature between 
the rights of the individual and the needs of society. In some circumstances it will be appropriate 
for the courts to recognise that there is an area of judgment within which the judiciary will 
defer, on democratic ground, to the considered opinion of the elected body or person whose act 
or decision is said to be incompatible with the Convention. This point is well made at p.74 para 
3.21 of Human Rights Law and Practice (Butterworths, 1999), of which Lord Lester of Herne 
Hill QC and Mr David Pannick QC are the General Editors, where the area in which these 
choices may arise is conveniently and appropriately described as the ‘discretionary area of 
judgment.’ 
 
Lord Hope’s reasoning has since been echoed in obiter passages of later cases, which suggest 
that judges should recognise a ‘discretionary area of judgment’88 or allow administrative 
officials some ‘degree or margin of deference.’89  
                                                
82 International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] QB 728 (CA) at 
[83]- [87]. In his opinion, Laws LJ asserts: “(1) that Acts of Parliament merit greater judicial deference than 
executive decisions or subordinate measures, (2) that greater judicial deference is owed in cases where the 
Convention contemplates a balance between individual rights and policy interests, (3) that greater judicial 
deference is owed where the subject matter falls within the traditional constitutional responsibility of Parliament 
or the executive, and (4) that greater judicial deference is owed where the subject matter implicates the actual or 
potential expertise of Parliament or the executive.” 
83 R (Prolife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation [2003] UKHL 23, [2004] 1 AC 185 at [75] (HL). 
84 Joseph, above n 9, at [22.5.1]. 
85 R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene and Others, above n 66. 
86 Ibid, at 371. 
87 Ibid, at 381. 
88 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Mahmood [2001] 1 WLR 840 (CA) at [38] (CA); 
Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681 at 703 (PC). 
89 International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 82, at 761 (CA). 
See also Popular Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue [2002] QB 48 at [69] (CA). 
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The deference principle has been described by North American commentators as the “passive 
virtue.”90 The courts there have fervently developed how the principle may be understood. In 
Baker v Canada91 the court recognised the deference principle as meaning ‘respect.’ 
Dyzenhaus writes that “deference as respect requires not submission but a respectful attention 
to the reasons offered or which could be offered in support of a decision.”92  
 
In order to understand the deference principle, it is important to identify that justiciability and 
jurisdiction are distinct concepts. Professor Joseph states that “jurisdiction identifies the court’s 
power to intervene in judicial review, while justiciability identifies the appropriateness to 
intervene in judicial review.”93 Justiciability has been described as a concept “whose purpose 
is to confine the courts to the exercise of judicial power in relation to issues not properly 
assignable to other branches of government under the separation of powers doctrine and 
otherwise ‘within the institutional competence’ of the courts.”94 Conversely, non-justiciability 
is a term that “may conveniently be used to denote decisions where the court is of the view that 
‘the decision-making function lies within the province of the executive and that it is 
inappropriate that the courts should trespass into that preserve.”95 While courts in New Zealand 
have jurisdiction to review prosecutorial discretion, it appears that the courts have largely ring-
fenced the discretionary area occupied by the prosecutor as “non-justiciable,” predominantly 
placing them outside the limits of court challenges.96 Deference in this regard, has evolved 
beyond giving “respectful attention”97 to prosecutors, rather, courts reviewing prosecutorial 
discretion in New Zealand are, as some judges feared, “graciously conceding.”98  
                                                
90 Alexander M Bickel The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Bobbs-Merrill, 
Indianapolis, 1962) at ch 4 entitled “The Passive Virtues.” See Joseph, above n 9, at [22.5.1]. 
91 Baker v Canada [1999] 2 SCR 817 at 859 per L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Mclachlin, Bastarache and Binnie 
JJ. 
92 D Dyzenhaus “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in M Taggart (ed) The Province of 
Administrative Law (Hart, Oxford, 1997) 279 at 286. 
93 Joseph, above n 9, at [22.5.1]. Approved in Trident Trust Co (NZ) Ltd v Bozo [2018] NZHC 947 at [18] per 
Downs J. 
94 Administrative Review Council The Scope of Judicial Review Discussion Paper (2003) at 28. See also Anthony 
Mason AC KBE “The High Court as Gatekeeper” (2000) 24(2) Melbourne University Law Review 784 at 788 and 
“The Importance of Judicial Review of Administrative Action as a Safeguard of Individual Rights” (1994) 1(1) 
Australian Journal of Human Rights 3 at 8. 
95 Administrative Review Council, above n 94 at 28. See also Anthony Mason AC KBE “The Importance of 
Judicial Review Of Administrative Action as a Safeguard of Individual Rights” (address made to the Australian 
Bar Association Fifth Biennial Conference, 4 July 1994) at 14. 
96 An observation made by Professor Philip Joseph in Joseph, above n 9, at [22.5.1]. 
97 D Dyzenhaus “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in M Taggart (ed) The Province of 
Administrative Law (Hart, Oxford, 1997) 279 at 286. 
98 R (Prolife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation, above n 83, at [75]. 
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6.1.3.3 Rationales for Judicial Reluctance  
 
There are various reasons for judicial reluctance to review prosecutorial discretion apposite to 
the deference principle. Some of the arguments include; the impossibility of total enforcement 
of the laws,99 the need for leniency in particular cases,100 and the prosecutor’s expertise, as 
opposed to the judge’s.101 Robert Heller identified four main rationales stipulated in United 
States v Armstrong102 for judicial reluctance to interfere with the prosecutorial discretion.103 
The rationales are used as justifications by the courts to “adopt the virtually irrebuttable 
presumption that a prosecutor is acting within constitutional limits.”104 But each rationale has 
an equally convincing counter-argument. 
 
1. The Separation of Powers Doctrine 
 
The separation of powers doctrine is committed to the principle of limited government. The 
doctrine lies at the heart of a prosecution decision. Since decisions involve a high content of 
judgment, prosecutors require full independence in the fundamental exercise of any 
discretion.105  
 
Proponents of this view advocate that the constitutionally-enshrined separation of powers 
doctrine generally prevents the judiciary from interfering with a prosecutor’s broad discretion 
                                                
99 Givelber “The Application of Equal Protection Principles to Selective Enforcement of the Criminal Law” [1973] 
U ILL LF 88 at 100-101; it can of course be argued that if total enforcement of the laws is impossible, perhaps 
the laws should be revised in a more enforceable manner, (i.e. fewer laws, with more resources allocated to the 
enforcement of those laws.)  
100 Ibid, at 100-102. However, a persuasive argument can be made against this rationale. One scholar argues that 
the result of discretionary leniency in enforcement is, in fact, injustice or discrimination towards those who are 
not treated leniently; see Davis, above n 76. 
101 Givelber, above n 99, at 192. 
102 United States v Armstrong, above n 75. See Heller, above n 76, at 1314; “The Armstrong court reversed a 
district court’s discovery order that would have compelled the [United States] Attorney’s Office for the Central 
District of California to disclose its criteria for bringing a drug prosecution federally. The Court found that such 
charging decisions fall within recognised prosecutorial discretion and that only a high threshold of evidence that 
suggests a constitutional violation based on selective prosecution would permit such discovery.” 
103 Heller, above n 76, at 1327-1341. Micheal O’Higgins “Reviewing Prosecution Decisions” (paper presented to 
9th Annual National Prosecutors’ Conference, Dublin Castle Conference Centre, May 2008) at 7.  
104 Heller, above 76, at 1326. 
105Polynesian Spa Ltd, above n 2, at [62] per Randerson J; Fox v Attorney- General, above n 9, at [30] – [31]; R 
(Corner House Research) v Director of The Serious Fraud Office, above n 52, at [31] per Lord Bingham; Marshall 
v DPP [2007] UKPC 4 (Jamaica) at [17] per Lord Carswell. For a commentary on the separation of powers 
doctrine see Joseph, above 9, at [8.0]. 
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to decide whether to prosecute or not and conduct criminal prosecutions.106 The reasons for the 
courts’ reluctance to judicially review appears to lie in the intersection of the componentry of 
government under the separation of powers doctrine. The Courts have taken a self-constraining 
approach as a result of these principles, which has created an institutional disinclination to 
interfere in this species of decision-making. But the absolute deference to prerogative power is 
now replaced by the considerable deference to the polycentric decision-making of prosecutors 
for and on behalf of the executive. 
 
The argument bluntly contends that the judiciary cannot interfere with the prosecutorial role of 
the executive. In the Canadian case R v Bladerstone et al,107 Monin CJM concisely summarised 
the argument as thus;108  
 
The judicial and executive must not mix. These are two separate and distinct functions. The 
accusatorial officers lay informations or in some cases prefer indictments. Courts or the curia 
listen to cases brought to their attention and decide them on their merits or on meritorious 
preliminary matters. If a judge should attempt to review the actions or conduct of the Attorney 
General…he could be falling into a field which is not his and interfering with the administrative 
and accusatorial function of the Attorney General and his officers. That a judge must not do. 
 
In Krieger v Law Society of Alberta, the Supreme Court of Canada considered whether the 
separation of powers doctrine formed the basis for judicial deference to prosecutorial 
discretion:109 “In our theory of government, it is the sovereign who holds the power to 
prosecute his or her subjects. A decision of the Attorney General, or of his or her agents, within 
the authority delegated to him or her by the sovereign is not subject to interference by other 
arms or government. An exercise of prosecutorial discretion will, therefore be treated with 
deference by the courts and by other members of the executive.” The court also commented on 
issues at a practical level regarding regular review of prosecutorial discretion observing that:110 
“The quasi-judicial function of the Attorney General cannot be subjected to interference from 
parties who are not as competent to consider the various factors involved in making a decision 
                                                
106 Heller, above n 76, at 1338. See also Robert J Frater Prosecutorial Misconduct (Canada law Book Ltd, Aurora 
(ON), 2009) at 45. This issue was discussed in Greymouth Petroleum Ltd v Solicitor General [2010] 2 NZLR 567 
(HC) which followed Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne, above n 2. Those decisions agree there is jurisdiction to 
entertain a review, but that this would only be in ‘exceptional circumstances’; Greymouth Petroleum Ltd v 
Solicitor-General at [39]. This is in contrast to the orthodox view espoused in Saywell v Attorney General [1982] 
2 NZLR  97 (HC) that review is not possible. Tindal v Muldoon HC Auckland A 383/83, 7 November 1983 is 
more liberal. 
107  R v Balderstone et al (1983), 8 CCC (3d) 532; [1983] MJ no 207 (Man CA). 
108 Ibid, at [28]. 
109 Krieger v Law Society of Alberta 2002 SCC 65, [2002] 3 SCR 372 at [45]. 
110 Ibid, at [32]. 
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to prosecute. To subject such decisions to political interference, or to judicial supervision, could 
erode the integrity of our system of prosecution.”  
 
Ramsay further explained the rationale stating:111 “It is fundamental to our system of justice 
that criminal proceedings be conducted in public before an independent and impartial tribunal. 
If the court is to review the prosecutor’s exercise of his discretion the court becomes a 
supervising prosecutor. It ceases to be an independent tribunal.” In Director of Public 
prosecutions v Humphrys, Viscount Dilhorne made advisory comments regarding the 
rationale:112 “A judge must keep out of the arena. He should not have or appear to have any 
responsibility for the institution of a prosecution. The functions of prosecutors and of judges 
must not be blurred. If a judge has a power to decline to hear a case because he does not think 
it should be brought, then it soon may be thought that the cases he allows to proceed are cases 
brought with his consent or approval.” Various commentators and many courts including the 
Armstrong Court have articulated that prosecutors are comparatively more competent than the 
judiciary in making such decisions due to their expertise and experience in confronting these 
types of issues regularly.113 
 
Although it is now well established in New Zealand that courts have jurisdiction (albeit 
restricted) to judicially review prosecutorial discretion, the rationale that the courts should not 
interfere by virtue of the separation of powers argument is unconvincing. The more compelling 
and converse argument is that prosecutors should retain broad discretion in their decision-
making process, since they have specialised judgment and acuity to make such decisions 
compared to the courts.114 However, the validity of this argument is lost when the courts are 
called upon to review an allegedly flawed decision. Reviewing executive action is a primary 
discipline of the judiciary and they regularly review policy decisions of other state actors.115 
                                                
111 J A Ramsay “Prosecutorial Discretion: A Reply to David Vanek” (1987-88) 30 Crim LQ 378-380.  
112 Director of Public prosecutions v Humphrys [1976] 2 All ER 497 (HL) at 511. 
113 See for example, United States v Armstrong, above n 75, at 1486; "Judicial deference to the decisions of [federal 
prosecutors] rests in part on an assessment of the relative competence of prosecutors and courts."; Wayte v United 
States, above n 69; describing common factors considered in making charging decisions as "not readily susceptible 
to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake"; Steven Alan Reiss “Prosecutorial Intent in 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure (1987) 135 U Pa L Rev 1365 at 1368-1369; describing the prosecutor-as-expert 
argument for judicial deference to prosecutorial discretion. But see Vorenberg, above, n 74, at 1545-48; describing 
and criticizing this expertise argument for unfettered prosecutorial discretion. 
114 Heller, above n 76, at 1341. 
115 For example, government ministers. See Chapter 6, section 6.1.4.3. See for example R v Secretary of State for 
Social Security, ex parte Council for the Welfare of Immigrants. 
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This begs the question why prosecutorial discretion, a power exercised by the executive, exists 
as an anomaly in this regard.  
 
Heller argues: “To cloak prosecutorial discretionary decision-making in a presumption of 
regularity based on the fact that enforcement of the nation’s criminal laws is the “special 
province of the Executive Branch, however, ignores the proper role of the judicial branch 
within the constitutional system of checks and balances.”116 These checks and balances do not 
only safeguard against gross abuse, but also guard against the dangers that are endemic in any 
discretion based decision-making. For example, when a prosecutor becomes too close to a case 
and loses perspective. Even the most capable prosecutors may overlook important public 
interest considerations, or make a material error of law.  
 
The independence of a prosecutor can only materialise under certain conditions and without 
trespassory interference by the exercise of judicial power. But the judicial duty necessarily 
intersects with prosecutorial discretions. Any demarcation dispute needs to be resolved by a 
highly principled and transparent praxis with the authority of the Court of Appeal and of the 
Supreme Court.   
 
2. The Limit of Court Resources 
 
This argument purports that “prosecutorial and judicial resources will be stretched beyond 
acceptable limits if frequent judicial reviews of charging decisions are allowed.”117 Given New 
Zealand’s already over-burdened criminal justice system, this argument asserts that the 
“prosecutorial discretion is necessary to curb the ever-increasing strain” on the courts.118 The 
strain on resources and on the courts and prosecutors may be felt in two ways. First, criminal 
statutes often prescribe criminal conduct in broad terms. If a reviewing court finds the 
impugned decision not to prosecute to be flawed, then following from the experience of the 
English courts, prosecutors will need to reconsider their decisions and upon reconsideration, 
may decide to proceed. By this process, more cases will advance through the criminal justice 
system. Secondly, it is held that any collateral civil litigation to challenge decisions to prosecute 
will burden the criminal justice system’s resources and cause long-winded delays in criminal 
                                                
116 O’Higgins, above n 103, at 7; Heller, above n 76, at 1340. 
117 Heller, above n 76, at 1328. 
118 Ibid. 
	 96 
proceedings. The Courts are concerned that allowing more judicial review challenges against 
prosecution decisions will “open up the ‘floodgates of litigation’ inviting a deluge of spurious 
claims.”119  
 
Admittedly, the preservation of prosecutorial and judicial economy and preventing delay in 
criminal proceedings are legitimate concerns. These concerns are especially highlighted when 
there are possible avenues for frivolous and collateral litigation. The courts must find the 
correct balance between accounting for these legitimate concerns without disregarding claims 
that may be meritorious. Such a balance would require consideration of the legitimate goal of 
preventing frivolous claims against a victims’ right to review. The proper means of finding this 
balance is for the New Zealand courts to use variable intensities of review that consider the 
nature, importance and context of the decision, in order to minimise the risk of meritorious 
claims being turned away. The current ‘exceptional circumstances’ approach taken in review, 
is arguably too exacting and obfuscates the process of adopting an appropriate intensity of 
review. 
 
3. The Facilitation of Legal Enforcement 
 
The third policy argument that militates against judicial interference has been termed by 
American commentators as the “chilling of legal enforcement” justification.120 The argument 
maintains that prosecutors may second-guess their decisions to prosecute or not if they perceive 
that they will be subject to constant scrutiny by the courts.  
 
However, the courts using the ‘chilling of law enforcement’ argument as a justification for 
judicial resistance to intervene in prosecutorial discretion, means that the courts have 
improperly balanced a legitimate policy concern with a constitutional right. It is the 
prosecutor’s role to ardently enforce their discretion, as it is the courts to ensure that the 
prosecution discretion is not left unchecked. The lack of an institutional framework of checks 
and balances within which prosecutorial discretion is exercised encourages abuses of the rights 
of individuals. 
 
                                                
119 Amy G Applegate “Prosecutorial Discretion and Discrimination in the Decision to Charge” (1982) 55 Temple 
LQ 35 at 37. 
120 Heller, above n 76, at 1331. 
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4. Unnecessary Disclosure of Law Enforcement Strategies 
 
The fourth policy objection relates to the courts’ concern that if the judiciary scrutinises 
prosecutorial decision making too closely, it has the potential to undermine effective crime 
control. Vorenberg states that: “Charging unpredictability can be seen, in this view, as a way 
of retaining some ‘unearned’ deterrence that would be lost if penalties were known and 
predictable.”121 It is considered that the interest in protecting prosecutorial strategies from the 
public justifies the need for prosecutors to have broad discretion, and limited intervention from 
courts. 
 
However, there are two reasons that discredit that justification for broad prosecutorial 
discretion. Firstly, the argument presupposes that all criminals rationally pre-determine 
criminal acts before committing them. This is an unsupported assumption since many crimes 
are conducted on the spur of the moment. Additionally, even if some criminals structure their 
crimes in accordance with prosecution strategies, this is not necessarily undesirable. In fact, it 
may actually serve as useful tool for deterrence. If an offender is aware of the aggravating 
factors that might lead to a more serious charge or charges being laid, and a potentially harsher 
sentence, then the offender might choose to commit the crime in a more benign manner. For 
example, an offender choosing to commit a robbery instead of a more severe aggravated 
robbery (with a deadly weapon). Secondly, the strategies prosecutors have for law enforcement 
may be protected from exposure through judicial safeguards. The perception that court 
intervention of prosecutorial discretion would harm criminal enforcement efforts is “simply 
too weak an argument to support a policy that injects into the criminal justice system an avenue 
for misuse of governmental powers.”122  
 
One other rationale for judicial reluctance to challenge decisions not to prosecute exists that 
was not identified in Armstrong. The argument purports that taking a less restrictive approach 
to judicial review will lead to uncertainty for defendants. Under the principle of finality, it may 
be understood that to prevent defendants from being unfairly oppressed, defendants should be 
able to rely upon a prosecution decision not to prosecute, rather than having to live in a 
                                                
121 Vorenberg, above n 74, at 1549- 1550. 
122 Heller, above n 76, at 1338. 
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purgatory-like state, where the decision could change at any time.123 However, this argument 
fails to recognise that a decision not to prosecute does not necessarily mean that the defendant 
is acquitted. If new evidence comes to light, it is still possible that the individual may be re-
charged with the offence. 
 
The issue has also been considered in various cases where the objection has been surmounted. 
For example, in Chaudhary Kennedy LJ124 found that the time that had elapsed since the 
offence may be a relevant consideration in the charging decision. If a defendant is prejudiced 
as a result of delays in the bringing of charges, then this should be a factor against prosecution. 
If the prosecutor had made an undertaking that the defendant would not be prosecuted, rather 
than making a representation that the case is closed, then this should likewise indicate against 
prosecution. However, if the offence is one of a more serious nature, for example sexual crimes 
or murder, then a greater delay in bringing charges may be acceptable.  
 
While the various rationales indicate why the courts are exercising restraint in judicial review 
of prosecutorial discretion, each rationale has an equally persuasive counter-argument against 
it. Despite this, courts are still showing a uniform approach towards judicial restraint and 
prosecutorial power remains essentially untrammelled. Prosecution decisions being polycentric 
in nature, combined with the concepts of deference and justiciability are factors that all limit 
the scope of judicial review. In the United Kingdom case, Sharma,125 the Privy Council 
extensively considered common law cases focusing on judicial review of prosecution decisions 
and concluded that the language used in the cases showed a consistent approach: “Rare in the 
extreme, “Sparingly exercised,” “very hesitant” and “very rare indeed.” The Privy Council 
approved of Lord Steyn’s dicta in Kebilene:126  
 
“My Lords, I would rule that absent dishonesty or mala fides or an exceptional circumstance, 
the decision of the Director to consent to the prosecution of the applicants is not amenable to 
judicial review.” 
 
                                                
123  See R v Smith [2003] 3 NZLR 617 (CA) at [46] per Elias CJ; “Unless a judgment of a Court is set aside on 
further appeal or otherwise set aside or amended according to law, it is conclusive as to the legal consequences it 
decides.”; Starmer, Keir QC “Finality in criminal justice: when should the CPS reopen a case?” [2012] Crim LR 
526-534. See also paragraph 7.1 of the Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines 2013. 
124 R v Director of Public Prosecutions ex parte Chaudhary, above n 54. 
125 Sharma v Brown-Antoine, above n 67.  
126 R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene and Others, above n 66, at 371. 
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The language used in these United Kingdom cases is echoed in many of the pronouncements 
of the courts in New Zealand. In numerous cases, the courts here have articulated their own 
underlying rationales as the basis of their reticence. 
 
6.1.3.4 Judicial Restraint: The New Zealand Context  
 
The New Zealand courts have adopted a very cautious approach, since their slow but eventual 
emancipation from the prerogative non-justiciability approach.127 Brown J in Osborne (HC) 
reasoned that rather than set down principles, a case by case approach was required until the 
highest New Zealand courts consider the issue.  
 
In view of the extensive arguments and authorities cited to the Osborne Supreme Court, it had 
an opportunity to fully lay down the law in this regard. Instead, it decided the case on a very 
narrow basis. It did not comment on the decisional law test of ‘exceptional circumstances’ in 
Polynesian Spa (an authority cited to it at some length by all parties) nor did it approve or 
disapprove of the principles behind the exercise of judicial restraint in the review of 
prosecutorial discretion articulated by the Court of Appeal. This engenders an undesirable 
uncertainty as to the true state of the law. To this end, it is appropriate to work backwards from 
the Court of Appeal’s findings in reaching their conclusion. The Court of Appeal was 
particularly influenced by Polynesian Spa.  
 
In Polynesian Spa, Randerson J found six reasons to support the ‘exceptional circumstances’ 
approach as the test for reviewability, and why the ambit of review should not be extended 
further.128 Although His Honour made clear that the justifications applied to both decisions to 
prosecute and not to prosecute, only two of the six reasons can legitimately apply to decisions 
not to prosecute. The remaining four rationales129 essentially argued that matters should be 
                                                
127 Prerogative powers are reviewable in New Zealand, but some arcane restrictions still remain see Taylor, above 
n 3, at [2.25] – [2.29]. Even the prerogative of awarding honours is justiciable: Black v Chrétien (2001) 199 DLR 
(4th) 228 Ont: CA. But the Crown has the “exclusive power over the making of war and deployment of armed 
forces”; Rosara Joseph, The War Prerogative: History, Reform and Constitutional Design (Oxford University 
Press, 2013) at 110. 
128 Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne, above n 2, at [62]. 
129 The other four of Randerson J’s reasons at that only apply to a prosecution decision to prosecute are (at [62]): 
“(c) Decisions to initiate and continue prosecutions generally involve a high content of judgment and discretion 
in the decisions reached. (d) Where a prosecution ensues, the courts possess an inherent power to stay or dismiss 
a prosecution for abuse of process. (e) The conclusion on behalf of a prosecuting authority that an offence has 
been committed is merely an expression of opinion which is capable of being challenged in Court. (f) If factual 
errors are made in an investigation by a prosecuting authority or if there is further or other material which a 
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considered at trial, which cannot apply to decisions not to prosecute, where the prosecution 
process comes to an end and no trial takes place. Only the first two reasons are useful in this 
context. The first reason contended that;130 
  
a) It is important that the proper constitutional boundaries be observed. The discretion to 
prosecute on behalf of the state is a function of Executive government rather than the 
courts whose function is to ensure the proper and fair conduct of trial […] 
 
Randerson J’s reason resonates with Lord Bingham’s explanation as to why courts do not 
disturb a decision of an independent prosecutor save in highly ‘exceptional circumstances’ in 
Sharma v Brown-Antoine.131 Lord Bingham made similar opine in R (Corner House Research 
and another) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office:132 “Only in highly exceptional 
circumstances will the court disturb the decisions of an independent prosecutor and 
investigator…The reasons why the courts are very slow to intervene are well understood. They 
are, that the powers in question are entrusted to the officers identified, and to no one else. No 
other authority may exercise these powers or make the judgements on which such exercise 
must depend.” Randerson J133 noted a “marked reluctance” to intervene with the discretion 
since prosecution decision-making is a function of executive government and not of the 
courts.134 It would be inappropriate for the courts to interfere in prosecutorial decisions given 
its own function of responsibility for the conduct of criminal trials.135 
                                                
defendant considers ought to have been weighed by the prosecuting authority, there is an opportunity to explore 
and test such issues at trial and to bring such further evidence as the defendant sees fit.” 
130 Ibid, at [62] per Randerson J. 
131 Lord Bingham stated: “That the powers in question are entrusted to the officers identified and to no one else, 
no other authority may exercise the powers or make the judgments on which such exercise must depend.” For 
other cited reasons see; Sharma v Brown-Antoine, above n 67, at 788 E-H. 
132R (on the application of Corner House Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office, above n 52, at [31] 
per Lord Bingham. 
133 Polynesian Spa Ltd, above n 2, at [61] per Randerson J.  
134 Ibid, at [62] per Randerson J; Fox v Attorney- General, above n 104 at [28]; Sharma v Brown-Antoine, above 
n 67, at 789 per Lords Bingham and Walker; Krieger v Law Society of Alberta, above n 108, at [45] per Iacobucci 
and Major JJ for the court. It is generally inappropriate for a judicial officer to decide the merits of prosecution; 
Police v Hall [1976] 2 NZLR 678, 683 (CA) at 683 per Woodhouse J “it must normally be regarded as 
inappropriate for a judicial officer, whether Judge or Magistrate, to control executive officers in their decisions as 
to the initiations of prosecutions”. 
135 Fox v Attorney- General, above n 9, at [31]; R v Anderson 2014 SCC 41, [2014] 2 SCR 167 at [32] per Moldaver 
J for the court, citing the Supreme Court of Canada’s earlier decision in R v Power [1994] 1 SCR 601 at 627. In 
R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene, above n 66, at 370 D the court held that there is a “strong 
presumption against the Divisional Court entertaining a judicial review application where the complaint can be 
raised within the criminal trial and appeal process.” In Attorney General v Tsang Yuk Kiu [1996] HKC 38, the 
court noted that it is “the trial judge who has the responsibility for ensuring that the criminal process is not abused 
by the prosecution, and it is not for the Court of First Instance by judicial review to substitute an opinion of its 
own.” In Ng Pak Min v HKSAR High Court of Hong Kong, 27 July 1999 HCAL 70/1999 at [11] per Stock J, the 
court commented that the principle of judicial review is an avenue of last resort, that requires scrupulous adherence 
as “it will only be in the most exceptional circumstances that a court will stop criminal proceedings in limine.” 
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Randerson J’s reasoning is made on the basis that a demarcation between responsibilities exists. 
However, judicial reluctance to intervene on the basis that the decision-making is some aspect 
of executive function, is an unsatisfactory answer. The Courts’ core function is to ensure 
government acts under and in accordance with the law. By emphasising that the source of the 
decision-making is in the executive, to justify non-interference, is only a covert revival of the 
discredited prerogative non-reviewability position. The Judges in Matalulu136 in the Supreme 
Court of Fiji recognised the “polycentric character of official decision making,” and 
considerations including policy and the public interest are areas that courts will not supervise 
via judicial review because “it is within neither the constitutional function nor the practical 
competence of the courts to assess their merits.” Respect for the kindred concepts of separation 
of powers and the rule of law prevents the courts from encroaching into the territory occupied 
by the prosecutor. But again, the Courts are not lacking in “practical competence” to decide 
the issues. It is always a matter of evidence. Despite assertions to the contrary, the Courts are 
institutionally equipped to decide all issues involving the power of the State, as criminal law is 
only a subset of public law itself. 
 
While it is true that the executive and judiciary perform distinct constitutional roles, the 
functions of each can only properly be carried out if the judicial and executive arms work as a 
“collaborative enterprise.”137 It is the function of the judicial arm to scrutinize executive action 
and use judicial review as a safeguard against abuses of executive power.  
 
Randerson J’s second reason for the ‘exceptional circumstances’ approach was:138 
 
b) Decisions to initiate and continue prosecutions generally involve a high content of judgment 
and discretion in the decisions reached. 
 
Randerson J’s sentiment was similarly observed in the courts of Matalulu139 and Hallett v 
Attorney-General (No 2).140 While there is no denying that prosecutors require broad discretion 
                                                
136 Matalulu v Director of Public Prosecutions (Fiji), above n 4, (the Court comprising French, Keith and von 
Doussa JJ, respectively, Chief Justice of Australia, a Justice of the New Zealand Court of Appeal and a Justice of 
the Federal Court of Australia); Matalulu has been approved by the Privy Council on appeal from: Mauritius, 
Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica in; Mohit v DPP of Mauritius, above n 52; Sharma v Brown-Antoine, above n 
67; Marshall v DPP, above n 105. 
137 Philip A Joseph “Parliament, the Courts, and the Collaborative Enterprise” (2004) 15 KCLJ 321. 
138 Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne, above n 2, at [62] per Randerson J. 
139 Matalulu v Director of Public Prosecution (Fiji), above n 4. 
140 Hallett v Attorney-General (No 2) [1989] 2 NZLR 96 (HC) (Henry J). 
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to make specialised decisions of a “polycentric nature,” this does not mean that such decisions 
should be left virtually unbridled. Some commentators object to the courts’ habitual rubber 
stamping of prosecutorial decisions. It is feared that the culture of judicial reticence has the 
“potential for, and the reality of abuse, charging that discretionary enforcement detracts from 
the legitimacy of the criminal justice system, violates the principle of fair notice, and frustrates 
the will of the people.”141 It is the court’s mandate to provide checks on discretion. 
 
An interesting point of comparison is the willingness of the courts to regularly and freely 
review other types of administrative decisions that similarly require a high content of judgment 
and discretion, “while the prosecutor’s discretion is left relatively unhampered.”142 The 
purpose in making this distinction is to call attention to the fact that decisions of courts on 
which abuse of discretionary powers are based, are more often than the courts have admitted, 
judgments about what is thought to be the right approach for Parliament to take.143 An overt 
example of this is the English Court of Appeal case; R v Secretary of State for Social Security, 
ex parte Council for the Welfare of Immigrants.144 The majority found it inconceivable that 
Parliament could have “intended to authorise the removal of all social security entitlements 
from asylum seekers who failed to claim asylum upon entry into the United Kingdom.”145 The 
Courts saw it fit to quash the regulations giving such effect. Parliament plainly disagreed and 
passed new legislation that re-authorised the regulations in the same terms. Lord Sumption 
suggests there are two ways in which the court’s decision can be interpreted:146 
Some might say that this was a vindication of the proper role of the Courts. They were not 
prepared to allow a harsh policy to be followed by the executive on such an issue until 
Parliament had authorised it in unmistakable terms. But another possible conclusion is that the 
Court of Appeal’s view that Parliament could not have intended such a thing always was 
unrealistic. It ignored the political background to the legislation and underrated the level of 
Parliamentary concern about the effect of the UK’s relatively generous level of social provision 
                                                
141 Applegate, above n 119, at 40. For references to abuse caused by unbridled discretion see Robert H Jackson 
“The Federal Prosecutor” (1940) 24 J Am Jud Soc’y 18 at 19 noted the prosecutor’s extreme power and its 
possibility for abuse. See also Kenneth Culp Davis Administrative Law Treatise (2d ed, K.C Davis Pub. Co, San 
Diego, 1979) at 209-210; James Vorenberg “Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials” (1976) Duke 
LJ 651 at 652-653; For reference that discretionary enforcement detracts from the legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system see Givelber, above n 99, at 100. For reference concerning violation of principle of fair notice see 
Givelber, above n 99, at 98. For reference concerning the frustrated will of the people see: Givelber, above n 99, 
at 96. 
142 See Applegate, above n 119, at 40. See also Davis, above n 141. 
143 Jonathan Sumption QC “Judicial and Political Decision-Making: The Uncertain Boundary” (the F A Mann 
Lecture, 2011) at 4. 
144 R v Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, [1997] 1 WLR 
275, [1996] 4 All re 385, [1996] EWCA Civ 1293. 
145 Sumption, above n 143, at 4. 
146 Ibid. 
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in drawing asylum-seekers across Europe to our shores. Differences like these at one point 
became so intense that an attempt was made, which was ultimately abandoned, to oust by statute 
the courts’ powers of judicial review over certain categories of asylum decisions. 
Judgments of this nature are undeniably political, for the simple reason that they deal “with 
matters (namely the merits of policy decisions) which in a democracy are the proper function 
of Parliament and of ministers answerable to Parliament and the electorate.”147 The courts have 
blurred the line between policy and law in such decisions.148 This begs the question why 
polycentric prosecution decisions, that are reviewed in light of process and not merit, are 
comparatively non-justiciable? There is inconsistency and contradiction in the courts’ 
approach. Policy decisions are purported to be rarely justiciable matters, yet the courts are 
prepared to intervene in such decisions if they were made via other types of administrative 
discretion and not prosecutorial. The lack of consistency in the courts’ approach creates an 
injustice. It places the power of prosecutors not only beyond the law, but also beyond other 
discretionary decision-making powers of the executive.  
Another consideration as to why courts may exhibit institutional inertia, is the impact and 
disruption caused by collateral challenges to the criminal justice system. The point was 
considered in Polynesian Spa149 having regard to Kebilene150 about decisions to prosecute. 
Nevertheless, the same concerns can be raised for prosecution decisions not to prosecute. 
However, the ‘exceptional circumstances’ standard151 for review stipulated in Polynesian Spa 
then practically closes the scope for review. Perhaps the dominating latent reasoning, the 
inarticulate premise of the New Zealand courts', is the floodgates anxiety.  As Brewer J noted, 
adopting a line from the movie Field of Dreams, in relation to judicial review of the decisions 
of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner when that first became available it was thought there 
                                                
147 Sumption, above n 143, at 4. 
148 Ibid, at 2; Jonathan Sumption QC referred to the judgment of Laws LJ in R v Department of Education and 
Employment ex parte Begbie [1999] EWCA Civ 2100, [2000] 1 WLR 1115 since it confronted the issue of whether 
judicial decisions on questions of policy implicated democratic legitimacy and that commented that Laws LJ 
“distinguished between cases which raised, directly or indirectly, ‘questions of general policy affecting the public 
at large or a significant section of it’, and cases affecting only the individuals concerned by some particular 
application of policy. The difference was that in the former category, to quash the decision on the grounds other 
than irrationality would require the judges to ‘don the garb of the policy-maker, which they cannot wear’; while 
the latter can be resolved judicially with ‘no offence to the claims of democratic power.’” 
149 Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne, above n 2, at [62] per Randerson J. 
150 R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene and others, above n 66. 
151 Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne, above n 2, at [69] per Randerson J. R (Corner House Research) v Director of 
The Serious Fraud Office, above n 52, at [31] per Lord Bingham, held that only in highly exceptional cases will 
the Court disturb the decision of an independent prosecutor. Lord Bingham’s judgment was supported by Lord 
Hoffman at [49], Lord Rodger at [50] and Lord Brown at [58]. Baroness Hale agreed with Lord Bingham on the 
ultimate outcome, but did not discuss justiciability at [52] - [57]. 
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would be very few cases, rather than the hundreds that ensued: “However – if you build it 
[they] will come.”152 
 
The Court of Appeal in Osborne also commented on judicial restraint in the review of 
prosecutorial discretion, making the similar points153 noting that “the exercise of restraint- 
which relates to the scope and standard (or intensity) of review, and to the availability and 
scope of relief — is not to be confused with the issue of justiciability. The latter concerns 
whether the Courts are prepared to intervene at all in the exercise of their constitutional 
responsibility to review aspects of Executive action.”154 The Court reiterated that the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion is justiciable and that Courts are prepared to review executive action 
of that nature, “but the intensity of review, and availability of relief, will be constrained…”155 
Rewa involved an application for judicial review of the decision by the Attorney-General to 
lift a stay of proceedings against the applicant in relation to a charge of murder.156 It was held 
that the crown was not in a position to argue the merits of the application.157 The court noted 
its own jurisdiction to stay or dismiss a prosecution for an abuse of the process but that different 
considerations apply to the exercise of the Attorney-General’s prerogative power.158 The court 
cited Moevao v Department of Labour159 where Richardson J “emphasized the importance of 
the distinction between the decision to prosecute, which was a matter of administrative law, 
and the abuse of process doctrine as a matter of criminal procedure.”160 The court followed the 
Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Osborne161 regarding the need for judicial restraint in the review 
of prosecutorial discretion.162  
                                                
152 Deliu v Office of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner [2012] NZHC 356, [2012] NZAR 80 at [28]. 
153 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (CA), above n 25, at [34]; “(a) the importance of observing constitutional 
boundaries, including the Executive’s role in deciding whether to prosecute, and the Courts’ role in ensuring the 
proper and fair conduct of trials; (b) the high content of judgment and discretion in prosecutorial decisions; (c) 
the undesirability of collateral challenges to criminal proceedings which may disrupt due process; (d) the High 
Court’s inherent power to stay or dismiss a prosecution for abuse of process; (e) the opportunity to challenge a 
prosecutor’s opinion that an offence has been committed — either summarily, by applying for a discharge under 
s 147 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011, or at trial; and (f) the existence of other mechanisms for accountability 
of prosecutorial decisions, such as the responsibility of the relevant minister to Parliament.” 
154 Ibid, at [35]. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Rewa v Attorney-General of New Zealand, above n 25, at [1]. 
157 Ibid, at [13] 
158 Ibid, at [41]. 
159 Moevao v Department of Labour [1980] 1 NZLR 464 (CA). 
160 Rewa v Attorney-General of New Zealand, above n 25, at [42]. 
161 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (CA), above n 25. 
162 Rewa v Attorney-General of New Zealand, above n 25, at [45]. 
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The margins that the courts have set for themselves regarding justiciability are so narrow, that 
in practice, judicial review of prosecution decisions has arguably become synonymous with 
non-justiciability. In New Zealand it is very common in non-serious crimes that courts will 
interfere in a prosecution decision by dismissing a charge at trial under s147 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 2011.163 This can happen for various reasons, including when a judge believes 
for some reason the case should not have been brought by the prosecutor, or where there has 
been an abuse of process. Essentially, similar matters are put before a judge on judicial review, 
yet it appears that the courts are unprepared to interfere with prosecution decisions in this 
context. If the Judiciary chooses to forgo these checks and balances, this means that the 
executive has in this regard a virtually unfettered discretion, which is wrong in principle. 
The New Zealand Law Commission (NZLC) reported164 on a discussion paper165 which 
critiqued New Zealand’s prosecution system. It concluded that the issue relating to the judicial 
reviewability of prosecutorial decisions, garnered the most adverse comments out of all the 
proposals made in the Discussion paper. “There were fears expressed that it would become a 
routine tactic in criminal cases, placing obstacles in the path of prosecutions.”166 The Law 
Commission found that “the Department of Labour believed that any move to open up legal 
avenues for external review should be resisted. The police were of a similar view.”167 The 
NZLC proposed that there should be no “general legislative intervention to encourage judicial 
review of prosecution decisions, stating it was a matter best left for the courts to develop.”168 
The discussion paper also considered whether prosecutions decisions should in principle, be 
amenable to judicial review. “If so, it proposed that all prosecuting agencies should be 
amenable to judicial review on the same footing.”169  
                                                
163 See the clear remarks of Simon France J in DGN v Auckland District Court [2015] NZHC 3338, [2018] NZAR 
137 at [28]; ‘compelling reasons’ are required not to use s147 applications as at [30] an ‘abuse…sourced in delay 
or misconduct fits within the s147 rubric. See also Rowell v District Court at Wellington [2017] NZHC 2706, 
[2017] NZAR 1717 at [3] that s147 Criminal Procedure Act is wide enough to encompass all argument of law and 
jurisdiction- including, it would appear most challenges to police or prosecutorial impropriety such as in Torres-
Calderson v Police [2018] NZHC 722 [54], [2018] NZAR 665. 
164 New Zealand Law Commission Criminal Prosecution (NZLC R66, Wellington, 2000) 
165 New Zealand Law Commission Criminal Prosecution (NZLC PP28, Wellington, 1997) 
166 New Zealand Law Commission Criminal Prosecution, above n 164, at 27 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid; “In particular, it proposed at [220] that section 20 of the Serious Fraud Office Act 1990, which exempts 
the prosecution decisions of the SFO from judicial review, be reviewed in light of the C v Wellington District 
Court [1996] 2 NZLR (CA) and R v Bedwellty Justices, ex parte Williams [1997] 1 AC 225 cases.” The 
Commission decided that the section does not need to be repealed as the section allows for decisions of the 
Director not to prosecute to be reviewed.  
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Three conclusions can be made from the Commission’s report. Firstly, issues concerning the 
justiciability of prosecution decisions should stay within the realm of the courts, and is not an 
issue that can be solved by legislative intervention. Secondly, the Commission did not 
discourage the courts to develop the law regarding judicial review of prosecutorial discretion. 
This may suggest that the Commission believes this area of the law is insufficiently developed 
in New Zealand.170 Lastly, by questioning the amenability of all prosecuting agencies’ 
decisions, the Commission indicates its interest in the widening of the scope of review in this 
regard.  
 
The separation of powers doctrine and the polycentric nature of prosecution decisions appear 
to have restrained the courts from widening the scope for reviewability beyond the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ end-point. The very high threshold for review in New Zealand gives 
prosecutors what O’Higgins calls “partial immunity.”171 However, the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ quasi-standard has rule of law implications as there are no checks on 
prosecutorial discretion when a prosecution is discontinued as judicial review is notionally 
available, but realistically unavailable. The lack of checks goes against the separation of 
powers doctrine and means that justice is not served in those circumstances. For the judiciary, 
by self-abnegation, to have erected a virtually insurmountable hurdle to succeed in judicial 
review of these decisions, is to place such decisions almost beyond the law. For prosecutors, 
such an ecosystem is ideal for breeding aberrant and perverse decisions, with virtual impunity. 
 
Judicial reluctance and inertia to change from traditional practice, means that the prosecutorial 
discretion remains largely unfettered. Although there are legitimate reasons to reject a check 
on the prosecutorial discretion, there are clearly identifiable implications with the current 
system. These issues relate largely to the rule of law. 
 
                                                
170 See Ian Dobinson’s comment on the need for effective judicial review of decisions not to prosecute; “The 
decision not to prosecute is different. It is very unlikely…that an accused would seek to overturn a decision not 
to prosecute… It is therefore left to the victim or those close to the victim to seek redress. One avenue is through 
a private prosecution, but this is problematic and costly. Similarly, a civil action for damages could be brought 
but this also has inherent problems…every legal system has a vested interest in ensuring that all such decisions 
are seen to be fair and just. Unfair and unjust decisions not to prosecute, as stated above, have significant potential 
to bring a justice system into disrepute and it is accordingly the responsibility of both the government and the 
courts to safeguard against this.”; Ian Dobinson “The decision not to prosecute” (speaking at the International 
Conference of the International Society for the Reform of Criminal Law papers, 26 August 2001).   
171 O’Higgins, above n 103 at 2. 
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6.2 Rule of Law implications  
 
Judicial review has been described as “the rule of law in action,”172 judicial resistance to review 
prosecutorial discretion therefore raises concerns for the rule of law.173 The question that must 
be asked is: can the rule of law be supported given that prosecutors in New Zealand exercise 
broad discretion while the judiciary has self-imposed austere limitations to judicial review of 
prosecution decisions?174 Justice Beazley and Pulsford considered whether compliance of the 
rule of law is more fiction than reality, using an analogy from Hans Christian Andersen’s fairy 
tale; “is the cloth woven with gold, or do we fool ourselves, as did the emperor in his new 
clothes…”175 This analysis examines whether the rule of law is being upheld in the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion in New Zealand. On examination, it would appear that the cloth here, 
is far from lustrous. 
 
The working definition of the rule of law is greatly contested by theorists, however, there are 
two main views that dominate the multitude of definitions. The positivist view is that the 
principle is simply procedural, eschewing any prescriptive content.176 The substantive, 
normative or natural law orientation contends that the rule of law necessitates certain 
requirements as to the content of the law. Since the substantive view is encapsulated within the 
working definition advocated by positivists, the positivist approach will be used and in this 
sense, both views will be considered. On a positivist view, the rule of law is broken down into 
three meanings; 
 
a) Public action must be authorized by law, 
b) The law applies to all equally, and 
c) The law must be accessible. 
 
                                                
172 Ministry of Justice (United Kingdom) Judicial Review: Proposals for Further Reform Consultation Paper 
(2013) at [21] cited in Amy Street Judicial Review and the Rule of Law: Who is in Control? (online looseleaf, 
The Constitution Society, 2013) at 12; “Judicial review…can be characterised as the rule of law in action…” 
173 See Matthew Smith New Zealand Judicial Review Handbook (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters New Zealand Ltd, 
Wellington, 2016) at [2.0]; “Judicial review upholds the rule of law, requiring and incentivising good decision-
making and preventing abuses of public power.” 
174 Michael Code “Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Decisions: A Short History of Costs and Benefits, in Response 
to Justice Rosenberg” (2009) 34 Queen’s LJ 863 at 873; “The concept of prosecutorial independence, when 
properly understood, protects Crown counsel’s decisions from certain forms of improper interference and 
influence, but judicial oversight is not one of them.” 
175 Justice M J Beazley AO and Myles Pulsford “Discretion and the rule of law in the criminal justice system” 
(2015) 89 ALJ 158 at 158. 
176 Joseph, above n 9, at [7.2.3]; “On this view the rule of law means government in accordance with formally 
authenticated laws and is not to be confused with institutional values, such as democracy, justice, equality, human 
rights or respect for human dignity.” 
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The following sections consider whether the rule of law is protected by the current regime of 
judicial review of prosecutorial discretion by considering the three meanings of the rule of law 
in this context.  
 
6.2.1 Public Action Must Be Authorised by Law 
 
Dicey, explained in 1885, that the rule of law had three meanings.177 Dicey described the first 
as meaning “[t]he absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the 
influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even 
of wide discretionary authority on the part of the government…; a man may with us be 
punished for a breach of law, but he can be punished for nothing else.”178 Therefore, any public 
authority who imposes a detriment or penalty must be able to supply the rule or statute or 
common law that authorizes the action. Accordingly, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is 
linked to the potential for arbitrariness. Under Dicey’s first meaning of the rule of law, 
“arbitrariness, prerogative, or discretionary executive power entailed the rule of lawless 
government.”179 This meaning however, has been criticized for treating “arbitrary power” and 
“wide discretionary authority” as indistinguishable, both being a violation of the rule of law.180  
 
Lord Bingham likewise commented on the relationship between the rule of law and discretion, 
cautioning that questions of legal right and liability should be determined by applications of 
the law instead of relying on the exercise of discretion.181 Academic commentators have 
however, criticized the assertion that discretionary powers are inherently undesirable.182The 
focus of Dicey’s first meaning has changed in modern times from the removal of discretions, 
to controlling their ambit and application.183 Discretion does not itself violate the rule of law, 
so long as the essential aspects of the rule of law are satisfied.184 The criminal justice system 
                                                
177A V Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th ed, Macmillan & Co, London, 1959). 
See RA Cosgrove The Rule of Law: Albert Venn Dicey, Victorian Jurist (Macmillan, London, 1980); see also 
Joseph, above n 9, at [7.5.1]. 
178 Dicey, above n 177, at 202. 
179 Joseph, above n 9, at [7.5.1]. 
180 Ibid, at [7.5.2(2)(a)]. 
181 T Bingham “The Rule of Law” (2007) 66 Camb LJ 67 at 72. 
182 Joseph, above n 9, at [7.5.2 (2)(a)]. See, for example, RVF Heuston Essays in Constitutional Law (2nd ed, 
Stevens, London, 1964) at 42. 
183 Joseph, above n 9, at [7.5.2 (2)(a)]. 
184 Beazley and Pulsford, above n 175, at 2. 
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today cannot function without discretion, and it may even be considered unwise to have a 
system based entirely on fixed rules.185  
 
Former England and Wales DPP Keir Starmer stated that: “Properly exercised the discretion 
whether to prosecute or not delivers justice and is consistent with the rule of law.”186 One 
academic pointed out that “Prosecutorial discretion and the rule of law exist optimally in a 
system where there is a measured balance of suspicion and trust in Government; where there 
is an accepted trade-off by the citizenry between collective interests and individual rights. The 
Public Prosecutor is the lynchpin in maintaining this delicate balance in the criminal justice 
system, and in a functioning democracy, is answerable to the collective will of the people, 
expressed through Parliament.”187 The guard against wrongful use of discretionary power and 
the protection of the rule of law, therefore first lies in the hands of the prosecutor. Thereafter, 
the responsibility to check for inconsistencies is placed on the courts.  
 
The need for effective review of prosecutorial discretion is important for many reasons. In 
Wong v R, Gleeson CJ commented that “all discretionary decision-making has the potential to 
cause some degree of inconsistency. But there are limits beyond which such inconsistency 
itself constitutes a form of injustice.”188 Lord Bingham explained that “the broader and more 
loosely textured a discretion is, whether conferred on an official or a judge, the greater scope 
for subjectivity and hence for arbitrariness.”189 The rule of law requires that public action must 
be authorized by law,190 and that no public power is unfettered or “at large.”191 The normal 
course for public action to be scrutinized is through judicial review. Judicial review operates 
as a disincentive for decision-makers to act arbitrarily192, however the courts have constrained 
their powers to review prosecution decisions by only allowing the two nominated grounds for 
review stipulated in Polynesian Spa193 to be available. Therefore, any unrestrained or abusive 
use of prosecutorial discretion that falls outside of bad faith or a collateral purpose is effectively 
                                                
185 Jeffries JC “Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes” (1985) 71 Virginia L Rev 189 at 213. 
186 Keir Starmer QC “The rule of law and prosecutions: to prosecute or not to prosecute” (2011) 24 Advocate 40 
at 42. 
187 Kumaralingam Amirthalingam “Prosecutors and the Rule of Law- The Role of Legal Education and Training” 
(speech given to the IAP 18th Annual Conference, Moscow, 9 September 2013) at [20]. 
188 Wong v R (2001) 207 CLR 584; 76 ALJR 79 at [6]. 
189 Bingham, above n 181, at 73. 
190 Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St Tr 1029; Bingham, above n 181, at 73. 
191 Joseph, above n 9, at [7.5.2(2)(a)]. See Padfield v Minster of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997 
(HL) at 1060; Wellington City Council v Woolworths New Zealand Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 NZLR 537 (CA) at 545. 
192 Joseph, above n 9, at [7.5.2(2)(c)]. 
193 Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne, above n 2, at [64] per Randerson J. 
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left unchecked. The courts have rationalized on a separation of powers argument to adopt a 
strict approach, this in practice however neglects the rule of law.  
 
 Justice Palmer argues for greater justiciability of public power explaining that:194 
 
If a public body purports to exercise public power in a specific instance those concerned with 
that exercise must be able to ask an independent body- the courts- whether the exercise of public 
power accorded with the law. If it did, no harm is done by testing the question and, indeed, 
public confidence in law and government is enhanced. If an exercise of public power were not 
made according to law then the rule of law requires that be addressed, as it is when any other 
decision-maker acts inconsistently with the law. To leave the decision to the executive branch, 
untested, is to leave the effective determination of the law- a judicial function- to the executive. 
 
Former Justice Sir John McGrath shared a similar sentiment about the court’s role. His Honour 
on behalf of Chief Justice Elias and himself, in the Supreme Court stated, although the focus 
of his comments related to statutes limiting recourse to judicial review, arguably the same 
concerns are applicable to the exercise of discretionary power:195 
 
[3] Judicial review is the common law means by which the courts hold such officials to account. 
It provides the public with assurance that public officials are acting within the law in exercising 
their powers, and are accountable if they depart from doing so. Statutes limiting recourse to 
judicial review to challenge statutory decisions accordingly raises issues of constitutional 
concern. This concern is reflected in the presumption of the courts, when interpreting such 
legislation, that it was not Parliament’s purpose to allow decision makers power conclusively 
to determine any question of law. Legislation which does not on its terms prohibit judicial 
review, but restricts its availability, can nevertheless interfere with full supervision by the courts 
of the conformity of activities of government with the rule of law. The courts are reluctant to 
read legislation in a manner that impairs their ability to hold public officials to account in this 
way. 
 
Justice Brennan contends that “judicial review is neither more nor less than the enforcement of 
the rule of law over executive action; it is the means by which executive action is prevented 
from exceeding the powers and functions assigned to the executive by the law and the interests 
of the individual are protected accordingly.”196 The rule of law requires that there is no such 
thing as an unchecked discretion, yet the courts have through self-abnegation chosen to restrict 
the availability for review of prosecutorial discretion, this ultimately interferes with the rule of 
law. De Smith defined one aspect of the rule of law as meaning; “the law should conform to 
                                                
194 The Honourable Justice Matthew Palmer, Judge of the High Court of New Zealand “The Rule of Law, Judicial 
Independence and Judicial Discretion” (Speech given as the Kwa Geok Choo Distinguished Visitor 2016, National 
University of Singapore, 20 January 2016). 
195 Tannadyce Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2011] NZSC 158, [2012] 2 NZLR 153.  
196 Church of Scientology v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25 at 71 per Brennan J (Australia). 
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minimum standards of justice, both substantive and procedural.”197As will be discussed in the 
next Chapter, there is currently no procedural justice mechanism in place to protect victims’ 
interests at the prosecution decision-making stage. Substantive justice also cannot be achieved 
if judicial review is so restricted that deserving claimants are excluded from any opportunity 
for redress. If a flawed prosecution decision is left unchecked, it simply cannot be reasoned 
that minimum standards of justice are functioning as they should. 
 
6.2.2 The Law Applies To All Equally 
 
Dicey’s second meaning of the rule of law was described in this way: “Equality before the law, 
or the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land administered by the ordinary 
courts; the ‘rule of law’ in this sense excludes the idea of any exemption of officials or others 
from the duty of obedience to the law which governs other citizens of from the jurisdiction of 
ordinary tribunals.”198 This definition has also been criticized for the fact that not all are subject 
to the same laws, for example where different legal rules apply to different statuses recognized 
by law.199 The principle of equality therefore operates if the laws applying to each status are 
capable of applying to all equally.200 Lord Bingham later stated that the rule of law requires 
that the laws of the land should apply equally to all, save to the extent that objective differences 
justify differentiation.201 The court in the Australian case Wong v R reiterated the principle of 
equality stating; “Equal justice requires identity of outcome in cases that are relevantly 
identical. It requires different outcomes in cases that are different in some relevant respect. 
Equality before the law requires consistent treatment.”202 The test for equality before the law, 
will be whether a prosecutor has taken into account relevant/irrelevant considerations. The test 
will reveal whether the prosecutor has acted arbitrarily or not.203  
                                                
197 Joseph, above n 9, at [7.2.1]; SA De Smith and R Brazier Constitutional and Administrative Law (8th ed, 
Penguin Books, London, 1998) at 17. 
198 Dicey, above n 177, at 202-203. 
199 Different legal rules apply with every status recognized by law, for example; welfare beneficiaries (Social 
Security Act 1964), infants and adults (Minor’s Contracts Act 1969); Joseph, above n 9, at [7.5.2(3)(a)]. 
200 Ibid, at [7.5.2(3)(a)]. 
201 Grenville Cross, Director of Public Prosecutions of Hong Kong “To prosecute or not to prosecute” South China 
Morning Post (Hong Kong, 19 December 2000); “No two cases are alike. Factors may arise in one case which 
have no relevance in another. That does not mean that the taking into account of such factors somehow 
contravenes the principle of equality before the law. If that were right, it would never be proper to decide not to 
prosecute a suspect because he was very young, or very old, or seriously ill, or badly stressed, since that would 
involve the giving of preferential treatment to that person over others. Equality before the law does not require 
that every case be treated in exactly the same way, irrespective of the personal situation of the suspect, or the 
circumstances of the case, or the merits of the prosecution.” 
202 Joseph, above n 9, at [7.5.1]. 
203 Beazley and Pulsford, above n 175, at 2. 
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The difficulty with testing for arbitrariness of prosecutors in terms of equality before the law 
in the New Zealand context again, relates to the availability of grounds of review. In Osborne, 
the High Court did not reject the argument that judicial review is available if the prosecutor 
has failed to have regard to a relevant consideration or has had regard to an irrelevant 
consideration, but held that such an approach is “unlikely to be vindicated” on account of the 
breadth of considerations that the prosecutor could properly take into account, resulting from 
the “high level of restraint” observed by the courts for decisions regarding policy.204 This 
means that although the courts may test for equality before the law by construing the 
relevant/irrelevant considerations test that the prosecutor conducts, the court’s scrutiny has 
little or no practical affect even if the prosecutor was found to be arbitrary in the decision-
making process. Clear violations of the rule of law are slipping through cracks in the review 
system. 
 
Another aspect of equality before the law was argued by Robert Heller. Heller contends that 
the rationales for judicial reluctance to review a prosecutorial decision, “although admittedly 
based upon legitimate governmental interests, fail to justify the decree of discretion granted to 
prosecutors because they fail to balance these legitimate interests against the important 
guarantee205of equal protection of the laws.”206 The context of Heller’s argument was based on 
race-based selective prosecution claims:207 “nowhere is a careful re-examination of the 
prosecutorial discretion more warranted than in the context of race based selective prosecution 
claims.” However, the same concerns apply to judicial review of prosecutorial discretion, since 
the same rationales apply. Despite equality before the law being an essential attribute of the 
rule of law,208 prosecutors are practically placed beyond the law in regards to judicial review 
of their decisions. There is an unfair balance of rights between prosecutors and judicial review 
complainants. 
 
                                                
204 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (HC), above n 50, at [38]. 
205 Heller commented that the constitutional principle of selective prosecution was embodied in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause (America).  
206 Heller, above n 76, at 1343. New Zealand’s constitutional structure is based on the rule of law. One of the 
requirements of the rule of law is for the law to apply to all equally. 
207 Ibid, at 1327. 
208 Dicey, above n 177, at 202-203. 
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Equality of the law requires consistent treatment.209 Bias, whether implicit or not conflicts with 
the rule of law. The law must apply to everyone equally. Different application of the law 
effectively means that different people are being subject to different laws. As Piwowarski aptly 
posits:210 “At a meta-level […] the ability to treat seemingly-like cases differently may 
diminish judicial participants’ perceptions of the evenhandedness of the judicial process.” This 
appositely exposes how this facet of the rule of law is weakened. 
 
6.2.3 The Law Must Be Accessible 
 
The prosecutorial discretion being largely unfettered fails to protect another aspect of the rule 
of law, that being certainty.211 Lord Bingham has explained that under the rule of law, “the law 
must be accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable.”212 Raz, on the 
same footing identified that one principle of the rule of law is that all laws should be 
prospective, open and clear,213 as it aids the function of the law in guiding the behaviour of its 
subjects.214 Hayek, also included the need for certainty in his definition of the rule of law; “that 
government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand- rules which 
make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in 
given circumstances, and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.”215 A 
rule of law implication that flows from the prevailing New Zealand decisional law of judicial 
review of prosecutorial discretion, is the absence of a clear entry point for judicial intervention. 
This hinders applicants for civil legal aid for such judicial reviews, as they need to demonstrate 
factual and legal merit.216 The prevailing uncertainty in this regard will act, or may act, as an 
institutional inhibition to being able to successfully obtain legal aid as the case law obscures 
any confident foreseeability of success in this area.         
 
                                                
209 See for example, Matadeen v Pointu [1999] 1 AC 98 (PC) at 109, and Ririnui v Landcorp Farming Ltd [2016] 
NZSC 62, [2016] NZLR 1056 at [95] Pora v Attorney General [2017] NZHC 2081, [2017] 3 NZLR 683 at [121]. 
See also Joseph, above n 9, at [7.5.1]. 
210 Nathan Piwowarski Discretion and the Rule of Law: Is it Time for a Little Formalism? (Or, Mr. Prosecutor: 
How Formalists Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Discretion)” (speaking at the King Scholar Senior Seminar 
Paper, Michigan State University College of Law, 2007) at 34. 
211 Beazley and Pulsford, above n 175, at 2. 
212 Bingham, above n 181, at 69. 
213 J Raz “The Rule of Law and its Virtue” (1977) 93 LQR 195 at 198. 
214 Ibid. 
215 Raz, above n 213, at 195, quoting Friedrich A Hayek The Road to Serfdom (Routledge Press, United Kingdom, 
1944) at 54. 
216 See the Legal Services Act 2011, s10(4)(d)(i) which prohibits the grant of civil legal aid where “the applicant’s 
prospect of success are not sufficient.” 
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One of the fundamental elements of the rule of law is certainty and predictability.217 This is 
especially important for criminal law since the loss of liberty is at stake in any case.218  
However, a consequence of decisions being made by prosecutorial discretion is the ability for 
prosecutors to effectively re-write the law by requiring certain elements that are not already 
expressed in governing statutes. Chaudhary, illustrates this point.219 The main issue in the case 
involved the act of buggery. Buggery under section 21(1) of the sexual offences Act 1956 
stated: “It is a felony for a person to commit buggery with another person or with an animal.” 
Consent was not a defence to buggery.220 As a result of the offence being discriminatory in 
nature, in the 1990s, the CPS created two divisions of buggery under s12(1): consensual 
buggery and non-consensual buggery.221 Prosecution for consensual buggery required special 
circumstances, otherwise it would not generally call for prosecution; if for example the act was 
made in a place restricted from public access.222 Those who had engaged in non-consensual 
buggery would more likely be prosecuted.  
 
Chaudhary is an example of where the prosecutorial discretion goes beyond the decision 
whether to prosecute or not, but effectively enables a prosecutor to use their power to re-write 
the law. The CPS developed two categories of buggery, to aid decision-making, yet through 
practice, it has become new law that has not gone through the appropriate Parliamentary 
process. Furthermore, this newly created law is inaccessible since it is only available to those 
who have access to the offices of prosecution authorities and Crown Solicitors. In this regard, 
the prosecutor has stepped outside the bounds of his duty, and made the law inaccessible to the 
public. Such actions demonstrate complete neglect of the rule of law. Justice Cooper in New 
Zealand Motor Caravan Association Inc v Thames-Coromandel District Council explained the 
importance of accessible laws:223 “Citizens are entitled to regulate their affairs in accordance 
with the law, and should not be dependent on enforcement policies able to be changed without 
the formality and publicity attendant on the actual law making process.”  
 
                                                
217 See Joseph, above n 9, at [7.2.3] for a commentary on the substantive concept of the rule of law. 
218 Ibid. 
219 R v Director for Public Prosecutions, ex parte Chaudhary, above n 54. 
220 Ibid, at 139. 
221 Ibid, at 146. 
222 Ibid, at 136. 
223 New Zealand Motor Caravan Association Inc v Thames-Coromandel District Council [2014] NZAR 1217 at 
[62]. 
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6.2.4 Concluding Comments 
 
The current strict approach to review of prosecutorial discretion distinctly contrasts the rule of 
law in every aspect of the working definition advocated by positivists. Palmer doubts whether 
the rule of law is properly recognised or has durability in New Zealand. He expressed that the 
rule of law is in peril:224  
 
In my view the rule of law, supported by the principle of judicial independence, is and should 
be a corner stone of New Zealand’s constitutional instrument by which the coercive powers of 
the state can be contained, but I sound a word of warning to the legal establishment. I am not 
confident that New Zealanders currently understand the rule of law or, in a crunch, would 
necessarily stand by it as a fundamental constitutional norm…The rule of law is not reinforced 
by New Zealand cultural value. Neither is this surprising given its lack of academic and legal 
articulation. Without academic and judicial clarification of the meaning and importance of the 
concept of the rule of law and judicial independence, and some concrete event or debate that 
generates public appreciation and regard for it. I believe the rule of law is a vulnerable 
constitutional norm in New Zealand. 
 
Palmer’s admonition may be overstated. However, to the extent that the judicial reviewability 
of prosecutorial discretions is ring-fenced by the exacting test of ‘exceptional circumstances,’ 
his statement, in this context, has some resonance. 
 
6.3 Problematic Prosecutorial Decision-Making 
 
Having considered how the current approach to judicial review leaves the rule of law 
unprotected by each of its meanings, this section considers examples of its violations caused 
by unprincipled decision-making in New Zealand and other jurisdictions. Interdisciplinary 
research concerning the patterns of decision-making of public prosecutors will also provide a 
better understanding of the inherent dangers of discretionary power. The deficiency of the 
Osborne decision is the opportunity that was wasted to adequately protect aggrieved victims 
from prosecutorial misconduct. 
 
6.3.1 Bias in Prosecutorial Discretion  
 
In describing the prosecutors’ discretion to make decisions, Gershman observed that “various 
legal, political, experiential and ethical considerations inform and guide the charging 
                                                
224 Sir Geoffery Palmer “New Zealand Constitutional Culture” (2007) 22 NZULR 564 at 588-589. 
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decision.”225 However, an adverse side-effect of exercising discretion, although unprincipled, 
is the ability of prosecutors to inject their personal preferences in decision-making. Hence, the 
prosecutor has “virtually unfettered power to make momentous choices that can destroy a 
person’s reputation, liberty and even life itself.”226 Prosecutors may be influenced in their 
decision-making by a vast range of influences. For example, prosecutors have been found to 
adopt unconscious heuristics that have resulted in unequal treatment.227 Numerous studies 
undertaken in the field of psychology have acknowledged that “prosecutors and police 
investigators alike are vulnerable to: confirmation or expectancy bias, coherence bias, 
attribution bias, including gender and race attribution; and commitment bias.”228 Piwowarski 
in his analysis of interdisciplinary research on the topic found that prosecutors may decide to 
prosecute on the basis of:229 “non-legal institutional pressures, including public230 and political 
                                                
225 Gershman, above n 77, at 513. 
226 Bennett L Gershman “The New Prosecutors” (1992) 53 U Pitt L Rev 393 at 405. See also the cautionary 
comment made by former United States Solicitor-General and Supreme Court Justice, Robert H Jackson; “The 
prosecutor has more control over life, liberty and reputation than any other person…His discretion is 
tremendous…If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows that he can choose his defendants…it is 
this realm- in which the prosecutor picks some person whom he dislikes or desires to embarrass, or selects some 
group of unpopular persons and then looks for an offense, that the greatest danger of abuse of prosecutorial power 
lies. It is here the law enforcement becomes personal.”; Robert H Jackson “The Federal Prosecutor”, above n 141, 
at 18, quoted in Davis, above n 76, at 190. 
227 Piwowarski, above n 210, at 28, referring to Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke “Mental Contamination and 
Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations (1994) 116 Psychol Bull 117 at 119-130; 
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228 It has been illustrated through research that the reasoning process of humans is able to be distorted by 
prejudices, for example, via confirmation or hindsight bias. See Glazebrook, Susan Justice of the Supreme Court 
of New Zealand “Keynote address to the Criminal Law Conference” (Criminal Law Conference 2012: Reforming 
the Criminal Justice System of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 17 November 2012) at 3 footnote 10 citing Keith A 
Findley and Michael S Scott “The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases” (2006) Wis L Rev 
291 at 292; “Confirmation bias is the tendency to seek or interpret evidence in ways that support existing beliefs, 
expectations, or hypotheses. When testing a conclusion, police officers, convinced for example by an early (but 
plainly flawed) eyewitness identification, may seek evidence that will confirm the guilt of a particular individual, 
not disconfirm it. As a result, they may overlook viable alternative perpetrators, and downplay inconsistencies 
and inaccuracies in other evidence suggesting that the person they focused on may not have been the actual 
perpetrator.” See Glazebrook, above n 228, at 3 footnote 11citing Findley and Scott, above n 228 at 316.; 
“Hindsight bias is the tendency for people to think that an eventual outcome was inevitable. Their knowledge of 
certain outcomes, such as a charge being laid, affects their recollection of what actually happened. For example, 
once police and prosecutors conclude that a particular person is guilty, not only might they overestimate the degree 
to which that suspect appeared guilty from the beginning, but they will likely best remember those facts that are 
incriminating.” 
229 Piwowarski, above n 210, at 29. 
230 James Eisenstein & Herbert Jacob Felony Justice: An Organizational Analysis of Criminal Courts (Little-
Brown, Boston, 1977) at 47; “Individual prosecutors’ effective performance is generally measured by the number 
of trials (with violent crimes most highly valued, the percentage of convictions (including pleas), and the length 
of sentence for repeat and violent offenders.”; William F McDonald Plea Bargaining: Critical Issues and 
Common Practice (Department of Justice, 1985). 
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pressure231 for guilty verdicts pleas;232 the exigencies of the adversarial trial system233 and high 
caseloads.”234  
 
It has been long-established that prosecutors might be to some extent responsible for 
propagating inequality in the criminal justice system.235 Smith and Levinson argued that 
implicit racial attitudes and stereotypes have the ability to skew prosecutorial decisions in 
various ways in terms of racial bias.236 Implicit racial bias is a term that researchers use to 
describe the cognitive processes where regardless of even the best intentions, individuals can 
automatically classify information in racially biased ways.237  
 
The English case Manning,238 is said to have raised broader issues relating to racism in the 
criminal justice system and pertaining particularly to prosecutorial decisions that involve 
police. The applicants sought judicial review of the decision not to prosecute after the death of 
their relative, who was a black man that died in custody. Burton argues that “the facts of Mr 
Manning’s case certainly do nothing to dispel the belief of some black families that they have 
to fight hard for justice in a system that discriminates against ethnic minorities. If, as in the 
                                                
231 Sara Sun Beale “The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How Market Driven News Promotes 
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2094–106; considering the extreme deference given to prosecutors; Rory K. Little “What Federal Prosecutors 
Really Think: The Puzzle of Statistical Race Disparity Versus Specific Guilt, and the Specter of Timothy 
McVeigh” (2004) 53 Depaul L Rev 1591 at 1599–600; addressing “unconscious race empathy” that white 
prosecutors may have with white defendants or white victims; Jeffrey J Pokorak “Probing the Capital Prosecutor’s 
Perspective: Race of the Discretionary Actors” (1998) 83 Cornell L Rev 1811 at 1819; alluding to unconscious 
biases produced due to similarities between prosecutors and victims; Yoav Sapir “Neither Intent nor Impact: A 
Critique of the Racially Based Selective Prosecution Jurisprudence and a Reform Proposal” (2003) 19 Harv 
Blackletter LJ 127 at 140–41 proposing that it “[i]s likely that unconscious racism influences a prosecutor even 
more than it affects others”. 
236 Robert J Smith & Justin D Levinson “The impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial 
Discretion” (2012) 35 Seattle University Law review 795.  
237 Ibid at 797. 
238 R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Manning, above n 34. 
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Manning case, a prosecution does not follow the inquest verdict of unlawful killing suspicions 
of racism are bound to remain.”239  
 
The existence of any discrimination or unprincipled use of discretionary power in the 
prosecution decision directly violates the rule of law and neglects the values of the Prosecution 
Guidelines. Although allegations of discriminatory prosecution are very difficult to prove and 
such decisions are invariably protected by the cloak of discretion, the fact that discretionary 
decision-making is susceptible to such risks, means that the courts should be more open and 
cautious to scrutinising prosecution decisions.240  
  
6.3.2 Questioning Decisions Not to Prosecute: The Political Arena 
 
Another area of major concern involves wrongful non-prosecution of Government actors. 
South Africa’s National Prosecuting Authority is headed by the National Director. 
Inappropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion to not prosecute is most evident in cases 
involving the National Director exercising his constitutionally sanctioned power of veto over 
decisions of prosecutors beneath him. In the Institute for Security Studies monograph by Jean 
Redpath, it was found that the national director’s power to veto has been exercised (or not 
exercised) in a way that has left researchers questioning the independence and impartiality of 
the NPA.241 The statistics are as follows; “in 2005-2006 the NPA received 517 101 new dockets 
from the police, but prosecutions were instituted in only 74 059 (14%) of cases and declined 
                                                
239 Mandy Burton “Reviewing Crown Prosecution Service decisions not to prosecute” (2001) 5 Crim LR 374-
384. In the New Zealand context, the most apparent bias in the criminal justice system is racial. Cabinet papers 
relating to the “effective Interventions” package, that have been behind recent reforms in the criminal justice 
sector, suggests that over-representation of Māori may be attributed to bias or other unintended consequences of 
discretion; Department of Corrections Over-representation of Māori in the criminal justice system: An exploratory 
report (2007); suggests that “when a range of measures of social and economic disadvantages are taken into 
account, Māori ethnicity recedes as an explanation for over-representation. The level of Māori over-representation 
in the criminal justice system is very much what could be predicted given the combination of individuals’ life 
experiences and circumstances, regardless of ethnicity. In this sense, Māori over-representation is not a “Māori” 
problem at all.” But see Khylee Quince “Māori and the Criminal Justice System” in J Tolmie W Brookbanks 
Criminal Justice in New Zealand (wellington, Lexis Nexis, 2007); a New Zealand Professor of Law with special 
interest in Māori and the criminal justice system, commented on the presence of discrimination stating that; “what 
is happening to Māori within the justice system is not just happening to them because of class, and because of the 
seriousness and prevalence of their offending, at a deeper level it is happening to them because they are Māori.” 
240 See Keir Starmer QC [Director of public prosecutions of England and Wales] “The rule of law and 
prosecutions: to prosecute or not to prosecute” (paper delivered at the Middle Temple and SA Conference, 
Advocate, December 2011) at 41. 
241 Jean Redpath Failing to prosecute? Assessing the state of the National Prosecuting Authority in South Africa 
(ISS monograph Number 186, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2012) at vi. 
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in 307 362 (60%), while 136 589 (26%) were referred for further investigation.242 While the 
NPA would tend to blame withdrawals on poor docket preparation by the police and this may 
indeed be the case of withdrawal in many cases, the NPA’s own audit of 2007 withdrawals 
does not give a proper account for the reason for 55% of the withdrawals.”243  
 
The researchers concluded that the statistics indicate a general tendency to decide not to 
prosecute.244 This included decisions not to prosecute in particular, high-level NPA officials, 
even when South Africa’s Special Investigating Unit had considered the cases and 
recommended prosecution. A trend of the NPA terminating prosecutions and forfeitures against 
the high-profile and politically connected was also found. The facts suggest that the NPA is 
exercising the discretion not to prosecute inappropriately and without due regard to the South 
Africa’s constitutional duty to prosecute. The secondary-effect being the depletion of “internal 
morale and external public confidence.”245  
 
What this section ultimately highlights is that the appearance of prosecutorial independence is 
equally as important as actual independence. The Honourable Mr Justice Coldrey whilst acting 
as DPP in Victoria Australia wrote:246 “It is not suggested that an Attorney-General would seek 
to act other than honourably in making a prosecutorial determination. However, given the 
potency of these pressures, the process of evaluation central to decision making may well be 
affected by considerations (albeit subconscious) extending beyond those appropriate to a 
specific case.” He continued to reveal the crux of the issue:247 “On a more tangible level, a 
major problem exists when the prosecutorial discretion must be exercised in a controversial or 
politically sensitive circumstances. There is a real potential that such decisions will become 
subject to distortion or misconstruction if they are drawn into the ambit of party political debate 
or alternatively, will be perceived as having been motivated by political partisanship. It is not 
to the point that such assertions and perceptions may be factually groundless. The damage that 
                                                
242 Ex parte Attorney-General. In re: The Constitutional Relationship between the Attorney-General and the 
Prosecutor-General 1998 NR 282 (SC) (1); [1995] (8) BCLR 1070 (NmSC). 
243 Redpath, above n 241, at 41. 
244 Ibid. 
245 Ibid. 
246 John Coldrey “The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions: Independence Professionalism and 
Accountability” (1990) as cited in Geoffrey Flatman “Independence of the Prosecutor” (Paper presented at the 
Australian Institute of Criminology Conference: Prosecuting Justice, Independence of the Prosecutor, Melbourne, 
18-19 April 1996). 
247 Coldrey, above n 246, as cited in Flatman, above 246. 
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is created is that the necessary public confidence in the administration of the criminal law will 
be eroded.” 
 
Another aspect of the rule of law deserving of attention is that of accountability. There are two 
forms of accountability. The first is where prosecutors must be accountable to the ‘interested 
parties,’ and the second is accountability in the sense of curial sanction.248 It is under the second 
meaning that prosecutors enjoy greater immunity from being held to account compared to their 
professional counterparts. 
 
6.4 Lack of Prosecutorial Accountability  
 
When Crown Prosecutors are found to have caused a miscarriage of justice through 
prosecutorial misconduct by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal, this in practice does 
not call for further investigation nor sanctions against them. Certainly, all lawyers are 
susceptible to disciplinary proceedings by the New Zealand Law Society Standards Committee 
or the New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal.249 Complainants may 
also exhaust civil law avenues for conduct amounting to malicious prosecution or claim actions 
in tort. 250 However, regardless of these disciplinary routes, “Crown prosecutors are rarely held 
to account, certainly externally, even with a clear appellate court determination of prosecutorial 
misconduct causing a miscarriage of justice.”251 The WorkSafe prosecutor in Osborne for 
example, was not sanctioned even after the finding of the Supreme Court for his misconduct. 
 
To some extent, accountability is realised as the courts maintain the final decision over the 
determination of a prosecution. This accountability mechanism however, does not reach 
decisions not to prosecute as such matters never proceed to trial. It also fails to give relief to 
individuals who have been exposed to the stresses of lengthy trials which should have never 
proceeded.252 Independence without accountability presents a major threat to the public interest 
                                                
248 Accountability in its first sense will be discussed in Chapter VII; that prosecutors must give proper regard to 
victims’ interests. 
249 Ministry of Justice “New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal” <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
250 Frater, above n 106, at 257; “Civil actions for malicious prosecution or other torts…and even in rare 
circumstances, prosecution”; Nelles v Ontario [1989] 2 SCR 170 is Canadian authority for the position that 
prosecutors have civil liability for malicious prosecutions 
251 Nigel Stone “Production of Reports Following Finding of Miscarriage of Justice in Certain cases” (2013) 21 
Waikato Law Review 49 at 49. 
252 Flatman, above n 246. 
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which requires administration of the criminal justice system to be fair and just.253 Coldrey J 
whilst acting as DPP stated: “Whilst it is argued that prosecutorial independence is an essential 
element in the proper administration of criminal justice it must be equally recognised that 
inherent in an independence without accountability is the potential for making arbitrary, 
capricious, and unjust decisions.”254 New Zealand lacks a workable accountability mechanism 
for abuses of prosecutorial power.  
 
The principle of accountability is central to the concept of democratic governance based on the 
rule of law. Lord Bingham states that under the rule of law, ministers and public officers at all 
levels must exercise the powers conferred on them reasonably, in good faith, for the purpose 
for which the powers were conferred and without exceeding the limits of such.255 If public 
decision-makers are able to avoid being held to account for misconduct, “government has the 
potential to become arbitrary and self-serving.”256 Limiting bureaucratic discretion by ensuring 
compliance with specially designed rules and regulations keeps the government accountable 
and achieves three means: “The proper use of public funds, the fair treatment of citizens and 
the achievement of policy objectives as determined through the democratic process.”257  
 
Three elements comprise and ensure the accountability of public decision-making. The first 
element is answerability, this means that public officials must be able to justify and explain 
how his or her powers are exercised. Secondly, accountability is dependent on responsiveness, 
which requires the public to participate in the decision-making process. Finally, accountability 
mechanisms must be enforceable, whereby the decision-maker is subject to some form of 
sanction when they are unable to answer for the exercise of their powers or failed to respond 
to public expectations and needs. 
 
Former Crown Prosecutor, Nigel Stone examined this issue and contrasted a prosecutor’s 
accountability to the way judges may be held to account by the Judicial Conduct 
Commissioner, police officers by the Independent Police Conduct Authority or doctors, nurses 
                                                
253 Flatman, above n 246. 
254 Coldrey, above n 246, as cited in Flatman, above n 246. 
255 Lord Bingham of Cornhill “The Rule of Law” (lecture given to the sixth Sir David Williams Lecture, Centre 
for Public Law, University of Cambridge, November 2006). 
256 Martin Schönteich Strengthening prosecutorial accountability in South Africa (Institute for Security Studies 
Paper 255, April 2014) at 2. 
257 Ibid; Robert D Behn Rethinking democratic accountability (Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 
2001) at 9. 
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and others in the medical profession by the Health and Disability Commissioner.258 While 
judges, police officers and medical professionals may be scrutinised by independent bodies, 
the actions of prosecutors are not subject to the same supervisory processes.259 The lack of 
consistency in the processes is simply bewildering and difficult to rationalise. Furthermore, in 
2006, the Supreme Court of New Zealand in Chamberlains v Lai260 lifted “barristerial 
immunity” for defence counsel which had been a feature of the system since the 1970’s. 
Despite a burgeoning trend for accountability, prosecutors have managed to slip through the 
cracks unlike their learned counterparts thus far.  
 
The main reason why prosecutors have been protected from accountability unlike other 
professionals is due to their special role of acting in the public interest and not on behalf of the 
public.261 Prosecutors do not advocate for victims of crime, since they are not truly their 
‘lawyer’. Contrastingly, judges, police officers and medical professionals act exclusively on 
behalf of society’s interests at large. Therefore, it may be concluded “that no individual ought 
to be able to make a complaint against them.”262  
 
Despite this, Stone argues that there needs to be another method, aside from bringing issues to 
the New Zealand Law Society to which certain classes or persons are able to submit their 
concerns relating to prosecutorial actions. “Victims should have the power to make a complaint 
about the conduct of a Crown Prosecutor insofar as they were directly affected by that decision. 
This would not extend, of course, to a complaint made on the basis that an accused was 
acquitted.”263 Prosecutorial independence and accountability can operatively co-exist; 
“provided an appropriate balance between them is found, both principles can be protected.”264 
In fact, the expectation that a prosecutor acts impartially denotes the need for scrutiny to ensure 
such impartiality.265 
 
                                                
258 Stone, above n 251, at 49-53. 
259 Ibid. 
260 Chamberlains v Lai [2006] NZSC 70, [2007] 2 NZLR 7.  
261 Stone, above n 251, at 54. 
262 Ibid. 
263 Ibid. 
264 Schönteich, above n 256, at 2. 
265 Timothy Waters Overview: Design and Reform of Public Prosecution Services in Promoting Prosecutorial 
Accountability, Independence and Effectiveness: Comparative Research (Sofia, Open Society Institute, 2008) at 
22. 
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Currently in New Zealand and in jurisdictions overseas, there is a developing trend of greater 
public accountability and transparency within criminal justice systems.266 The oversight, 
review and inspection mechanisms have been termed the ‘fourth arm of governance.’267 
Accountability of the executive is also part of the victims’ rights movement which advocates 
for increasing accountability and participation of victims.268 It is argued that since Crown 
prosecutors maintain a significant role in acting in the public interest, “a greater level of 
accountability and transparency in regard to their decision-making should accompany this 
responsibility.”269 A system that holds prosecutors to account when it is warranted, empowers 
the public. It gives recognition to the fact that the Prosecution Office derives its power from 
the state, which in turn has derived its power from the public.  
 
The rule of law in relation to judicial review of prosecutorial discretion has become a truism 
without content. Without sufficient protection, there is doubt as to whether the cloth will ever 
“indeed be golden.”270 
 
The next Chapter considers the impact of the current law on those most directly affected by a 
decision not to prosecute; the victims.
                                                
266 Stone, above n 251, at 53. 
267 F Contini and R Mohr “Reconciling independence and accountability in judicial systems” (2007) 3(2) Utrecht 
Law Review 31.  
268 See Jonothan Doak “Victims’ Rights in Criminal Trials: Prospects for Participation,” (2005) 32 Journal of Law 
and Society 294-316; Tyrone Kirchengast “Victims’ Rights and the Rights to Review: A Corollary of the Victim’s 
Pre-trial Rights to Justice,” (2016) 5(4) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 103 at 115. 
269 Stone, above n 251, at 53. 
270 Beazley & Myles, above n 175, at 174. 
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 CHAPTER 7 
 
7 The Insufficient Protection of Victims’ Rights and Interests 
 
The Supreme Court in Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand highlighted the unprincipled outcome 
of the prosecution decision1 but did not consider the issue of consultation raised in the Court 
of Appeal.2 This Chapter does not consider the issue of whether victims have a ‘legitimate 
expectation’ of consultation, but questions why consultation is not already a procedural right 
for victims in the prosecution decision-making phase, when one of the public law values that 
underlie judicial review is the safeguarding of individual rights.3 De Smith, in defining the rule 
of law, recognised that “the law should conform to minimum standards of justice, both 
substantive and procedural.”4 The lack of minimum standards of justice for victims during the 
prosecution process and other victim-related issues in judicial review are considered.  
 
7.1 Definition of Victims Under the Victims’ Rights Act 2002 
 
The Victims’ Rights Act 2002 (VRA) was enacted to give victims of criminal offences, 
statutory recognition in New Zealand’s criminal justice system.5 It has converted some 
directives concerning the proper treatment of victims into enforceable rights. 
 
However, the VRA’s definition of “victim” under s4 as “a person against whom an offence is 
committed by another person” appears to limit the rights of victims in a pre-conviction phase.6 
                                                
1 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand [2017] NZSC 175, [2017] 15 NZELR 365 at [1]. 
2 One of the issues before the Court of Appeal in Osborne v Worksafe New Zealand [2017] NZCA 11, [2017] 2 
NZLR 513 at [85] – [89]; was “Did the applicants have a legitimate expectation that they would be consulted prior 
to the prosecutor making its decision?” 
3 See Matthew Smith New Zealand Judicial Review Handbook (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters New Zealand Ltd, 
Wellington, 2016) at [2.0]. 
4 SA de Smith and R Brazier Constitutional and Administrative Law (8th ed, Penguin Books, London, 1998) at 
17. 
5 The new Act replaced and further developed the principles in the Victims of Offences Act 1987 by establishing 
specific obligations on certain agencies to provide information and assistance to victims of crime. Interest in 
replacing the old Victims of Offences Act 1987 sparked from a citizen-initiated referendum that took place in 
1999, which found that victim participation in the criminal justice process being at the discretion of the judge was 
insufficient. See Ann Ballin Toward equality in criminal justice: final report of the Victims Task Force 
(Wellington, 1993); which also strongly disapproved of the principles contained in the Victims of Offences Act 
1987. The new Act gave effect to New Zealand’s commitment to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Victims of 1985. 
6 Victims’ Rights Act 2002, s4(a)(i). 
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“Offence committed” suggests proven guilt and therefore does not include those aggrieved by 
an accused where guilt has not yet been proved. Conversely, the UN Declaration states that a 
person may be deemed a “victim” in the course of the prosecution charging process when guilt 
of an accused is yet to be proved or not.7 The Declaration states: “A person may be considered 
a victim, under this Declaration, regardless of whether the perpetrator is identified, 
apprehended, prosecuted or convicted and regardless of the familial relationship between the 
perpetrator and victim.”8 Although the VRA may in practice, allow victims to exercise their 
rights regardless of whether anyone is, charged, arrested or convicted of the offence(s) in 
question, the definition of “victim” in the VRA does not currently reflect this understanding.  
 
7.1.1 Locus Standi of Victims 
 
Victims in New Zealand are not considered parties to criminal proceedings and therefore have 
no legal standing.9  Victims are only relevant in the prosecution process for reporting the crime, 
and thereafter, for supplying information to investigators and when required by prosecutors, to 
give evidence in court. This exclusion of victims from any formal role in the system leaves 
them fully dependent on prosecutors to represent their interests in the proceedings.10 Victims 
have been described as “passengers in a system which was being driven by other people,” and 
often experience feelings of disempowerment and irrelevancy.11  
 
Although the Guidelines, UN Declaration and the VRA aim to protect victims in the 
prosecution process, Garkawe argues that “little real change has occurred as far as the role of 
                                                
7 The Declaration of the Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (1985) at [4] - [7]. 
Geoffrey Flatman and Mirko Bagaric “The Victim and the Prosecutor: The Relevance of Victims in Prosecution 
Decision Making” (2001) 6(2) Deakin Law Review 238 at 238 noted that the Declaration: “sets out basic standards 
for the treatment for victims, including, the standard that victims should be treated with both compassion and 
respect for their dignity. It also provides that the criminal justice system should allow the views of victims to be 
‘presented and considered at appropriate stages of the proceedings where their personal interests are affected, 
without prejudice to the accused and consistent with the relevant national criminal justice system.’”  
8 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, GA Res 40/34 UNGAOR, 
40th sess, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/Res/40/34, (1985), annex A, art 2. 
9 The adversarial legal system places decision-making power in the hands of the parties to the proceedings, who 
decide how the case should be presented and what evidence will be led. 
10 Sam Garkawe “The Role of the Victim During Criminal Court Proceedings” (1994) 17(2) University of New 
South Wales Law Journal 595 at 598. It should be noted that the only exception to this is for the victim to take 
their own private prosecution. 
11 House of Commons Justice Committee The Crown Prosecution Service: Gatekeeper of the Criminal Justice 
System (Ninth Report, HC 186, 2009) at 37.  
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victims is concerned.”12 These legal instruments only promote victims’ rights in a ‘symbolic’ 
way and remain mostly ‘ineffectual’ for five reasons.13  
 
Firstly, victims are only one of the numerous factors that prosecutors take into consideration 
under the Guidelines. If a victim does not agree with a decision, prosecutors can easily justify 
their actions on the basis of other considerations.14 Secondly, the ‘rights’ embodied in the 
Declarations and Acts are only effective if victims are aware of them and take initiative to 
request that the right be granted. Neither the police nor Crown Solicitors are obliged to inform 
victims of these rights. Garkawe argues that “consequently, many victims remain ignorant of 
these rights, and even if aware, often have difficulty knowing how to exercise them.”15 
 
The third reason concerns the time constraints on prosecutors. The prosecutor’s role is an 
onerous one, consideration of victims may simply be overlooked, despite the fact that 
prosecutors should do so.16 The fourth reason is that where there has been a breach of rights, 
the legislation does not provide for a guaranteed judicial or administrative remedy or an adverse 
consequence in case of breach.17  In this sense, victims are placed in an even more vulnerable 
position, as prosecutor’s face no accountability for non-compliance.  
 
The final reason is “the presence of the largely hidden factor of bureaucratic resistance to 
change, particularly changes that add to the burden of a Department.”18 Andrew Karmen 
crisply summarises this point: 19 “Criminal justice professionals have little incentive to act in 
accordance with the wishes and needs of victims, since they are not directly accountable to 
them, either legally or organizationally. Official priorities are to achieve high level of 
productivity and to maintain smooth coordination with other components of the system. 
Victims are viewed as a resource to be drawn on, as needed in the pursuit of organizational 
                                                
12 Garkawe, above n 10, at 599. Garkawe’s arguments were based on the DPP Guidelines and various Declarations 
and Charters of Victims’ Rights in New South Wales Australia. The same arguments are applicable to the New 
Zealand’s context.  
13 Ibid.   
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid, at 600. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Andrew Karmen Crime Victims - An Introduction to Victimology (2nd ed, Brooks/Coles Pub. Co, Calif, 1990) 
at 212. 
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objectives that are usually only incidental to the satisfaction of the interests of the individual 
victims.”  
 
7.2 Insufficient Rights for Victims 
 
The rights of victims under the VRA20 are only protected insofar as the role victims play in the 
criminal justice system; as witnesses and information receivers.21As vulnerable players in the 
system, victims are not always comfortable asking for information regarding their case, and 
some simply do not know how. Information is one of the most important needs of victims 
participating in the prosecution process.22 In this regard, the VRA only goes halfway in 
protecting victims’ right to information at the prosecution decision-making stage. Section 12(1) 
states:  
 
A victim must, as soon as practicable, be given information by investigating authorities or, as 
the case requires, by members of court staff, or the prosecutor, about the following matters…  
 
The legislation provides a clear framework, where the onus is on the corresponding agent to 
provide the information automatically to the victim at a practicable time. The statutory 
obligation on prosecutors is reinforced in the Prosecution Guidelines 2013, where information 
must be provided to victims to ensure they “understand the process and know what is happening 
                                                
20 The purpose of the Act is to improve provisions for the treatment and rights of victims of offences; see Victims’ 
Rights Act 2002, s3, see also s7. In Ontario Canada, any rights in the Victims’ Bill of Rights, 1995, S.O. 1995, 
c.6 are actually considered principles and not enforceable statutory rights. In Vanscoy v Ontario, [1999] OJ 1661, 
99 OTC 70 (Ont SCJ) at [20] - [22]; it was held that the Act “is a statement of principle and social policy, 
beguilingly clothed in the language of legislation. It does not establish any statutory rights for victims of crime”  
21 A summary of the Victims’ Rights Act 2002 is provided by the Ministry of Justice “A Guide for Agencies 
dealing with Victims of Offences” <www.justice.org.nz>: The Victims’ Rights Act 2002 “(1) expands the range 
of persons who are defined as victims for the purposes of the Act by including parents and guardians of child 
victims and close family members of those murdered or rendered incapable. (2) provides that persons not strictly 
under the Act may have input into proceedings involving the accused/offender (3) mandates the provision of 
assistance and information to victims (4) encourages the holding of meetings between victims and offenders, in 
accordance with principles of restorative justice (5) prohibits the disclosure in court of victim’s address except in 
particular circumstances (6) requires that in all cases a victim impact statement is sought, for the information of 
the sentencing judge (7) requires that victims’ views on any application for order prohibiting the publication of 
the accused/offender’s name are sought (8) provides comprehensive rights of notification, to victims of certain 
offences, of the occurrence of specified (including forthcoming) events relating to the accused/ offender (9) 
provides that victims of certain offences may participate in the decision-making processes, such as processes for 
the offender’s release from prison under the Parole Act 2002 or for the deportation of the offender under the 
Immigration Act 1987.” 
22 Angela Jane Lee Victims’ Needs: an Issues Paper (prepared for the Department of Justice Policy and Research 
Division, 1993). 
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at each stage.”23 The provision to this extent, has been drafted carefully and is realistically 
enforceable.24  
 
Conversely, a victim’s right to information in the context of the charging decision at subsection 
(b) is insufficient. Section 12(1)(b) of the VRA stipulates that a victim must: 
 
as soon as practicable be given information for the charges laid or reasons for not laying 
charges, and all changes to the charges laid. 
 
On this basis, any prosecutor who merely informs a victim that discontinuation resulted from 
public interest concerns, has fulfilled the obligation under s12(1)(b). The insufficiency in such 
an answer lies in the detail not provided. Lay victims are unlikely to understand what falls into 
the public interest without proper consultation. The provision fails to specify how 
comprehensive and detailed prosecution reasoning should be for the benefit of victims. As it 
stands, s12(1)(b) ironically protects prosecutors by allowing them to ‘check-off’ matters which 
require mere compliance, whilst insufficiently providing for victims’ needs.  
In Osborne, the Court of Appeal commented on the limits to victims’ right to information at 
the prosecution decision-making stage. The Court stated that the VRA is “concerned with 
duties of courtesy, compassion and the provision, as soon as possible, of information about 
various prosecution-related matters (including the final outcome). These obligations are 
altogether at a remove from a statutory requirement of consultation before prosecutorial 
discretion is exercised.”25 The Court also commented on the Victims of Crime- Guidance for 
Prosecutor Guidelines of 2012,26 stating: “These too only refer to the need to give 
                                                
23 Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines 2013, paragraph 29.2. 
24 Victims’ rights in Canada are comparatively passive and vague. The Victims’ Bill of Rights states; “victims 
should have access to information about the charges laid with respect to the crime and, if no charges are laid, the 
reasons why no charges are laid.”; Victims’ Bill of Rights, 1995, SO 1995, C.6, Principle 2 (v). There is no 
indication of who is to give information and the inclusion of the word “should” diminishes the enforceability of 
the right.  
25 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (CA), above n 2, at [88]. 
26 See Victims of Crime- Guidance for Prosecutors 2012, paragraph 16: “Prosecutors will on request meet the 
family of someone killed as a result of a crime and explain a decision on prosecution. In any case involving a 
death the prosecutor has a role to play in minimising the additional distress criminal proceedings are likely to 
cause to a victim's family and friends. The bereaved family are likely to be acutely concerned about any major 
decision taken in the case, e.g. to change the charge or accept a plea to an alternative or lesser charge, or to 
terminate the proceedings.” Note, paragraph 17 of the Victims of Crime- Guidance for Prosecutors 2014 is 
identical to paragraph 16 of the 2012 Guidelines except for the first sentence which reads: “Prosecutors should on 
request meet the family of someone killed as a result of a crime and explain a decision on a prosecution.” 
(emphasis added) The use of the word ‘should’ in the revised 2014 version of the Guidelines downplays the need 
for prosecutors to perform this responsibility compared to the 2012 version where the word ‘will’ was used 
instead. Victims’ interests are afforded even less protection as newer versions of the Guidelines are made.  
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information to victims. They do not create a legitimate expectation of consultation.”27 In 
contrast, the Divisional Court in R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Manning held 
that although the DPP was not required as part of his general duty to give reasons for a 
decision not to prosecute, it was reasonable to do so where no compelling grounds suggested 
otherwise.28 In that case, an individual had died in custody and a properly directed inquest 
had reached a verdict of unlawful killing. The English courts are more willing to take 
victims’ interests into account where a death has occurred.29 The court found that reasons 
should have been given for a decision not to prosecute:30  
[33] In the absence of compelling grounds for not giving reasons, we would expect the 
Director to give reasons in such a case: to meet the reasonable expectation of interested 
parties that either a prosecution would follow or a reasonable explanation for not prosecuting 
be given, to vindicate the Director's decision by showing that solid grounds exist for what 
might otherwise appear to be a surprising or even inexplicable decision and to meet the 
European Court's expectation that if a prosecution is not to follow a plausible explanation will 
be given. We would be very surprised if such a general practice were not welcome to 
Members of Parliament whose constituents have died in such circumstances. We readily 
accept that such reasons would have to be drawn with care and skill so as to respect third 
party and public interests and avoid undue prejudice to those who would have no opportunity 
to defend themselves…In any event it would seem to be wrong in principle to require the 
citizen to make a complaint of unlawfulness against the Director in order to obtain a response 
which good administrative practice would in the ordinary course require. 
Another aspect of the charging decision that affects the sufficiency of victims’ rights is the 
prospect of delay. In other jurisdictions, it is emphasised that in order to treat victims with due 
respect, decisions not to prosecute must be communicated to victims without undue delay.31 
                                                
27 Osborne v Worksafe New Zealand (CA), above n 2, at [89]. See also Osborne v Worksafe New Zealand [2015] 
NZHC 2991, [2016] 2 NZLR 485, (2015) 13 NZELR 485 at [86] where Brown J reflected on the applicant’s 
written submissions on the issue of whether the applicants had a legitimate expectation that they would be 
consulted prior to the prosecutor making its decision; “The tenor of the argument is reflected in the following 
paragraphs: …There was a secret arrangement in which the prosecutor assumed a role almost as a kind of 
unauthorised agent for the victims, which even extended to “trading” the dismissals of charges (and dismissals 
“on the merits”) for the payment of the reparations owed to the victims by PRC. In truth, the [Worksafe] placed 
itself in a highly compromised position. It purported to act for the victims and to negotiate with Mr Whittal about 
the reparation owed to the victims, but excluded them form any input into the terms of the “unfortunate bargain” 
that it made.” Brown J decided at [88], [89] and [94] that none of the provisions referred to, or cases cited, could 
support the conclusion that the victims’ dependents had a legitimate expectation of prior consultation.  
28 R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Manning [2001] QB 330. 
29 Ibid, at [33]; “It is not contended that the Director is subject to an obligation to give reasons in every case in 
which he decides not to prosecute…But the right to life is the most fundamental of all human rights.” 
30 Ibid. 
31 The EU Directive states: “Member States shall ensure that victims are notified without unnecessary delay of 
their right to receive the following information about the criminal proceedings instituted as a result of the 
complaint with regard to a criminal offence suffered by the victim and that, upon request, they receive such 
information: (a) any decision not to proceed with or to end an investigation or not to prosecute the offender…” 
EU, Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing 
minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework 
Decision 2001/220/JHA, [2012] OJ, L 315/57 at 67. See also section 14, The Victims’ Bill of Rights, C.C.S.M. 
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Although it is general practice in New Zealand to do so,32 the obligation under s12(1)(b) is 
only for a prosecutor to communicate the decision to victims “as soon as practicable.”33Almost 
invariably, that will be after it has been communicated to the defendant.34 To inform victims 
of the decision only when it is practicable, encourages delay and the inefficiency of the victims’ 
real opportunity to make a difference. 
 
Other issues relating to word-choice in the VRA, also prevent the legislation from fully 
realising its intended purpose.35 The use of the curious word “should”36 in introducing a 
number of victims’ rights was “criticized in Parliamentary debates as it was considered to 
downplay the enforceability of the rights included in the Act.”37 
 
Victims or their dependents currently do not have a legitimate expectation for consultation 
prior to a prosecution decision being made, not even where deaths have occurred. They only 
have a right to information, but even this right is more symbolic than effectual. When a victim 
is fully informed about the prosecution decision, two positive outcomes are produced. Firstly, 
a victim who understands why their case is to be discontinued is better able to move on from 
the criminal experience. Secondly, being properly informed also prevents victims from 
perceiving that the justice system has failed to serve them properly. The discipline of providing 
reasons especially to the dissatisfied party or parties in litigation, is an indispensable part of 
                                                
c. V55 (Manitoba); “At the victim's request, the Director of Prosecutions must ensure that the victim is consulted 
on the following, if reasonably possible to do so without unreasonably delaying or prejudicing an investigation or 
prosecution: a. decision on whether to lay a charge.” 
32 The Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines 2013, paragraph 19.1 states that: “The overarching duty of a 
prosecutor is to act in a manner that is fundamentally fair. Prosecutors should perform their obligations in a 
detached and objective manner, impartially and without delay.” The Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines 
2013 have no binding force, but must be considered by prosecutors. The Court of Appeal in its judgment of 
Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (CA), above n 2, held that under s12 of the Victims’ Rights Act 2002 the 
provision of information to victims must be done “as soon as possible” at [88]. 
33 Victims’ Rights Act 2002, s12(1). 
34 Arguably, a delay in receiving information regarding the prosecution decision, paired with insufficient 
reasoning would cause emotional distress and confusion for victims, leaving them feeling like “peripheral players” 
in the process; Elisabeth McDonald “The views of complainants and the provision of information, support and 
legal advice: How much should a prosecutor do?” (2011) 17 Canterbury Law Review 66. A victim’s participation 
in this state-controlled process has the potential to cause “secondary victimization”, leaving victims worse off 
than if they had not reported the offence at all; E Corns “Criminal Proceedings: An Obligation or Choice for 
Crime Victims” (1994) 13 Univ Tas LR 358. 
35 An example is however, found in s7 (emphasis added) which states: “Any person who deals with a victim (for 
example, a judicial officer, lawyer, member of court staff, Police employee, probation officer, or member of the 
New Zealand Parole Board) should—(a) treat the victim with courtesy and compassion; and (b)respect the 
victim’s dignity and privacy.” 
36 In a statutory formulation, this is an unparalleled example of a weak future indicative tense grammatical form. 
37 Susan Glazebrook, Justice of the Supreme Court of New Zealand “Streamlining New Zealand’s Criminal Justice 
System” (Criminal Law Conference 2012: Reforming the Criminal Justice System of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 
17 November 2012) at 26. See Honourable Phil Goff, Second Reading (5 Oct 1999). 
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the fundamental judicial obligation.38 While no direct analogy with prosecutors can be made, 
essentially the same imperatives and obligations ought to apply in view of the victims’ role. 
The critical question is, why a right to consultation has not already been incorporated as a 
procedural right for victims in the prosecution decision-making phase?  
 
The consideration that follows, of victims’ interests and needs illustrates the necessity of such 
a right. The law has not conformed to minimum standards of justice for victims during the 
prosecution decision-making phase. 
 
7.2.1 Victims’ Interests Unsecured 
 
Paying regard to victims’ interests may be understood as “the taking into consideration of the 
views and concerns of victims in the course of the judicial process.”39 As victims are directly 
affected by the crime, they have a natural interest in the proceedings against defendants. How 
these interests are to be considered, depends on the procedural rules that allow victims to share 
their views and concerns, and more substantially, how they are considered by decision-makers 
in the process.40  
 
Consideration of victims’ interests in the prosecution process can be divided into two 
dimensions of the justice integer, these either being procedural or substantive.41 Procedural 
justice is concerned with fairness of treatment in processes. Procedural justice can be achieved 
by allowing victim involvement in the proceedings, their input on decisions and their ability to 
help shape outcomes.42 Allowing victims to participate in proceedings fosters the victim-
perception of being respected, which can improve satisfaction with the criminal justice system. 
Substantive justice is achieved through the outcomes of judicial mechanisms, this includes 
                                                
38 See Singh v Chief Executive Officer, Department of Labour [1999] NZAR 258 (CA) where Keith J identified 
five rationales. 
39 Separate Opinion of Judge Pikis in Prosecutor v Lubanga, Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the Joint 
Application of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0105/06 concerning the “Directions and Decision of the Appeals Chamber” 
of 2 February 2007 ICC-01/04-01/06-925, 13 June 2007 at [14]. 
40 Luke Moffett “Meaningful and Effective? Considering Victims’ Interests Through Participation at the 
International Criminal Court” (2015) 26(2) Criminal Law Forum 255-289. 
41 See Marie Manikis “Expanding participation: victims as agents of accountability in the criminal justice process” 
(2017) 1 PL 63-80; Luke Moffett Justice for Victims before the International Criminal Court (Routledge, 
Abingdon, Oxon, 2014). 
42 Jo-Anne Wemmers Victims in the Criminal Justice System (Kugler, Amsterdam,1996); and Yael Danieli 
“Massive Trauma and the Healing Role of Reparative Justice” in R Letschert, R Haveman, A M de Brouwer, and 
A Pemberton (eds.) Victimological Approaches to International Crimes: Africa (Intersentia, 2011) at 235-261. 
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redressing the harm caused to victims and the causes of victimisation, which give rise to three 
main rights in relation to outcomes: truth; justice and reparations.43 The two types of justice 
work cohesively to provide for an effective remedy. 
 
Victims currently have no opportunity to be actively involved or participate at the decision-
making stage. Not even a consultative right.44 This issue is not specific to New Zealand, but 
continues to be problematic in other jurisdictions.45 Rt Hon Lord Goldsmith QC has 
commented that “the prosecutor plays a vital role in achieving this objective [of putting the 
victim at the heart of the criminal justice system] by communicating with and supporting 
victims of crime. They are also champions of victims’ rights and protect their interests.”46 
However, this means is simply unachievable at the prosecution decision-making phase, without 
a procedural justice mechanism in place. Protecting victims’ interests has been historically, of 
low priority in the criminal justice system,47 and this important objective is still yet to be 
prioritised. 
 
It has been suggested by the Victims’ Task force that “a new understanding of the nature of the 
relationship between the victim and the State is necessary”48 if any improvement from the 
                                                
43 Based on the right to an effective remedy under Article 8 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 217 
A (III), 10 December 1948. 
44 It is perhaps for this reason, that prosecutors are often targeted by victims as failing to address or protect their 
interests properly. 
45 McDonald, above n 34. For example, global studies on the experiences of female victims of sexual assault, have 
indicated that the majority of prosecuting counsel are considered by such victims to aggravate their difficulties in 
the trial process, as opposed to alleviating them; See Amanda Konradi Taking the Stand: Rape Survivors and the 
Prosecution of Rapists (Praeger, London, 2007); Joseph R Gillis and others “Systemic Obstacles to Battered 
Women’s Participation in the Judicial System: When Will the Status Quo Change?” (2006) 12 Violence Against 
Women 1150; Lisa Frohmann “Constituting Power in Sexual Assault Cases: Prosecutorial Strategies for Victim 
Management” (1998) 45 Social Problems 393; Sara Payne Rape: The Victim Experience Review (Home Office, 
2009) at 22; Mark R Kebbell, Caitriona M E O’Kelly and Elizabeth L Gilchrist “Rape victims’ experiences of 
giving evidence in English courts: a survey” (2007) 14 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 111; ACT Government 
A Rollercoaster Ride: Victims of Sexual Assault: Their experiences and views about the Criminal Justice process 
in the ACT (ACT Government, 2009) at 20. Other research shows that participants in the criminal justice system 
find it to be “an artificial, alienating and disempowering process that does not produce an outcome in which they 
have confidence.”; See Ministry of Women’s Affairs Restoring Soul: Effective Interventions for Adult 
Victim/Survivors of Sexual Violence (2009) at 37. 
46 Statement by Rt Hon Lord Goldsmith QC [the United Kingdom’s former Attorney General] The Prosecutors’ 
Pledge (2006). 
47 The New Zealand Law Commission Criminal Prosecution (NZLC PP28 1997) at 12; “Traditionally, the 
criminal law has been viewed as being concerned with the State’s interests in the preservation of peace and order, 
and civil law as being concerned with providing redress and compensation to individual victims. In the past the 
criminal justice system has marginalised victims of offences.”  
48 Ibid, at 79. 
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current position is to be achieved. 49 Sir Ken Macdonald QC, noted that “it is possible to find a 
balance which improves the respect with which victims and witnesses are treated, while at the 
same time upholding defendant rights and fair trial principles.”50 To this extent, any expansion 
of the role of victims in the criminal justice system must not unduly compromise the existing 
rights of the accused or impact society’s interest in seeing justice be served. 
 
7.2.2 The Relevance of Victims’ Interests 
 
The Social Contract Theory has been utilised by scholars to illustrate that victims enjoy the 
State’s protection.51 The theory purports that citizens surrender their natural liberties in 
exchange for the enjoyment of order and safety of the organised state. Locke contended that 
individuals are not forced, but through consent, volunteer their natural rights to a trustful and 
neutral authority in exchange for neutral and equal protection.52 When the authority fails to 
protect the individuals who conferred power to it, then the authority’s exercise of that power is 
illegitimate.53  
 
The above reasoning is transferable to the context of improper prosecution decisions not to 
prosecute. In state-controlled prosecutions, the state displaces the victim’s right to exact private 
vengeance, requiring the victim to instead channel any desires of retaliation though the criminal 
                                                
49 Ballin, above n 5, at 35; “To the victim, the offence is a personal matter requiring restitution of harm suffered, 
while to the state it is a violation of criminal law requiring a consistent, predictable and equitable response under 
the law.” 
50 Sir Ken Macdonald QC [the former Director of Public Prosecutions in England and Wales 2003-2008] (speech 
given to the institute of Human Rights, 18 January 2008); “Balancing the Rights of Victims and Defendants: 
prosecutors and due process” The Ministry of Justice also held similar views: “We believe that it is possible to 
find a balance between improving the involvement of victims in the criminal court process and upholding the 
principled, professional operation of the system including the rights of the defendant”; Ministry of Justice A Focus 
on Victims of Crime: A Review of Victims’ Rights – Public Consultation Document (2009) at 25. This would be 
the social contract theory in practical operation. 
51 See John Locke Two Treatises of Government by Peter Laslett (student ed, Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 1988); Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law (4th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2014) at 
[7.2.1]. See also Wayne A Logan “A Proposed Check on the Charging Discretion of Wisconsin Prosecutors” 
(1990) 1990 Wis L Rev 1695 at 1720; Steven J Heyman, “The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and 
the Fourteenth Amendment” (1991) 41 (3) Duke LJ 507 at 514; Kenneth L Wainstein “Judicially Initiated 
Prosecution: A Means of Preventing Continuing Victimization in the Event of Prosecutorial Inaction” (1988) 76 
(3) Cal L Rev 727 at 730; Richard L Aynes, “Constitutional Considerations: Government Responsibility and the 
Right Not to be a Victim” (1984) 11 Pepp L Rev 5 (1984) 63 at 75-77; Paul S Hudson, “Crime Victim and the 
Criminal Justice System: Time for a Change, The Symposium: Victims' Rights” (1983-1984) 11 (5) Pepp L Rev 
23 at 32. 
52 Locke, above n 51, at 130 and 135. 
53 Ibid. 
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justice system.54 Therefore, the criminal law can be seen as establishing a social contract 
between the state and the victim. If a prosecutor decides not to prosecute without a legitimate 
reason, this is equivalent to the state’s failure to protect victims from crime and is a complete 
disregard of victims’ retributive interests. Kenneth Wainstein asserts that when this situation 
occurs, the state loses its exclusive right to determine whether or not to prosecute and victims 
should therefore be allowed to invoke judicial power to reverse the decision not to prosecute, 
in order to defend for their interests.55 Views shared by other academics also include the fact 
that victims of crime should not have to experience re-victimisation caused by the state’s own 
wrongful inaction.56  
 
The inclusion of victims’ interests in the prosecution process is relevant for two other reasons.57 
Firstly, victims are critical in proving the occurrence of such crimes by testifying and providing 
evidence to aid investigators and prosecutors. This can be achieved by affording sufficient 
protection of victims’ rights and interests, in order to build trust between victims and the 
criminal justice system, and would facilitate co-operative behaviour. Secondly, the criminal 
law’s purpose is to prosecute and punish perpetrators of the law, on a moral basis it is deemed 
unjust to allow the needs and interests of those most affected by crimes to be ignored in the 
process of seeking justice.58 It has been accepted that “criminal law and criminal procedure 
could never really lead to justice being administered unless and until the system pays respect 
to the interests of victims of crime.”59  
 
7.2.3 What do Victims Need? 
 
                                                
54 Josephine Gittler “Expanding the Role of Victim in a Criminal Action: An Overview of Issues and Problems” 
(1984) 11 (5) Pepp L Rev 117 at 142. 
55 Wainstein, above n 51, at 730. 
56 Gittler, above n 54, at 117; Richard L Aynes, ‘Constitutional Considerations: Government Responsibility and 
the Right Not to be a Victim’ (1984) 11 Pepp L Rev 5 at 63. On this note, an analogy has been used by one 
academic to compare victims that are unreasonably blocked from accessing the criminal justice system, as 
analogous to those who have been denied the benefits of insurance, for which premiums have been paid; Li Tian 
“Victims’ Opportunities to Review a Decision not to Prosecute made by the Crown Prosecutor” (LLM Thesis, 
The University of Western Ontario, 2013). 
57 Moffett, above n 40.  
58 William Tallack Reparation to the Injured and the Right of the Victims of Crime to Compensation (London 
1900); Margaret Fry “Justice for Victims” (1959) 8 Journal of Public Law 191-194. 
59 Marc Groenhuijsen “Conflicts of Victims’ Interests and Offenders’ Rights in the Criminal Justice System a 
European Perspective” (1996) in C. Sumner et al. (eds) International Victimology: Selected Papers from the 8th 
International Symposium: Proceedings of a Symposium, 21-26 August 1994 (Australian Institute of Criminology, 
Canberra, 1994) at 163-176. 
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In 1993, New Zealand’s Department of Justice researched victims’ needs to assess the effect 
of changes made by the Victims of Offences Act 1987.60 It recognised five categories of need, 
that may restore victims’ sense of self-worth and enable victims to move on from criminal 
experiences if these needs were supported:61 
 
• Information 
• Involvement and participation  
• Protection and privacy, 
• Support, and 
• Reparation and/ or compensation 
 
The NZLC contends that “of all the needs expressed by victims, the need for case-related 
information and assistance” is most commonly sought.62 Section 12(1) of the VRA does not 
protect this need sufficiently. When a prosecution decision is made, most victims want to know 
what the charging decision is, what charges are laid, the reasons for the decision, and whether 
to offer diversion or seek reparation. Only a right to consultation can adequately support and 
fulfil victims’ needs at the pre-trial stage. Giving victims greater participatory rights allows 
abstract justice to take on a more personal dimension by providing reparation in the form of 
satisfaction, since their suffering has been recognised. This is turn, promotes an individual’s 
healing process and gives victims the sense of empowerment, agency and closure. Furthermore, 
such rights help lay the foundation for reconciliation for those affected.  
 
7.2.4 Concluding Comments  
 
                                                
60 Now the Victims’ Rights Act 2002. See Lee, above n 22, at 9 -10. See also New Zealand Law Commission, 
above n 47, at 84. These needs are still relevant to victims today. Victims’ justice needs are intricate and 
individualised. The emotional effects of crime on victims are likewise specific to the individual, See Wallace 
Victim Impact Statements: A Monograph (Department of Justice, Wellington, 1989) at 16; even if an offence is 
minor in nature, it cannot be assumed that the impact on the victim is also minor, likewise for serious offences, it 
cannot be assumed that the impact on the victim will be serious. See also The New Zealand Law Commission The 
Justice Response to Victims of Sexual Violence: Criminal Trials and Alternative Processes (NZLC R136, 2015) 
at 128; without the support of these complex needs in the criminal justice system, victims can inadvertently 
experience trauma, distress, and secondary victimisation. See also Judith Herman “Justice From the Victim’s 
Perspective” (2005) 11 Violence Against Women 571 at 574; “if one set out intentionally to design a system for 
provoking symptoms of traumatic stress, it might look very much like a court of law.” At 575 Herman writes that 
the “wishes and needs of victims are often diametrically opposed to the requirements of legal proceedings” and 
that “the victims vision of justice is nowhere represented in the conventional legal system”. 
61 New Zealand Law Commission, above n 47, at 84. 
62 Ibid. See Lee, above n 22, at 29; Church, Lang, Leigh, Young, Gray and Edgar Victims’ Court Assistance: An 
Evaluation of the Pilot Scheme (prepared for the Department of Justice Policy and Research Division, 1995). The 
provision of information enables victims to make their own choices throughout their experience of the prosecution 
process. These choices are fundamental to victims’ recovery; See Lee, above n 22, at 29.  
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Currently, victims’ needs and interests are inadequately protected. As Locke’s Social Contract 
recognises, civil society is dependent on national governance and coercive force to preserve 
individual rights.63 Victims currently only have participatory opportunities at the end stage of 
the trial process,64 but are merely information receivers at the pre-trial prosecution stage.65 The 
current statutory law is an imbalance. It does not create an entitlement to be consulted prior to 
a decision having been made not to prosecute. It only engenders a subsequent hope to find out 
why a prosecution has already been decided not to be justified. But even that provision of 
information, is of flimsy value, as it occurs retrospectively to the decision. As the previous 
sections have illustrated, minimum standards of justice for victims, as stakeholders in the 
criminal justice system, are ignored. This undermines the rule of law by disincentivising 
victims from having any role in the decision to prosecute or not which manifestly affects them 
and their right to dignity and intrinsic worth.66  
 
7.3 Discretionary Relief: Limitations and Uncertainty 
 
As a consequence of the limited procedural rights in the prosecution process,67 victims have 
limited power to redress the wrongs caused by unjust prosecution decisions. Even when an 
impugned decision is decidedly flawed, the court may under judicial review, still refuse to grant 
a remedy or be incapable of granting the most appropriate remedy.68  
                                                
63 See Locke, above n 51; Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law (4th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 
2014) at [7.2.1]. 
64 The New Zealand Law Commission, above n 47. A particularly important participatory right is the ability for 
victims to present an impact statement to the sentencing judge. The statement has a visceral role and it opens an 
opportunity for new facts that may not have been revealed in the course of the trial to be heard; Ann Ballin Report 
on the Progress of the Victims Task Force (Wellington, 1989) at 4.  
65 Section 12(1) Victims’ Rights Act 2002; Prosecution Guidelines 2013, paragraph 29.2. 
66 SA de Smith and R Brazier Constitutional and Administrative Law (8th ed, Penguin Books, London, 1998) at 
17; “the law should conform to minimum standards of justice, both substantive and procedural.” 
67 See Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne The Criminal Process (4th ed Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2010) at 52. See also Marie Manikis “Imagining the Future of Victims’ Rights in Canada: A Comparative 
Perspective” (2015) 13(1) Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 163 at 164; Andrew Ashworth classifies victims’ 
rights as “service and procedural rights. Service rights are defined as initiatives that aim to provide victims with 
better treatment and experiences in the criminal justice system. They include for example, rights to 
information/notification.…Procedural rights, on the other hand, are more controversial within the adversarial 
context, since they provide victims with a more participative role in the decision-making process.” These rights 
include opportunities for victims to provide information and at times, their views and opinions to criminal justice 
agencies, as well as victim personal statements at sentencing. 
68 Jonathan Auburn, Jonathan Moffett and Andrew Sharland Judicial Review Principles and Procedure (Oxford 
University Press, United Kingdom, 2013) at 795; “Where on a claim for judicial review, the court concludes that 
a particular decision or action is or was unlawful, it has a discretion as to whether to grant or refuse a final remedy 
and, if it does grant a final remedy, what remedy should be grant: a successful claimant has not entitlement to a 
final remedy. However, in practice a court will not refuse a final remedy unless there is a good reason to do so.” 
See: Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Business Ltd [1982] AC 
617 (HL) at 656 per Lord Roskill; R (Edwards) v Environment Agency [2008] UKHL 22, [2008] 1 WLR 1587, at 
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The courts’ discretion is influenced by many factors, but generally, the established 
discretionary grounds have a broad tripartite classification.69 The first category concerns issues 
related to the applicant, for example a court may choose not to grant relief based on an 
applicant’s behaviour.70 The second category involves considerations that relate to the 
circumstances of the case, these include whether the same decision would be reached by a 
decision-maker if there was to be a reconsideration,71 or if the flaws are not of a serious 
nature,72 or if it would result in undue prejudice to third parties.73 The last category involves 
matters that relate to the wider public interest, such as whether the granting of a remedy would 
be futile or whether disproportionately adverse administrative consequences would flow from 
granting a remedy.74   
 
The Osborne Court of Appeal did note however that “a decision not to prosecute because of an 
                                                
[63] per Lord Hoffman; Berkeley v Secretary of State for the Environment (No 1) [2001] 2 AC 603 (HL) at 616 
per Lord Hoffman and at 608 per Lord Bingham; R v Governors of Small Health School, ex parte Birmingham 
City Council (1989) 2 Admin LR 154 (CA) at 167 per Glidewell LJ; R v General Medical Council, ex parte Toth 
[2001] 1 WLR 2209 (QB) at [6] per Lightman J. See also T Bingham “Should Public Law Remedies be 
Discretionary?” [1991] PL 64. 
For example, when a person has been acquitted, only declaratory relief may be available. See Osborne v WorkSafe 
New Zealand (SC), above n 1. 
69 Jonathan Auburn, Jonathan Moffett and Andrew Sharland, above n 68 at 796; “When deciding whether to refuse 
a particular final remedy, the court will take into account all the circumstances of the case. Accordingly, the 
exercise can be an acutely fact-sensitive one and, therefore, care should be taken when seeking to apply the 
approach taken in one case to another case.” 
70 For example, if complainants brought delayed applications for review, commenced proceedings too soon, failed 
to exhaust other available alternate remedies, clearly waived any procedural irregularity or were found to have 
bought proceedings for strategic reasons or for reprehensible behaviour. See Van der Plaat v District Court [2005] 
NZAR 344 where proceedings were described as ‘continued harassment’ and Northcote Mainstreet Inc v North 
Shore City Council [2006] NZRMA 157at [281] where it could not be concluded that the plaintiffs had brought 
proceedings ‘as an altruistic act or as self-appointed guardians of the public quest,’ but were trade competitors 
whose challenge would in any event be futile. 
71 For example, where there is only a moderate procedural defect in process and where the result does not depend 
on evidence and argument yet to be heard and upon which opinions may differ. See Phillips v Wairarapa Kennel 
Association Inc [2005] NZAR 460 at 470. If a decision on reconsideration is inevitably to be the same, this is a 
basis for granting only declaratory relief or no relief at all. 
72 See Forbes v Coxhead 29/8/05, Mackenzie J, HC Wellington, CIV 2005-485-624. 
73 See Ngati Maru v Thames Coromandel District Council 27/8/04, Laurenson J, HC Hamilton, CIV 2004-485-
330. 
74 See Percival v Attorney-General [2006] NZAR 215. Unless the court is persuaded by such factors and is 
precluded from granting a remedy, there are various remedies available generally on judicial review, see Judicial 
Review Procedure Act 2016, s16; Paul Radich “Achieving outcomes in public law disputes” in Judicial Review 
Intensive (September 2007); “A declaration about the effect of flaws in a process. Declarations can be seen to 
emanate from the consideration of an application for review, they would often be an integral part of conclusions 
drawn by a court; Mandamus; an order compelling a decision-maker to perform the power or public duty under 
review; Injunction; to prevent a breach, continuation of a breach or a further breach of duty; Prohibition; to prevent 
a decision-maker from exercising a power or jurisdiction that it is not lawfully empowered to exercise; Certiorari- 
to quash or vary a decision on the review and usually accompanied by a direction requiring the decision maker to 
make its decision again.” 
	 138 
unlawful general policy -in effect an abdication of discretion — is both reviewable and likely 
to result in relief being ordered (usually in the form of an order to reconsider).”75 In order to 
gain insight on the impact the discretion may have on judicial review cases involving 
prosecution decisions, it is important to consider as a parallel, the issues that judicial discretion 
presents for other types of judicial review involving administrative decision-making.  
Cooke J in the late 1970s espoused that administrative law needs to develop as an effective and 
realistic branch of government. He cautioned that progress should not be equated with giving 
judgment to the plaintiffs,76 nor should the discretionary remedies be granted “lightly.”77 Cooke 
J’s admonishing dicta revealed that whilst there were significant advancements in 
administrative law, the strong culture of remedial restraint in New Zealand courts should 
persist. The rationale for restrained remedial discretion ensured that decision making in the 
public interest by the administrative and judicial branches could be assured and recognised and 
“any incipient tendencies for judicial aggrandisement could be seen to be thwarted.”78 
Professor Joseph contends that the significance of remedial discretion consequently became an 
“indispensable adjunct” to the perceived judicial function.79  
 
However, the restrictive approach to remedial discretion volte-faced in the early 1990s. Courts 
being more liberal with the granting of remedies caused one analyst to query whether an 
“undesirable gap”80 was forming in New Zealand’s case law between public law rights and 
vindication of those rights. Even more recently, Professor Janet McLean asserted that the 
“existence of a potentially opaque and incoherent remedial discretion was becoming 
increasingly difficult to justify.”81  
 
The concerns of academics regarding the liberal use of remedial discretion have not however, 
been echoed in judicial decisions in more recent times. Air Nelson Ltd v Minister of Transport82 
                                                
75 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (CA), above n 2, at [39].  
76 Stininato v Auckland Boxing Association (Inc) [1978] 1 NZLR 1 at 29. 
77 Ibid. 
78 John Caldwell “Judicial Review: The Fading of Remedial Discretion” (2009) 23 NZULR 489 at 490.  
79 See the comment of Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law (4th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 
2014) at [27.4.1]. More generally on the remedial discretion, see Greg Kelly, Jessica Gorman, Jason McHerron, 
John Wild, Nicholas Wood and Andrew Beck McGechan on Procedure (Looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters, New 
Zealand) at JA4.03. 
80 J Beatson “The Discretionary Nature of Public Law Remedies” [1991] NZ Recent Law Review 81. 
81 J McLean “Roadblocks, Restraint and Remedies: The idea of Progress in Administrative Law” in G Huscroft 
and M Taggart (eds), Inside and Outside Canadian Administrative Law: Essays in Honour of David Mullan (2006) 
211 at 213 and 233. 
82 Air Nelson Ltd v Minster of Transport [2008] NZAR 139 (CA) 
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is a useful example. O’Regan J held “there must be extremely strong reasons to decline to grant 
relief.”83 Berkeley v Secretary of State for the Environment from the House of Lords, was cited 
with approval in Air Nelson, where the discretion to refuse relief was considered to be “very 
narrow” and “exceptional.”84 O’ Regan J held that “the starting point is that where a claimant 
demonstrates that a public decision-maker has erred in the exercise of its power, the claimant 
is entitled to relief.” 85 He had also advocated similar views in his dissenting judgment in 
Unison Networks Ltd v Commerce Commission.86 The majority in that case strongly cautioned 
against using the discretion to refuse to set aside an unlawful decision.87 It was found that “even 
if [the plaintiff was] unscrupulous and had behaved badly, the decision-making process would 
still be flawed and the public would still be entitled to have it done properly. I do not consider 
that such circumstances would be a reason to refuse relief.”88 Asher J went on to say, “I 
consider that a relevant factor in considering whether to grant relief is whether the seriousness 
of the error identified in the successful judicial review application is proportionate to the 
consequences of relief being granted. Weight should be given to the gravity of the error and all 
the circumstances of the case.”89 Fogarty J attractively set out the true principles animating the 
inherently discretionary nature of judicial review in Barker v Queenstown Lakes District 
Council.90 
 
The judgments of the Court of Appeal91 in both cases indicate that New Zealand has now firmly 
subscribed to the view that discretionary remedies should rarely be refused. This greatly 
contrasts with the approach advocated in Cooke J’s earlier dicta.92 Arguments for withholding 
relief in discretion have considerably lost persuasive power in the courts of New Zealand and 
                                                
83 Ibid, at [60]. 
84 Berkely v Secretary of State for the Environment [2001] 2 AC 603 at 608 (HL) per Lord Bingham, and at 616 
per Lord Hoffman, respectively. 
85 Air Nelson Ltd v Minister of Transport, above n 82, at [61]. 
86 Unison Networks Ltd v Commerce Commission CA284/05, 19 December 2006 at [94]. 
87 Ibid, at [81], with reference to authorities cited by Michael Fordham Judicial Review Handbook (4th ed, Hart, 
Oxford, 2004) at [24.3.4]. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the respondent had acted lawfully, and 
accordingly did not address the question of relief: Unison Networks Ltd v Commerce Commission [2008] 1 NZLR 
42. 
88 Unison Networks Ltd v Commerce Commission, above n 86, at [367]. 
89 Ibid, at [375]. 
90 Barker v Queenstown Lakes District Council [2006] NZAR 716 [54] – [56] emphasising an evaluation of the 
gravity of error and its two dimensions.  
91 Air Nelson Ltd v Minister of Transport, above n 82; Unison Networks Ltd v Commerce Commission, above n 
86. 
92 Stininato v Auckland Boxing Association (Inc), above n 76, at 29. 
	 140 
the United Kingdom. The same strong legislative presumption in favour of grant of relief is 
also to be found in section 19 of the Crown Entities Act 2004.93  
 
Despite the current judicial trend of exercising remedial discretion more liberally, until 
Osborne in the Supreme Court, there had been no successful judicial review of prosecutorial 
discretion in New Zealand.94 The lack of certainty of obtaining practical or worthwhile relief 
in this regard, places victims in a vulnerable position for two reasons. Firstly, even in a 
successful review, remedies are not guaranteed. The second reason concerns the lack of 
jurisprudence in New Zealand as to what remedies are available for review of prosecution 
decisions not to prosecute. The lack of clarity and unpredictability in the exercise of remedial 
discretion may leave victims feeling discouraged from initiating judicial review. It also a rule 
of law implication95 that affects victims’ ability to obtain legal aid.96 Professor Herman, argues 
that more victims might be willing to participate in legal proceedings if they believed there 
were outcomes that could potentially make the ordeal worthwhile. However, she notes that 
“even a successful legal outcome does not promise much satisfaction, because [victims’] goals 
are not congruent with the sanctions that the system imposes.”97 As in Osborne in the Supreme 
Court, the only relief available was a Declaration- a pronouncement of proven illegality and 
failures by the prosecutor- as the defendant had been wrongfully but irreversibly acquitted.  
 
The next Chapter addresses the boundaries of discretionary power in relation to relief and the 
inter-play between the concepts of reconsideration, reneging and resumption. 
                                                
93 A point made by Joseph, above n 79, at [27.4.1]. Section 19(1) and (2) of the Crown Entities Act 2004 suggests 
that unless the error in question is “minor or technical” relief should be granted. 
94 But see now Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (SC), above n 1. 
95 See Friedrich A Hayek The Road to Serfdom (Routledge Press, United Kingdom, 1944) at 54. 
96 See Chapter 6 at section 6.2.3. 




8 Relief, Reconsideration, Resumption and Reneging 
 
In Hallett v Attorney-General (No 2) Henry J pointed out that the question of jurisdiction to 
review must not be confused with the power to give discretionary relief.1 This Chapter 
considers the court orders that could not be considered in Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand 
and the limits of court power in this context.2 In some cases, the prosecutor themselves may 
decide to reverse their original decision. Although the power to reverse serves as a 
constitutional safeguard, it also has far-reaching consequences. The boundaries of 
discretionary power must be well-understood to maintain consistency and certainty in the law. 
 
8.1 Discretionary Court Orders: The Orthodox Approach  
 
8.1.1 New Zealand 
 
Although the Osborne appeal was dismissed in the Court of Appeal, the court still broached 
the question of relief. The court held that “a decision not to prosecute because of an unlawful 
general policy — in effect an abdication of discretion — is both reviewable and likely to result 
in relief being ordered (usually in the form of an order to reconsider).”3   
 
The court also stated: “We add that even if the Prosecution Decision or District Court Decision 
had been shown to be unlawful, we would not have quashed them. It is impossible to restore 
the circumstances pertaining at the time of those decisions, because the $3.41 million has been 
irretrievably transferred to the families. That is a sufficiently strong reason to decline 
substantive relief.”4 The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s point on relief by 
granting the dependents a declaration that the conditional payment was an unlawful bargain.  
Given the particular circumstances of the Osborne case, quashing the prosecutor’s decision 
would not have been appropriate. However, it is clear that a quashing order and an order for 
                                                
1 Hallett v Attorney-General (No 2) [1989] 2 NZLR 96 (HC) at 102. 
2 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand [2017] NZSC 175, [2018] 1 NZLR 447, [2017] 15 NZELR 365. 
3 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand [2017] NZCA 11 at [39] per Kós P. 
4 Ibid, at [101] per Kós P. 
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reconsideration is the most common method used by courts to deal with impugned decisions 
in appropriate cases.5 If a reconsideration order is made, the court will not be able to substitute 
its own view of the matter for that of the prosecutor. Nor does it have the power to require the 
prosecutor to change the original view. The court may express its opinion on the matter which 
could have the effect of assisting the prosecutor’s next decision, however the court’s power is 
confined to this limit. 
8.1.2 United Kingdom 
 
In the United Kingdom, the common method for courts to deal with incorrect or irrational 
decisions not to prosecute is to quash the decision and simultaneously order a reconsideration 
from the DPP or CPS.6  The Court has jurisdiction and is more specialised than a prosecutor in 
interpreting the law, therefore it is accepted that a direction for reconsideration is not an 
inappropriate transgression from the courts. Full discretion remains with the prosecutor and 
they may choose to maintain their original decision. The courts have highlighted however, that 
there would not be a reconsideration of the prosecutorial discretion simply because the court 
itself would have reached a different decision.7 
In R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Treadaway, the applicant had been released 
from prison after serving a sentence for robbery.8 After his release, he was awarded damages 
by the High Court in respect of an assault he had suffered at the hands of five police officers. 
The DPP decided not to prosecute any of them. The Divisional Court allowed the application, 
finding that even though the civil court’s decision did not bind the DPP, the High Court judge 
had made substantial conclusions and findings. The DPP ought to have examined these findings 
closely before the decision not to prosecute was entered. The court held that the DPP did not 
give the High Court’s decision the analysis it deserved and consequently the DPP failed to 
notice that evidence was missing. Accordingly, the Divisional Court directed the CPS to 
reconsider its decision not to prosecute. 
                                                
5 The same approach is taken in the United Kingdom, see R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene 
and Others [1999] UKHL 43, [2000] 2 AC 326, [1999] 3 WLR 972.The Hong Kong courts also take this approach; 
Eric Wing Hong Chui and T Wing Lo Understanding Criminal Justice in Hong Kong (2nd ed, Routledge, New 
York, 2016).  
6 R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Manning [2001] QB 330. Lord Justice Goldring in R (on the 
application of Guest) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] EWHC 594 (Admin) [2009] 2 Cr App R 26 at [50] 
held that a court should not make a quashing order if it were to be merely academic.  
7 R (on the application of F) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2013] EWHC 945 (Admin), [2014] 2 WLR 190 
at [5] citing Lord Bingham CJ in R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Manning, above n 6. 
8 R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Treadaway, The Times October 31 1997. 
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In R (on the application of Joseph) v Director of Public Prosecutions a decision not to 
prosecute was made by the CPS on the basis the evidence was insufficient to defeat a probable 
defence of self-defence.9 The Divisional Court used its remedial discretionary powers to direct 
the CPS to reconsider its decision not to prosecute. The court held that the case required 
reconsideration since it could be demonstrated on an objective appraisal that there was serious 
evidence supporting a prosecution that had not been carefully considered, in particular that 
pertaining to the issue of self-defence. 
In R (on the application of Peter Dennis) v Director of Public Prosecutions, the DPP decided 
not to prosecute an employer for gross negligence manslaughter resulting from an employee 
falling to his death through a skylight in the course of work.10 The DPP refused to prosecute 
on the basis that the case did not satisfy the Code for Crown Prosecutors. The Administrative 
Court found that the prosecutor failed to deal with the core issues of the case that might have 
been brought against the employer. It was found that the prosecutor also failed to provide clear 
reasoning relating to the verdict of inquest and why it should not have led to a prosecution. It 
was the opinion of the court that had those matters been considered, a different decision might 
be made. The court referred the matter back to the CPS, emphasizing that the final decision 
would still be for the prosecuting authority and not the court. In making his decision, Lord 
Justice Waller set out the approach for applications where reconsideration of the decision not 
to prosecute may be appropriate:11 
(i) If it can be demonstrated on an objective appraisal of the case that a serious point or serious 
points supporting a prosecution have not been considered; 
(ii) If it can be demonstrated that a conclusion in a significant area about the nature of the evidence 
supporting a prosecution, is irrational; 
(iii) Where the points are such to make it seriously arguable that the decision would otherwise be 
different; or 
(iv) Where an inquest jury has found unlawful killing, the reasons why a prosecution did not follow 
have not been clearly expressed. 
 
In R (on the application of Guest) v Director of Public Prosecutions the claimant was a victim 
of an alleged assault who challenged the failure of the respondent to quash a conditional caution 
                                                
9 R (on the application of Joseph) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2001] Crim LR 489. 
10 R (on the application of Peter Dennis) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2006] EWHC 3211. 
11 Ibid, at [29] – [30]. 
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given to the assailant.12 The Divisional court held that the offence failed to meet the criteria of 
the Code for Crown prosecutors for a caution, since the offence was particularly serious in 
nature, involving violence and injury. The decision to give a conditional caution is therefore 
able to be judicially reviewed if it may be demonstrated that it was unlawful as a result of 
improper procedure or if it has been issued for an offence that falls outside of the Director’s 
Guidance or it is unreasonable on Wednesbury principles.13 In such circumstances the decision 
to authorise and then administer a conditional caution may be quashed and then caution set 
aside. 
The cases above establish when the courts are likely to quash a prosecutor’s original decision 
and order a reconsideration. The question of how far court orders can go in this context is 
considered next. 
 
8.2 The Limits of Court Power  
 
8.2.1 The Court’s Power to Compel or Reinstate a Prosecution 
 
An area of disparity among common law jurisdictions regarding the limits of court power is 
whether the judiciary has power to compel a prosecutor to prosecute after a judicial review 
application. The Canadian courts appear to be prepared to exercise such power as necessary, 
while the courts in the United Kingdom and South Africa see the exercise of such power as an 
affront to the separation of powers doctrine. While the New Zealand courts have not directly 
tackled this question, the statement made in the Court of Appeal that abuse of prosecutorial 
discretion would “likely to result in relief being ordered (usually in the form of an order to 
reconsider),”14 accords more with the South African and United Kingdom’s position. 
 
In National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Freedom Under the Law the South 
African Supreme Court of Appeal considered whether courts have power to reinstate a 
prosecution decision.15 The court below was held to be correct in setting aside the impugned 
decisions however, ordering the NDPP to reinstate the charges against the respondent to be 
                                                
12 R (on the application of Guest) v Director of Public Prosecutions, above n 6. 
13 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. 
14 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (CA), above n 3, at [39] per Kós P. 
15 National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Freedom Under Law (67/2014) [2014] ZASCA 58. 
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enrolled and pursued without delay was an inappropriate transgression of the separation of 
powers doctrine.16 Brand JA explained:17 
 
That doctrine precludes the courts from impermissibly assuming the functions that fall within 
the domain of the executive. In terms of the Constitution the NDPP is the authority mandated 
to prosecute crime, while the Commissioner of Police is the authority mandated to manage and 
control the SAPS. As I see it, the court will only be allowed to interfere with this constitutional 
scheme on rare occasions and for compelling reasons. Suffice it to say that in my view this is 
not one of those rare occasions and I can find no compelling reason why the executive 
authorities should not be given the opportunity to perform their constitutional mandates in a 
proper way. The setting aside of the withdrawal of the criminal charges and the disciplinary 
proceedings have the effect that the charges and the proceedings are automatically reinstated 
and it is for the executive authorities to deal with them. The court below went too far. 
 
The United Kingdom case, R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene considered 
the discretion of the DPP to prosecute during an interim period between the enactment of the 
Human Rights Act and the bringing into force of the provisions.18 The House of Lords held 
that the DPP’s decision to consent to a prosecution would not be amenable to judicial review 
proceedings in the absence of dishonesty, bad faith or an exceptional circumstance. The House 
quashed the declaration from the Divisional Court that the DPP’s continuing decision to 
proceed with the prosecution was and unlawful act. The House concluded that as soon as the 
Human Rights Act came into force, the argument that domestic legislation is incompatible with 
the Convention should be brought at trial or appeal process. The additional remedy of judicial 
review should not be open to the defendants. Lord Hope added that “the process of judicial 
review could do no more than require the Director to reconsider his decision. It could not 
require him to change his view. It would fall short of providing a remedy which is as effective 
as that which could be provided by the trial judge during the trial process or on appeal.”19 Lord 
Hope’s statement emphasises that the court’s powers cannot go beyond an order for 
reconsideration.  
 
Conversely, in Canada, applications have been made seeking court orders in the nature of a 
mandamus to compel prosecutions. In Meyer v British Columbia (Attorney General), the 
petitioner applied to the Supreme Court of British Columbia for an order of mandamus 
compelling that the Attorney General of British Columbia prosecute a member of the Canadian 
Pacific Railway Police for an alleged assault. The Court stated that “the mandamus application 
                                                
16 National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Freedom Under Law, above n 15, at [51].  
17 Ibid. 
18 R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene and Others, above n 5. 
19 Ibid, per Lord Hope. 
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focuses upon the ability of this Court to review the Attorney General’s discretion.”20 The court 
concluded that “the ability of a judge to interfere with prosecutorial discretion is limited to 
cases of ‘flagrant impropriety’”21 and that in the current case there was no evidence of ‘flagrant 
impropriety’ and therefore dismissed the application for mandamus. 
 
In Gervasoni v Canada (Justice), the applicant sought a mandamus, to compel the Minister of 
Justice to seek formal written assurances from the requesting state that the death penalty would 
not be sought in the case.22 The Court of Appeal for British Columbia dismissed the application 
and held that “the Minister was acting within the parameters of his discretion” and that “the 
requesting state having advised the Minister of its final decision that the death penalty will not 
be sought or imposed in this case, the maximum sentence which the applicant is facing, if 
convicted, is life imprisonment.23 The Minister is entitled in these circumstances to issue the 
warrant of surrender without further consideration of death penalty assurances, and in so doing 
has not committed reviewable error.”24   
 
While the power to compel a prosecution has never actually been exercised by the Canadian 
courts, there has been no dialogue that suggests that such power is inappropriate. To this extent, 
it would appear that the Canadian courts would be willing to compel a prosecution where an 
abuse of discretion is found in mandamus applications.  
 
The question of whether New Zealand courts should allow mandamus to compel a prosecution 
makes for an interesting hypothetical exercise.  
 
The argument that New Zealand courts should follow the Canadian position by allowing courts 
to compel prosecutions in ‘exceptional circumstances’ is made on the basis of two reasons. 
Firstly, the power to direct a reconsideration is essentially a court power that asks of a 
prosecutor to perform a specific action. On this basis, the concept of compelling is no different. 
Admittedly, compelling is a greater intrusion on the prosecutor’s discretion, than directing a 
reconsideration. However, when a court has already concluded that a decision is wrong in law, 
the intrusion on discretion is arguably justified. When a court quashes a decision and directs 
                                                
20 Meyer v British Columbia (Attorney General) 2002 BCSC 257 at [10]. 
21 Ibid, at [16]. 
22 Gervasoni v Canada (Minister of Justice) (1996) 72 BCAC 141 (CA) 
23 Ibid, at [26]. 
24 Ibid, at [29]. 
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the prosecutor to reconsider, yet the original decision is maintained, the court’s quashing of the 
decision is rendered meaningless and the applicant for judicial review has essentially, ‘won the 
battle, but lost the war.’ The preserving of original decisions, may also encourage applicants 
who are unaffected by judicial review costs to repeat applications, in the hopes for a more 
desirable outcome. Judicial review in this sense can become endless, and burdensome for the 
criminal justice system.  
 
Secondly, the power to compel may also protect against reconsiderations that are made in bad 
faith or conducted improperly. Although such situations are likely to be extremely rare, 
allowing the courts to compel a prosecution completely eliminates the risk of this happening. 
There is no way of detecting whether a prosecutor that has been directed to reconsider their 
decision has properly made a second decision not to prosecute, or whether they have stubbornly 
insisted on not prosecuting. Even when a proper second decision not to prosecute is reached, it 
does not eliminate the wrong-doing that was found by the courts in judicial review.  
 
If the New Zealand courts followed the South African and United Kingdom’s position, it would 
be on the basis that allowing courts to compel a prosecution would be to usurp the function of 
the prosecutor, which is a plain violation of the separation of powers doctrine.  
 
While there are merits to both positions, considering the New Zealand Court of Appeal’s 
statement regarding discretionary orders, it is likely that our judiciary would consider the power 
to compel prosecutions to be overstepping its function.25 The Canadian courts have set the high 
standard of ‘flagrant impropriety’ for review, and it is arguable that extraordinary remedies are 
warranted when review is able to meet such a high test. The threshold for review in South 
Africa, the United Kingdom and in New Zealand is much lower, and any orders that may flow 
from a successful review do not need to be ‘extraordinary’ in nature. Furthermore, the New 
Zealand version of judicial review of prosecution decisions has generally followed the 
precedents set by the United Kingdom and development of this species of review appears to 
accord more with the United Kingdom position compared to judicial review in Canada.  
 
                                                
25 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (CA), above n 3, at [39] per Kós P; “a decision not to prosecute because of 
an unlawful general policy — in effect an abdication of discretion — is both reviewable and likely to result in 
relief being ordered (usually in the form of an order to reconsider).” 
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While compelling or reinstating prosecution decisions may be inappropriate, the position in 
New Zealand on reinstatements of judicial decisions is different. 
 
8.2.2 Power to Direct Inferior Court to Resume Terminated Proceedings: A Parallel 
 
Reinstatements in New Zealand have been ordered, where a judge from an inferior court 
prematurely or unjustifiably discontinues a case by wrongly acceding to a recusal submission, 
or through self-abnegation. A superior court can through judicial review, order the judge to 
return to the seat of adjudication.26  
 
In Hosking v Tauranga District Court, it was found that the Judge had no basis to terminate 
the trial as he did. It was appropriate not to dismiss the prosecution but for the original trial 
judge to resume the hearing.27  
 
On a similar footing, is the power of the executive to reverse its own decisions. 
 
8.3 The Prosecutor’s Power to Reverse 
 
8.3.1 Reversals vs the Principle of Finality 
 
In New Zealand, a prosecutor has discretionary power to reopen a prosecution decision not to 
prosecute and reverse the decision provided there are justifiable reasons to do so.28 This power 
safeguards the proper functioning and quality of discretionary decision-making. The 
                                                
26 Gerard McCoy “Judicial recusal in New Zealand,” in H P Lee (ed) Judiciaries in Comparative Perspective 
(Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2011) at 327-328. 
27 Hosking v Tauranga District Court [2009] NZAR 712; see also Police v Wanganui District Court [2009] NZAR 
97; Although the District Court Judge was wrong in concluding that it was “impracticable” to continue and wrong 
to reach that decision in breach of natural justice, neither mandamus or a declaration was granted; Nattrass v 
Attorney General [1996] 1 HKC 480; where a prosecution application in Hong Kong had wrongly succeeded; Re 
Polities, ex parte Hoytes Commission Pty Ltd (1991) 65 ALJR 445, HCA; an Australian case where the 
commissioner ejected too soon. 
28 See the reasons identified at paragraph 7.3 of the Prosecution Guidelines 2013: “7.3.1 Rare cases where a 
reassessment of the original decision shows that it was wrong and should not be allowed to stand; 7.3.2 Cases 
which are stopped so that more evidence which is likely to become available in the near future can be collateral 
and prepared. In these cases, the prosecutor will tell the defendant that the prosecution may well start again; and 
7.3.3 Cases which are stopped because of a lack of evidence but where more significant evidence is discovered 
later.” 
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consequences of reversals are however, somewhat extensive. Most apparent is that the power 
essentially rebuts the finality principle. 
 
Keir Starmer QC commented on the commonness of reversals in the United Kingdom before 
the VRRS was introduced: “The decisions of prosecutors were rarely reversed because it was 
considered vital that decisions, even when later shown to be questionable, were final and could 
be relied upon.”29 The principle of finality also encourages police and prosecutors to reach the 
correct decision the first time. Starmer stated that “this approach was intended to inspire 
confidence, but in reality it had the opposite effect. Refusing to admit mistakes can seriously 
undermine public trust in the criminal justice system.”30 Following Starmer’s argument, it may 
be understood that the prosecutor’s right to reverse a decision is important in the interests of 
justice and that victims’ rights should outweigh the accused’s right to certainty. 
 
The case R v Christopher Killick involved two sufferers of cerebral palsy who complained to 
the police of being anally raped and sexually assaulted. A third complainant was identified and 
said he had been non-consensually buggered.31The appellant, who also suffered from cerebral 
palsy, denied any form of sexual activity with the two complainants and maintained that the 
anal intercourse was consensual. The CPS decided not to prosecute and the appellant was 
informed of the decision via email. 
 
A complaint was made about the prosecution decision which resulted in a review. The review 
concurred, however three and a half years later a “third tier” review resulted in a reversal of 
the decision not to prosecute. Alison Levitt QC who effected the reversal concluded that while 
the original decision not to prosecute was not unreasonable, it was wrong in that there was a 
realistic prospect of a conviction and it was in the public interest that there should be a 
prosecution. 
 
Throughout the reviews the appellant was told on numerous occasions that he would not be 
prosecuted which he relied on to his detriment. The appellant submitted that the CPS’s reversal 
of the decision not to prosecute was an abuse of process. His honour Judge Rook QC dismissed 
                                                
29 Owen Bowcott “Crime victims allowed to challenge prosecutors” The Guardian (United Kingdom, 5 June 
2013). Sir Keir Starmer QC was the DPP of England and Wales. 
30 Ibid. 
31 R v Christopher Killick [2011] EWCA Crim 1608. 
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the application and held that the CPS had the right to review and reverse its decision and 
commence proceedings. The court reiterated that the complainants had the right to seek review 
of the prosecution decision “that right under the law and procedure of England and Wales is in 
essence the same right expressed in Article 10 of the Draft EU Directive on establishing 
minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime dated 18 May 
2011 which provides: ‘Member States shall ensure that victims have the right to have any 
decision not to prosecute reviewed.’”32 The court found no abuse of process in the case:33   
 
[55] Although no excuse was or could have been put forward for the delay, we do not consider 
that in itself it amounted to an abuse of process or caused prejudice or detriment. We accept the 
evidence that there was clear strain, but it did not amount to prejudice or detriment. Nor was 
the delay in disclosure until 2010… prejudicial; even if the appellant had been prosecuted 
immediately, he would not have seen the note until after he had made his prepared statement. 
Nor could it possibly be said, to accept the statement of Lord Steyn in Latiff [1996] 1 WLR 
104, that the continued prosecution was “an affront to public conscience. 
 
The court continued to explain that the communications to the appellant that he would not be 
prosecuted could not be considered legally binding:34   
 
[56] Thus even on the assumption, contrary to our decision, a representation was made, there 
was good reason why the prosecution had to review the matter; the delay arising out of the 
review caused no prejudice. There was no abuse of process. In all the circumstances, the judge 
was right to dismiss the application on this basis. We would simply observe, given the 
circumstances of this case, that it must be for the Director to consider whether the way in which 
the right of a victim to seek a review cannot be made the subject of a clearer procedure and 
guidance with time limits. As we have explained, the right of a complainant to a review is 
nothing to do with complaints about the conduct of a level of service provided by the CPS; it 
is an integral part of the exercise of a prosecutorial discretion and the use of the term complaint 
has the danger to which we have referred. 
 
In holding this view, the Court of Appeal endorsed the victim’s “right” to have a decision not 
to prosecute reviewed and the test on review is understood to be “unreasonableness” not in the 
traditional Wednesbury sense,35 but where the original decision was “wrong.”  
 
The view held by the Killick court essentially recognises that adjustments to the principle of 
finality are justified in that victims are not just witnesses in the criminal justice process, but 
real participants that have needs, interests and rights that must be protected. Starmer explained 
that “Neither the Killick judgment nor the draft EU Directive referred to in it, qualify that 
                                                
32 R v Christopher Killick, above n 31, at [49]. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation, above n 13. 
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“right” and so, presumably, it is available to all victims and not just in special or ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ and, equally importantly, presumably the “right” to a review can only have 
practical effect if it carries with it a right to have reversed any decision which, on review, is 
found to be wrong.”36 On judicial review of prosecution decisions, the court assumes that the 
prosecutor would have considered all relevant factors in reaching their decision, accordingly it 
would “be disproportionate for a public authority not to have a system of review without 
recourse to court proceedings.”37 The Killick decision is a prime but extraordinary example of 
when the original prosecution decision failed to be fully informed and was ultimately wrong. 
In rare cases like Killick, it would appear that the principle of finality must yield in order to 
ensure that correct decisions are made, whether in light of victims’ rights or from a more 
traditional public law view. 
 
It should be noted that the reversal in Killick occurred without the introduction of any fresh 
evidence. The appropriateness to reverse a decision without new evidence is closely tied to the 
finality principle and common law jurisdictions have approached the issue in different ways. 
 
8.3.2 Reversals Without New Evidence 
 
While the power to reverse acts as a constitutional safeguard, it should only be exercised where 
strong and compelling reasons exist. Most reversals occur when new evidence is introduced, 
or when evidence will become available in the near future. In New Zealand, it is rare that a 
reversal can take place without a crown prosecutor referring to fresh evidence.38 The 
appropriateness of reversing a decision not to prosecute in the absence of fresh evidence is 
therefore an important issue to consider. The courts in the United Kingdom, Hong Kong and 
Ireland have set out legal principles in case law to guide the appropriate use of reversals when 
no new evidence can be produced. 
 
8.3.2.1 United Kingdom 
  
                                                
36 Keir Starmer QC “Finality in criminal justice: when should the CPS reopen a case?” [2012] Crim LR 526-534. 
37 R v Christopher Killick, above n 31, at [48]. 
38 See though Rewa v Attorney General [2018] NZHC 1005 where a stay entered by the Solicitor-General was 
uplifted as a result of the outcome and implications in Pora v R [2015] UKPC 9, [2016] 1 NZLR 277. 
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In R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Burke, the Crown discontinued proceedings 
and made an agreement not to reinstate them in the absence of fresh evidence.39 The case 
involved an alleged sexual assault that was dropped on the basis of insufficient evidence. The 
Crown reneged on that promise however when the victims’ mother made an informal complaint 
to the DPP who then recommended that proceedings should be commenced against the 
claimant in the absence of fresh evidence. The DPP formed the view that the original decision 
to discontinue was wrong. The court refused the judicial review application on the basis that 
the DPP retains a discretion to reinstate a prosecution without needing to demonstrate special 
circumstances in support of that decision.40  
 
The Killick case is another example of a rare occasion where the prosecutor was justified in 
reversing the original decision not to prosecute, even after the accused had been informed that 
a prosecution would not be instituted.41 The Court of Appeal concluded that “as a decision not 
to prosecute is in reality a final decision for a victim, there must be a right to seek a review of 
such a decision”42 and that the reversal of the original decision did not amount to an abuse of 
process. 
 
8.3.2.2 Hong Kong 
 
In R v Harris,43 the appellant argued that because the Attorney General had previously assured 
him that he would not be charged he should have been granted a stay at trial as he had sought. 
The evidence as it stood for the initial decision not to prosecute was precisely the same as it 
was on the date of the decision to prosecute. On behalf of the Attorney General, it was argued 
that the prosecution was not an abuse of process because the assurance of non-prosecution had 
been based on incorrect legal advice, and the prosecution was launched only when the error 
came to light.  
 
                                                
39 R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Burke [1997] COD 169. 
40 The Divisional Court was prepared however, to accept that a complaint could be brought on grounds that the 
CPS has raised a legitimate expectation on the part of the defendant that he would not be prosecuted. Such 
considerations may go to issues of abuse of process. Philips LJ said: ‘I consider that if a letter is written which 
creates an expectation that there will be no further prosecution, this can be a material factor in deciding what the 
public interest requires.’ This was relied on and considered in R (SA) v Director of Private Prosecutions [2002] 
EWHC 2983 (Admin) at [34]. Another example is R (O) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2010] EWHC 804 
(Admin). 
41 R v Christopher Killick, above n 31. 
42 Ibid, at [48]. 
43 R v Harris [1991] 1 HKLR 389 (CA). 
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The Court of Appeal held it had no power to interfere with the Attorney General’s discretion 
to prosecute, however once the charge was put before the court it could at that point consider 
whether the prosecution should be allowed to continue if abuse of process grounds had been 
raised. The court found that there was nothing unlawful in the change of mind of the Attorney 




In Eviston v Director of Public Prosecutions, the DPP reversed a decision not to prosecute but 
made the reversal without any new evidence.44 The Supreme Court held that the DPP was 
entitled to review his original decision in the absence of fresh evidence and make a new 
decision without needing to provide reasons.45 But it held in this particular case however, the 
DPP had failed to follow fair procedures and on that basis the prosecution required intervention 
to be stopped. McGuinness J stated “on these facts it seems to me that once the DPP had 
unequivocally and without any caveat informed the Applicant that no prosecution would issue 
against her in connection with this road traffic accident, it was a breach of her right to fair 
procedures for him to reverse his decision and to initiate a prosecution by the issuing of the 
summons on the 23rd of December 1998.”46 Keane CJ stated as “there was no new evidence 
before him when the decision was received, the applicant was not afforded the fair procedures 
to which in all the circumstances, she was entitled.”47  
 
Carlin v Director of Public Prosecutions 48 was decided on a similar basis to Eviston. The case 
involved the applicant (Mr Carlin) being arrested with assault causing harm in July 2001. The 
DPP had decided and informed Mr Carlin that no prosecution would be brought, but following 
an internal review the DPP directed that a prosecution be bought. Mr Carlin took judicial 
review proceedings to prohibit prosecution.  
 
                                                
44 Eviston v Director of Public Prosecutions [2002] IESC 62, [2003] 3 IR 260. Denham J stated: “The decision-
making power to bring a prosecution on indictment lies with the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, 
which is an independent office, established by statute. The decision to bring a prosecution depends on all the 
circumstances of a case. In some situations, it may not be appropriate to bring a prosecution in the first instance, 
or for a second time, for good reasons. It requires an exercise of discretion on the matrix of facts. The 
circumstances will be different in every case.”  
45 See for commentary, Sean E Quinn Criminal Law in Ireland (4th ed, Irish Law Publishing, Ireland, 2009) at 
221. 
46 Eviston v Director of Public Prosecutions, above n 44, at 230. 
47 Ibid, at 299 per Keane CJ. 
48 Carlin v Director of Public Prosecutions [2010] IESC 14, [2010] 3 IR 547. 
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The Supreme Court dismissed Mr Carlin’s appeal and accepted the DPP’s right to review a 
decision not to prosecute. Fennelly J found that the DPP was entitled to review decisions even 
with representations by the alleged victim and their dependents. The decision to prosecute and 
the right to review prosecution decisions were held to be exercises of executive power immune 
from review, absent mala fides.49 
 
8.2.3.4 Concluding Comments 
 
All three jurisdictions affirm that the DPP has the right to review and reverse an original 
decision even in the absence of new evidence. In the United Kingdom, failure to inform an 
accused of the possibility of a reversal does not amount to the reversal being invalidated. There 
the courts have taken a more victims’-rights approach towards any adjustments to the principle 
of finality, and see that this shift in paradigm increases public confidence in the administration 
of justice. The same pertains in Hong Kong.  
 
In Ireland however, the courts are more protective of the accused’s right of certainty. But no 
specific test was articulated in Eviston for intervention.  
 
Denham J’s approach in Carlin, does not concern the factual accuracy of the decision, but 
rather the process by which it was reached. Carlin has been described as inhabiting “a space 
beyond traditional concerns about process and or the public’s interest in prosecution. It points 
to a need to articulate and explore the reflexive relationship between fair trial rights and the 
public community interest in criminal justice. Denham J invokes the public’s confidence in the 
justice system in order to convey the message that there are values intrinsic to the criminal 
justice system that cannot be simply labelled as defendant’s rights or public interest in a 
prosecution. Instead, broader, fundamental interests relating to the legitimacy of verdicts (and 
by extension the authenticity of complainant’s suffering) are at stake.”50  
 
While all three jurisdictions maintain different approaches towards the rights of victims and 
those who are suspects, the overarching concern for legitimacy in the DPP’s decision-making 
process and the interest of preserving public confidence has been at the core of those decisions. 
                                                
49 A position very close to Matalulu v Director of Public Prosecutions [2004] NZAR 193 (SC Fiji). 
50 Sinead Ring “Carlin v DPP: Prosecutorial Discretion and the Decision (Not) to Prosecute” (2010) Human Rights 
in Ireland <www.humanrights.ie>. 
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While finality in decision-making is a critical feature of the rule of law, in the context of 
justified reversals, the rule of law ideal is better served when finality is trumped to avoid 
injustice.51 
 
The next Chapter considers the alternative route to justice; private prosecution.
                                                
51 As Lord Atkin said in Ras Behari Lal v King-Emperor (1933) 50 TLR 1, 2 (PC) at 2 “Finality is a good thing, 




9 Private Prosecution 
 
One alternative remedy to judicial review long-held to be one of the bastions of the common 
law, is the right of an aggrieved person to bring a private prosecution.1 In Osborne v WorkSafe 
New Zealand the appellants were barred from instituting this right.2 This Chapter evaluates the 
viability and efficiency of the private prosecution alternative for those who seek to challenge a 
decision not to prosecute, in particular, the restrictions placed on initiating private prosecutions. 
It also considers issues involved with interventions to, inter alia prevent their abuse in New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom and Hong Kong. These jurisdictions approach the right in similar 
ways, but have different restrictions when legislation and case law are considered. It is argued 
that since access to justice via private prosecution is so onerous, the test for judicial review of 
prosecution decision-making must be recountoured to give deserving applicants greater 
opportunities to achieve justice.  
 
9.1 New Zealand 
 
The right to privately prosecute in New Zealand is now preserved by s26 Criminal Procedure 
Act 2011.3 The NZLC critically analysed the need for private prosecutions and concluded that: 
“The important constitutional and theoretical place of private prosecutions within our system 
warrants their retention.”4 While prosecuting criminal offenders is a central function of the 
state,5 the ability for private entities and individuals to alternatively commence a private 
prosecution acts as “a safeguard against the misuse [of this] public power.”6 Private 
prosecutions also play a role in satisfying state deficiencies “existing not through negligence 
                                                
1 R v Gratanelli (1849) St Tr (NS) 979; Gouriet v Union of Post Office Worker [1977] 3 All ER 70, [1978] AC 
435; Jiang Enzhu v Lau Wai-hing [2000] 1 HKLRD 121, [1999] 3 HKC 8. Whether privately prosecuting is a 
‘right’ was questioned in Jones v Whalley [2007] 1 AC 63, [2007] 1 Cr App R 2. 
2 Section 54A(2) of the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 precludes private prosecution if WorkSafe 
has taken enforcement action. 
3 Summary Proceedings Act 1957, s13 “Except where it is expressly otherwise provided by an Act, any person 
may lay an information for an offence” was repealed by s7(2) Summary Proceedings Amendment Act (No 2) 
2011, from 1 July 2013. 
4 New Zealand Law Commission Criminal Prosecution (NZLC R66, 2000) at 92. 
5 New Zealand Law Commission Criminal Prosecution (NZLC PP28, 1997) at 137. 
6 Ibid at 136. 
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or abuse but rather through economic limitations.”7 Most relevantly, the right to privately 
prosecute provides victims with an alternative avenue to protect their interests if public 
prosecutors decline to prosecute.8  
 
Despite the significant constitutional function of private prosecution, there are substantial 
inroads to exercising the right. Deterrents to privately prosecuting include the cost, 
inconvenience, the legal skill required to present a case in court, the stringent burden of proof 
required for a conviction and the risk of an adverse costs award. The Criminal Disclosure Act 
2008 also applies. These factors, combined with the general lack of awareness of the existence 
of this prosecutorial right, make private prosecutions in New Zealand uncommon. The 
subservience of the victim in law is further underpinned by the fact that a private prosecution 
may be taken over by the Solicitor-General or crown prosecutor at any time.   
 
Section 26 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 provides that:9 “the Registrar may accept [a] 
charging document for filing; or refer the matter to a District Court Judge for a direction that 
the person proposing to commence the proceeding file formal statements, and the exhibits 
referred to in those statements, that form the evidence that the person proposes to call at trial 
or such part of that evidence that the person considers is sufficient to justify a trial.” 
 
Section 26(2) states that: “The Registrar must refer formal statements and exhibits that are filed 
in accordance with subsection (1)(b) to a District Court Judge,10 who must determine whether 
the charging document should be accepted for filing. A Judge may issue a direction that a 
charging document must not be accepted for filing if he or she considers that— 
                                                
7 New Zealand Law Commission, above n 4, at 94. In Edwards v District Court at Lower Hutt [2018] NZHC 1266 
at [19], Cooke J noting the cases Taka v District Court at Auckland [2015] NZHC 972, [2016] NZAR 1459 at 
[12] – [17] and Mitchell v Porirua District Court & Ors [2017] NZHC 1331 at [73] stated “I accept that the right 
involves an important safeguard arising from the state’s otherwise complete control of prosecutions. But I also 
accept Mr Robinson’s submission that there is an equally important check to prevent the power of private 
prosecution being used inappropriately.” 
8 New Zealand Law Commission, above n 5, at 137. See Bill Hodge, “Private Prosecutions: Access to Justice” 
(1998) 4 NZLJ 145-148; “private prosecution is not a medieval anachronism but is rather a useful weapon for the 
pursuit of justice. Justice must not only be seen to be done, it must be done, and if by no one else, then by the 
victims themselves. Private prosecutions have the constitutional high ground, therapeutic value for the victims, 
and genuine practical significance. Access to justice is a good thing, and the few participatory windows of access 
should be opened wider, not closed down. Just as war is too important to be left to the generals, so justice is too 
important to be monopolized by the crown.” 
9 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s26 (1)(a) and (b). 
10 Prescott v District Court at Northshore [2017] NZHC 2828, [2018] NZAR 307 at [46] (“prescriptive”). 
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(a) the evidence provided by the proposed private prosecutor in accordance with subsection 
(1)(b) is insufficient to justify a trial; or 
(b) the proposed prosecution is otherwise an abuse of process.” 
In Taka v Auckland District Court,11 Brewer J held that in evaluating the evidential merit of a 
proposed private prosecution, the private prosecutor was required to file formal statements (and 
exhibits referred to in them) in order that a Judge could evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence. 
Brewer held whether the putative defendants had the right to be heard before a Judge 
determines that the prosecution be accepted for filing, depends on a contextual assessment 
involving the statutory framework, the nature of the decision and the effect on the individual.12 
Where a private prosecutor has an evident personal motive the putative defendant should be 
heard.13  
 
Another limitation is the additional requirement of consent from the Attorney-General for 
prosecution of a motley assortment of offences or where only certain organisations or parties 
may commence proceedings. The justifications are alleged to be to secure consistency.14  
 
The Prosecution Guidelines state that “the Solicitor-General has a limited role or authority in 
relation to private prosecutions, for example when the power to stay a prosecution is exercised 
or there is a statutory requirement that a prosecutor obtains the Solicitor-General’s consent.”15 
The requirement of consent by the Attorney General can also be exercised by the Solicitor 
General.16  
 
                                                
11 Taka v Auckland District Court, above n 7. 
12 See Durayappah v Fernando [1967] 2 AC 337 (PC) and Royal Australasian College of Surgeons v Phipps 
[1999] 3 NZLR 1 (CA). 
13 Brewer J applied Wang v North Shore District Court (No 2) [2014] NZHC 2756, [2014] NZAR 1428. 
14 An example of this was the introduction of the Crimes (Indecency) Amendment Act 2015. It created a barrier 
to private prosecutions specifically against crimes against morality and decency via section 4 of the Act. Section 
4 replaced section 124(5) of the Crimes Act 1961 with: No private prosecution (as defined in section 5 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 2011) for an offence against this section can be commenced without the Attorney 
General’s consent. The offence in section 124 Crimes Act 1961 relates to the distribution or exhibition of indecent 
matter. 
15 Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines 2013, paragraph 2.5. 
16 Section 9A of the Constitution Act 1986 states: “The Solicitor-General may perform a function or duty imposed, 
or exercised a power conferred, on the Attorney-General.” It is likely that the Solicitor-General will exercise the 
power conferred on the Attorney-General when the issue concerns legal matters, such as the consent for private 
prosecutions. See Gibbs v New Plymouth District Council [2009] NZAR 344 at 350-351 (HC). 
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Private prosecutors are also limited in the right to appeal sentences. In Gibbs v New Plymouth 
District Council, Harrison J ruled that the Council as prosecutor was debarred as a matter of 
jurisdiction from pursuing an appeal against sentence in the absence of consent from the 
Solicitor-General, necessitated by the mandatory requirement in s115A(2) Summary 
Proceedings Act 1957 (now s246(2) Criminal Procedure Act 2011). 17 By contrast, an appeal 
against acquittal can be brought as of right by an aggrieved private prosecutor: s248(1) 
Criminal Procedure Act 2011. 
 
Access to justice via private prosecution is limited by costs. Legal aid is not available in New 
Zealand to fund private prosecutions.18 Hence, legal process and costs will present a huge 
barrier.19 In cases involving alleged breaches of the HSEA 1992, it is likely that an employer 
will have access to greater resources (including insurance funding) than an employee, and those 
who are faced with corporate defendants are likely to be at a financial disadvantage.20 A poorly 
prepared prosecution may also result in significant cost orders being made under the Costs in 
Criminal Cases Act 1967.21 
 
The NZLC has emphasised the importance of private prosecutions within our justice system 
but has also highlighted the dangers of the current system. “To a large extent, those dangers 
arise out of a lack of independent review or supervision of a private prosecution once 
commenced, and the consequent absence of protections for a defendant.”22 Paragraph 2.5 of 
the Prosecution Guidelines states that: “The Solicitor-General expects law practitioners 
conducting a private prosecution to adhere to the Law Society’s general rules of professional 
conduct and to all relevant principles in [the] Guidelines.”23 Courts also have supervisory 
jurisdiction over private prosecutions.24 
 
                                                
17 Gibbs v New Plymouth District Council, above n 16. 
18 See Part 2, Legal Services Act 1991. 
19 Natalie K Fraser “Smoke and Mirrors: The Introduction of Private Prosecutions under s54A of the Health and 
Safety in Employment Act 2002” (2003) 9 Te Mata Koi: Auckland University Law Review 1230-1266. 
20 However, it is likely that many small businesses will have few resources than a union. 
21 Costs will not be awarded however just because the accused is acquitted. There must be more justification than 
just losing. 
22 New Zealand Law Commission, above n 4, at 92. 
23 The Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines 2013, at paragraph 2.5.  
24 In the case Teo v Attorney-General [2002] NZAR 793, the Court of Appeal of Samoa held that the decision of 
the Attorney-General to discontinue a private prosecution is reviewable by the Court but only on the ground of 
“flagrant impropriety in the exercise of discretion,” the same standard applied in the Canadian case Kostuch v 
Attorney General (1995), 174 AR 109 (CA). 
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In Mitchell v Tyson, 25 Clark J held that section 26(3) Criminal Prosecutions Act 2011 provides 
the statutory basis for balancing the rights of a private prosecutor to prosecute those who offend 
against the criminal law with the rights of individuals not to be subject to a prosecution that is 
without merit.26 The appellant had no right of appeal under s296 Criminal Procedure Act 2011 
as it only provided appellate jurisdiction to the High Court where a person had been “charged 
with an offence.” A decision to refuse to allow the filing of a charging document, as here, could 
not constitute the jurisdictional fact that the intended defendant had been charged.27 “The 
appellant’s remedy lay in judicial review. The Court of Appeal recognized in R v Anderson 
that the availability of judicial review was relevant in construing the scope of s296.”28  
 
Wang v North Shore District Council involved an application for judicial review of whether a 
Judge had an obligation to provide reasons to authorize a summons at the behest of a private 
prosecutor to commence a prosecution.29 It was decided that in the context of private 
prosecutions, the judicial discretion as to whether or not a summons should be issued provides 
a valuable safeguard to prevent any abuse of process in commencing such prosecutions and 
requires a closer scrutiny of the basis upon which such a private prosecution application was 
made, than in public prosecutions.30 It was held that since judicial review is the only remedy 
available where there has been a refusal to exercise a discretion in favour of granting or refusing 
a summons, judicial review proceedings are entirely appropriate.31 
 
In Prescott v District Court at North Shore,32 the applicant’s proposed private prosecution 
charging documents were not accepted by the Registrar on directions from the District Court 
                                                
25  Mitchell v Tyson [2016] NZAR 1545. 
26 Following Taka v Auckland District Court, above n 7. 
27 Clark J applied Anderson v R [2015] NZCA 518, [2016] 2 NZLR 321. 
28 Mitchell v Tyson, above n 25, at [39]; R v Anderson, above n 25, at [46]. 
29 Wang v North Shore District Court [2013] NZHC 3126, [2014] NZAR 101. On 6 November 2014, the plaintiffs 
were successful again in their application for judicial review of a decision of the District Court to accept charging 
documents issued by a private prosecutor, the second defendant, against the plaintiffs: Wang v North Shore 
District Court (No 2), above n 13. According to the NZAR headnote by Kim J McCoy for Wang v North Shore 
District Court (No 3) [2015] NZHC 1611, [2015] NZAR 1678 at 1678; “the plaintiffs sought costs against both 
the District Court and the private prosecutor, contending that costs were justified because it was the second time 
within a year that judicial review proceedings had been successfully brought against the court in relation to the 
same essential matter, (2) the District Court had on any view made too many errors of fact and law and (3) 
successful parties required to take judicial review of proceedings against an inferior court should be entitled to 
the remedy of a compensatory costs order.” The court dismissed the application, finding that “costs will not be 
awarded against a Court for having made an error of law. Costs would only be awarded against a Court upon 
proof that a judicial officer had acted perversely, oppressively or in bad faith.”  
30 Burchell v Auckland District Court [2012] NZHC 3413, [2013] NZAR 219 was considered. 
31 C v Wellington District Court [1996] 2 NZLR (CA) distinguished. 
32 Prescott v District Court at North Shore, above n 10. 
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Judge. In following Taka and applying Mitchell, the court held that the provisions of s26 are 
prescriptive. The court held that the District Court Judge made errors of law by failing to direct 
the private prosecutor to file formal documents and by making a decision regarding the 
sufficiency of evidence presented by the applicant on the basis of an inadmissible opinion 
reached by another judge in earlier separate proceedings.33 
 
Prescott emphasized that the reasons and conclusions of the decision maker may disclose an 
error of law upon which the challenge to the decision is founded, but the court will focus only 
on the impugned decision itself in judicial review.34 Only in ‘exceptional circumstances’ will 
a reviewing court determine that it is appropriate to order the removal of a specific finding 
from a decision, as opposed to quashing the decision.35   
 
Private prosecutions were introduced to the HSEA in 2003. Reporting before that amendment, 
the Transport and Industrial Relations Select Committee stated:36  
 
There are a number of reasons for removing the Crown’s monopoly on prosecutions. These 
include enhancing the deterrent effect of enabling a greater range of persons to enforce the Act; 
providing an alternative means of seeking justice for aggrieved parties where a case is not 
prosecuted by OSH; and providing a safeguard against potential inertia, incompetence or biased 
reasoning.” Concern had been expressed to the Select Committee that the right to prosecute 
might be used by trade unions as an industrial weapon. The Select Committee noted that private 
prosecutions could be taken only if the Department of Labour elected not to act; “[t]he 
Department of Labour advises that the safeguards surrounding private prosecution are robust 
and protect against inappropriate private litigation. Meanwhile, the provisions of the Sentencing 
Act reduce incentives to take private prosecutions for financial gain because victims can no 
longer be awarded part of a fine. 
 
Parliament also decided that the ordinary time-bar to initiate such prosecutions should be more 
flexible because of: long latency occupational illness, latent defects, and a failure by the 
employer to notify serious harm. In the case of private prosecutions, the July- October 2001 
Cabinet paper that recommended flexible, limitation periods stated that:37 “In the private 
prosecution context, a private party may choose to begin their investigation only after OSH has 
decided not to prosecute…This may not provide enough time for another party to prepare a 
                                                
33 Dorbu v The Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal HC Auckland CIV-2009-404-7381, 11 May 
2011 was followed. 
34 Arbuthnot v Chief Executive of the Department of Work and Income [2007] NZSC 55, [2008] 1 NZLR 13. 
35 Y v Director of Proceedings [2016] NZHC  2054 considered. 
36 McVicar v District Court at Wellington HC Wellington CIV-2010-485-1834,3 February 2011 at [19] cited by 
Miller J. 
37 Ibid, at [25] cited by Miller J; Summit Wool Spinners Ltd v Department of Labour [2007] NZHC 1852; [2008] 
NZAR 19 per Asher J at [25] – [29] re s54D. 
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prosecution within the six-month period and the Court would consider whether further time is 
warranted in that situation. Section 54B sets out the six-month time limit by which an inspector 
must file a charging document.” 
 
Section 27 of the HSEA 2002 provided for the substitution of new sections 53 and 54 of the 
Act. As a consequence, by the new s54A(2)(a) of the Act a private prosecution can be instituted 
if an inspector (defined in s2) or another person has “not taken enforcement action against any 
possible defendant in respect of the same matter.” A specific extension of time for laying a 
private prosecution information is given as long as there is compliance with s54C(3) which 
requires any application to extend time is made with one month after receiving a notice from 
the Secretary under s54c(1)(b). 
 
Since the amendment, very few private prosecutions have been successful.38 This is likely to 
be a direct result of the practical difficulties involved but also the high case-load taken on by 
WorkSafe. The most obvious restraint on private prosecutors trying to claim under the HSEA 
is obtaining sufficient evidentiary material to make their case. WorkSafe has statutory powers 
to investigate into such cases which are unavailable to laymen. Victims may however, be able 
to obtain evidence from WorkSafe by using the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA). If 
WorkSafe has not already previously investigated the case, victims will have a difficult task of 
conducting their own investigation. Reflecting on the private prosecution HSEA amendment, 
the Court in the successfully prosecuted case of Creeggan v New Zealand Defence Force 
stated: “You are proof that one person can make a difference. By dint of your tenacity and 
resolve, you have managed to create a silver lining from an unimaginable tragedy that has 
seared itself into the nation’s psyche. You have demonstrated what the amendment legislation 
permitting private prosecutions set out to achieve.”39 
 
While private prosecutors have experienced some degree of success in cases involving a 
previous decision not to prosecute, there remain significant statutory brakes and inherent 
                                                
38 See New Zealand Meat Workers Union v South Pacific Meats Limited [2012] DCR 877 (HC) where a conviction 
was upheld on appeal and Creeggan v New Zealand Defence Force DC Wellington CIV-2012-085-543, 22 
October 2013.  
39 Creeggan v New Zealand Defence Force, above n 38, at [48].  In another HSEA case, Kelly v M & A Cross Ltd 
DC Rotorua CRI-2014-063-000784, 21 May 2014, WorkSafe NZ made the decision not to prosecute against 
forestry company M&A Cross, when a falling log struck and killed a worker. After WorkSafe made its decision, 
the Council of Trade Unions launched a private prosecution. M&A Cross Ltd pleaded guilty. See also McCoy v 
Downer and Company Ltd (1981) 1 DCR 327. (Wellington City Council refused to enforce its noise bylaw- 
successful private prosecution). 
	 163 
restrictions. If a private prosecution fails, the risk of facing malicious prosecution proceedings 
in tort exists.40 
 
9.2 United Kingdom 
 
The right to bring private prosecutions in the United Kingdom is preserved by statute.41 It has 
been described there as “a valuable constitutional safeguard against inertia or partiality on the 
part of authority”42 and “against capricious, corrupt or biased failure or refusal of those 
authorities to prosecute offenders against the criminal law.”43 In certain cases, an intending 
prosecutor must obtain the consent of the Attorney General or the DPP before the 
commencement of proceedings.44 A private prosecution is commenced by issue of a summons 
from a magistrate. The discretion of the magistrate to issue a summons engaged: “(i) whether 
the allegation is of an offence known to the law and if so whether the essential ingredients of 
the offence are prima facie present; (ii) that the offence alleged is not ‘out of time’; (iii) that 
the court has jurisdiction; (iv) whether the informant has the necessary authority to 
prosecute.”45 A summons will not be granted where there is impropriety or where an abuse of 
process is involved.46  
 
                                                
40 See Commercial Union Assurance Co of New Zealand v Lamont [1989] 3 NZLR 187. For other cases on judicial 
review of private prosecutions, see Matthew Smith New Zealand Judicial Review Handbook (2nd ed, Thomson 
Reuters New Zealand Ltd, Wellington, 2016) at [3.4.4]; see Kern v District Court at North Shore [2014] NZHC 
896, [2014] NZAR 699; Ericson v District Court at Wellington [2013] NZHC 516; Burchell v Auckland District 
Court, above n 28. 
41 Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, s6(1): “Subject to subsection (2) below, nothing in this Part shall preclude 
any person from instituting any criminal proceedings or conducting any criminal proceedings to which the 
Director’s duty to take over the conduct of proceedings does not apply.” 
42 Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers, above n1, at 477 per Lord Wilberforce. 
43 Ibid, at 498 per Lord Diplock. 
44 Examples include the institution of prosecutions under section 2(4) of the Suicide Act 1961, which relates to 
the assistance of another’s suicide, or the institution of war crime prosecutions under the Geneva Conventions Act 
1957, s1A and International Criminal Court Act 2001, s53(3). 
45 R v West London Justices, ex parte Klahn [1979] 2 All ER 221.  
46 R (on the application of the Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Newham) v Stratford Magistrates’ 
Court [2004] EWHC 2506 (Admin). An example of an abuse of process would be where the private prosecutor 
encouraged the crime or was in some way involved in the mischief he has complained of: R (on the application 
of Dacre) v Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2008] EWHC 1667 (Admin). 
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By s6(2) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, the DPP may take over the private 
proceedings at any stage.47 A private prosecutor is under no obligation to inform the CPS that 
a private prosecution has commenced.48 
 
In the United Kingdom prior to 23 June 2009,49 the best exposition of the DPP’s policy was 
encapsulated in a letter written on behalf of the Director and quoted by Laws LJ in R v Director 
of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Duckenfield: 50  
 
…where we have been asked…to take over the prosecution in order to discontinue it, we would 
do so if one (or more) of the following circumstances applies: there is clearly no case to answer. 
A private prosecution commenced in these circumstances would be unfounded, and would 
therefore be an abuse of the right to bring a prosecution; the public interest factors tending 
against prosecution clearly outweigh those factors tending in favour; the prosecution is clearly 
likely to damage the interests of justice. The CPS would then regard itself as having to act in 
accordance with our policy…It has been considered that to apply the Code tests to private 
prosecutions would unfairly limit the right of individuals to bring their own cases. 
  
Duckenfield involved private prosecutions that had been brought by a representative of the 
victims’ families against two retired police officers in relation to the Hillsborough disaster for 
manslaughter and wilful neglect of duty.51 The two officers requested that the DPP take over 
and discontinue the prosecutions. This request was rejected by the DPP and the officers were 
unsuccessful in their application for judicial review. The Divisional Court rejected the 
challenge to the lawfulness of the DPP’s policy; he was completely within his powers to refuse 
to take over the private prosecution and to discontinue it and that the criteria are not the same 
as for the Code of Crown Prosecutors. Laws LJ stated:52 
 
                                                
47 Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, s6(2): “Where criminal proceedings are instituted in circumstances in which 
the Director is not under a duty to take over their conduct, he may nevertheless do so at any stage.” 
48 See CPS “Private Prosecutions: Legal Guidance” <www.cps.gov.uk >. The CPS may therefore find out about 
a private prosecution in one of the following ways: “where the private prosecutor, or a representative of the private 
prosecutor, asks the CPS to take over the prosecution; where the defendant, or representative of the defendant, 
asks the CPS to take over the prosecution; where extradition is required and the Home Office (directly or 
indirectly) refers the private prosecutor or representative of the private prosecutor, to the CPS; where a justices’ 
clerk refers a private prosecution to the CPS under section 7(4) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, because 
the prosecution has been withdrawn or unduly delayed and there does not appear to be any good reason for the 
withdrawal or delay; where a judge sends a report to the CPS; where the CPS learns of the private prosecution in 
another way, for example from a press report.” 
49 See R (on the application of Gujra) v Crown Prosecution Service [2012] UKSC 52, [2013] 1 AC 484 (UKSC) 
at [24]. 
50 R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Duckenfield [2000] 1 WLR 55 at 63. 
51 Ibid. On 29 June 2018 at Preston Crown Court Oppenshaw J lifted the stay imposed by CPS in 2000 halting 
private prosecutions for manslaughter by gross negligence, see Danny Boyle “Hillsborough match commander 
David Duckenfield will face trail, as judge lifts ban on prosecution” The Telegraph (United Kingdom, 29 June 
2018); The former Commander of Police David Duckenfield at the 1989 FA Cup semi-final. 
52 R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Duckenfield, above n 50, at 68 per Laws LJ. 
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…in truth, however, it could not be right for the DPP to apply across the board the same tests, 
in particular the ‘reasonable prospect of conviction’ test referred to in the correspondence, in 
considering whether to take over and discontinue a private prosecution as the Code enjoins 
Crown Prosecutors to follow in deciding whether to institute or proceed with a prosecution 
themselves; the consequence would be that the DPP would stop a private prosecution merely 
on the ground that the case is not one which he would himself proceed with. But that, in my 
judgment, would amount to an emasculation of section 6(1) and itself be an unlawful policy. 
 
This policy relating to the evidential criterion of “clearly no case to answer” was changed after 
23 June 200953 and the “reasonable prospect test” was used instead. The very policy that was 
previously held to be unfairly limiting the rights of private prosecutors was introduced. It has 
since been the DPP’s policy to take over and discontinue private prosecutions unless the 
prosecution was more likely than not to result in a conviction.  
 
In R (on the application of Gujra) v Crown Prosecution Service, the appellant had instituted 
two private prosecutions which were subsequently taken over and discontinued by the DPP.54 
The Supreme Court agreed on the important and practical constitutional role that private 
prosecutions played in the United Kingdom and that the right has a distinguished pedigree, 
however their Lordships differed on the extent of the right. Lord Wilson for the majority 
affirmed that while the right to initiate private prosecutions remained intact, it could not have 
been the intention of Parliament that the DPP should decline to exercise his discretion so as to 
intervene and discontinue a prosecution even in circumstances that lack a reasonable prospect 
of success.55 It was held that testing for the likelihood of conviction was a comparatively more 
relevant question than the old “no case to answer” test. Lord Wilson disagreed with 
Duckenfield. 
 
Lord Neuberger in agreement with Lord Wilson observed that factors such as the unfairness to 
a defendant, costs, use of court time and confidence in the justice system justify the Reasonable 
prospect of conviction (RPC) test in public prosecutions be applicable to private prosecutions.56 
The Attorney General has always retained the prerogative power by entering a nolle prosequi 
in private prosecutions.57 His Lordship concluded that although the new policy might restrict 
the right to privately prosecute, it is not unacceptable as a matter of law.58   
                                                
53 See R (on the application of Gujra) v Crown Prosecution Service, above n 49, at [25].  
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid, at [39]. 
56 Ibid, at [57]. 
57 Ibid, at [64]. 
58 Ibid, at [71]. 
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Lady Hale and Lord Mance for the minority adopted a wider, rights-based approach to the 
question and held strong views on the constitutional basis for private prosecutions and the 
importance of the individuals’ right of access to the courts. No unjustified intrusion by the 
executive into an individual’s right of access to the courts should be countenanced.59 Lady Hale 
added that the possibility of judicial review is “not a good safeguard” and the test may raise 
issues involving the violation of arts.3 and 8 of the European Convention of Human rights.60 
 
The strict legal analysis of the majority is persuasive, however in recognising that there is a 
right to initiate a private prosecution but no right to continue, save for circumstances where the 
conditions are the same as those applicable to a continuance of a public prosecution, essentially 
weakens the right to initiate private prosecutions in the first place. Lord Mance and Lady Hale’s 
approach recognised this, however even the minority’s position raises several practical 
challenges. Amirthalingam explained that:61  
 
In particular, a difficulty with the minority’s approach is that in theory, whenever the Director 
exercises his discretion not to prosecute on the basis that the evidential sufficiency test has not 
been satisfied, the dissatisfied victim or kin might then seek to launch a private prosecution on 
the ground that there is no case to answer…In Jones v Whalley the House of Lords upheld a 
magistrate’s decision to stay the proceedings when a private prosecution was brought against 
an individual who had been cautioned by the police and told that he would not be prosecuted. 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill noted that, similarly, a decision by the Director not to prosecute 
should also stand and any attempt to bring a private prosecution could be reviewed as an abuse 
of process (at [15]). 
 
The split decision in Gujra is indicative of the difficulties of finding the balance between well-
considered theory and practical justice in areas involving prosecutorial discretion and 
legitimate expectation. What the Gujra decision does not change, is the fact that some 
prosecutions will never come to the attention of the CPS. Stark made the observation that “In 
the absence of a particular need for CPS involvement, they will then continue without the 
assistance of the state’s prosecution service. But if both the evidential and public interest tests 
                                                
59 R (on the application of Gujra) v Crown Prosecution Service, above n 49, at [103] - [105]. 
60 Ibid, at [132] Per Lady Hale dissenting. Article 3 is prohibition of torture. Article 8 is right to respect for private 
and family life. Under both articles, the state has a positive obligation to provide an effective deterrent, in the 
shape of the criminal law. Lady Hale cited X and Y v Netherlands (1985) 8 EHRR 235 as an example. Lady Hale 
at [133] in Gujra: The court held “that the obligation is not fulfilled if a private prosecution, which a reasonable 
prosecutor could consider more likely than not to succeed before a reasonable court, can be prevented because 
another prosecutor takes a different view.” 
61 Kumaralingam Amirthalingam “Private prosecutors and the public prosecutor’s discretion” (2013) 129 LQR 
325-328. See also Jones v Whalley, above n 1. 
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are satisfied, is the DPP not recognising, in essence, that the state ought to be prosecuting the 
defendant? If so, one might wonder why the pursuit of these cases should depend on the action 
of private prosecutors.”62 
 
An onerous feature of private prosecution is obtaining evidentiary material. In R v Director of 
Public Prosecutions, ex parte Hallas it was held that both private prosecutors and defendants 
in the United Kingdom are prevented from obtaining access to statements, photographs, reports 
or other documents held by the CPS.63 In Taylor and Another v Director of Serious Fraud 
Office and Others the court held that there is no right to obtain documents from the CPS since 
the evidentiary material is held under confidentiality for those who provided the materials, and 
is not open to the public domain.64 However, victims of crime in the United Kingdom, unlike 
in New Zealand are entitled to know why the DPP declined to prosecute the alleged offender.65  
 
9.3 Hong Kong  
 
Hong Kong’s 2013 Prosecution Code states that: “Under the common law a person has the 
right to commence a criminal prosecution in the public interest.”66 Both the courts and scholars 
have emphasised the right of private prosecution.67 Apart from the deterrent of cost, there are 
two barriers to the initial institution of a private prosecution.68 Firstly, a private prosecutor must 
persuade a magistrate to issue a summons. Thereafter, in order to retain control of the case, a 
                                                
62 Findlay Stark “The Demise of the Private Prosecution” [2013] The Cambridge law Journal 8 at 10. 
63 R v DPP ex parte Hallas [1988] 87 Cr App R 340 
64 Taylor and Another v Director of Serious Fraud Office and Others [1992] 2 AC 177. 
65 For detailed and recent discussion of this issue in the United Kingdom, see Armani Da Silva v The United 
Kingdom [2016] ECHR 314, (2016) 63 EHRR 12. 
66 Department of Justice Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Prosecution Code 2013 at paragraph 7.1. 
67 See for scholars, Simon N M Young ‘Prosecutions Division of the Department of Justice’ in Mark S Gaylord, 
Danny Gittings, and Harold Traver (eds) Introduction to Crime, Law and Justice in Hong Kong (Hong Kong 
University Press, 2009) at 111-130; Gary N Heilbronn, Criminal Procedure in Hong Kong (Longman Group 
1990) at 62. In Re Ng Chi Keung CACV 32/2013, 19 May 2014, the Court held that ‘[t]here can be no doubt that 
an individual has a right to institute a private prosecution.’ As in the United Kingdom and New Zealand, the right 
to bring a private prosecution in Hong Kong is not absolute and is restricted by certain limitations. The court in 
Ma Pui Tung v Department of Justice CACV 64/2008 acknowledged that citizens who have been aggrieved by a 
prosecutor not to bring a prosecution, have the right to privately prosecute. 
68 The government does not provide legal assistance for conducting a private prosecution: D v Director of Public 
Prosecutions [2015] HKCFI 1151, [2015] 4 HKLRD 62 at [14]. It was argued that ‘the burden of bearing the 
costs of such a [private] prosecution, including the legal fees of the defendant if the prosecution fails, generally 
serves to deter private prosecutions: Simon N.M Young ‘Prosecutions Division of the Department of Justice’ in 
Mark S Gaylord, Danny Gittings, and Harold Traver (eds) Introduction to Crime, Law and Justice in Hong Kong 
(Hong Kong University Press, 2009) at 111-130. 
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private prosecutor must persuade the Department of Justice (DoJ) not to take it over, even 
though the Secretary of Justice may do so.69  
 
The magistrate’s exercise of discretion on whether to issue a summons for private prosecutions 
is based on the prima facie evidence test.70 The application will be dismissed if there is 
‘insufficient evidence to support the complaints made by the applicant.’71 In applications where 
there is a ‘lack of particulars and substance to the draft charges,’72 or if the application discloses 
‘no criminal offence’ and does ‘not even show a prima facie case on the facts,’73 the magistrate 
will refuse to issue summons to initiate the prosecution.74 This screening process by the 
magistrate is to ensure that intending prosecutors do not institute frivolous claims against 
others. It has also been argued that once a private prosecution satisfies the prima facie evidence 
test, the expense of time and money is on the private prosecutor to defend himself and the 
court’s time and resources will be used to hear the case, therefore it is not unreasonable to 
require such a level of evidence to be made out before institution.75  
 
The requirement of prima facie evidence for the institution of private prosecutions is arguably 
more restrictive than the test imposed in New Zealand, which only requires that summons be 
issued when a private prosecutor has proven that the case against the accused is not frivolous 
or unfounded.76 The court in HKSAR v Wong Kun Cheong even went as far as requiring ‘direct 
and admissible evidence’ to support a complaint before a magistrate would issue summons.77 
That “the requirement for ‘direct’ evidence is too strict as it is not possible in all cases for the 
                                                
69 Magistrates Ordinance (Cap 227), s14 “Private Prosecution and Intervention by the Secretary for Justice.” 
70 Which considers if there is prima facie evidence adduced by the applicant against the accused. See HKSAR v 
Cheung Kin Chung [2015] HKCFI 890, [2015] 3 HKLRD 310 at [37]. See also HKSAR v Cheung Kin Chung 
[2015] HKCFI 2064 at [15]. See also Tsui Koon Wah v Principal Magistrate of Kowloon City Magistrates’ Courts 
(unrep., HCAL 81/2006, [2006] HKEC 1721.) 
71 Re Robert James Stairmand [2010] HKCA 138, CACV 283/2009 (13 May 2010) at [7]. 
72 HSKAR v Cheung Kin Chung [2014] HKCFI 1814, HCMA 490/2014 (25 September 2014) at [10]. 
73 HKSAR v Cheung Kin Chung [2015] HKCFI 2115, HCMA 411/2015 (5 November 2015) at [36]. 
74 The High Court in HKSAR v Cheung Kin Chung [2014] HKCFI 1394, HCMA 335/2014 (1 August 2014) at 
[32] stated “[a]n applicant for issuing of a summons to start a private prosecution must understand that he is 
starting a solemn criminal proceeding by making a serious allegation against another person. Once a summons is 
issued, the person to whom the summons is issued is burdened with a criminal prosecution. The applicant therefore 
cannot assume that a Magistrate will grant him the application and issue the summons if the only thing he provides 
is an Information containing a Statement of Offence and Particulars of Offence.” 
75 Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi “Private Prosecutions in Hong Kong: The Role of the Magistrates and State 
Intervention to Prevent Abuse” (2016) 4 The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 253 at 258. 
76 Attorney-General v Slavich [2013] NZHC 627 (27 March 2013).  
77 HKSAR v Wong Kun Cheong [2002] HKCFI 101, HCMA 242/2002 (9 April 2002) at [2]. 
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prosecutor to adduce direct evidence. Therefore, magistrates should not raise the threshold too 
high as this would indirectly undermine the right to institute a private prosecution.”78  
 
McConville further explained that “In order to adduce sufficient evidence to sustain a 
prosecution, the private prosecutor needs to get relevant evidence to support a legal 
challenge.”79 Private prosecutors would therefore need to obtain from the DPP, the reasons for 
making the decision not to prosecute. However, in Hong Kong’s Prosecution Code, the DPP is 
not required to provide reasons behind his decisions and will only do so in ‘exceptional 
circumstances.’80 McConville commented that “it is arguable that these guidelines no longer 
comport with modern expectations relating to the rights of victims and their families, at least 
in certain classes of cases. The best example would be the death of a citizen whilst in the 
custody of state officials where doubts are raised as to the adequacy of the police investigation 
or of the related prosecutorial review.”81 Although McConville was referring an earlier version 
of Hong Kong’s Prosecution Code, the current 2013 version contains similar deficiencies. The 
victims and families in such cases are still left without a proper forum to adduce sufficient 
evidence to bring a private prosecution and are often left without proper explanations and 
information regarding the decision not to prosecute. Hong Kong’s position is the same as New 
Zealand, both being behind the United Kingdom. 
 
Hong Kong’s Prosecution Code does not expressly require that a person who wishes to institute 
must be a victim of crime.82 While victims of crime have certainly brought private prosecutions 
‘in the public interest’ the Prosecution Code does not specifically provide the right of private 
prosecution to victims. This may be contrasted by the position taken by Lord Mance in Gujra 
who explained the rationale behind empowering victims of crime to take private prosecutions.83  
                                                
78 Mujuzi, above n 75, at 259. 
79 Michael James McConville "Politicians and Prosecutorial Accountability in Hong Kong" (2007) 36 Common 
Law World Review 355 at 360. 
80 See Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Prosecution Code 2013, paragraph 23. 
81 McConville, above n 79, at 361. 
82 Paragraph 7.1 of the Code provides that “[u]nder the common law a person has the right to commence a criminal 
prosecution in the public interest.” 
83 R (on the application of Gujra) v Crown Prosecution Service, above n 49, at [116] per Lord Mance dissenting: 
“Private prosecutions is, and I think always has been, a safeguard against the feelings of injustice that can arise 
when, in the eyes of the public, public authorities do not pursue criminal investigations and proceedings in a 
manner which leads to culprits being brought before a criminal court. The impunity which offenders appear to 
enjoy can be socially detrimental. That is…particularly so in those cases where a victim actually knows that the 
offence has been committed but finds that a [public] prosecutor does not think on a balance of likelihood that his 
evidence, if given orally in court, will be accepted. The feeling of injustice will be particularly acute, if…the 
[public] prosecutor’s decision was a fine one, and the alleged victims or another prosecutor might equally 
reasonably have concluded that the case was one in which the evidential test was satisfied.”  
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One of the less restrictive features of instituting private prosecutions in Hong Kong as against 
other states however, is that the 2013 Prosecution Code provides that there is no prerequisite 
that the DPP should have declined to prosecute before instituting a private prosecution. In the 
United Kingdom, private prosecutions may only be instituted after the public prosecutor has 
declined to prosecute.  
 
Intervention by the Secretary for Justice may occur after a summons have been issued. This is 
because Article 63 of the BL vests the ultimate control of prosecutions in the Department of 
Justice84 in accordance with the Prosecution Code.85  
 
Hong Kong’s former DPP commented that: “The procedure is open to the intrusion of improper 
personal or other motives. It may be used to bring groundless, oppressive or frivolous 
prosecutions…There may be a duplication of proceedings. The prosecution may be contrary to 
the public interest, included in which is a consideration of the likelihood of conviction, and of 
the appropriateness of conviction.”86 Where the right of private prosecution has been abused 
and the Secretary of Justice has intervened, Berry Hsu has termed this exercise of power the 
‘prerogative power of nolle prosequi.’87 
 
In Ng Chi Keung v Secretary for Justice an application for judicial review of two decisions 
taken by the DPP was made.88 The first decision by the DPP was to intervene and assume 
                                                
84 Paragraph 1.1 of The Statement Prosecution Policy and Practice states: “The Department of Justice is 
responsible for the conduct of criminal proceedings in Hong Kong. In the discharge of that function the 
Department enjoys an independence which is constitutionally guaranteed. Article 63 of the Basic Law of Hong 
Kong stipulates that the Department ‘shall control criminal prosecutions, free from any interference’. That the 
notion of prosecutorial independence enjoys an entrenched status enables prosecutors to discharge their duties to 
the public within secure parameters. Prosecutors act independently without fear of political interference or 
improper or undue influence. At the same time, the Secretary for Justice is accountable for their decisions and 
actions.” 
85 At paragraph 7.3 “[t]he Secretary for Justice is entitled to intervene in a private prosecution and to assume its 
conduct, becoming a party to the proceedings at that time and displacing the original prosecutor. The Secretary 
for Justice may continue proceedings privately begun or may prevent them from continuing by declining to sign 
the charge sheet or indictment” see sections 74 and 75 of the District Court Ordinance, Cap. 336 and section 17 
of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap. 221. A decision on the future course of the prosecution will be made 
in accordance with the Prosecution Code before a decision is made whether or not to intervene. 
86 Ian Grenville Cross “Instituting Private Prosecutions” Hong Kong Lawyer (Hong Kong, March 2001). 
87 Berry Fong-Chung Hsu “Legal Facets of Hong Kong SAR Economic Development: Colonial Legacy and 
Constitutional Constraint” in Ming K. Chan and Alvin Y, So (eds) Crisis and Transformation in China’s Hong 
Kong (Hong Kong University press, Hong Kong, 2002) at 220-225. Section 15 Magistrates Ord 227 (HK) has the 
chapeau: “Secretary for Justice may withdraw case by entering nolle prosequi.” 
88 Ng Chi Keung v Secretary for Justice [2016] 2 HKLRD 1330 (CFI). 
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control of three private prosecutions initiated by the applicant.89 The second decision was that 
taken by the DPP to discontinue those private prosecutions on the basis that there was no 
reasonable prospect of conviction. The court held, dismissing the application on the basis that 
the view that there was insufficient evidence was unimpeachable.  
 
One important distinction between Hong Kong’s Prosecution Policy compared to that in the 
United Kingdom was highlighted in this case. Patrick Li J stated that “Under Pt. 11 of the 
policy, the right to bring a private prosecution is recognized and the power to intervene by the 
SJ is emphasized.”90 The Judge added “[a]ccording to code 11.6(c), the DPP would only apply 
the reasonable prospect test when considering taking over with a view to terminate the private 
prosecution…the DPP would leave them to the magistrates to ensure that there would be at 
least prima facie evidence before issuing summonses.”91  
 
It was noted by the respondents in Ng Chi Keung that “From 1996-2000, there were 30 
applications for private prosecutions allowed by the magistrates, about 65 summonses were 
issued. From 2001 to 7 September 2013, there were 21 applications for private prosecutions 
allowed by the magistrates. There were 24 applications refused or withdrawn. A total of 41 
summonses were issued.92 Throughout these years, the DPP took over and discontinued only 
two private prosecutions.” The statistics failed to reveal whether the bulk of “other private 
prosecutions” satisfied the prima facie evidence or reasonable prospect of conviction test.93 
The court made the comment that “One fact is clear- intervention by the DPP was extremely 
rare. There is no evidence that the DPP adopted the RPC across the board to restrict private 
prosecutions.”94  
 
Pursuing a private prosecution in order to challenge a prosecution decision not to prosecute in 
Hong Kong has been described as “inefficient, haphazard and ineffective.”95 While individual 
                                                
89 The applicant alleged that the interested parties had conspired to pervert the course of justice by making a false 
report to the Commercial Crime Bureau. 
90 Ng Chi Keung v Secretary for Justice, above n 88, at [81]. 
91 Ibid, at [82]. 
92 New Zealand does not carry statistics for private prosecutions on a national basis. The number of interventions 
by the Solicitor-General has not been stated. 
93 Ng Chi Keung v Secretary for Justice, above n 89, at [83]. 
94 Ibid, at [84]. 
95 McConville, above n 79, at 375. 
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citizens of Hong Kong retain the right to institute private prosecutions, “this rarely acts as a 
safeguard in practice because of the many obstacles that need to be overcome.”96 
 
9.4 Concluding Comments 
 
The experience from the three jurisdictions demonstrates that the ability to privately prosecute 
fulfils an important constitutional purpose by safeguarding against inertia and partiality of 
public authorities. However, all three jurisdictions have placed restrictions on the right. It is 
important to briefly consider the rationale behind these limitations. In any public prosecution, 
it is assumed that the prosecutor will carry out his or her role “moderately, albeit firmly. He 
must not strive unfairly to obtain a conviction; he must not press his case beyond the limits 
which the evidence permits; he must not invite the jury to convict on evidence which in his 
own judgment no longer sustains the charge laid in the indictment.”97 These propositions are 
axiomatic in the criminal law process of all three jurisdictions, however they do not apply to a 
private prosecutor. A private prosecutor will almost undoubtedly have a personal interest in the 
outcome of their case and uses the “criminal courts as an extension of a personal dispute.”98 
As a corollary of exercising the right to privately prosecute, the liberty of the accused is put at 
risk since prosecutions “can be conducted by people who are not, and may not understand the 
implications of being Ministers of Justice.”99  
 
The courts have grappled with the difficult task of “ensuring that the victim’s right to institute 
a private prosecution is not eroded, while the accused’s right not to be harassed in the name of 
private prosecutions is protected.”100 Overall, it is concluded that private prosecution is still a 
mostly ineffective alternative dispute mechanism. Numerous legal barriers must be 
surmounted. Essentially, “the type of case which presents the greatest difficulty is where a 
private prosecution has been brought because the CPS have decided not to prosecute. The 
private prosecution in such a case represents an attempt to overrule the decision of a Crown 
Prosecutor.”101 
 
                                                
96 McConville, above n 79, at 360. 
97 The Report of the Farquharson Committee “The Role of Prosecution Counsel” (1986). 
98 Richard Buxton “The private prosecutor as a minister of justice” (2009) 6 Crim LR 427-432. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Mujuzi, above n 75 at 259. 
101 Peter Hungerford-Welch “R (on the application of Gujra) v Crown Prosecution Service: prosecution - private 
prosecution - policy of Director of Public Prosecutions” (2013) 4 Crim LR 337-341. 
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Private prosecution is “not likely to be allowed to be used as a vehicle by those who merely 
have an axe to grind. It is, rather, used on the one hand to ensure the enforcement of laws which 
official bodies appear not to have the will or the resources to enforce. On the other hand, it has 
utility as a means of redress for victims where the authorities may be reluctant either to enforce 
the law or enforce it with adequate rigour.”102 There is a need then, to assess the ways in which 
the right to private prosecution could be strengthened, and the three jurisdictions considered 
have done so in various ways.  
 
Firstly, New Zealand’s approach to the institution of private prosecutions places minimal 
restriction on intending prosecutors by requiring only that the case against the defendant be not 
frivolous or unfounded to justify a trial. In comparison, Hong Kong requires a prima facie case 
or direct evidence against the defendant before institution is allowed. In the United Kingdom, 
victims are afforded greater rights to access to the reasons behind a public prosecutor’s 
decision-making where a decision not to prosecute has been made. This allows victims to 
experience a greater chance of success in private prosecutions and less chance of intervention, 
since evidentiary thresholds are more likely to be met. This right is unavailable in Hong Kong 
and New Zealand. As one academic cogently put, “there would seem to be little justification 
for a justice system which left so much in the hands of victims and their families who will often 
be without legal skills and financial resources.”103 Thirdly, one of the procedural aspects of 
private prosecution peculiar to Hong Kong is that there is no prerequisite that the DPP should 
have declined to prosecute before instituting a private prosecution.104 Vexatious claims, are 
most likely be filtered out before they can be initiated, and the courts may stay these cases for 
abuse of process. 
 
In all three jurisdictions, there is no requirement for the informant’s consent to be sought before 
the DPP takes over the private prosecution. In such cases the interests of justice overrides the 
views of any of the informant or victim. One academic has argued that requiring consent from 
the victim “ensures that a victim participates actively in a decision that will affect his private 
prosecution. The challenge, though, is that there is a danger that the victim may refuse to give 
                                                
102 L H Leigh “Private prosecutions and diversionary justice” (2007) 4 Crim LR 289-295. 
103 McConville, above n 79, at 362. 
104 It must be noted that one author in Hong Kong holds the view that private prosecutions can only be instituted 
after the DPP has declined to prosecute. See Stephen D Mau Hong Kong Legal Principles: Important Topics for 
Students and Professionals (2nd ed, Hong Kong University Press 2013) at 132. 
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his consent, although the DPP is of the view that there it is not in the interests of the public to 
continue with the private prosecution.”105  
 
When the state decides not to prosecute and further prevents a private prosecution, what access 
to justice do such victims have left? In her dissent, Lady Hale in Gujra emphasised the 
importance of protecting and defending the interests of those who are typically vulnerable to 
not being listened to by public prosecution authorities.106 This is a strong argument in favour 
of public prosecutors taking greater initiative to consult with victims. It is not persuasive 
however, to broaden the right to privately prosecute.107 Private prosecution is not an answer to 
the finding herein, that the current self-abnegation by the New Zealand judiciary of its full 
constitutional role to supervise prosecutorial decisions and process by judicial review, is 
indefensible. 
                                                
105 Mujuzi, above n 75 at 268. 
106 R (on the application of Gujra) v Crown Prosecution Service, above n 49, at [124] - [126], [130]. 






Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand dealt with illegality- an extremely rare circumstance.1 
Judicial checks and balances exist in the trial scenario by the role and authority of the trial 
judge. However, that scrutiny is simply unavailable where a decision not to prosecute is made. 
The only scrutiny is under judicial review, which has been uniformly unsuccessful, save for 
the result in Osborne, which did not disturb the long-standing very narrow scope for such 
review espoused in Polynesian Spa. There is wide scope for a decision not to prosecute to be 
abused. The Supreme Court’s decision is significant for affirming jurisdiction to judicially 
review prosecution decision-making, albeit confining its decision to only the head of illegality. 
It left undecided the wider justiciability issues. From a comparative law viewpoint as noted in 
Chapter 4, that avoidance sets New Zealand’s law on judicial review of prosecutorial discretion 
back from almost all of the selected comparators. As Chapters 6-7 illustrated, the current 
attenuated decisional law is too restrictive, and does not fulfil the rule of law imperative nor 
the wider expectations of society. Chapter 8 offered a conceptual lens through which could be 
seen the need for appropriate boundaries to be established in the exercise of discretionary 
power. The structural and practical limitations impinging on private prosecution, as discussed 
in Chapter 9, reinforce the need for a recontouring of the current law on judicial review of 
prosecutorial decision-making. 
 
To curb those juridicial risks exposed by the arguments in this thesis, the Supreme Court should 
take the earliest opportunity to bring judicial review of prosecutorial discretion into alignment 
with the modern developments in other common law jurisdictions. New Zealand is an 
uncomfortable outlier. Continuation of the current reluctant approach only serves to weaken 
the general bulwark of administrative law and therefore public accountability under the law. 
While the courts in New Zealand have zealously striven to protect and uphold the rule of law 
in this area, their self-imposed restrictions create deleterious conditions, engendering in 
prosecutors a belief of invulnerability from focused judicial scrutiny in decisions not to 
                                                
1 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand [2017] NZSC 175, [2018] 1 NZLR 447, [2017] 15 NZELR 365 at [1]; 
Polynesian Spa Ltd, [2005] NZAR 408 (HC) at [64]. 
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prosecute. That apparent untouchability, corroborated statistically, is an Alsatia that public law 
cannot countenance. 
 
Legislative reform is overdue to protect victims’ rights and ensure that the engagement of those 
rights within the criminal justice system is accessible, transparent and robust. These 
fundamental qualities need to be implemented to ensure that key players in the prosecution 
system are seen to be accountable for their actions. If these changes in the law will enhance the 
protection of the fundamental rights of individuals and affirm the rule of law in action, then 
they must be accomplished. 
 
The following recommendations intend to provide guidance for developments post-Osborne.2 
 
  
10.1 Recommendations  
 
The recommendations resulting from the considered issues are divided into five sections. The 
first, recommends a recontouring of judicial review to potentiate access to supervisory access 
for victims, without compromising the tenets of the separation of powers. The second, 
recommends ways in which the prosecutorial decision-making process may be realigned to 
promote the lawful exercise of prosecutorial powers. The third section provides 
recommendations to enhance victims’ rights in the prosecution process. The fourth provides 
recommendations in relation to private prosecutions and the approach to relief. The final 
section addresses issues specific to the Supreme Court’s decision in Osborne and makes 
recommendations in light of that watershed development.3  
 
10.2 Widening the Scope for Review in New Zealand  
 
Some of the public law values that underlie judicial review are the rule of law, the safeguarding 
of individual rights, accountability, consistency and certainty in the administration of 
legislation.4 This thesis demonstrates the current status of judicial review ability of 
prosecutorial decisions not to prosecute in New Zealand is so austere that these values are 
                                                
2 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (SC), above n 1. 
3 Ibid. 
4 See Matthew Smith New Zealand Judicial Review Handbook (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters New Zealand Ltd, 
Wellington, 2016) at [2.0]. 
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failing to be protected. The President of the United Kingdom Supreme Court, Lord Neuberger, 
observed in a public lecture, “the courts have no more important function than protecting 
citizens from the abuses and excesses of the executive.”5 But the current judicial review regime 
of prosecution decisions in New Zealand fails to administer justice according to that function. 
Prosecutorial action is essentially insulated from judicial scrutiny, thus weakening the rule of 
law.  
 
The issues covered in Chapter 6 highlighted the prevailing problems that prevent judicial 
review from being an effective remedy for claimants. The courts are extremely reluctant to 
review a discretionary decision not to prosecute by a Crown prosecutor, but a “prosecutor’s 
discretion to make a decision in the public interest carries with it the need to make that decision 
reviewable.”6 The available grounds to challenge such decisions in New Zealand have been 
wrongly held to be narrow in scope, and wrongly confined to breaches that can be made under 
the ‘illegality’ branch.  
 
In Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne, it was held that a “generally strict approach to judicial review 
of prosecutorial discretion is maintained,” and that review was only available for ‘exceptional 
circumstances.’7 The New Zealand jurisprudence to date is patchy and opaque. It requires a 
strict approach but does not condescend to identification of a precise test. We lack in New 
Zealand, endorsement of an articulated and principled basis identifying the intensity of 
supervisory intervention. Polynesian Spa is only a first instance decision and although it has 
been considered by the Court of Appeal in a number of cases, there is no definitive approval 
of its strict test.8   
 
In reviewing polycentric decision-making,9 of which prosecutorial discretions is a prime 
example, the Polynesian Spa court could have created the same level of restraint by adopting 
                                                
5 Lord Neuberger, President of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom “Justice in an Age of Austerity” (Justice 
Tom Sargent Memorial Lecture 2013, 15 October 2013). 
6 Ian Grenville Cross “Focus on Discretion to Prosecute: The DPP and Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion” 
(1998) 28 Hong Kong LJ 400. 
7Polynesian Spa Ltd, above n 1, at [66]. 
8 See Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand [2017] NZCA 11, [2017] 2 NZLR 513; Wright v Bhosale [2016] NZCA 
593, [2017] NZAR 203; Burgess v Field [2007] NZCA 547, [2008] 1 NZLR 733. 
9 See Matalulu v Director of Public Prosecutions (Fiji) [2004] NZAR 193 (SC Fiji) at 735-736; “The polycentric 
character of official decision-making in such matters including policy and public interest considerations which 
are not susceptible of judicial review because it is within neither the constitutional function nor the practical 
competence of the courts to assess their merits.” However, in New Zealand, it is now accepted that prosecution 
decisions are susceptible to review. See Joseph, above n 9, at [22.5.5] (Constitutional and institutional limits to 
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a textured intensity of review, instead of narrowing the grounds for judicial review. The 
variegated intensity of review would have provided the optimum principled solution and not 
the virtual exemption approach imposed by requiring ‘exceptional circumstances.’ The only 
basis of intensity of review of prosecutorial discretion in Polynesian Spa was to use the 
contextual quasi-standard of ‘exceptional circumstances.’ On this basis, it is unsurprising that 
the Polynesian Spa court reacted against liberalisation of grounds of review, as it was a simpler 
solution to narrow the grounds of judicial review as a means of limiting intensity (at the High 
Court level anyway)10 than to modulate a variegated basis of intensities of review, with little 
to no guidance from the superior courts. The ‘exceptional circumstances’ approach continues 
to be the quasi-standard adopted by New Zealand courts for judicial review of prosecution 
decisions. This quasi-standard paired with the narrow ground confined to ‘illegality,’ 
diminishes the rule of law that judicial review is meant to instantiate.  
 
The New Zealand position is the antithesis of the United Kingdom position, where judicial 
review of prosecution decisions in ‘exceptional circumstances’ is available under all three 
branches of the broader grounds of review. The English courts determine the intensity of 
review using variegated forms of intensity and structured forms of deference.11 O’Higgins 
commented on the current ‘exceptional circumstances’ approach in the United Kingdom stating 
that “it may be fairly said that, while ‘exceptional circumstances’ have to be found before a 
prosecution decision can be challenged, the category of cases in which a review can be brought 
in the UK and Ireland is not closed.”12  
 
10.2.1 Recontouring the Grounds for Review 
 
                                                
judicial review). See also Piers Von Berg Criminal Judicial Review A Practitioner’s Guide to Judicial Review in 
the Criminal Justice System and Related Areas (Hart, Oxford, 2014) at 243. 
10 See GDS Taylor Judicial Review: A New Zealand Perspective (3rd ed, Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2014) at [3.15] 
for a commentary on limiting available grounds as a means of limiting intensity. 
11 See Knight, “Modulating the Depth of Scrutiny in Judicial Review: Scope, Grounds, Intensity, Context” [2016] 
New Zealand law Review 63 at 79. See R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Bugdaycay 
[1987] AC 514 at 531 (HL); R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith [1996] QB 517 (CA); R v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, ex part Brind [1991] 1 AC 696; R v Lord Saville of Newdigate, ex parte A [2001] EW 
Civ 2048, [2001] WLR 2855; R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex parte Begbie [2000] 1 
WLR 1115 at 1130; R (Mahmood v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] EWCA Civ 315, [2001] 
1 WLR 840 at 849; A (Asif Javed) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] EWCA Civ 789, [2002] 
QB 129 at [49]; Sheffield City Council v Smart [2002] EWCA Civ 4 at [42]; Kennedy v Charity Commission 
[2014] UKSC 20, [2014] 2 WLR 808. See generally Tom Hickman Public Law After the Human Rights Act (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2010) at 18 and 105. 
12 Micheal O’Higgins “Reviewing Prosecution Decisions” (paper presented to 9th Annual National Prosecutors’ 
Conference, Dublin Castle Conference Centre, May 2008) at 34. 
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By the generality of judicial review, executive acts can be challenged at common law on the 
grounds of illegality, irrationality or procedural fairness, although the grounds of review are 
not closed.13 As a result of the Polynesian Spa decision, prosecution decisions in New Zealand 
are only judicially reviewable to the extent that they were made in bad faith, for a collateral 
purpose or made in accordance with an unlawful policy. The High Court decision confined 
judicial review only to matters that fall within the ‘illegality’ branch of review as opposed to 
allowing the other orthodox common law grounds of unreasonableness and unfairness to 
apply.14  
 
Judicial review must be recontoured by discarding Polynesian Spa so that all the traditional 
grounds of review at common law of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety 
become available for judicial review of prosecution decisions. It must be empahsised that these 
branches of review are not hermetically sealed nor mutually exclusive.15 The most logical and 
practical way of implementing this reform is to adopt the current model of judicial review in 
England and Wales. In England and Wales, it has been the mantra of judicial review that 
administrative acts of the prosecutor are challengeable by the three branches of review, namely 
for illegality, irrationality and procedural unfairness. That approach is partly seen in R v 
Director of Public Prosecutions Ex parte Chaudhary, which held:16 
 
[Judicial review can occur] if and only if it is demonstrated to us that the Director of Public 
Prosecution acting through the Crown Prosecution Serviced arrived at the decision not to 
prosecute: 
1) Because of some unlawful policy… 
2) Because the Director of Public Prosecutions failed to act in accordance with his or 
her own settled policy as set out in the Code; or  
3) Because the decision was perverse. It was a decision at which no reasonable 
prosecutor could have arrived. 
 
Chaudhary promotes the interests of aggrieved victims who have been denied a trial, by a 
decision not to prosecute. The grounds of review that are available in England and Wales have 
the effect of substantially broadening reviewability. The real question in judicial review is: 
                                                
13 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [CCSU] [1985] AC 374, [1984] 3 WLR 1174, 
[1984] 3 All ER 935 (HL). 
14 Ibid, at 410-411. Lord Diplock classified the grounds for judicial review into three categories: illegality, 
irrationality and procedural impropriety. 
15 Michael Fordham Judicial Review Handbook (6th ed, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2012) at 487. 
16 R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Chaudhary [1995] 1 Cr App 136. The analysis here is still too 
limited. The full exposition of the grounds for reviewability of prosecutorial decisions is correctly found in DL v 
[Area] Standards Committee LRCO 164/2016, 26 October 2016. 
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‘Has something in public law terms gone wrong?’17 The same legal error can fall within one 
or more of the grounds available, having a different threshold.  
 
The expansive reform of the grounds of judicial review in New Zealand will be 
counterbalanced by other principles which can be used to keep challenges within their proper 
limits, such as adopting an appropriate standard of review. This would mean that all the 
traditional grounds of review are available, but will be restricted by the intensity with which 
they are applied depending on the facts of each individual case. This recontouring of the 
grounds of review will not only provide aggrieved victims with greater opportunities to have 
their cases heard, but when paired with an appropriate standard of intensity of review, will 
allow the courts to fulfil their oversight function without overstepping the boundaries occupied 
by the executive. This reform brings a categorical approach for the courts to find the balance 
between vigilance and restraint, and allow the focus of judicial review to be on matters that are 
deserving of true judicial concern.  
 
10.2.2 Variable Intensities of Judicial Review  
 
The Supreme Court in New Zealand has not yet clearly embraced the language of variable 
intensities of review. That would promote consistency and certainty in judicial review of 
prosecution decisions. While there is suggestion that the variation of intensities of review may 
be “deeply embedded in the jurisprudence and… numerous judicial methodologies… covertly 
recognise this modulation process,”18 the use of terminologies reflecting intensities help 
“exhibit the transparent mediation of the balance between vigilance and restraint.”19 A clear 
modulating process of variable intensities will also ensure that the standard of review applied 
to a particular decision is appropriate, since review is based on a sliding scale. 
 
However, the question of ‘what standard of review should be in place?’ is not a simple one. 
Any solution would need to balance the importance of accountability with the principles of 
independence of prosecutors in making their decisions, as well as the separation of powers 
between prosecutors and judges. The difficulty is that “[c]reating a framework for judicial 
oversight of Crown discretion appears inconsistent with the simultaneous affirmation of 
                                                
17 Pora v Attorney General [2017] NZHC 2081, [2017] 3 NZLR 683 at [138] per Ellis J 
18 Knight, above n 11, at 64. 
19 Ibid, at 79. 
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prosecutorial independence from political and judicial interference as a constitutional principle. 
Interestingly though, they are each enlisted for the common purpose of eliciting adherence to 
the Crown’s traditional virtues of impartiality and fairness. The important distinction between 
them resides in the particular corruption each is focused on addressing.”20 Prosecutorial 
independence safeguards against the potential for external corruption, “[i]t seeks to maintain 
the purity of an institution’s commitment to its mandate, shielding it from outside influence. 
This is best achieved through decision-making autonomy and immunity from reprisal from 
outside sources.”21  
 
On the other hand, judicial oversight ensures that there is accountability where there is internal 
corruption. “Accountability seeks to ensure an institution is truly adhering to its public 
commitments and is not misusing its authority or concealing an ulterior agenda. It is best 
achieved through careful oversight of the institution’s use of discretion by an outside source.”22  
The challenge in adopting an appropriate standard of judicial review is finding a balance 
between the respective goals of each branch of government. Dr Knight describes the court’s 
role in this regard as finding the balance between vigilance and restraint.23 
 
In assessing what standard of review should be employed in reviewing administrative 
decisions, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the reviewing court must go through a 
“pragmatic and functional analysis” consisting of four steps.24 The court must consider who 
the original decision-maker was and who the body reviewing the decision will be, whether 
there is a privative clause or right of appeal, the general purpose of the legislation authorizing 
the decision as well as the nature of the decision.25 The weighing of these factors using a 
pragmatic and functional approach “inquires into legislative intent, but does so against the 
backdrop of the courts’ constitutional duty to protect the rule of law.”26 The Supreme Court of 
Canada also indicated that “the standard of review is a question of law, and agreement between 
                                                
20 Benjamin Snow “Reviewing Crown Discretion: The Need for a Unified, Principled Approach that Mandates 
Transparency” (2013) 98(6) Criminal Report 143. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Knight, above n 11, at 64. 
24 Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1998] 1 SCR 982 at [28] per Bastarache J. 
25 Ibid, at [26] per Bastarache J. See also Keddy v New Brunswick (Workplace Health, Safety & Compensation 
Commission) 2002 NBCA 24, 42 Admin LR (3d) 161 (NBCA) at [28] - [29]; Marie Manikis “Expanding 
participation: victims as agents of accountability in the criminal justice process” (2017) 1 PL 63-80. 
26 Dr Q v College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia [2003] 1 SCR 226, 2003 SCC 19 at [21]. 
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the parties cannot be determinative of the matter.”27 Therefore, it is the duty of the court to 
decide the appropriate level of deference it should grant in reviewing decisions based on its 
evaluation of the four factors. Dr Knight described the modulation of the depth of scrutiny in 
very practical terms: “Intensity is depicted in terms of a complete continuum of methods.”  
 
In New Zealand, intensity of review has mostly been developed as formulations of the 
reasonableness ground.28 Where an impugned decision is found to be unreasonable, under the 
modulating process of intensity of review, the courts are likely to assess the decision against a 
sliding scale of ‘reasonableness’.29 The Canadian Supreme Court in Dunsmuir defined the 
intermediate reasonableness standard as follows: “In judicial review, reasonableness is 
concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the 
decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range 
of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.”30 The 
Court in Ryan made the following analysis:31 “Applying the standard of reasonableness gives 
effect to the legislative intention that a specialized body will have the primary responsibility of 
deciding the issue according to its own process and for its own reasons. The standard of 
                                                
27 Monsanto Canada Inc. v Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services) 2004 SCC 54 at [6] per Deschamps J. 
28 See Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law (4th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2014) at [24.4]. See 
Kaur v Minister of Immigration [2018] NZHC 1049 at [20] – [27] where the applicants argued that an immigration 
officer’s decisions (under s61 of the Immigration Act 2009) should be reviewed against a lower threshold for 
review than Wednesbury unreasonableness. Jagose J at [24] held that “[a]t the policy level, s61 remains a 
functional backstop for the executive branch to consider, in its absolute discretion, policy factors emerging in the 
final analysis,” and that he was bound by appellate authority that such decisions would be reviewed against the 
Wednesbury standard. See also Hu v Immigration and Protection Tribunal [2017] NZHC 41, [2017] NZAR [508] 
at [28] – [29] where Palmer J postulated an alternative to the circular Wednesbury formulation namely: where a 
decision is so unsupportable or untenable that proper application of the law requires a different answer, it is 
unlawful because it is unreasonable. (Applying Bryson v Three Foot Six Ltd [2005] NZSC 24, [2005] 3 NZLR 
721.) 
29 See in particular Wolf v Minister of Immigration [2004] NZAR 414 (HC) at [43]. See Hu v Immigration and 
Protection Tribunal [2017] NZHC 41, [2017] NZAR 508 at [2]; discussed in MB Rodriguez Ferre “Redefining 
reasonableness” [2017] NZLJ 67; The approach of Palmer J is commended: “Where a decision is so insupportable 
or untenable that proper application of the law requires a different answer, it is unlawful because it is unreasonable. 
That may involve the adequacy of the evidential foundation of a decision or the chain of logical reasoning in the 
application of the law to the facts.” 
30 Dunsmuir v New Brunswick 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR at [44] and [47]; This standard was created as an 
intermediate standard in response to “the perceived all-or-nothing approach to deference, and in order to create a 
more finely calibrated system of judicial review.” See also L Sossin and C M Flood “The Contextual Turn: 
Iacobucci’s Legacy and the Standard of Review in Administrative Law” (2007) 57 UTLJ 581.  
31 Law Society (New Brunswick) v Ryan [2003] 1 SCR 247 at [50] per Iacobucci J. See also Manikis, above n 25, 
at 63-80; “Applying the standard of reasonableness gives effect to the legislative effect. The ‘reasonableness’ 
standard ensures that “the independence and expertise of prosecutors is not trivialised and replaced by penal 
populism and unfounded complaints arising solely from victim and public dissatisfaction with the prosecutorial 
decision. To protect prosecutorial independence, it would be imperative, in the event of a difficult and 
controversial decision, to maintain prosecutorial decisions and thus adopt a more rigid standard than one of 
correctness.” See also Dean R Knight “A Murky Methodology: Standards of Review in Administrative Law” 
(2006) 6 NZJPIL at 150 - 158. 
	 183 
reasonableness does not imply that a decision maker is merely afforded a “margin of error” 
around what the court believes is the correct result.” 
 
Despite the flexibility shown by the court in R (on the application of F) v Director of Public 
Prosecutions32 where the ‘correctness’ standard of review was applied, the courts of England 
and Wales have generally adopted a deferential approach to judicial review by using the 
standard of ‘reasonableness’ of both unreasonable decisions to and not to prosecute.33 The level 
of deference to the original decision should depend on the nature in dispute. If the issue is a 
matter of fact, such as re-evaluating existing evidence or re-identifying public interests in the 
case, the court should not consider whether the institution of the prosecution could be more 
reasonable, but whether the non-prosecution falls into the acceptable range of reasonableness. 
If the issue is about legal considerations, such as the interpretation of the applicable law or 
legality of a policy concerning public interests, the court can make a conclusion based on its 
own judgment and analysis without deferring to the original decision. These should not be a 
one-size-fits-all approach to the reviewability of prosecutorial discretions. It will depend on 
the nature of the challenge. 
 
Reviewability based on the contextual ‘exceptional circumstances’ approach has on face-value, 
a high threshold, and is uncertain. It was concluded in Chapter VI that while the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ approach may operate as a standard of review, it nevertheless is a muddled and 
subtle variation of a standard that has crept into jurisprudence. The ‘exceptional circumstances’ 
approach is not only of austere scope but also ambiguous in application. What is required in 
New Zealand is a transparent and distinct modulating process of intensity of review, that 
facilitates consistency and certainty across all judicial review cases, involving that of 
prosecutorial discretion.  
 
It has been suggested by Dr Manikis that the standard of review for judicial review cases of 
prosecutorial decisions in England and Wales should change depending on the nature of the 
decision i.e. whether it is substantive or procedural.34 Dr Manikis explained that “due to the 
                                                
32 R (on the application of F) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2013] EWHC 945 (Admin); (an anomalous 
decision.) 
33 But note Knight, above n 11, at 78-79 “In English-style judicial review, this judicial method [of scrutiny of 
review] tends to be seen in particular grounds or doctrines for substantive review, rather than providing grand 
schematic.” The explicit standard of ‘reasonableness’ based on cases that have considered judicial review 
prosecutorial discretion best resembles the depth of scrutiny applied in England and Wales.  
34 Manikis, above n 25, at 63-80. 
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specific nature of substantive prosecutorial decisions, a deferential standard such as 
reasonableness would be required if the body reviewing the decision is not within the 
prosecutorial office” and when the decision made by prosecutors “is procedural in nature, 
regardless of the reviewer, a lower standard of correctness would be considered appropriate 
since these decisions are more about respecting a fair process and the rule of law than weighing 
numerous factors. In this respect, the independence and separation of powers is less of a 
concern, since it does not affect the core of the prosecutor’s decision.”35 
 
While the above framework aims to balance accountability with prosecutorial independence 
and the separation of powers between judges and prosecutors, with respect, the 
substantive/procedural dichotomy is a most tenuous basis for creating split standards of 
applicable deference. So often procedural and substantive issues are inter-dependent, if not 
actually fused. That proposal may be paralleled with the approach taken in Krieger v Law 
Society (Alberta), where the Supreme Court of Canada distinguished between “core” and “non-
core” discretions, in order to preserve traditional areas of Crown discretion.36 Prosecution 
powers categorized as “core” included the decision whether to prosecute or not. The Court held 
that the threshold for review of these cases would be tested against the high ‘flagrant 
impropriety’ standard.37  The category of “non-core” powers included decisions that related to 
prosecution “tactics or conduct before the court.”38 The Court in Krieger did not place any 
constraints on cases involving “non-core” discretions for judicial review. Essentially, the 
Krieger court sought to restrict judicial review depending on the nature of prosecutorial 
decisions by adopting two applicable standards of review.  
 
The problem with this approach however, is that it creates unnecessary complication for the 
judicial review process. In criminal law, errors of procedure can be fatal to the safety of the 
substantive process or verdict. Prosecution decisions by their very nature are often both 
substantive and procedural in nature. The courts would in many cases, need to force certain 
decisions to fit into one of the categories and exercises of labelling would be created. Form 
would triumph over substance. This would be a reversion to the discredited over-refined ultra 
vires approach. It would also create rigid and logically inconsistent outcomes. Furthermore, 
                                                
35 Manikis, above n 25, at 63-80. 
36 Krieger v Law Society of Alberta 2002 SCC 65, [2002] 3 SCR 372, 4 CR (6th) 255 (SCC) at [47].  
37 Ibid, at [49]. 
38 Ibid, at [47]. 
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the strained efforts of the courts may be questioned on appeal if it could be established that the 
court made an error in categorising the nature of the decision and therefore applied the wrong 
standard of review. Many prosecution decisions cannot be isolated into the 
substantive/procedural dichotomy but overlap and are inseparable in nature.  
 
The viability of the two-levels of deference crafted in the Krieger decision was heavily 
criticized,39 and one author explained that the approach “diverts the law’s focus from the true 
purpose of the analysis-achieving a measure of judicial oversight that respects independence 
while ensuring accountability.”40 Cases since Krieger illustrate how the strained dichotomy 
categorization process has caused judicial disparity and difficulties for the courts. For example, 
Justice Hill in the Québec Court of Appeal in Camiré decided that the discretion to repudiate a 
plea agreement was not a “core” power.41 The Supreme Court of Canada however, rejected this 
view and held that the power “fell squarely within the core elements of prosecutorial 
discretion”42 The R v Nixon court conflated the two standards of review by taking a less 
deferential approach to “core” powers compared to earlier cases that had categorised powers 
as “non-core.” 43 Categorisation is as the Canadian approach amply demonstrates, hazardous 
and not necessarily intuitive. 
 
What should be adopted instead, is a “unified and principled” approach using variable 
intensities of review that allows for effective judicial oversight, without compromising the 
independence of the prosecutor.44 The standard of ‘reasonableness’ for example operates on a 
sliding scale so that even where decisions are of a substantive or procedural nature, the courts 
have the ability to adjust levels of deference within the ‘reasonableness’ standard.45 As Lord 
                                                
39 See Michael Code “The Attorney General in the 21st Century: A Tribute to Ian Scott: Judicial Review of 
Prosecutorial Decisions: A Short History of Costs and Benefits, in Repsonse to Justice Rosenberg” (2009) 34 
Queen’s LJ 863 at [48] - [51]. 
40 Snow, above n 20. 
41 Camiré c. R, 2010 QCCA 615 (Qué CA) at [31] - [34]. 
42 R v Nixon 2011 SCC 34, [2001] 2 SCR 566, 85 CR (6th) 1 (SCC) at [30]. 
43 See Ibid. See also Snow, above n 20. 
44 Snow, above n 20. 
45 See Wolf v Minister of Immigration, above n 29, where Wild J endorsed the intermediate standard of 
reasonableness (or unreasonableness) based on a sliding scale at [47]; “Whether a reviewing Court considers a 
decision reasonable and therefore lawful, or unreasonable and therefore unlawful and invalid, depends on the 
nature of the decision: upon who made it; by what process; what the decision involves (ie its subject matter and 
the level of policy content in it) and the importance of the decision to those affected by it, in terms of its potential 
impact upon, or consequences for, them.” John M Evans “Standards of Review in Administrative Law” (2013) 
26 Can J Admin L & Prac 67; “In judicial review proceedings, whether a decision is reasonable depends on the 
statutory scope of the decision-maker’s range of choice. The narrower the range, the easier it will be to prove that 
the decision fell outside the range of possible decisions; conversely, the broader the range of choice, the more 
difficult it will be to prove unreasonableness.” 
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Steyn emphasised in the oft repeated dictum, “In law context is everything.”46 The curial 
technique of variable intensities of review ensures that the contextual character of the decision 
is the focus of judicial review rather than its formal nature. It allows for an appropriate amount 
of transparency of the prosecutor’s decision, while maintaining a high level of recognition 
towards prosecutorial independence. Code commented that “a deferential standard of review 
in relation to prosecutorial decisions is justified by the need to prevent constant second-
guessing of the many small choice or “judgment calls” that the Crown must make during the 
conduct of a case.”47 If the New Zealand Supreme Court adopts the language of variable 
intensities of review, greater transparency will be achieved,  public confidence in the 
administration of justice will be advanced, prosecutorial independence will be preserved and 
judicial review will be able to tenaciously fulfil its fundamental rule of law function. 
 
10.2.3 Concluding Comments 
 
The effect of this reform is that it creates a system where judicial review is available for genuine 
claims, which provides aggrieved victims with access to judicial review when it is needed. It 
is the crucial role of the courts to delineate the boundaries of judicial review. With these 
recommendations for reform, the courts can expand the scope of judicial review of 
prosecutorial decisions not to prosecute but also afford an appropriate amount of deference to 
the prosecutor. In addition, victim’s interests will be subject to greater consideration, the rule 
of law is better protected and judicial review in the context of prosecutorial discretion fulfills 
its constitutional role. Finally, the widening of reviewability may also attract deserving victims 
to pursue their cases and achieve justice where it is warranted. 
 
10.3 Reforms to Help Reduce Miscarriages of Justice 
 
One of the findings of this thesis is the danger of wide prosecutorial discretion paired with a 
judicial reluctance to review prosecution decisions. What must be emphasised however, is that 
broad prosecutorial discretion is not inherently dangerous, it only becomes troubling when use 
of discretion becomes “idiosyncratic, unaccountable or opaque.”48 Broad discretion is in fact 
                                                
46 R (on the application of Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26, [2001] 1 AC 
532, [2001] 2 WLR 1622, [2001] 3 All ER 433 at [28] per Lord Steyn. 
47 Code, above n 39. 
48 Stephanos Bibas “The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion” (2010) 19 Temple Political and Civil Rights Law 
Review 369 at 372. 
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essential in doing justice: “Justice not only requires rules but also fine-grained moral 
evaluations and distinctions.”49 
 
In R v Beare, Justice La Forest commented that “discretion is an essential feature of the criminal 
justice system. A system that attempted to eliminate discretion would be unworkably complex 
and rigid.”50 Along similar lines, Bibas argued that “discretion per se is neither bad nor 
antithetical to the rule of law. We often equate the rule of law with rigid rules, emphasising the 
need to treat like cases alike. But the flip side of rigid rules is discretion in applying them where 
they do not quite fit. The flip side of treating like cases alike is treating unlike cases unlike. By 
their nature, rules cannot capture every subtlety, which is why various actors need discretion 
to tailor their application of the law.”51 He continued to note that: “Discretion is far from 
lawless or arbitrary. When used judiciously, it can deliver consistent and tailored results. What 
we need to watch out for in practice then, are the forces that push prosecutorial discretion in 
the wrong direction, away from the public’s sense of justice.”52 The problem with prosecutorial 
discretion is “not that it places discretionary power in the hands of individuals. What is 
troubling is that it is very often ad hoc, hidden and insulated from public scrutiny and criticism. 
Many discretionary decisions require no reasoned justification.”53 The existing risk is that 
prosecution decisions may be inconsistent or subconsciously biased.  
 
There are two approaches that may be taken to reduce miscarriages of justice in the prosecution 
decision-making process and therefore reduce the quantum of victims seeking judicial 
review.54 One way is to narrow the prosecutor’s discretion by codifying limitations on their 
power. An example of this would be to codify the Prosecutorial Guidelines. Sze Ping Fat’s 
comment on the future of Hong Kong’s Prosecution Guidelines accords with this first 
approach. He argued that:55 
 
If the prosecution policy is to serve a useful purpose in the administration of justice, it is only 
fair and reasonable that the relevant principles and guidelines be refined and handed down as a 
statutory code (with sanctions for non-compliance). This will not only ensure that a consistent 
and judicious approach is always applied by both the police and the DoJ in reaching their 
                                                
49 Bibas, above n 48, at 370. 
50 R v Beare [1988] 2 SCR 387 at 410. 
51 Bibas, above n 48, at 370. 
52 Ibid, at 374. 
53 Ibid, at 373. 
54 The term “miscarriage of justice” is nowhere defined in New Zealand legislation. 
55 Sze Ping Fat “Prosecution Policies: Hong Kong” (2017) 181 JPN 310. 
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decisions but also assist the court with objectively ascertainable standards against any misuse 
or abuse of the prosecutorial power accorded by art.63 of the Basic Law. 
 
The problem with restricting prosecutorial discretion however, is that it limits the prosecutor’s 
“capacity to provide for individual or unanticipated circumstances. This kind of approach also 
minimises the ambit for grounds such as […] unreasonableness. The more prescriptive […] 
laws are, the more scope there tends to be to argue about their correct meaning.”56 Douglass 
explained that:57 
 
It is not unwarranted for society to demand that ethical standards be applied to prosecutors. The 
public has invested prosecutors with almost total discretion in the performance of their duties. 
Although there has been considerable discussion in recent years to limit prosecutorial 
discretion, society, the legislatures and the courts generally recognize that an attempt to provide 
guidelines, standards or limitations on prosecutorial discretion is a difficult, if not impossible 
task. Legislatures and courts have consistently backed away from attempts to codify any 
limitation on the prosecutor’s discretion, recognising that the most effective limitation on the 
exercise of discretion is a professionally responsible prosecutor. 
 
In a report to the Attorney-General, the Australian Administrative Review Council similarly 
contended that:58  
 
 Although it is clear that Parliament has the power to exclude or define the procedural 
requirements imposed on decision makers, it is difficult for any code to cover all circumstances 
that might be thrown up. For example, it is one thing to define the ambit of a decision maker’s 
duty to disclose material. It is more difficult to deal exhaustively with circumstances in which 
a decision maker has misled a person affected by a decision and deprived them of an 
opportunity to present a case fairly. It is equally difficult to deal with a situation in which the 
decision maker proposes to make adverse findings about a person without giving them an 
opportunity to respond. Although the effect of such a provision may be to reduce judicial 
review, it is doubtful, in practice, that review could be eliminated entirely. 
 
The recommendations in this section do not subscribe to the restrictive approach, but instead 
introduce educative tools and mechanisms of prosecutorial accountability and that may be 
included into the existing prosecuting framework. In order to reduce the potential for judicial 
intervention, the practical reforms are based on the guiding principles of respect for autonomy, 
the need for high quality decision-making and the importance of making prosecution decisions 
more legitimate in the eyes of the public. 
 
                                                
56 Administrative Review Council (Australia) The Scope of Judicial Review (Report No 47, 2006) at 24. 
57 John Jay Douglass, Ethical Issues in Prosecution (Houston: U. of Houston Law Center, 1988) at 2. 
58 Administrative Review Council (Australia), above n 56. 
	 189 
10.3.1 Rule of Law Training 
 
Procedures must be set in place that guarantee the careful selection of prosecutors and which 
safeguard against their arbitrary dismissal, as a means of protecting prosecutorial 
independence.  
 
One academic contends that prosecutors should undergo rule of law training, where the nature 
and role of prosecutorial discretion is thoroughly addressed:59  
 
The strategy for effective education and training should be informed by three criteria: (i) holistic 
– it should involve the various stages of legal education and involve different perspectives; (ii) 
vertical – it should build and reinforce rule of law values at different points and in different 
contexts; (iii) reflective – it should ensure prosecutors understand that adherence to the rule of 
law is not achieved merely by following rules but by making the rights decisions. Just as the 
rule of law flourishes when it is part of a supportive ecosystem so too the education and training 
effort must be part of an ecosystem that reinforces the values at all stages from university 
education, through vocational and professional training and reflection throughout one’s career. 
 
If public prosecutors are fully trained and understand the implications of arbitrary decision-
making to the rule of law, the risk of inconsistent decisions is likely to be reduced, and 
prosecutors are more likely to be conscious of unequal treatment of offenders when exercising 
their powers.60 The Prosecution Guidelines together with rule of law training will provide a 
much stronger safeguard to ensuring that decisions have not been injected with the personal 
preferences of the prosecutor but are the product of careful decision-making by the evidential 
and public interest tests.  
 
10.3.2 Greater Prosecutorial Accountability 
 
Currently, victims of crime aggrieved by prosecutorial misconduct in New Zealand have no 
real way (let alone a dedicated process) of having their complaints investigated. Various 
jurisdictions overseas have incorporated mechanisms to promote prosecutorial accountability.  
 
                                                
59 Amirthalingam, Kumaralingam “Prosecutors and the Rule of Law- The Role of Legal Education and Training” 
(speech given to the IAP 18th Annual Conference, Moscow, 9 September 2013) at [44]. 
60 This type of rule of law training may be similar to the ‘continuing professional development’ requirement of all 
lawyers in New Zealand who provide regulated services. All lawyers must complete 10 hours of ‘CPD’ activities 




In the United Kingdom, the CPS established a quality assurance unit that operated within the 
CPS itself in 1995. In 2000, the unit became an independent statutory body, the Crown 
Prosecution Service Inspectorate (CPSI).61 The CPSI’s mission is to enhance the quality of 
justice by independently inspecting and assessing prosecutions handled by CPS. The CPSI 
serves to improve the CPS’s effectiveness and efficiency, in order to promote public confidence 
in the service. The CPSI annually reviews “a sample of case files from across all geographic 
regions where CPS’s operate, for the quality of prosecutorial decisions (e.g. ensuring that the 
Code for Crown Prosecutors is applied correctly), case preparation and progress, victims’ and 
witnesses’ experiences of the criminal justice system, and prosecutors’ adherence to custody 
time limits for detained accused persons.”62 The annual investigations enables the CPSI 
comprehensively review of the casework quality of the CPS. The CPSI places pressure on the 
CPS conducting follow-up inspections to see if recommendations from the review have been 
adopted. Furthermore, the CPS may feel pressure to address CPSI recommendations since the 
reports suggesting improvements to CPS operations are publicly available. 
 
Similarly, in Scotland, an Inspectorate of Prosecution (IPS) inspects the operations of the 
Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS), the authority responsible for 
prosecutions in Scotland. The IPS makes recommendations in relation to improvements in 
service delivery, which as a result makes the COPFS more accountable whilst enhancing public 
confidence.63  
 
In Victoria Australia, the accountability issue has been approached in a different way, through 
the Public Prosecutions Act 1994. The statute requires the DPP to consult with the Chief Crown 
Prosecutor and either counsel involved in the trial or the next most senior Crown Prosecutor 
regarding “special decisions” before the DPP may conclude his decision.64 Although the final 
decision belongs to the DPP, if his decision happens to fall into the minority then he is required 
to furnish the Attorney with details regarding the reasons for his decision which are tabled in 
Parliament.65 The tabling of the information is suspended however where it may prejudice the 
                                                
61 Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate Act 2000. 
62 Martin Schönteich Strengthening prosecutorial accountability in South Africa (Institute for Security Studies 
Paper 255, April 2014) at 7. In 2012/2013 CPSI inspectors examined over 2,800 case files as part of the CPSI’s 
Annual Casework Examination Programme. 
63 Scottish Government “Inspectorate of Prosecution in Scotland (IPS leaflet)” <www.scotland.gov.uk>. 
64 See s45C of the Public Prosecutions Act 1994. See also Geoffrey Flatman QC, Director of Public Prosecutions 
(Victoria), “Independence of the Prosecutor” (paper presented to Australian Institute of Criminology: Prosecuting 
Justice, Melbourne 18 and 19 April 1996.) 
65 Ibid. 
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proceedings. What this process does well is that it separates the prosecutorial decision making 
function from the administration of the office or resource which implement the decisions. 
 
In considering this accountability mechanism Geoffrey Flatman while he was DPP stated:66 “I 
think this division of function is appropriate in principle and effective in action. It puts the 
Director and Crown Prosecutors in the position of being able to make prosecution decisions 
without the distraction of concerns about the resource implications of those decisions and the 
many matters of administration which come up in a large and busy office. In doing so, they are 
ultimately accountable to the Attorney. At the same time, the Office of Public Prosecutions has 
a dual accountability: it is responsible to the Director as his or her solicitor and it is responsible 
to the Minister for the manner in which it carries out the business of the Director and handles 
the budget allocated to it.”67 
 
Japan has a prosecutorial accountability mechanism that specifically reviews prosecutorial 
decisions not to prosecute; the Japanese Prosecutorial Review Commission system (PRC). 
When the prosecutorial discretion not to prosecute is exercised for matters of a political nature, 
the PRC will consider the independence of such decision-making. The PRC begins the 
reviewing process in one of two ways. The first is where a victim or his/her representative 
applies for a commission hearing to investigate the application. The second is when the 
commission itself, via a majority vote, decides to carry out an investigation. Japan has at least 
one commission in every district court area, comprising of 11 members who are chosen at 
random from public voting lists for six month terms.68 After investigations, the PRC submits 
“one of three recommendations: non-prosecution is proper, non-prosecution is improper, or 
prosecution is proper.”69 The recommendations are of an advisory nature and do not bind the 
prosecutor. Since the conception of the PRC in 1949 till 1989, Japan’s PRCs undertook and 
disposed of an average of 1930 cases a year. “When viewed as a proportion of decisions not to 
prosecute, PRCs held hearing on an average of 34.5 suspects for every 10,000 (or 0.35 percent) 
not prosecuted.70 Over this 40-year period PRCS recommended prosecution in about 7 per cent 
                                                
66 Flatman, above n 64. 
67 Ibid. 
68 See Schönteich, above n 62, at 10; “Meetings are held quarterly or on special call of the chairperson of the 
commission, who is elected by its members. Politicians, elected officials, and those who perform vital political 
and criminal justice functions are disqualified from participating in PRCs. PRCs are assisted by secretaries who 
are appointed by the Supreme Court.” 
69 Ibid, at 11. 
70 M D West “Prosecution review commissions: Japan’s answer to the problem of prosecutorial discretion” 
Columbia Law Review 92 (1992) at 698. 
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of all cases heard. Of these, 20 percent resulted in prosecutors reversing their initial decision 
not to prosecute.”71  
 
New Zealand has no centralised prosecuting agency, therefore accountability mechanisms that 
base their operations on the existence of such agencies, namely prosecution service 
inspectorates and complaints assessors, are not roles that can be easily replicated in New 
Zealand’s criminal justice system. Furthermore, these roles do not act as a panacea for holding 
prosecution services to account an improving their performance. Inspectorates for example 
only create their reports annually, and from a sample of casework. While the role of complaints 
assessors is dependent on members of the public to make complaints in the first place.  
 
In contrast, the Japanese accountability mechanism of a prosecutorial review commission, casts 
a much wider net in scrutinising prosecutorial action, especially for decisions not to prosecute 
which are evidently much more susceptible of being left unchecked. The ability to register 
complaints also “ensures a level of victims’ rights; and the system encourages citizen 
participation in the democratic process.”72 However Japan has recently re-developed the power 
of PRCs, allowing them to overrule the prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute and compel a 
prosecution through a specially court-appointed prosecutor. This change was a dangerous one. 
It removes the prosecutor’s “final control over the charging decision, ‘replacing it with the 
unbridled discretion of lay persons whose focus may be unduly skewed by the notoriety of the 
event or potential accused.’ The risk is undermining individuals’ right not to be prosecuted 
arbitrarily and, when prosecuted, strictly according to the prosecution service’s written 
guidelines.”73  The transferability of such a mechanism to New Zealand is inappropriate, as it 
dangerously places specialised power in the hands of people who do not understand it, and fails 
to properly protect prosecutorial discretion. Judicious discretion can actually promote justice, 
and necessarily tailors application of the law.74   
 
                                                
71 West, above n 70, at 702. See also Schönteich, above n 62, at 11. 
72 Schönteich, above n 62, at 14. Since their inception in 1948, more than half a million Japanese citizens have 
participated in PRCs. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Bibas, above n 48, at 370. 
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One of the difficulties of creating a complaints system for prosecutorial misconduct is that 
Crown prosecutors act exclusively in the public interest.75 Consequently, it has been 
unconvincingly argued that no one should be able to file a complaint against them.76 On such 
reasoning, a claim to act in the public interest would always provide total immunity and 
simultaneously deny accountability regardless of its perversity. 
 
Stone’s proposal aims to bridge the gap by creating a reporting system headed by the Solicitor-
General, who has complete discretion to determine whether a prosecutor’s conduct should be 
investigated or not. He contends that despite prosecutors acting for society’s interests at large, 
certain classes of person should be able to make a complaint against them.77 The basis of the 
Solicitor-General’s decision is determined by:78 
 
1. a finding by an appellate court of prosecutorial misconduct resulting in a miscarriage 
of justice; or  
2. a complaint made by a person falling within a defined category. 
 
Those who fall within the defined category would importantly include victims of crime. When 
the investigation is completed, a report would be written by a lawyer with the appropriate 
qualifications, similar to reports written by the Commissioner of Health and Disability for the 
medical field.79 The report would then be published online and distributed to Crown 
prosecutors throughout New Zealand, outlining the reasons for the miscarriage of justice in the 
overall contextual setting.80 An accompanying education programme based on each report 
would also be distributed.81The reports act as both a mechanism of accountability and an 
important educative tool for crown prosecutors.82 While disciplinary proceedings would be 
separate from the reporting system, the disciplining body could consider the “well informed” 
opinion of the Crown Law Office investigation.83 
 
                                                
75 Crown prosecutors are accountable to their respective Crown solicitor and to the firms they have been employed 
by. Crown solicitors are accountable to the Solicitor-General. See Nigel Stone “Production of Reports Following 




79 Ibid at 55. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid at 56. 
82 Ibid at 58. 
83 Ibid. 
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One of the issues reported by victims of crime concerning the Victims Right to Review Scheme 
(VRRS) in the United Kingdom, is the perceived lack of objectivity within the scheme, as 
essentially prosecutors are reviewing their peers.84 Stone’s proposal faces the same dilemma, 
as the expertise required to investigate into prosecutorial misconduct “would, in practical 
terms, need to be found within the Crown Law Office.”85 In order to mitigate the issues 
concerning objectivity, Stone suggests that the method used by the Health and Disability 
Commissioner could be adopted “To ameliorate the potential issues of objectivity, the Health 
and Disability Commissioner requires any expert engaged in the commission of a report to 
declare any conflicts of interest that he or she might have, relying on professional integrity to 
remain objective. From time to time experts from Australia are asked for their assistance, 
although this seems unfeasible in the context of prosecutorial investigations owing to the 
difference between New Zealand and Australian law. Whenever possible, these practices 
should be adopted in the production of the reports concerning prosecutors.”86 
 
Stone also contends that the reporting system would be more favourable than establishing a 
“Prosecution Review Authority” as the creation of such an authority would incur additional 
costs and because of the “lack of evidence to suggest the problem of prosecutorial 
accountability justifies the significant step of establishing an entirely separate agency to 
oversee prosecutors.”87 
 
In considering ways to keep prosecutors from abusing their discretion, Bibas commented that 
“the best way to keep discretion from being idiosyncratic is to encourage prosecutors to 
develop patterns and habits and then justify deviations from those habits.”88 Stone’s proposal 
encourages prosecutors to develop good habits through the continuation of quality 
improvement. The reports are written with the intent to educate prosecutors of mistakes to 
avoid and therefore improve decision-making. As a result, both the possibility for miscarriages 
of justice and the quantum of judicial review cases will be reduced. The focus on education 
rather than discipline accords well with the principle of accountability which requires that 
                                                
84Mary Lliadis, Asher Flynn “Providing a Check on Prosecutorial Decision-making: An Analysis of the Victims’ 
Right to Review Reform (2017) 58 The British Journal of Criminology 550-568; D. Shaw “Victims’ Right of 
Review Scheme Sees 146 Charged” BBC News (United Kingdom, 19 July 2014). 
85 Stone, above n 75, at 55. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Bibas, above n 48, at 374. 
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prosecutors retain “judgment and courage to make the necessary decisions inherent in every 
prosecution.”89  
 
Stone’s reporting system offers a new mechanism of accountability that fosters “robustness, 
openness and transparency” without compromising the prosecutor’s broad discretion. The 
system also accords with the Victims’ Rights movement by providing aggrieved victims with 
a forum to have their complaints heard.90  
 
10.3.3 Internal Re-review of Decisions Not to Prosecute 
 
Following on from Bibas’s recommendation that prosecutors should develop patterns and 
habits for the proper exercise of discretion, one of these habits should be to re-review decisions 
not to prosecute when they are likely to be challenged on judicial review.91 
 
If the right to pre-charge consultation is incorporated into the existing system, prosecutors will 
have a reasonable idea of whether the decision not to prosecute is likely be challenged via 
judicial review, as the victim is likely to make this known in the consultation.92 It is 
recommended that such decisions should be re-reviewed by the prosecutor. This habit would 
ensure that the best interests of the victim are protected and would also serve the prosecutor’s 
interests as the re-review serves as a check for high-quality decision making.  
 
If an original decision on re-review is found to be wrong, the prosecutor must take the necessary 
steps to rectify the decision if possible. The effect of the recommendation is to allow quicker 
resolution of improper or wrong decision-making and to decrease the need for judicial review. 
 
10.3.4 Concluding Comments 
 
To reduce the quantum of judicial review cases, it is important to look at the root of the 
problem, that being miscarriages of justice resulting from poor prosecution decision-making. 
The following recommendations place the victim at the fore and focus on improving the quality 
                                                
89 R v Tkachuk, 2001 ABCA 243 at [27], 293 AR 171. 
90 Stone, above n 75, at 58. 
91 Bibas, above n 48, at 374. 
92 See Chapter 10 at sections 10.4-10.4.5. 
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of decision-making and the development of good habits to ensure the proper exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion.  
 
10.4 Improving Victims’ Rights in the Prosecution Decision-Making Process 
 
Over the last three decades, common law jurisdictions93 have engaged in a movement geared 
towards changing the way victims’ rights are both viewed and incorporated into the criminal 
justice process.94 This shift in attitude and the sea-change of victims’ rights rose from growing 
concerns about the role and treatment of victims, who have traditionally been denied 
participatory rights on the basis that this threatens the objective and public nature of the 
criminal justice system.95  It may also been argued that since victims have an opportunity to 
seek damages in civil actions, procedural rights for victims are neither relevant nor justified. 
Doak justified this lack of victims’ rights in the pre-trial phase of criminal proceedings:96 
 
The concept of victim involvement here is fraught with numerous difficulties on account of the 
myriad of competing aims of criminal justice, which include the objective of adjudication of 
guilt, the desirability of truth-finding, the preservation of public interests, and the need to 
preserve fair trial rights for the accused. It is additionally complicated by the fact that his or her 
status as a ‘victim’ is somewhat uncertain prior to the determination of the accused’s guilt. 
 
But, “victim-oriented reforms [have] been regarded as crucial towards acknowledging the 
victim’s interest, alongside those of the accused and the state: a perspective Lord Steyn 
describes as a triangulation of interests.”97 Brienen and Hoegen have reasoned that the 
presumption of being a ‘non-victim’ until the trier of fact has been determined essentially 
                                                
93 Including New Zealand, the common law states of England and Wales, Canada and Australia have a limited 
historical record of granting rights to victims; Tyrone Kirchengast “Victims’ Rights and the Rights to Review: A 
Corollary of the Victim’s Pre-trial Rights to Justice,” (2016) 5(4) International Journal for Crime, Justice and 
Social Democracy 103 at 105. 
94 Jonathan Doak “Victims’ Rights in Criminal Trials: Prospects for Participation,” (2005) 32 Journal of Law and 
Society 294-316; Kirchengast, above n 93, at 115. 
95 Doak, above n 94, at 294. See also Asher Flynn “Plea-negotiations, Prosecutors and Discretion: An Argument 
for Legal Reform” (2016) 49 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 564-582; “Changes include 
compensation schemes, improved access to information, Victim Personal Statements (VPS) and other protective 
measures for victims, for example restrictions on questions that can be asked of victims when testifying in sexual 
offence trials, and the use of video testimony and devices to block the offender from the victim’s view.” 
96 Doak, above n 94, at 296. Doak’s conclusion that victims are difficult to incorporate into the criminal justice 
system was also based on structural barriers of the criminal justice system, normative barriers, the merging of 
public and private interests and the limitations of the victim/prosecutor relationship. 
97 Lliadis and Flynn, above n 84, citing Lord Steyn in Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1999) [2001] 2 AC 
91 at [118] (cited with approval by the House of Lords in R v H [2004] 2 AC 134 at 145–146).  
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precludes some of the substantive rights and interests from protection during the pre-trial and 
trial stages.98 
 
This section recommends the promulgation of victims’ rights and interests through reforms 
that increase the inclusion and consideration of victims in the pre-trial phase. Currently, victims 
are excluded from the existing adversarial framework until sentencing or in the diversion 
process. Although decisions not to prosecute in New Zealand are justiciable, victim-focussed 
reform should be prioritised at this stage because the prosecution decision-making process 
itself, is shrouded by a veil of legal privileges and expansive confidentiality claims. Victims’ 
rights are and only acknowledged and regulated by the Prosecution Guidelines, which are ‘soft 
law’ in nature.99 Prosecution decisions are therefore made in a process of “low visibility” 
towards victims.100 As one author observed, “maintaining accountability requires a consistent-
and potentially uncomfortable-measure of sunlight.”101 A reform of the prosecution decision-
making process would advance the trend evidenced in international literature, of providing 
victims with enforceable rights. 102 These recommendations ensure that victims are not left in 
the dark and play a more prominent role in improving the transparency, accessibility and 
accountability of prosecution decisions. 
 
10.4.1 Improving the Existing Victims’ Rights 
 
The definition of ‘victim’ under the VRA should include both “offence committed” and 
“alleged offence,” which would harmonise with the UN’s definition.103 
 
If a defendant has the right to be tried without undue delay, then as a matter of the fair balancing 
of rights, victims should also have the right to receive information regarding a prosecution 
decision without delay and when they can still influence the final dispositive decision.104 That 
                                                
98 Marion Brienen and Ernestine Hoegen, Victims of Crime in 22 European Justice Systems (Willem-Jan der Wolf, 
The Netherlands, 2000) at 30. 
99 See also the Victims of Crime- Guidance for Prosecutors Guidelines 2014. 
100 John Li J Edwards, The Attorney General, Politics and the Public Interest (London: Sweet & Maxwell,1984) 
at 403. 
101 Mark Phillips “The Public Interest Criterion in Prosecutorial Discretion: A Lingering Source of Flexibility in 
the Canadian Criminal Process?” (2015) 36 Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues 43. In a well-known 
quotation, Justice Brandeis described sunlight as the “best of disinfectants”, Louis D Brandeis “What Publicity 
Can Do” Harper’s Weekly (New York, 20 December 1913) at 10. 
102 Doak, above n 94, at 294. 
103 See Chapter 7 at section 7.1. 
104 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s25(b).  
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prosecution decision is apex within the prosecution process where victims’ interests are at 
stake, so time must be prioritized in performing this obligation. The phrase “as soon as 
practicable in s12(1)(b) of the VRA 2002 should be replaced with “without delay” in order to 
enhance victims’ confidence in the legal system. 
 
Replacement of the curious word “should,” with “must,” in relation to various rights within the 
VRA 2002 will also guarantee their enforceability and afford better treatment of victims. The 
current statute is intentionally aspirational – it is a ‘feel good’ response that actually creates 
little in the way of textured rights. 
 
10.4.2 Why Victims’ Interests Should be Given Weight at the Prosecution Decision-
Making Stage  
 
The Prosecution Guidelines and VRA 2002, requires prosecutors to provide information to 
victims about the charging decisions.105 But this is an inadequate safeguard. Resistance towards 
victim participation is evident in the prosecution decision-making phase.106 This resistance, 
likely to be a product of institutional inertia, is sometimes justified as a limit on defendants’ 
existing rights, which would introduce prosecution-orientated changes in the system.107 
 
For many victims, participation and involvement in the prosecution process is highly 
prioritised, but it is ultimately the State’s role to control how such decision-making should be 
conducted. It is argued that the State should not place expectations or further burdens on 
victims by involving them in the prosecution decision, regardless of their individual 
preferences.108 Some criminal legal theorists assert that the State should retain full 
responsibility for this role to “ensure that there is order and law-abidance” and must bear the 
“burden” on behalf of citizens to see that justice is served.109 Doak in critiquing that view, 
explained that:110 “Conceptually, victims have no role to play in the modern criminal justice 
                                                
105 Victims’ Rights Act 2002, s12(1); Prosecution Guidelines 2013 paragraph 29.2. 
106 Sarah Welling “Victims in the Criminal Process: A Utilitarian Analysis of Victim Participation in the Charging 
Decision” (1988) 30 Ariz L Rev 85 at 85. 
107 Ibid, at 86; See Lynne N Henderson “The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights” (1985) 37 Stan L Rev 937.  
108 Andrew Ashworth “Victims’ Rights, Defendants’ Rights and Criminal Procedure” in Adam Crawford and Jo 
Goodey (eds) Integrating a Victim Perspective within Criminal Justice: International Debates (Ashgate, 
Dartmouth, 2000) at 198.  
109 Andrew Ashworth “Responsibilities, Rights and Restorative Justice” [2002] British Journal of Criminology 
578 at 579; Doak, above n 94. 
110 Jonathan Doak Victims’ Rights, Human Rights and Criminal Justice: Reconceiving the Role of Third Parties 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2008) at 35-36. 
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system other than to act as “evidentiary cannon fodder”… Therefore, although many victims 
feel as though they are “owed” a right to exercise a voice in decision-making process, such as 
prosecution…the criminal justice system places such rights or interests in a firmly subservient 
position to the collective interest of society in prosecuting the crime and imposing a 
denunciatory punishment.” It is also contended that State management of prosecution decision-
making results in better consistency and predictability of treatment- which is very important 
when considering the impact of variable outcomes on a defendant.111 
 
Other commentators have cautioned against participatory rights, fearing that “victims may seek 
to pursue a prosecution for reasons unrelated to the likelihood of obtaining a conviction, such 
as for therapeutic reasons.”112 However, evidence about whether participating in a criminal 
trial has therapeutic benefits for victims is inconclusive.113 Other studies considering victim 
involvement at other stages of the prosecution process, suggests that involvement in the form 
of giving evidence and being cross-examined, causes distress to victims and can lead to 
secondary victimisation.114  
 
The most repeated and possibly leading argument against victim participation is that it will 
limit the existing rights of defendants. The protection of the rights of suspects and defendants 
is a legitimate objective of the prosecution system. New Zealand has obligations under the 
ICCPR, and NZBORA to protect the rights of suspects and defendants.115 It is argued that 
according victims’ views with more weight will significantly increase both costs and the 
                                                
111 Elisabeth McDonald “The views of complainants and the provision of information, support and legal advice: 
How much should a prosecutor do?” (2011) 17 Canterbury Law Review 66 at 67. 
112 Victorian Law Reform Commission The Role of Victims of Crime in the Criminal Trial Process: Consultation 
Paper (July 2015) at 54. See Geoffrey Flatman and Mirko Bagaric “The Victim and the Prosecutor: The Relevance 
of Victims in Prosecution Decision Making” (2001) 6(2) Deakin Law Review 238 at 251. 
113 Jo-Anne Wemmers “Victims’ Experiences in the Criminal Justice System and Their Recovery from Crime” 
(2013)19(3) International Review of Victimology 221 at 222; Jim Parsons and Tiffany Bergin “The impact of 
Criminal Justice Involvement on Victims’ Mental Health” (2010) 23(2) Journal of Traumatic Stress 182 at 183. 
114 Victorian Law Reform Commission “The role of victims in the decision to prosecute” 
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present at trial and to present a defence. Sections 23-23 and 26-27 also provide rights for suspects and defendants 
in the investigation and prosecution process. Note that the corresponding provisions of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights are not entirely synonymous with those in New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
Compare for example article 9(2) and 9(3) of the Covenant with s23(2) and 23(3) of the New Zealand Bill of 
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volume of trials that may not result in convictions. A further consideration is the victims’ ability 
to pressurise prosecutors to file aggravated charges.  
 
Advocates for increased victim participation assert there is an imbalance between defendants’ 
rights and victims’ rights. However, Macdonald contends that arguments to justify an 
expansion of victims’ participatory rights on the basis of fair balancing are problematic.116 
Firstly, exactly what is being balanced are incommensurables. Secondly, it is difficult to 
determine the weight to be accorded to such potentially competing interests. Edwards states:117 
“We cannot justify granting participation rights to victims simply because they are rights 
enjoyed by defendants; the justification for granting certain rights to defendants is crucial to 
ensure that he receives a fair trial, and is not subject to unrestrained power and resources of the 
state. However, legal representation for a victim cannot be justified on these grounds, as the 
victim is not in a position of inequality vis-à-vis the state.”  
 
Edward’s proposition that victims are not in a position of inequality in relation to the State 
lacks plausibility, in the context of an improper prosecution decision not to prosecute. The 
position illustrated by the social contract theory is exactly on point.118 
 
Welling asserts that the introduction of participatory rights for victims will not affect the 
existing rights of defendants or create implications for the prosecution process. A defendant’s 
right to challenge a prosecution decision can only be affected by the power of the prosecutor, 
since they have exclusive power over the decision, and it does not require that victims’ views 
dominate the prosecutor’s decision.119  
 
Welling explained that the prosecutor’s main interest in regarding the process of reaching the 
charging decision, is to do so by the simplest process to achieve the quickest decision.120 In 
this regard, the interest of the prosecutor and victim diverge. For the prosecutor, “the amount 
of additional time consumed by victim participation would depend on the type of participation 
right defined, but there will inevitably be some impact…From the prosecutor’s perspective, 
                                                
116 McDonald, above n 111, at 67. 
117 Ian Edwards “An Ambiguous Participant: The Crime Victim and Criminal Justice Decision-Making” (2004) 
44 Brit J Criminal 967 at 972. 
118 See Chapter 7 at section 7.3.2. 
119 Welling, above n 106, at 88. 
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victim participation would be benign as to the substance of the charging decision, but would 
entail some costs for the process of making the decision.” 121 The prosecutor is always free to 
allow the victim to participate if the prosecutor decides it would be appropriate. Therefore, the 
only circumstance “where victims’ participation rights would have any practical impact is 
where a prosecutor wants to make the prosecution decision without consulting the victim.”122 
Consequently, the only situations that are changed by allowing participatory rights are those 
circumstances where a “prosecutor is resistant to victim participation, otherwise the victim 
would already have been consulted.”123 
 
Crimes against the individual victim are also acts against society as a whole; “victims are not 
owed convictions; rather it is the larger society, if anyone that has the right to pursue 
convictions.”124 The interests of victims will require balancing against the objectives of the 
criminal prosecution system.125 The decision to prosecute still lies exclusively with the 
prosecutor. Victims’ interests can and should be considered and protected yet maintaining the 
criminal law’s objective of holding those responsible to account under fair processes.   
 
On balance, allowing participatory rights to victims will in fact have little if any impact on the 
rights of the accused or the prosecution process generally. It is important then, to consider what 
kind of participation is appropriate or desirable for victims. In presenting this debate, Edwards 
distinguishes between dispositive and non-dispositive participation.126 Dispositive 
participation affords control to the victim over certain aspects of the process, for example the 
prosecutor may be under an obligation to ascertain a victim’s preference and act in accordance 
with it, however it will be for the victim to provide this preference. Non-dispositive 
participation includes consultation; the provision of information; and, expression. In these 
types of participation, the victim is not the decision-maker but they are given a position where 
they could potentially influence the particular decision. This is distinct from the victim’s 
current position in the system as an ‘information receiver,’ where the role is a passive one that 
entails no interactive input into the decision-making itself.127  
                                                
121 Welling, above n 106, at 91. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Larry May, Crimes against Humanity: A Normative Account (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) 
at 220. 
125 The New Zealand Law Commission Criminal Prosecution (NZLC PP28 1997) at 12. 
126 Edwards, above n 117, at 974. 
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10.4.3 Need for Pre-Charge Consultation 
 
A pre-charge consultation between the prosecutor and victim should be introduced into the 
prosecution decision-making process, in order to support victims’ procedural justice needs.128 
This means that victims should be afforded non-dispositive participation rights. A right to 
consultation. Currently, victims have a superficial right to information by the VRA 2002, which 
comes into force only after the prosecutor has made the prosecution decision.129 Giving victims 
a participatory right, will expand their role from being an instrument that enables the prosecutor 
to procure convictions, to a tool which can be used in the interests of justice.  
 
There are specific benefits to victims who are able to participate in the prosecution system. 
Bacik et al. conducted research on rape victims and observed that those victims who were 
offered some type of formal role at trial were reported to have a greater understanding of their 
role at trial, appeared to exhibit better levels of confidence and articulateness when testifying, 
received less hostility from the accused’s legal representative and felt greater satisfaction with 
their treatment in the legal process.130 Doak concluded that “offering victims some form of 
acknowledged and formal role at trial should enhance their sense of powerlessness that many 
have reported during criminal proceedings.131 In turn, more victims might be encouraged to 
report crimes and cooperate with the police and prosecution authorities.”132  
 
A pre-charge consultation gives victims the opportunity to have their views heard, a factor that 
the prosecutor might into consideration. It may also encourage the prosecutor to decide to 
prosecute and file the most serious charges that can be justified. This in turn, would gratify the 
victim’s interest in the substance of the charging decision. It is important to note that ultimately, 
the decision-making power still lies with the prosecutor. Despite whether the final decision is 
                                                
128 Ian Grenville Cross “Focus on Discretion to Prosecute” (1998) 28 Hong Kong Law Journal 400; Cross says 
there is a difference between informing and consulting in practice. They can be distinguished where there is 
legitimate public interest. “Sir Thomas Hetherington, when asked for examples of cases where he initiated 
consultation with the Attorney-General, gave this reply: ‘Some of the City Fraud cases-involving Lloyds and 
Johnson Mathey Bankers- because there is so much legitimate public interest in what is going to happen. Cases 
involving public figures such as Derek Hatton, the Deputy Leader of Liverpool Council, where we decided not to 
prosecute: that was one where we kept the Attorney informed rather than asking him to take a decision.’” 
129 Victims’ Rights Act 2002, s12(1). 
130 I Bacik, C Maunsell and S. Grogan “The Legal Process and Victims of Rape” (Dublin Rape Crisis Centre and 
School of Law, Trinity College, 1998). 
131 Doak, above n 94, at 312. 
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favourable to the victim or not, allowing for victim participation in the decision-making process 
will make victims feel less alienated and irrelevant in the prosecution process. Enabling a right 
to participate by consultation will also mean that the process accords with the New Zealand 
Ministry of Justice’s goal to be more “responsive” to victims.133  
 
Recently, the International Criminal Court has responded to societal outcry that victims are 
unfairly ignored by the criminal justice system, by allowing victims for the first time in the 
history of international criminal justice, the possibility to share their views and concerns in the 
proceedings, represented by a lawyer.134 To give victims in New Zealand participatory rights 
at the charging decision develops the criminal law in terms of international standards and would 
also be in accord with the global victims’ movement, which advocates for “greater victim input 
into the central decisions affecting the outcome of the prosecution.” 135 Victims in New Zealand 
have already been given the right to participate in post-conviction phases, therefore 
conceptually, allowing a right to participate in the charging decision is logical. “Granting 
victims’ a right to participation at the charging stage would be consistent with the current 
structure and would contribute to a coherent system.”136  
 
A right to non-dispositive victim participation provides greater access to justice and can be 
easily incorporated into the existing adversarial framework. As Doak pointed out, “[i]t is ironic 
that the person whose complaint was instrumental in bringing the case to court is denied the 
right to participate as a separate player in proceedings, but must instead play an extremely 
limited role…the injection of the victim’s perspective could lend additional transparency to the 
                                                
133 Ministry of Justice A Focus on Victims of Crime: A review of Victims’ Rights- Public Consultation Document 
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occurs to the final stage of proceedings when a sentence is given. This of course would include the prosecution, 
decision-making phase. The Ministry asserted that the benefits of victim participation in the whole criminal justice 
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criminal justice system, such confidence is necessary for those victimised by the crime and for the whole 
community and is seen as essential to ensuring that victims report crimes”; Ministry of Justice A Focus on Victims 
of Crime: A review of Victims’ Rights- Public Consultation Document (2009) at 4. 
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outcome of the case.”137 Incorporation of a pre-charge consultation therefore elevates the 
victims’ role from what is currently a position of virtual irrelevancy to an ‘agent of 
accountability’.138 In this sense, victims who participate in a consultation have the opportunity 
to scrutinise prosecution powers for themselves and query whether they have been treated fairly 
in the process.  
 
Consultation also benefits the criminal justice system generally by promoting the value of 
truth-finding and transparency in the decision-making process. Telford and Walker expanded 
on this notion by explaining how victim participation in the criminal justice process is able to 
bolster the systems overall legitimacy: 139 
 
…Similarly, participation in the criminal process also serves to legitimise the system by 
engaging interested, and often aggrieved parties in resolving a dispute, or as a form of external 
audit to help ensure equitable procedures…  
 
Lliadis and Flynn considered a wide range of literature that considered victims’ procedural 
justice needs,140 which included: 141 
  
(1) information- to be kept informed at all stages of the case’s progression before decisions are 
made;  
(2) validation- including validation of victimisation experiences, feeling as though they are 
believed and being treated with respect and dignity;  
(3) voice- providing victims with the opportunity to narrate their story to a supportive and 
receptive audience, and to have this story acknowledged and;  




A pre-charge consultation is able to satisfy all of these needs. Firstly, victims who consult with 
the prosecutor have access to clear information about how and why a prosecution decision will 
be made. This in turn allows victims to understand their role in the decision-making process 
                                                
137 Doak, above n 94, at 312. 
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Justice Needs” (2010) 85 Family Matters 28-37. 
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and any potential implications for them. Clark found that victims who had received information 
“expressed relief, as it provided them with forewarning about the system, and they were able 
to adjust and manage their expectations accordingly.”142 Where a decision not to prosecute is 
taken, it allows victims to make informed decisions about whether to engage in judicial review, 
and to prepare themselves for such a step if it is needed. Victims may also experience a sense 
of closure that they would otherwise not receive when a prosecution does not follow. Access 
to information enables victims to understand their own rights, the system’s purpose and can 
help them feel less frustrated with ‘seemingly futile decisions.’143  
 
Flynn noted that: “Notwithstanding that often immense differences between individual victims 
and their victimisation experienced, a common need consistently identified by victims of crime 
is the desire to be kept informed at all stages of the case’s progression through the criminal 
justice process…when such information is provided, it has been recognised that victims feel 
an increased level of satisfaction.”144  
 
Validation for victims may be understood as the expression of belief by system officials to 
victim allegations.145 Judith Herman observed that giving victims validation through official 
acknowledgement of the crime can be difficult to achieve in the criminal justice system as a 
result of constitutional limitations of the law that protect the accused against the powers of the 
state.146 The pre-charge consultation overcomes this difficulty by ensuring that victims’ 
narratives are heard and considered by the prosecutor without hindering the rights of the 
accused or prosecution powers.  
 
While on face value, it may appear that a consultation right conflicts victims’ interests against 
the rights of defendants and the prosecutor’s duties, Welling explained that victim participation 
at the charging decision cannot violate defendants’ rights “because only the prosecutor, as the 
exclusive source of charging, has the power to violate the rights of the defendant with regard 
to charging.”147 Victim participation also does not determinatively affect the prosecution 
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decision, and therefore does not conflict with the prosecutor’s right to decide whether to 
prosecute or not.148 Van Ness has argued that “it is inevitable that the interests, rights and needs 
of victims will conflict at some point with those of the state. The question, then, is not how to 
avoid conflicts between competing interests, but how to manage them effectively, so that as 
many of the competing interests as possible are accommodated in a principled manner.”149 Pre-
consultation is the answer. It allows victims’ interests to be taken into account without usurping 
the state’s right to prosecute or not as both rights are equally enforceable. To this extent, the 
main function of the criminal justice system of punishing the guilty and acquitting the innocent 
is not impeded by incorporating a pre-consultation right.150 
 
As Tyler acknowledged, “[h]aving an opportunity to voice their perspective has a positive 
effect upon people’s experience with the legal system irrespective of the outcome, as long as 
they feel that the authority sincerely considered their arguments before making their 
decision.”151 By this understanding, a participation via consultation can improve victims’ 
satisfaction with the justness of the prosecution process. As ‘agents of accountability’ a pre-
charge consultation also offers victims a sense of control even if participation does not fully 
affect the final outcome of the decision.  
 
Canvassing the right to pre-charge consultation in light of the existing framework of the 
Victims’ Right to Review Reform Scheme (VRRS) in the United Kingdom, demonstrates that 
a right to pre-charge consultation is better at fully supporting victims’ procedural justice needs 
compared to a right to request an internal review, which only really enhances victims’ rights in 
an adversarial context.152 It is for this reason why the pre-charge consultation has been 
recommended over schemes like the VRRS. 
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The primary aim of the newly introduced VRRS in the United Kingdom seeks to promote 
transparency, accessibility and accountability by allowing victims to request a review of a 
prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute. Essentially, the scheme seeks to achieve the same 
outcomes for victims as the pre-charge consultation does. While in a successful review under 
the VRRS, the prosecutor may choose to reverse his or her decision, the effect of a pre-charge 
consultation, while not being wholly determinative also has the effect of ‘review’ in the sense 
that victims provide a check on the exercise of prosecution powers and their views may have 
some weight in the final decision made by the prosecutor. These similarities make the VRRS 
an attractive comparator. 
 
In a socio-legal study analysing the VRRS, Lliadis and Flynn concluded that “while the 
theoretical underpinnings of the VRR present major benefits for victims, our data suggests that 
the potential shortcomings may limit the viability of victims’ procedural justice needs being 
met.” These findings were based on the fact that the VRRS relies upon the CPS themselves to 
conduct reviews, “the very organisation the victim is questioning.”153 The perceived level of 
accountability therefore is diminished in the eyes of victims which in turn “reduces the VRRS’s 
effectiveness in meeting victims’ procedural justice needs.”154 In comparison, the level of 
accountability surrounding pre-charge consultation remains high, because prosecutors would 
be under the duty to provide both the reasons for their decision and how the decision itself was 
reached. A pre-charge consultation facilitates transparency, something the VRRS lacks.  
 
These findings suggest that victim’s procedural justice needs are not met by simply giving 
victims more opportunities to have prosecution decisions reviewed. What is needed is a 
mechanism like a pre-charge consultation which makes victims key players in the decision-
making process. A flow-on effect of increased transparency of decision-making is that victims 
in judicial review cases of decisions not to prosecute, will have the evidentiary material needed 
to support their case. Such victims would have already been consulted in the process, and 
therefore would have been given reasons behind the decision not to prosecute by the 
prosecutor. Generally, legal opinions written by Crown-Solicitors providing reasons for 
prosecution decisions are legally privileged and unobtainable.155 Crown Solicitors do not fall 
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under the Official Information Act 1982, which makes obtaining non-privileged information 
itself an arduous task. Both factors diminish the transparency and predictability of how 
prosecution decisions are made.156 A pre-charge consultation is therefore integral in providing 
victims access to these reasons, whilst also improving transparency and accountability of 
prosecution decisions.  
 
Despite the current right to information under s12(1)(b) of the VRA 2002 regarding the 
charging decision, the provision of reasons behind a prosecution decision is still rarely 
practised. Professor Michael Taggart explained:157 
 
Despite the rhetoric of administrative law’s commitment to transparency, in the long historical 
view neither the common law in general nor administrative law in particular was committed to 
reason giving as an essential prerequisite to the validity of decision-making… but it seems only 
a matter of time before the exceptions swallow the hoary general rule that reasons not be given. 
 
In recognising the need for transparency in the prosecution process, Snow argued that:158  
 
The best way to facilitate judicial review in a manner that respects prosecutorial independence, 
while ensuring accountability, is by requiring transparency. This would place a legal obligation 
on the Crown to provide an explanation for their discretionary decisions…Mandated 
transparency should not be characterised as judicial supervision or interference. It is the law 
and the public interest, not the judiciary, which require explanation. This obligation would 
achieve a balance between accountability and independence that effectively promotes 
adherence to the Crown’s high traditional virtues. It can only serve to enhance public 
confidence in the administration of justice, at the expense of secrecy, which is “simply no 
longer acceptable to the public.” Justice Rosenberg predicted that transparency would become 
necessary “not solely because courts may demand [it]…but because the Attorney General will 
recognize that providing reasons is in the public interest. 
 
Transparency must not be an aspirational ideal, it must become a mandatory duty. A right to 
pre-charge consultation will allow transparency of prosecution decision-making and “reduce 
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the likelihood that people will perceive a gulf between their expectations of the criminal justice 
system and the reality.”159  
 
10.4.4 Incorporation of Pre-Charge Consultation  
 
It is recommended that the most practical and effective way of incorporating the right to a pre-
charge consultation is to amend the existing s12(1)(b) of the VRA 2002. Currently, the right 
states that “A victim must, as soon as practicable, be given information by investigating 
authorities or, as the case requires, by members of court staff, or the prosecutor,” regarding the 
charging decision. 
 
In order to fulfil victims’ procedural justice needs, the current right should be amended so that 
s12(1)(b) is isolated from the general ‘information of proceedings’ categories under s12 and 
instead make a stand-alone provision which states that victims must, without delay be consulted 
by the prosecutor, about the charges laid or reasons for not laying charges, and all changes to 
the charges laid. To ensure that victims are provided with sufficient information, it is 
recommended that the revised s2(1)(b) should provide a non-exhaustive list of categories of 
information that a victim should receive when a prosecutor provides the reasoning for their 
decision. For example, in a consultation, the prosecutor must explain to victims in layman’s 
terms what the decision is, why it was reached and what a decision not to prosecute actually 
means (e.g. a decision not to prosecute is not equivalent to an acquittal.)  
 
In Manning, Lord Bingham suggested there should be a policy of pro-active disclosure.160 Pro-
active disclosure would provide a clear interpretation of how policies were applied, and checks 
for inconsistency. It would act as a fillip to judicial review when reasons for a decision are 
transparent and can be understood. The amendment of section 12(1)(b) would mean ‘pro-active 
disclosure’ becomes a right.  
 
Consultation should be conducted either orally or in written form, and is limited to the victim 
sharing their views and concerns, giving them no right to determine the substance of the 
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prosecution decision. 161 This is because the main benefits of victim participation are derived 
from the participation process, and not the impact the participation has on the substance of the 
decision.162 The consultation should be expeditious and should not absorb undue amounts of 
time, but should be thorough enough so that victims leaving the consultation have the 
information that they need. A new guideline in the Victims of Crime-Guidelines for 
Prosecutors should be created to guide prosecutors on the depth of consultation required. This 
should reflect the proportionality and seriousness of the offence. For example, where someone 
has been killed as a result of a crime, the prosecutor must on request, meet the family to explain 
a decision on a prosecution.163 The standard requirements for consultation are set out in 
Wellington International Airport v Air New Zealand and include the requirement that 
consultation must be genuine and approached with an open mind, and allow sufficient time and 
information for those consulted to make a meaningful point.164 Redefining the right to 
information as a participation right of consultation necessitates a remedy where the right is 
denied.  
 
Moffett recognised that “victim’s rights are meant to ensure justice mechanisms are responsive 
to their needs and consider their input into proceedings so as to remedy their harm.”165 Giving 
victims of crime the right to a pre-charge consultation creates no risk of infringing upon any 
legal or moral right, since the substance of the prosecution decision is the product of power of 
the prosecutor. Furthermore, “the victim’s right to participate in the charging decision does not 
cater to society’s baser instincts, nor is it a masquerade to limit defendant’s rights under the 
guise of concern for victims. Rather, it has social utility.”166 New Zealand’s criminal law must 
give victims a right to participate in the prosecution decision-making to see that procedural 
justice is secured.167 Any denial risks the credibility and efficacy of the system. It would also 
relegate victims to the position of ‘objects’ meaning that “justice is done on the basis of their 
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suffering, without recognising them as [human beings that have] needs and interests in 
determining the substantive outcomes.”168 
 
10.4.5 Concluding Comments 
 
Under Lord Steyn’s triangulation of interests, the result may be a narrow isosceles triangle- the 
hypotenuse between the state and the defendant may be longer than the side reflecting victims’ 
interests. But there must be three clear sides- at present there are not-the current law provides 
for only a straight line between the state and the defendant. As Kirchengast argued, “boundaries 
which once separated the victim from substantive participation in adversarial systems of justice 
are now being eroded and dismantled in favour of rights and powers that can be enforced 
against the state or the accused, albeit in an unconventional, fragmented and at times 
controversial way.”169 Victims must be given better procedural rights during the prosecution 
decision-making phase. To attain this balance does not require the sacrifice of public justice 
nor initiation of private justice. As Michael O’Connell, the Commissioner for Victims’ Rights 
in South Australia stated, “It does require us, however, to acknowledge victims as real people 
with real need and real rights – and, if we get it all right, we will attain a better justice.”170  
 
 
10.5 Recommendations for Discretionary Relief and Private Prosecutions 
 
10.5.1 Discretionary Relief: The Appropriate Boundaries 
 
The New Zealand courts should follow jurisprudence from the United Kingdom and allow 
flawed decisions in judicial review cases to be quashed and then direct the prosecutor to 
reconsider the decision. A consideration of whether or not the extraordinary remedy of 
mandamus should be made available in New Zealand was made in Chapter VIII section 8.2.1. 
It is recommended that such power should not be made available, to compel an actual specific 
decision, rather reflecting the separation of powers, an order to reconsider or a Declaration 
would be appropriate. 
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A mandamus to compel essentially require the court to step outside of its constitutional bounds 
and to exercise the powers vested in the prosecutor. The judiciary must decide cases in light of 
law, but do not have the authority to decide to prosecute- that would create a fundamental 
incompatibility with the adjudicative role. Only the executive has the exclusive power of direct 
action, but it has no lawful authority to act outside of the provisions of the laws or the specific 
judgments of the judiciary. The separate functions and independence of both branches is the 
core of the separation of powers doctrine. To allow mandamus to compel a prosecution as a 
form of relief would be asking the courts to usurp powers beyond their authority, or as Justice 
Iacobucci put it, the courts “should not use the open door of jurisdiction to enter rooms in which 
they did not belong.”171 For this reason, relief should be limited to quashing and directing 
reconsideration by a prosecutor or giving a focussed Declaration as relief. 
 
10.5.2 Strengthening the Right to Private Prosecution 
 
Where a prosecution decision not to prosecute has been made in New Zealand, victims may 
choose instead of judicial review to exercise the right to private prosecution. This right however 
is subject to numerous limitations, as illustrated in Chapter IX. Many of these limitations are 
procedural statutory requirements that private prosecutors must fulfil. Some of these limitations 
can be overcome, but there are ways in which the right to institute a private prosecution may 
be strengthened.  
 
It was noted that one to the deterrents of private prosecution is costs. In New Zealand, a 
successful private prosecutor’s costs may be awarded on the “just and reasonable” basis 
provided for in s4(1) of the Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1967, so the court may order the 
offender to reimburse the private prosecutor the costs incurred in the prosecution. A similar 
approach172 is taken in the United Kingdom173 and other countries such as South Africa,174 
Zimbabwe175 and Namibia.176 One recommendation which would assist indigent private 
                                                
171 Frank Iacobucci “Articulating a Rational Standard of Review Doctrine: A Tribute to John Willis” (2002) 27 
Queen’s LJ 859. 
172 See Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi “Private Prosecutions in Hong Kong: The Role of the Magistrates and State 
Intervention to Prevent Abuse” (2016) 4 The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 253 at 253-273. 
173 See Murtaza Ali Shah “Private Prosecution of Altaf Hussain if CPS Does Not Act: Barrister Gulraiz” The News 
(31 August 2016).  
174 Criminal Procedure Act, No 51(1977) s15.  
175 Mary Taruvinga “Kereke Ordered to Pay Legal Costs” News Day (Zimbabwe, 20 August 2016). 
176 Criminal Procedure Act, No 51(1977) s15. This South African Act is also in force in Namibia. 
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prosecutors to exercise their rights would be for the New Zealand government to provide legal 
aid to private prosecutors who were able to satisfy the requirements under s26 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 2011. The jurisdictions of Scotland177, Azerbaijan,178 Spain and Poland179 have 
adopted this approach.  
 
Currently, a private prosecution may be taken over by the Solicitor-General or Crown 
prosecutor at any time. This intervention does not require consent from the private prosecutor 
or the court. In recommending ways to strengthen the right to private prosecution in Hong 
Kong, Mujuzi suggested that the executive’s decision to take over a private prosecution should 
be subject to judicial scrutiny.180 Mujuzi argued that “ensuring that the court has the final say 
on whether the DPP should take over a private prosecution guarantees that such prosecutions 
are not discontinued under questionable circumstances.”181 Uganda182 and Gambia183 are two 
common law countries that have adopted this approach.  
 
Mujuzi’s proposal makes the trial court’s consent to a take-over final. If a similar procedure 
were to be adopted by New Zealand courts it is recommended that the trial court’s view cannot 
be the final say and instead should be put to the public prosecutor to reconsider his or her 
decision if the court’s view differs from that of the public prosecutor. This would ensure that 
the separation of powers is maintained while also providing an added measure of protection of 
the right to privately prosecute from being unfairly discontinued. If the trial court is not a 
superior court, then its decision will remain amenable to judicial review, regardless of the 
public prosecution position. 
 
                                                
177 See Libby Brooks “Glasgow Bin Lorry Crash: Legal Aid Granted for Private Prosecution” The Guardian 
(United Kingdom, 9 March 2016). 
178 Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi ‘The Right to Institute a Private Prosecution: A Comparative Analysis’ (2015) 4 
International Human Rights Law Review at 242-243. 
179 Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi ‘Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice System in the European Union though 
Private Prosecutions: Issues Emerging form the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2016) 
24 EUR J Crime, Crim L & Crim J 107 at 119-120. 
180 Mujuzi, above n 172, at 273. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Article 120(3)(d) of the Constitution of Uganda provides that ‘the Director of Public Prosecutions shall not 
discontinue any proceedings commenced by another person or authority except with the consent of the court.’ See 
Mujuzi, above n 172, at 273. 
183 Section 84 of the Constitution of Gambia (1997) confers the DPP with power to conduct prosecutions. Section 
84(4) states that the DPP “shall not: (i) take over and continue any private prosecution without the consent of the 
private prosecutor and the court; or (ii) discontinue any private prosecution without the consent of the private 
prosecutor.” See Mujuzi, above n 172 at 273. 
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10.6 Recommendations Specific to the Osborne Case 
 
Our highest Court has already spoken in Osborne, however this section aims to provide 
recommendations for future Courts grappling with similar issues. 
 
10.6.1 Recommendation for Compounding of Offences in New Zealand 
 
The Supreme Court Decision in Osborne v WorkSafe NZ stated that “it is contrary to the public 
interest and unlawful for an arrangement to be made that a prosecution will not be brought or 
maintained on the condition that a sum of money is paid.”184 In other jurisdictions, this is 
known as ‘compounding of an offence,’ and “consists of a prosecutor or victim of an offence 
accepting anything of value under an agreement not to prosecute, or to hamper a 
prosecution.”185 While the Supreme Court has clearly held that such action is unlawful, New 
Zealand seems to have no statutory provision regarding compounding of offences.  
 
Compounding of a felony was once a common law offence but has been abolished in England 
and Wales,186 Northern Ireland,187 the Republic of Ireland188 and in New South Wales.189 The 
common law has been replaced by statute in these jurisdictions.  Only a few small countries in 
the Caribbean and South Pacific now allow compounding of offences, and even then, 
exclusively for fishing-related offences.190  
 
Compounding of offences is available in India191 and Singapore,192 but under very strict terms. 
The use of administrative penalties and the process of compounding of offences involves an 
exercise of judicial powers, “therefore, constitutional and administrative law implications for 
such options need to be comprehensively examined before using the compounding of offences 
as an option in enforcement.”193 In Singapore, usually only the alleged victim may compound 
                                                
184 Osborne v WorkSafe New Zealand (SC), above n 1. 
185 Corker Binning “Compounding a felony and settling criminal offences” <www.lexology.com>. 
186 The Criminal Law Act 1967 (UK) c 58, s5(5). 
187 The Criminal Law Act 1967 (Northern Ireland) c 18 (N.I.), s5(5). 
188 The Criminal Law Act 1997 (No.14), s8(3). 
189 The Crimes Act 1900, s341 [1]. 
190 Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations Report of and papers presented at the expert 
consultation on illegal, unreported and unregulated Fishing, (Sydney, Australia, 15-19 May 2000). 
191 Code of Criminal Procedure 1972, s320. 
192 Criminal Procedure Code 2010, ss241-243. 
193 Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, above n 190. 
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an offence.194 The victims in Osborne were not informed about the reparation agreement prior 
to the prosecution decision, which emphasises the illegitimacy of the compounding.  
  
Section 320(9) of the Indian Penal Code holds that no offence shall be compounded, except as 
provided by the section. The Supreme Court in India laid down the principle that “if a person 
is charged with an offence, then unless there is some provision for composition of it the law 
must take its course and the charge enquired into resulting in conviction of acquittal. If 
composition of an offence is permissible under the law the effect of such composition would 
depend on what the law provided for.”195 The question of compoundability arose in KV Antony 
v Sherafuddin, in the Kerala High Court. It was held that “in a case where a special enactment 
provides for compounding of offence it can certainly be done. If not, it cannot be done.”196 The 
Indian precedent is clear that compounding is only available when it is provided for in a statute.  
 
In Kamini Kumar Basu Thakur v Birendra Nath Basu Thakur,197the Privy Council considered 
the issue of compounding a non-compoundable offence. It was held that if an ekrarnamah 
(agreement)198 is executed to give effect to the arbitrator’s award that a complaint of a non-
compoundable offence will not be further proceeded with, then the consideration of the 
ekrarnamah is unlawful and the award is invalid. This is irrespective of whether any 
prosecution in law had been started. It was also acknowledged that “it is unlikely that an 
ekrarnamah will expressly state that a part of the consideration for it is an agreement to settle 
a criminal prosecution. It is enough in such cases if evidence is given from which the inference 
necessarily arises that part of the consideration is unlawful.”199  
 
In an important judgment of the Supreme Court of India, V Narashimha Raju v Gurumurthy 
Raju the appellant had filed an application under certain provisions of the Arbitration Act 1940, 
for setting aside the award on grounds that the consideration for the arbitration agreement was 
unlawful, “as it was the promise by the first respondent not to prosecute his complaint which 
involved a non-compoundable offence and, therefore, the agreement was invalid under s23 of 
                                                
194 Criminal Procedure Code 2010, Fourth Schedule. 
195 Biswabahan Das v Gopen Chanra Hazarika AIR 1967 SC 895 (India SC).  
196 KV Antony v Sherafuddin 1996 CriLJ 135. 
197 Kamini Kumar Basu Thakur v Birendra Nath Basu Thakur [1930] UKPC 4, (1930) 2 MLJ 82 per Sir Binod 
Mitter. 
198 A deed of settlement or arrangement in Indian Law.  
199 Kamini Kumar Basu Thakur v Birendra Nath Basu Thakur, above n 197, at [14]. 
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the Indian Contract Act 1872.200 It was invalid because its consideration was opposed to public 
policy.” The court held the award could not be enforced. Similarly, in Shripad v Sanikatta Co-
Operative Salt Sale, the court held “where an offence is non-compoundable, an agreement the 
purpose of which is to compound that offence, is illegal as opposed to public policy, but that 
where an offence is compoundable, an agreement aimed at compounding is not invalid as it is 
not opposed to public policy.” 201   
 
In Ouseph Poulo And Three Ors v Catholic Union Bank Ltd. And Ors, the Supreme Court of 
India agreed with Lord Akin in Bowhanipur202 and held that if “agreements made between the 
parties based solely on the consideration of stifling criminal prosecutions are sustained, the 
basic purpose of criminal law will be defeated; such agreements may enable the guilty persons 
to escape punishment and in some others they may conceivably impose an unconscionable 
burden on an innocent party under the coercive process of a threat of the criminal 
prosecution.”203 Essentially, when such an agreement is made, the complainant has chosen the 
fate of the complaint filed in criminal court and that strictly goes against public policy. The 
power to compound is extremely rare in Hong Kong and is strictly exercised to encourage 
compliance for very minor offences, such as filing obligations for companies204 or failure to 
declare dutiable goods.205  
 
The stifling of the prosecution by the prosecution in Osborne was unprincipled and was a thinly 
disguised attempt to buy off a prosecution, by paying the dependents of victims- who neither 
knew about or wanted this payment. 
 
10.6.2 Third Threshold to Review: When Prosecutions Are Commenced and 
Subsequently ‘Reversed’  
 
 
                                                
200 V Narashimha Raju v Gurumurthy Raju And Others 1963 AIR 107, 1963 SCR (3) 687. 
201 Shripad v Sanikatta Co-Operative Salt Sale (1944) 46 BOMLR 745. 
202 Bhowanipur Banking Corporation Ltd v Shreemate Durgesh Nadini Dasi [1941] UKPC 24, (1942) BOMLR 
1 (PC). Discussed in Osborne, above n 1. 
203 Ouseph Poulo And Three Ors v Catholic Union Bank Ltd. And Ors AIR 1965 SC 166, 1964 (o) KLT 398 SC, 
1964 7 SCR 745. 
204 The New Companies Ordinance (Cap.622)-Compounding of Specified Offences, Companies Registry External 
Circular No.12/2014, CR HQ/1-50/15 Pt. 4 (16 May 2014). 
205 Hong Kong Dutiable Commodities Ordinance, Chapter 109, Laws of Hong Kong. 
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There is room to suggest that, following the decision in Manning, if there is a lower threshold 
for a complainant or a victim’s family to review a decision not to prosecute, as contrasted with 
a defendant trying to review a decision to prosecute, then in circumstances where a prosecution 
is commenced but then ‘reversed’ and not proceeded with (as in the Osborne case) the bar to 
enable judicial review by a complainant or a victim’s family should be set lower.206   
 
A lower standard should exist because if the formal parties to a case, e.g. WorkSafe New 
Zealand and Mr Whittal, for improper or unlawful reasons do not want to proceed then the 
complainants and victims must be entitled to have standing to challenge as otherwise the parties 
have a hermetically sealed system that provides no scope for the other affected persons to 
challenge an unlawful outcome that the parties find comfortable, which fails in terms of basic 
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